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Abstract 
This examination of opposition tries to understand the political history of an 
Italian city -state in a new way. The aim of this study is to gain a better understanding 
of the nature of political conflict in Florence, and of the reasons for the instability of 
Florentine political life in the early sixteenth century. The concern is with plots, the 
violent overthrow of governments, and those condemned for speaking against the 
regime, rather than with simply critical opinion. These episodes of conflict between 
regimes and their opponents are the events from which the historian can learn most, 
both about the reasons for political conflict and its outcome, and about the strengths 
and weaknesses of both regimes and their opponents. 
Some of this opposition, such as the plot of February 1527, and those 
condemned for outspokenness against the regime throughout the period, is 
completely unknown to modern historians, and none has been examined in depth. 
This study examines opposition systematically for the first time, from a number of 
perspectives that have previously been neglected. It is based on extensive research in 
the Florentine archives, which permit us to give a full account, presented in the 
Appendices, of the political and social backgrounds of more than two hundred 
individuals involved in plots and other acts against the regime. 
There are two key aspects of opposition which concern Part One of this study: 
the role of foreign support in plots and the way in which conspiracy was affected by 
the advent of the Italian Wars in 1494; and how far conspiracy was characterized by 
the desire to introduce an aristocratic government to Florence or to re- establish the 
past regime. Part Two examines contemporary definitions and conceptions of 
political offences; the punishment of political crime; common attitudes towards plots 
and the way in which conspirators sought to explain and justify their deeds. 
The political and social backgrounds of opponents are examined in Part 
Three. The following questions are considered: how far was conspiracy the work of 
former supporters of the regime or long- standing opponents who had always sought 
its overthrow, of those from inside or outside the ruling circles of government, of 
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those in power or those they had thrown out of it; what was the relationship between 
plots and the way in which regimes treated their opponents and supporters; and what 
were the respective roles of wealth, youth and nobility in plots? By considering 
opposition from these perspectives, this study recovers a significant part of the 
political history of Florence, and forces a re- evaluation both of the nature of political 
conflict in the city after 1494, and of the reasons for the instability of Florentine 
political life in the early sixteenth century. 
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Introduction 
In the period from the overthrow of the Medici in 1494 until the capitulation 
of the Last Republic at the end of the siege in 1530 there were conspiracies to 
overthrow the regime in Florence uncovered in 1497, 1510, 1513, 1522 and February 
1527. Plots succeeded in forcing the overthrow of the Gonfalonier for life, Piero 
Soderini, in August 1512, and the overthrow of the popular government two weeks 
later in September. In April 1527 the revolt known as the Tumulto del Venerdì, whose 
leaders had been conspiring against the regime for some months, briefly forced the 
overthrow of the Medici. There were many less threatening attacks against 
governments throughout the period, and between 1502 and 1530 some fifty 
individuals were condemned for speaking disparagingly of the regime. 
These verbal offences, plots, and the violent overthrow of regimes form the 
opposition to government that concerns this study. Some of them, such as the 
conspiracy of February 1527, and those condemned for speaking out against the 
regime throughout the period, are completely unknown to modern historians. Others 
are more familiar, yet this opposition has never been studied systematically before. 
Direct concern with opposition or opponents to the regime in early sixteenth -century 
Florence has been very limited indeed. There was a brief study of the plot of 1522 
made over a century ago,' and there have been articles on Bernardo Rucellai and on 
Niccolò Valori.2 There are glimpses of opposition to the Medici to be found in a 
recent history of the followers of Savonarola,3 and in biographies of Francesco 
I A. Zandonati, La congiura contro il cardinale Giulio dei Medici (Rovereto, 1891). 
2 F. Gilbert, `Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: a Study on the origin of Modern Political 
Thought', Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, xii (1949), pp. 101 -32; C. Kovesi, 
`Niccolò Valori and the Medici Restoration of 1512: Politics, Eulogies and the Preservation of a 
Family Myth', Rinascimento, Ser. 2, xxvii (1987), pp. 301 -325; R. Pesman Cooper, `Political 
Survival in Early Sixteenth -Century Florence: the Case of Niccolò Valori', Florence and Italy. 
Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai Rubinstein, ed. P. Denly and C. Elam (London, 1988), pp. 
73 -90. 
3 L. Polizzotto, The Elect Nation: The Savonarolan movement in Florence 1494 -1545 (Oxford, 
1994). See also Idem, `The Medici and the Savoriarolans 1512 -1527: the Limitations of Personal 
Government and the Medicean Patronage System'. Patronage, Art and Society in Renaissance Italy, 
ed. F. Kent, P. Simons and J. Eade (Oxford, 1987), pp. 135 -153. 
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Vettori and Cardinal Francesco Soderini.4 The two most recent general studies of 
Florentine political history after 1494 both contain insights into opposition to popular 
governments and the Medici, but have not sought either to examine particular 
conspiracies in any depth, or to consider plots and the violent overthrow of regimes in 
general.5 
This study examines opposition systematically for the first time, from a 
number of perspectives that previously have been largely neglected. The key questions 
regarding opposition to government in Florence have thus far been ignored. Scholars 
have not asked what Florentines deemed to be a political offence, for example, and 
whether that changed from one regime to 'another; nor whether different regimes were 
equally able or willing to punish political crime. There has been little consideration of 
how far conspiracy was characterized by the desire to introduce an aristocratic 
government to Florence or to re- establish the past regime, nor of how much plots 
were the work of those from inside or outside the ruling circles of government, of 
former supporters of the regime or long- standing opponents, of those in power or 
those they had thrown out of power. It is usually assumed that plots were the work of 
the young rather than their elders, but it remains to be examined whether this was in 
fact the case. Questions have yet to be asked concerning how far conspiracy was 
affected by the advent of the Italian Wars in 1494; about the nature of the relationship 
between plots and the way in which regimes treated their supporters and opponents; 
or that between plots and common attitudes towards conspiracy. 
The rich archival sources of the period permit us to examine these questions 
about opposition systematically, and to provide some answers to them. The records of 
the decisions and deliberations of the magistracies and courts concerned with criminal 
justice, the Otto di Guardia, the Quarantia and the Signoria, survive almost 
completely intact and record those condemned for plots and verbal offences against 
the regime. From the archives of the Tratte it has been possible to give an account, 
presented in the Appendices, of the political and social backgrounds of more than two 
4 K. J. P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: the Life and Career of Cardinal 
Francesco Soderini (Cambridge, 1993); R. Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori: Florentine Citizen 
and Medici Servant (London, 1972). 
5 J. N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic 1512 -1530 (Oxford, 1983); H. C. Butters, 
Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth - Century Florence 1502 -1519 (Oxford, 1985). 
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hundred individuals involved in plots and other acts against the regime. This includes 
the offices held by both opponents and their fathers, their membership of the major or 
minor guilds, and the ages of those who conspired against the regime. Unpublished 
lists of supporters and opponents of the Medici regime are also of particular value 
with regards to the prosopography of opponents. Full use has been made of both 
official and private correspondence, laws and the deliberations of councils, 
magistracies, and advisory bodies, the reports of the Mantuan and Ferrarese 
ambassadors to Florence, the surviving examinations of conspirators, and of the 
published and unpublished diaries, chronicles, histories, political writings and tracts of 
both opponents and other contemporaries. 
There is an evident need to be judicious in dealing with sources regarding 
plots and other attacks against the regime, not least the examinations of those 
involved. Both regimes and conspirators sought to present their own interpretation of 
events, and all sources concerning opposition come in the end from either a hostile or 
supportive point of view. There is also a limit to the social and political realities that 
can be extracted from the records of the criminal justice system, and the conclusions 
that can be drawn from them. As Michelle Perrot best put it, there are no `criminal 
facts', only `criminal judgements' .6 
This is the first attempt to study conspiracies and other acts against the regime 
systematically in any period of Florence's medieval and Renaissance past. 
Conspiracies and the violent overthrow of regimes in Florence, as elsewhere in 
Renaissance Italy, have historically been treated in isolation, with little attempt to seek 
for patterns and comparisons amongst them.' There has been continuing interest in the 
Ciompi revolt of 1378,8 and there have been studies of popular protest and 
6 M. Perrot, `Delinquance et système pénitentiare en France au XIXe siècle', Annales. Economies, 
Societes, Civilisations, xxx (1975), p. 72. 
7 A point made in relation to plots in Italy in a recent study of trials for conspiracy against the Pope. 
See K. J. P. Lowe, `The Political Crime of Conspiracy in Fifteenth and Sixteenth -Century Rome', 
Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy, ed. T. Dean and K. J. P. Lowe (Cambridge, 1994), 
pp. 184 -203. 
8 A. Stella, La révolte des Ciompi: les hommes, les lieux, le travail (Paris, 1993); R. Trexler, Power 
and Dependence in Renaissance Florence, iii. The Workers of Renaissance Florence (New York, 
1993); Il Tumulto dei Ciompi: un momento di storia fiorentina ed europea (Convegno Internazionale 
di Studi, 1979) (Florence, 1981); N. Rodolico, I Ciompi: una pagina di storia del proletario operaio 
(Florence, 1945); G. Brucker, `The Ciompi Revolution', Florentine Studies. Politics and Society in 
Renaissance Florence, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 314 -56. 
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insurrection in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.9 There have been accounts of the 
aristocratic reaction against the Medici of 1465 -6,10 the Pazzi conspiracy of 1478," 
the overthrow of the Medici in 1494,12 and of the assassination of Alessandro de' 
Medici in 1537.13 A recent account of contemporary critical opinion of Lorenzo the 
Magnificent looks further than specific events or popular protest,14 but stops far short 
of any methodical examination of plots in.general and other attacks against the regime 
of the sort undertaken here. Opposition to government elsewhere in Renaissance Italy 
has been similarly neglected, with the notable exceptions of a study of rebellion in 
Siena,15 and a broad but brief sweep through political conflict in the city- states in 
general from the rise of the Commune until the fifteenth century.16 
9 N. Rodolico, Il popolo minuto: note di storia fiorentina 1343 -1378 (Florence, 1968); S. K. Cohn, 
Jr., The Labouring Classes in Renaissance Florence (New York, 1980); Idem, `Florentine 
Insurrection, 1342 -85, in Comparative Perspective', The English Rising of 1381, ed. T. Ashton and 
R. Hilton (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 143 -65. 
lo A. Municchi, La fazione antimedicea detta `del Poggio' (Florence, 1911); G. Pampaloni, 
`Fermenti di riforme democratiche nella Firenze medicea del Quattrocento', A.S.I., cxix (1961), pp. 
11 -62; Idem, Il giuramento pubblico in Palazzo Vecchio a Firenze e un patto giurato degli anti - 
medicei, maggio 1466', Bulletino Senese di storia patria, lxxi (1964), pp. 212 -38; N. Rubinstein, `La 
confessione di Francesco Neroni e la congiura antimedicea del 1466', A.S.I., cxxvi (1968), pp. 373- 
88; P. C. Clarke, `A Sienese Note on 1466', Florence and Italy: Renaissance Studies in Honour of 
Nicolai Rubinstein, ed. P. Denly and C. Elam (London, 1988), pp. 43 -52. See also N. Rubinstein, 
`Florentine Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendancy in the Fifteenth Century', Florentine Studies. 
Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 442 -463; M. 
Phillips, The Memoir of Marco Parenti. A Life in Medici Florence (Princeton, 1987); P. C. Clarke, 
The Soderini and the Medici: Power and Patronage in Renaissance Florence (Oxford, 1990). 
I H. Acton, The Pazzi Conspiracy (London, 1979). 
12 G. Guidi, Ciò che accadde al tempo della Signoria di Novembre -Dicembre in Firenze l' anno 
1494 (Florence, 1988). 
13 F. Martini, Lorenzino de' Medici e il tirannicidio nel rinascimento (Florence, 1882); P. 
Ghauthiez, Lorenzaccio (Lorenzin de Médicis), 1514 -1548 (Paris, 1904); M. Vannucci, Lorenzaccio. 
Lorenzo de' Medici: un ribelle in famiglia (Rome, 1984). 
14 A. Brown, `Lorenzo and Public Opinion in Florence: the Problem of Opposition', Lorenzo il 
Magnifico e il suo mondo, ed. G. Garfagnini (Florence, 1994), pp. 61 -85. Also of interest with 
regards to opposition to Lorenzo is P. C. Clarke, `Lorenzo de' Medici and Tommaso Soderini', 
Lorenzo de' Medici. Studi, ed. G. Garfagnini (Florence, 1992), pp. 67 -102. 
15 W. Bowsky, `The Anatomy of Rebellion in Fourteenth -Century Siena: From Commune to Signory 
?', Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200 -1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley and London, 
1972), pp. 229 -73. 
16 L. Martines, `Political Conflict in the Italian City States', Government and Opposition, iii (1968), 
pp. 69 -91. See also Idem, `Political Violence in the Thirteenth Century', Violence and Civil Disorder 
in Italian Cities, 1200 -1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley and London, 1972), pp. 331 -53. 
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Through a broad consideration of plots and other acts against the regime, 
from a number of viewpoints, the examination of opposition which follows tries to 
understand the political history of an Italian city -state in a new way. The aim is to gain 
a better understanding of the nature political conflict and the reasons for the political 
instability in Florence during the early Cinquecento. The concern is with plots, 
outspokenness against the regime, and the violent overthrow of governments, rather 
than with simply critical opinion, because these are episodes of conflict between 
regimes and their opponents. They are the events from which the historian can learn 
most, both about the reasons for political conflict and its outcome, about the strengths 
and weaknesses of both regimes and their opponents. 
Opposition is examined from three broad perspectives. In Part One, opposition 
is considered within the general political context, both foreign and domestic. The role 
of foreign support in plots is examined in Chapter One, which explores the way in 
which conspiracy was affected by the conflicts on the Italian peninsular brought about 
by the French invasion of Italy in 1494. In Chapter Two we compare the roles played 
in conspiracy by the desire to establish an aristocratic government on the one hand, 
and the desire to re- establish the past regime, whether that of the Medici or popular 
government, on the other. The concern of Part Two is with attitudes to opposition. 
Chapter Three examines contemporary definitions and conceptions of political crime, 
and Chapter Four considers the punishment of it. The commonly accepted notions in 
Florence regarding the utility and legitimacy of plots, and the way in which 
conspirators sought to explain and justify their deeds, are examined in Chapter Five. 
In Part Three the concern is with the political and social backgrounds of 
opponents. Chapter Six considers the political careers of conspirators, and seeks to 
determine how far plots were the work of former supporters of the regime or long- 
standing opponents who had always sought its overthrow, of those from inside or 
outside the ruling circles of government, of those in power or those thrown out of it. 
The relationship between plots and the way in which regimes treated their opponents 
and supporters is the concern of Chapter Seven. In Chapter Eight the social 
background of conspirators are examined, and we compare the roles of wealth, age 
and nobility in plots. It is hoped that through considering opposition in these ways, 
5 
this study will recover a significant part of the political history of Florence, and force 
a re- evaluation both of the nature of political conflict in the city after 1494, and of the 
reasons for the instability of Florentine political life in the early sixteenth century. 
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Part One 
The Political Context 
7 
1 
External Instability: The Role of Foreign Support 
Conspiracies against the regime in Florence were more frequent after 1494 
than they had been in the fifteenth century. In the thirty -six years from 1494 to 1530 
there were conspiracies to overthrow the regime uncovered in 1497, 1510, 1513, and 
1522. To these we can now add the Giachinotti -Pitti plot discovered in February 
1527, and unknown to modern historians. Conspiracies succeeded in toppling the 
Gonfalonier for life, Piero Soderini, in August 1512 and in overthrowing the popular 
regime two weeks later in September. The leaders of the Tumulto del Venerdì in April 
1527 had been conspiring against the regime for some months, and while the revolt 
that took place may have been sparked off accidentally, an uprising had been planned, 
perhaps even for the very next day. 
Plots had been far less frequent in the years before 1494. In the twenty -five 
years from when Lorenzo assumed leadership of the regime in 1469 until the 
expulsion of the Medici in 1494 only three plots had been uncovered against the 
regime, in 1478, 1481 and April 1494. Yet there had been earlier periods in Florentine 
history, the three decades following the Ciompi revolt in 1378 was only the most 
recent, when plots had occurred with far more frequency than they ever did in the 
early sixteenth century.' What most sets apart the period after 1494 is not the 
frequency of plots against the regime, but the frequency with which the regime was 
overthrown, whether by the direct use of violent force as in 1512, or by constitutional 
means, though with the threat of violence in the background, as in 1494, May 1527 
and 1530. Given that background of instability, what is arguably most remarkable 
' G. Brucker, The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1978), pp. 49, 56, 139 -41, 
171 -2, and passim. 
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about the pattern of conspiracy after 1494 is that plots were not more frequent, and 
only happened when they did. 
For throughout the period there were always discontented citizens who 
desired the overthrow of the regime, and who, as we shall see later, expressed their 
discontent in open and public verbal attacks against the regime throughout the period. 
There were intrigues, suspected plots and aborted plots. One example of an aborted 
plot is a little known episode of 1509 reported by both Galeotto Cei and Jacopo Pitti. 
One of the Priors for January and February of that year, Neri Capponi, is said to have 
suggested to one of his colleagues, Ugolino Mazzinghi, that they assassinate Soderini, 
but Mazzinghi refused and dissuaded Capponi from pursuing his plan further.2 Out of 
this continual discontent, real and identifiable attempts to overthrow the regime, our 
conspiracies, emerged in only six of the thirty -six years of the period. In the context of 
perennial discontent plots appear to have been rare indeed. 
Throughout the period the discontented discussed the possibilities and 
opportunities to overthrow the regime. Indeed some of those who did conspire 
against the regime, such as the plotters of 1497 and 1512, can be found to have been 
thinking about doing so for some years beforehand. Why then did plots occur only 
when they did? What occasion or opportunity had the conspirators been waiting for? 
The answer to that question, almost always, was outside help, the support of foreign 
arms. Almost all those who plotted to overthrow the regime were only prepared to 
proceed with foreign military backing, and almost all the conspiracies of the period 
were only undertaken with the intention of obtaining the support of foreign arms, and 
they advanced only once that support had been acquired. Foreign arms were not the 
only resource conspirators desired, as we shall see, but they were the most important 
and that in shortest supply. The possibility and opportunity of gaining the armed 
support of a foreign power was the one factor, which more than any other, dictated 
the timing of plots and the pattern of conspiracy through the period. 
The unwillingness of conspirators to proceed without outside help meant that 
foreign events dictated not only the timing but the progress of conspiracies. Plots 
2 G. Cei, `Storia di Fiorentia, 1494-1509', B.N.F., F.P., II-140, f. 114"; J. Pitti, `Istoria fiorentina', 
ed. F. Polidori, A.S.Í., Ser. 1, i (1842), p. 96. 
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floundered when, as in 1497 and 1522, the foreign support they were depending on 
failed to appear. And when the time came for the conspirators to strike, it was foreign 
support, or the lack of it, that dictated their success. It was the overwhelming 
presence of the Spanish army outside the city that enabled conspirators to eject 
Soderini from the Palace without resistance in August 1512, and to force the 
parlamento with equal facility in September, and it was the lack of the outside help its 
leaders were hoping for, that meant the Tumulto del Venerdì was crushed. 
The extent to which not only the sucess, but the very occurrence of conspiracy 
in early sixteenth -century Florence depended on foreign support has not been 
sufficiently recognized before. Indeed, with the exception of the overthrow of 
Soderini and the parlamento in 1512,3 and the Tumulto in 1527,4 the crucial role of 
foreign support even in particular conspiracies has been largely ignored, and the full 
story of the relationship between foreign events and the formation, success and failure 
of plots in 1512 and 1527 still remains to be told. Yet an understanding of how far 
plots depended on foreign support not only helps to explain the pattern of conspiracy 
throughout the period, but reveals the full extent to which the security of regimes in 
Florence ultimately rested on their ability to secure themselves from external military 
threat. For plots were testaments to the diplomatic errors of the regime, and their 
success the result of its military collapse. Plots thus provide dramatic evidence of how 
much the instability of Florentine politics after 1494 was the result of the instability of 
the Italian political scene after 1494, of the conflicts between the Pope, France and 
Spain, and the historical military weakness that made Florence so prey to them. 
Whilst the security of all regimes ultimately lay in their ability to defend 
themselves from external military threat, this proved to be doubly so for the Medici. 
Amongst those who conspired against the' Medici in 1527 were leading members of 
the regime for whom the diplomatic failures of the Medici provided not just the 
opportunity, but also the reason to conspire against them, that of saving Florence 
from the ruin to which Clement seemed willing to risk the city for the sake of the 
Papacy. The security of the Medici depended on their diplomatic success not only 
3 See the brief remarks in R. Pesman Cooper, `La caduta di Piero Soderini e il "governo popolare ". 
Pressione esterne e dissenso interno', A..S.L, cxliii (1985), pp. 226 -7, 256; Stephens, Fall, pp. 62 -3. 
4 C. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London, 1925), pp. 17, 20; Stephens, Fall, pp. 195 -6, 201. 
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because it enabled them to defend themselves from their opponents in the city, but 
also to maintain the support of leading members of the regime. 
However, plots that preyed on the external weaknesses of the regime were 
also evidence of its internal strength. They testified not only to the weakness of the 
regime abroad, but to the weakness of its opponents at home. Opponents could not 
threaten the security of the regime unless they had the support of foreign arms. The 
discontented, they admitted, were not powerful enough to overthrow the regime 
without outside help. Even when conspirators believed that discontent with the regime 
was widespread amongst the popolo, they believed the popolo to be a weak and 
unreliable foundation upon which to base an attempt to overthrow the regime. 
Guicciardini warned his sons in 1530 not to attempt to make `political change' 
(novità) in the hope of being followed by the 'popolo' since this was a `dangerous 
foundation'. The popolo lacked courage and often had a `different fantasy' from those 
who sought to rouse it, and could even turn against them, as it had against Brutus and 
Cassius.5 
This was sound advice, as Luigi Manelli's failed appeal to popular favour in 
1503 demonstrated.6 Piero Vaglienti recorded at the time how the `vile' and 
`worthless' Florentine popolo, good only for `jeering' and `chattering', had as usual 
abandoned someone who acted in its favour at the first sign of difficulty, and he 
concluded that it was `madness' to attempt to win the favour of a popolo that could 
be `pushed around' and `managed' as one wished. The 'grandi' had perceived this and 
accordingly did what was `necessary' to keep the popolo in check. Manelli should 
have remembered, Vaglienti wrote, the words of Giorgio Scali in the 1380s: `whoever 
bases themselves with reverence on the popolo, bases themselves on shit (merda)' .' 
The failure of the Tumulto del Venerdì was to provide the ultimate proof of the 
inability of the popolo, no matter how discontented, to overthrow the regime without 
outside help, and of the wisdom of conspirators in seeking to rely on foreign support. 
5 F. Guicciardini, Scritti politici e ricordi, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1933), pp. 310 -11: `Ricordi', C. 
121 
6 The case is discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 
7 P. Vaglienti, Storia dei suoi tempi, 1492 -1514, ed. G. Berti, M. Luzzati and E. Tongiorgi (Pisa, 
1982), p. 174. 
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Since the early years of the Commune there had always been conspirators in 
Florence, in the mid- thirteenth century,' or the 1350s and 60s for example,9 who had 
looked to foreigners for aid, and to their armies in particular. The Pazzi in 1478 had 
the support of the Pope and Girolamo Riario, as did perhaps the plot of 1481,1° and 
the plot of April 1494 involved the Duke of Milan.11 Yet until the early fifteenth 
century there had also always been conspiracies, such as that of 1457,12 which sought 
to overthrow the regime without foreign support of any kind, relying rather on the 
forces of exiles, mercenaries, supporters in the city and particularly the masses of the 
popolo minuto. Indeed such plots were common in the thirty years following the 
Ciompi revolt.13 What was new after 1494 was the much greater extent to which 
conspiracy depended on foreign support, and that it had to come from outside Italy, 
from France and Spain, as a result of which conspiracy was more difficult and more 
infrequent than it had been a hundred years previously. 
As the state became increasingly able through the fifteenth century to defend 
itself from internal revolt, so the ability to threaten the regime without outside help 
decreased. The popolo minuto, for example, fragmented into small and isolated 
communities in parishes on the city's periphery, and lost much of its former capacity 
for city -wide insurrection.14 At the same time, as foreign support was more essential 
to obtain, it was more difficult after 1494 to obtain it. For following the French 
invasion of Italy in 1494, the peninsula became the arena over the next thirty years 
and beyond for continual contest between France and Spain, and Italy was effectively 
divided between two great powers. As Giannotti lamented in the 1530s, this made 
conspiracy more difficult and thus less frequent than it had been in the past, when the 
greater number of independent states had made it easier for exiles and conspirators to 
acquire outside help. After 1494 allies and arms had to be sought from only two great 
8 N. Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine', II, vi, Opere, ed. M. Bonfantini (Milan, 1954), pp. 626 -7. 
G. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society 1343 -1378 (Princeton, 1962), pp. 111 -12, 185 -7. 
10 Brown, `Public Opinion', p. 64, n. 8. 
11 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1931), p. 90. 
12 Cohn, Labouring Classes, pp. 161 -2. 
13 Brucker, Civic World, pp. 56, 69, 71, 90, 100 -101, 326 -8, 337. 
14 Cohn, Labouring Classes, pp. 195 -6, 208 -9. 
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powers, and the discontented had to `wait for the occasion from the movements of 
those who, as of very great size, are restless and sluggish'.15 
Sluggish as the foreign powers were after 1494 however, the Italian Wars did 
at least ensure that there was always a foreign power potentially willing to ally with 
the discontented to overthrow the regime in Florence. That plots had been less 
frequent in the Laurentian period than after 1494 was due in large measure to the 
greater stability in the latter half of the fifteenth century outside the city, on the Italian 
peninsula. After 1494, as Florence and other Italian states were forced to ally with 
one of the two great foreign powers in order to preserve their independence, they 
were always the potential target of assault by the other. Florence was an attractive 
target too, as Cardinal Soderini urged the French in 1522,!6 and Filippo Valori urged 
Bourbon in 1527,17 able to provide valuable financial and military resources, as well as 
controlling territory of great strategic importance for the conquest or defence of the 
principle prizes in both Lombardy and the South.'8 More particularly, Florence, unlike 
Venice, was a traditionally weak military power,19 and no match for the armies of the 
Northern monarchies. While alliance with one might protect it from the other, the 
regime, as it was often warned, was utterly dependent on the fortunes of its ally for its 
security.20 
The greater instability in Italy after 1494 and the greater military weakness of 
Florence relative to the new foreign powers on the peninsula, meant that regimes in 
Florence were more vulnerable after 1494 than they had been in the past. The Medici 
were weaker than their ancestors in the fifteenth century had been, Machiavelli 
as D. Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, ed.. G_ Silvano (Geneva, 1990) p. 96_ 
'6 Baldovinetti, 'Memoriale', f. 177_ 
17 F. Valori, `Ricordi', B.N.F., Manoscritti Panciatichiani, 134, ins. 6, f. 47. 
's See the advantages outlined to the French and Spanish monarchs in G. Molini, Documenti di 
Storia Italia, i (Florence, 1836) pp. 144 -5: Renzo da Ceri to the King of France, 28 January 1522; 
Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and 
Spain, ed. P. de Gayangos, IV, i (London, 1877), p. 163: Louis de Paët and Miçer Mai to the 
Emperor, 11 August 1529. 
19 M. Mallet, `Preparations for War in Florence and Venice in the late Fifiteenth Century', Florence 
and Venice: Comparisons and Relations, i (Florence, 1979), pp. 149 -64. 
20 `Lodovicus Alamannus, Ill.mo. Domino Alberto Pio, Carpensi Principi et Caesareo Oratori, S.D.', 
ed. R. von Albertini, Das Florentinische Staatsbewusstsein im Übergang von der Republik zum 
Prinzipat (Berne, 1955), p. 376; N. Guicciardini, `Discorso di Niccolò Guicciardini del modo del 
procedere della famiglia de' Medici in Firenze et del fine che poteva havere lo stato di quella 
famiglia', ed. Albertini, Staatsbewusstsein, pp. 358 -60. 
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warned the Pope in 1519, since Florence was no longer powerful enough to defend 
herself.21 Alessandro de' Pazzi made the same warning to Cardinal Giulio in 1522, 
explaining that Italian affairs were now unstable where they had been `balanced' in 
Lorenzo's day, and that the Cardinal was not as able as Lorenzo had been to change 
alliances. Thus if the French ever defeated the Medici's Spanish allies, Pazzi warned, 
`the regime would be overthrown'.22 Whenever Florence was abandoned by her ally, 
the possibility of opponents gaining foreign support for an attempt to overthrow the 
regime was greatly increased, and without the protection of her ally, any foreign - 
backed plot could be a very grave threat indeed. 
It was in these conditions that the plot of 1497 arose. In February of that year 
a truce between Florence's ally, France, and the Italian League, removed the main 
source of Florence's protection against the Pope and his allies.23 At the end of 
February, a Gonfalonier was elected who was believed to be sympathetic to the cause 
of the exiled Piero de' Medici. Lorenzo Tornabuoni and Giannozzo Pucci wrote from 
Florence to Piero giving him news of the election and urging him to return to the city 
`with the favour of the League'.24 By 10 March, Tornabuoni later confessed, Piero 
had replied that he could have the League's `help' and `favour' to enter Florence, but 
preferred to do so `by means of the Signoria' with the League's consent, and to raise 
his own arms with the financial help, six thousand ducats, of his supporters in the 
city.25 
As Tornabuoni's examination testifies, the plotters considered it `very 
dangerous' to proceed if Piero did not have the `support' (le spalle) of Milan. Some 
days later they received assurances from Piero that he would come with `great favour 
of the League' and would have the `help' of Milan and the `support of all the League', 
which would be confirmed by a papal agent who would come to speak `in public, in 
21 N. Machiavelli, `Discursus florentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medices', Tutte le 
opere (Italy, 1813), iv, p. 109. 
22 A. Pazzi, `Discorso di Alessandro de' Pazzi al Cardinale Giulio de' Medici anno 1522', ed. G. 
Capponi, A.S.I., Ser. 1, i (1842), pp. 426 -7. 
23 P. Parenti, `Storia fiorentina', partly ed., J. Schnitzer, Quellen and Forshungen zur Geschichte 
Savonarolas, iv (Leipzig, 1910), p. 163. 
24 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 139. 
25 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, ff. 1 P, 12 ": Examination of Lorenzo Tornabuoni. This is part of a 
copy, first possessed by Francesco Guicciardini, of the original examinations of Giovanni Cambi, 
Niccolò Ridolfi, and Giannozzo Pucci, as well as Tornabuoni. 
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favour of Piero' and his readmission to the city. The agent did not come, which 
cooled their hopes, Tornabuoni confessed.26 He and Pucci sent word to Piero that 
`this was the time for him, having the favour of League and being both the 
Gonfalonier and the Signoria suitable to his purpose'. Messer Agnolo da Tiboli, an 
agent of the Orsini, came from Rome with assurances that `Piero would come with 
the favour of the League' .27 This was the assurance they needed, although Tiboli 
reported back that Bernardo del Nero, the Gonfalonier, professed that whilst he 
would always be a `good friend' of the Medici, he believed that more time was needed 
with regard to the situation within the city.28 Del Nero's reply to Piero's requests for 
support, Tornabuoni confessed, was that `Piero was reckoning without the host'.29 
Yet for Pucci, Tornabuoni, and the others involved, the League's support was 
clearly crucial to the conspiracy, a fact ignored in the only modem account of the 
plot,30 and it was the opportunity they had been waiting for since Piero had been 
expelled three years earlier. Tornabuoni confessed for example, that in the summer of 
1496 he and Pucci had discussed with another future conspirator, Jacopo 
Gianfigliazzi, the possibility that Piero might return with the help of the imperial 
attack on Tuscany. The Emperor, it turned out, favoured the overthrow of the regime 
but not the return of the Medici, and his expedition was a failure.3 In both the 
summer and winter of 1496 Piero had been in contact with Pucci, Niccolò Ridolfi and 
the other eventual leaders of the plot to request support for possible attempts to 
return to the city,32 and they resolutely insisted, as their examinations show, that he 
would have to gain the favour and support of the League, and especially of Milan, if 
he was to overthrow the regime.33 Del Nero, Piero was told, was ready to support his 
26 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, ff. 12`, 17 " -18 ": Examinations of Lorenzo Tornabuoni and 
Giannozzo Pucci. 
27 Ibid., f. 12 ". 
28 `Processo di Lamberto dell' Antella', ed. P. Villari, La storia di Girolamo Savonarola e de' suoi 
tempi (Florence, 1888), ii, p. xiii. 
29 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 13`: `Piero contava sanza l' hoste'; Parenti, `Storia', ed. 
Schnitzer, p. 212. 
30 Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. 7 -9, 12 -14. 
31 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 12`. 
32 Ibid., f. 13 ": Examination of Niccolò Ridolfi. Ridolfi confessed that he had discussed Piero's 
request in December with Bernardo del Nero, Andrea de' Medici (el Bucti), Giovanni Cambi, Gino 
Capponi, Pandolfo Corbinelli, Piero Pitti and Francesco Martelli. 
33 Ibid., ff. 13 ", 16", 17`- ": Examinations of Niccolò Ridolfi and Giannozzo Pucci. 
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return when the League `gave its consent'.34 Lorenzo Tornabuoni confessed that his 
`faith in the power of the League' had persuaded him that Piero could return `without 
scandal' .35 
Piero failed in the end to get as many forces as he wanted from the Venetians, 
and no help at all was forthcoming from Milan. This seems to have been one reason 
why during his approach to the city he sought to appeal to the discontent of the 
'popolo minuto' in a time of great dearth,36 encouraged that on account of their 
hunger the `starving populace (plebe)' and peasants desired the overthrow of the 
regime, and hoping that on his approach to the city gates the `multitude' would rise 
up and recall him.37 Piero's plan to exploit the hunger in the countryside and the city 
was `not a bad design', according to Parenti, and as he entered Florentine territory 
Piero successfully called on the contadini to join him, distributing bread and 
promising to put grain at a low price.38 The lower orders, when hungry, were 
evidently still perceived as a useful and malleable political force in the early sixteenth 
century, but it is quite clear that neither Piero nor the conspirators within the city 
would ever contemplated going ahead with the plot without the far more crucial 
foreign support. 
Although Piero succeeded in bringing troops to the walls of the city on 28 
April 1497, he had to withdraw the same day, as the conspirators inside failed to make 
the promised move to open the gates to his forces.39 As the accounts of Adriani, 
Parenti, Guicciardini and other contemporaries make clear, this was because Piero 
was late, delayed by bad weather, and the conspirators would make no move without 
him. By the time Piero did arrive, a new Signoria had been elected composed of his 
`enemies', the gates of the city were secured, and a number of citizens who were 
`suspect' (sospetto), on account of their support for the former Medici regime, were 
34 Ibid., f. 16 ". 
3' Ibid., f. 12`. 
36 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, 
1929), i, p. 283. 
37 Parenti, "Storia ", ed. Schnitzer, p 
38 Parenti, "Storia ", ed. Schnitzer, p 
39 Ibid. 
pp. 132, 138; Idem, Storia d' Italia, ed. C. Panigada (Bari, 
. 179; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 138. 
. 181; M. Sanudo, Diarii (Venice, 1879- 1902), i, col. 613. 
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detained in the Palace as a security measure.40 Amongst those fifty or so `supporters' 
of Piero detained, were at least three of the four main leaders of the plot, Pucci, 
Ridolfi, and Lorenzo Tornabuoni as well as their most prominent accomplices, Filippo 
dell' Antella, Piero Alamanni, Piero Tornabuoni and Francesco Martelli.41 If Piero had 
not been late, there would have been no `remedy' according to Cerretani, and there 
was no doubt in Parenti's mind that `the greatest disorder' would have resulted.42 
Piero himself blamed his failure on the meagre response of the League to his 
requests for `help and favour', which had deprived the expedition of the financial and 
military resources that the `opportune' quality of the `occasion' demanded.43 Milan 
had given no more than its consent to the expedition,44 and in its aftermath Piero 
sought to secure Milanese help for the future. If the next `occasion', Piero informed 
the Duke, was accompanied by his `auspices and authority', Piero had no doubt that 
his every `design and desire' would succeed.45 The conspirators in Florence agreed, 
and thus when news reached them in June 1497 that the Duke of Milan was wanting 
to send a force to help Piero return to the city, Antella, Martelli, Sforza Bettini and 
other plotters greeted it with confidence that Piero would therefore `undoubtedly' 
return.46 Piero Alamanni was reported to be `in firm hope of Piero's return, because 
one saw the wish of the League to be this' and because `much smaller forces than the 
League would make such effect'.47 Tornabuoni, according to Ridolfi's confession, 
declared himself ready `to give his life and property', if the Duke of Milan was willing 
to use his forces to overthrow the regime.48 
40 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 179 -81; B. Masi, Ricordanze di Bartolomeo Masi calderaio 
fiorentino dal 1478 al 1526, ed. G. Corazzini (Florence 1906), p. 34; F. Guicciardini, Storie 
fiorentine, pp. 132 -3; Idem, Storia d' Italia, i, p. 285; B. Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, ed. G. Berti 
(Florence, 1994), pp. 234 -5; J. Nardi, Istorie della città di Firenze, ed. L. Arbib (Florence, 1842), i, 
pp. 116 -18. For Adriani's account see `Frammenti istorici', in Opere minori di Niccolò Machiavelli, 
ed. F. Polidori (Florence, 1852), pp. 78 -9. These `fragments' are now commonly attributed to 
Marcello Virgilio Adriani. See G. Moccoli, `Marcello Adriani', D.B.I. (Rome, 1960 -), i, pp. 310 -1. 
41 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 181; Vaglienti, Storia, p. 42. 
42 Cerretani, Storia, p. 235; Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 181. 
43 G. Moncallero, Il Cardinale Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena: umanista e diplomatico 1470 -1520 
(Florence, 1953), p. 174. 
44 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 138; Idem, Storia d' Italia, i, p. 284. 
45 Moncallero, Bernardo Dovizi, p. 174. 
46 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, ff. 11`, 13 ": Examinations of Giovanni Cambi and Niccolò Ridolfi. 
47 Ibid., f. 11`. 
48 Cei, `Storia', f. 50'. 
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The dependence of conspiracy on foreign support was illustrated again in 
1510, when Florence found herself caught up in a war between her ally, France, and 
the Pope. Guicciardini later recounted how the Pope blamed Soderini for Florence's 
refusal to join the League against France, and was particularly angered when the 
Florentines cancelled a truce with the Sienese at the request of the French, and 
despatched two hundred men -at -arms to them towards the end of November.49 Thus 
the Pope had encouraged, by means of Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, a plot with 
Marcantonio Colonna, the condottiere, and some young Florentines to have Soderini 
killed.5° 
Prinzivalle della Stufa was the only Florentine, besides the Cardina1,51 found to 
have been involved in the plot, hatched in Bologna in November, according to the 
Otto.52 Della Stufa is reported to have told Filippo Strozzi, during an unsuccessful 
attempt to recruit him, how he had been moved by the Pope, through Colonna in one 
account,53 the Cardinal in another,54 to attempt to overthrow the regime and readmit 
the Medici to the city. To that end he had been assured of all papal support in terms of 
men and money and that, to have `comfort', soldiers would be amassed at the 
confines of Florentine territory from where they could be led to the city in a matter of 
hours.55 Colonna was to send eight or so `capable men' for the assassination of the 
Gonfalonier, whom della Stufa would shelter.56 It would be an `easy' enterprise, della 
Stufa reportedly told Strozzi, since the Gonfalonier was accustomed to go about the 
49 F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 63; B. Cerretani, Ricordi, ed. G. Berti (Florence, 1993), p. 
230. 
59 F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 63. See also Sanudo, Diarii, xi, col. 109. 
51 A formal protest was made to the Pope concerning the Cardinal's involvement. A.S.F., Dieci di 
Balìa, Missive, 36, f. 14r: Dieci to Perfrancesco Tosinghi, 24 December 1510; Ibid., Responsive, 102, 
f. 458r: Letter of Pierfrancesco Tosinghi, 25 December 1510; Sanudo, Diarii, xi, col. 713. 
52 A.S.F., O.G., 148, f. 266" (31 December 1510). 
53 L. Strozzi, `Vita di Filippo Strozzi' in G. -B. Niccolini, Filippo Strozzi, tragedia (Florence, 1847), 
p. xxvi. 
54 A.S.Mo., Canc. Duc., Firenze, 11 (unfoliated): Francesco dall' Oglio to Duke, 23 December 1510. 
55 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxvi. 
56 A.S.F., Dieci di Balla, Missive, 36, ff. 11r, 12 ", 16": Letters of 23 and 29 December 1510; A.S.Mo., 
Canc. Duc., Firenze, 11 (unfoliated): Francesco dall' Oglio to the Duke, 23 December 1510; 
Anonymous, `Diario istorico di quello che è seguito nella città di Firenze, cominciato l' anno 1435, 
finito nell' anno 1522', A.S.F., Manoscritti, 117, f. 88r; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 230; Idem, Storia, p. 
398; G. Cambi, Istorie fiorentine, ed. I. di San Luigi, Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xxi (Florence, 
1785), p. 244. 
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city on certain feast days without any guard, and one could equally safely occupy a 
gate of the city to admit troops despatched for the purpose by the Pope.57 
The extent of the Pope's involvement has not been emphasized in recent 
accounts.58 Rather, attention has been drawn to instructions from the Dieci to the 
Florentine ambassador in Rome after the plot's discovery,59 asking him to inform the 
Pope that although della Stufa claimed to have papal support, they did not believe he 
was involved.60 However, previous to this the Dieci had informed this same 
ambassador, as well as others in France and elsewhere, that the plot had been devised 
with the `consent and desire' of the Pope, as well as the Cardinal de' Medici and 
Colonna.61 Indeed the ambassador to France was informed that the Pope, angered by 
the despatch of Florentine troops to the French, had instigated the conspiracy and 
`summoned' and `encouraged' the others to take part.62 The Pope had vigorously 
objected to Florentine accusations of his involvement being made in the courts of 
France and elsewhere,63 and the Dieci noted that the disposition of the Pope towards 
Florence had `very much worsened than it was ... since he has understood himself to 
be blamed for the design made here'.64 
The Dieci had clearly affected to change its mind in order not to offend the 
Pope to the extent that a resolution of the conflict that had produced the plot would 
no longer be possible, and the Otto thought it better not to name those `most 
powerful foreigners' it condemned della Stufa for conspiring with.65 Meanwhile, to its 
ambassadors in France and elsewhere, the Dieci refuted the denials coming from 
Bologna,fi6 and Soderini alluded to the Pope's involvement in a speech to the Great 
57 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxvii. 
D8 S. Bertelli, `Pier Soderini "Vexillifer Perpetuus Reipublicae Florentinae ", 1502 -1512', 
Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. A. Molho and J. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971), pp. 
354 -5; M. Bullard, Filippo Strozzi and the Medici (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 61 -2. 
59 Butters, Governors, p. 143. 
60 A.S.F., Dieci di Balia, Missive, 36, ff. 14`- ", 23r ": Letters of 24, 28 December 1510, 1 January 
1511; Ibid., Responsive, 102, f. 459r: Pierfrancesco Tosinghi to the Dieci, 25 December 1510. 
61 A.S.F., Dieci di Balla, Missive, 36, ff. 9`, 11r ":'Letters of 23 December 1510. 
62 Ibid., 36, ff. 12`- ": Dieci to Roberto Acciaiuoli, 23 December 1510. 
G3 A.S.F., Dieci di Balla, Responsive., 102, f. 455`: Pierfrancesco Tosinghi to the Dieci, 24 December 
1510, P. Parenti, `Storia fiorentina', B.N.F., F.P., II, IV, 171, f. 46`. 
64 A.S.F., Dieci di Balla, Missive, 36, f. 261.: Dieci to Francesco Pandolfini, 3 January 1511. 
65 A.S.F., O.G., 148, f. 266 ". 
66 A.S.F., Dieci di Balla, Missive, 36, ff. 16 ", 17 ": Letters of 29 December 1510; Cerretani, Ricordi, 
p. 232. 
19 
Council.67 No contemporary doubted that the Pope was not only involved but had 
also instigated the plot. One account reports that della Stufa, knowing the Pope to be 
ill- disposed towards Soderini, offered his services, and accepted a request to take part 
in an attempt to overthrow the regime.68 The plot clearly depended completely on 
papal support, and would not have occurred without it. 
As in 1497, the conspiracy of 1510 had been able to take advantage of the 
opportunities presented by the popular regime's dogged adherence to the French 
alliance, and it was that same allegiance that provided the opportunity for the 
conspiracy against Soderini in 1512. One of its leaders, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 
later admitted that if an accord had been reached with the Viceroy, the regime would 
not have been overthrown.69 Recent accounts of Soderini's overthrow have focused 
mainly on the failure of the regime to accord with the Viceroy and the League, rather 
than the coup itself, and the relationship between the two remains to be examined.70 It 
becomes clear that without the supporting presence of the Spanish army, not only 
would the coup have failed, it would never have been attempted. As Giannotti later 
wrote, the `reason' for Soderini's overthrow was the discontent of some `wicked and 
ambitious' citizens, the `occasion' for it was the conflict between the Pope and 
France, and the eclipse of French power in Italy, and its `beginning' was the Spanish 
assault on Florence to readmit the Medici.71 That it succeeded where the two earlier 
attempts had failed was partly because it was not uncovered as was the plot of 1510, 
and that most of its leaders were not amongst those detained as a security measure as 
they were in 1497. Yet it was also because their foreign support, a Spanish army, was 
strong enough, whereas that in 1497 had not been, to paralyse the city in fear, and to 
deter potential resistance to the coup. 
After the defeat of the French in June 1512, Florence was isolated against the 
mainly Spanish forces of the Holy League. In mid -August the League adopted the 
decision to attack Florence, depose Soderini, and restore the Medici as private 
citizens. This was thanks to Giuliano de' Medici's promises of a huge sum to the 
67 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 247. 
68 Anon., `Diario istorico', f. 88`. 
69 A.S.F., C.P., 71, f. 50" (July 1529). 
70 Pesman Cooper, `Caduta', pp. 227 -255; Butters, Governors, pp. 157 -64. 
71 Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, p. 94. 
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Spanish Viceroy for their return to the city, with 10, 000 scudi to be paid immediately, 
which was only provided, according to Cerretani, with the financial help of Florentine 
citizens.72 By this time, according to Guicciardini, Paolo Vettori, Antonfrancesco 
degli Albizzi, Bartolomeo Valori and others had been conspiring with the Medici, for 
`some months'.73 Other accounts add Giovanni and Palla di Bernardo Rucellai,74 as 
well as Gino Capponi.75 Whether the funds for Giuliano came from them is not 
known, although accounts of the bankruptcy of Valori, Vettori and the other young 
men who led the overthrow of Soderini, which must be treated with some caution as 
we shall see, have been used as the basis for suggestions that others must have 
provided the funds.76 
Whatever the truth of the matter, what is clear is that the conspirators were 
depending on the support of the League, and had been waiting for some time for the 
opportunity to plot against the regime with outside help. Cerretani later argued that 
Giovanni Rucellai and the others had been part of a group of discontented which 
included Palleschi and opponents of Soderini who since at least the Strozzi- Medici 
marriage alliance of 1508 had been `waiting for the occasion' to overthrow Soderini, 
meeting and discussing how the Medici could be readmitted to the city, or Giuliano 
and a force conducted there, the Palace seized and Soderini killed.77 Certainly by 
1508, as we shall see, most if not all the conspiratorswere well -known opponents of 
the Gonfalonier, had openly consorted with the Medici in Rome, and were suspected 
of involvement in the Strozzi marriage and of wishing to overthrow the regime. The 
Rucellai were even suspected of having already attempted to do so. 
Guicciardini recorded that when Giovanni's father, Bernardo, left the city in 
1506, it was the opinion of some, perhaps. of the `most wise', that on account of his 
discontent with the Gonfalonier, Bernardo had discussed the overthrow of the regime 
with the Medici or Pandolfo Petrucci, for which Giovanni, of `similar mind and ways' 
72 B. Cerretani, Dialogo della mutatione di Firenze, ed. R. Mordenti (Florence, 1990), p. 44; Idem, 
Storia, pp. 435 -6. 
73 F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 231. 
74 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxix; Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 13. 
75 `Raccolto delle azioni di Francesco e Pagolo Vettori', ed. A von Reumont, A.S.I., Ser. 1, appendix 
vi (1848), p. 268. 
76 Butters, Governors, p. 167. 
77 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 42. 
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to his father, had secretly travelled on many occasions to Rome.78 These discussions 
were believed by the `wise' to have resulted in the expedition of Bartolomeo d' 
Alviano into Tuscany in August 1505.79 This had taken place with the express 
intention of restoring the Medici to the city, and the involvement of Florentines in the 
city seems to have been suspected at the time.80 Bernardo's departure, having already 
sent Giovanni to Venice some months before, was said to have been because he 
feared he might be tried by the Quarantia on that account.81 
The sum of all this suspicion is the possibility, as some historians have 
recognized, that those who overthrew Soderini in 1512 had been hoping and even 
working towards that end since 1505.82 If so, it serves to emphasize just how 
important foreign support was to the conspirators, in that they were prepared to wait 
so long for outside help, rather than proceed without it. To procure that help they 
were amongst those citizens who sought, according to Cerretani, to demonstrate to 
the envoy of the League, Lorenzo Pucci, on his visit to Florence in July, that the city 
desired the return of the Medici.83 The plan seems to have been, according to 
Machiavelli, that as soon as the Spanish army entered the Florentine dominion, the 
conspirators in the city would seize arms in their favour.84 The Viceroy reached Prato 
on 28 August expecting a move in Florence in favour of the Medici, as he had been 
promised, according to Nerli, by Valori, Vettori, Albizzi, the Rucellai, and `all that 
school of the garden of Bernardo Rucellai'.85 No move occurred, probably because, as 
Cerretani suggests, both Giovanni and Palla Rucellai, together with their father, 
Bernardo, and two of their closest associates from the gardens, Francesco da 
Diacceto and Giovanni Corsi, were amongst those detained in the Palace on 28 
August as `sospecti 86 
78 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 283. 
79 Ibid., p. 325. 
8° Parenti, `Storia', B.N.F., F.P., Il II 134, ff. 65 " -6`. 
81 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 283, 325. 
82 R. Pesman Cooper, `Pier Soderini: Aspiring Prince or Civic Leader ?', Studies in Medieval and 
Renaissance History, New Ser., i (1978), pp. 108 -9; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 59 -60. 
83 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 43; Idem, Storia, p. 434. 
84 Machiavelli, `Discorsi', II xxvii, Opere (1954), p. 294. 
85 F. Nerli, Commentari de' fatti civili occorsi dentro la città di Firenze dall' anno MCCXV al 
MDXXXVII (Augusta, 1728), p. 107. 
ß6 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 45; Idem, Ricordi, p. 277. 
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Vettori, Valori and Albizzi were not amongst those detained, and if they had 
temporarily lost their nerve, it was the sack of Prato on 29 August that restored it. On 
3 September Jacopo Guicciardini recalled the fear in Florence after the sack of the 
`manifest danger' the city was in, for which Soderini alone was blamed, and recorded 
how amongst the 'popolo' it was said that the Viceroy's demands should be met, 
rather than endanger the 'popolo' to save one man alone. As both the `fear' of the 
sack and `open' criticism of the Gonfalonier amongst the ` popolo' increased, 
Guicciardini recalled, the conspirators struck.87 
Soderini was being blamed throughout the city, yet on the day before the coup 
the Council of Eighty demonstrated its support by instructing orators to the Viceroy 
to reject demands for the Gonfalonier's deposition, and to agree only to the return of 
the Medici.88 The conspirators are recorded to have told Soderini that he should no 
longer `hold the city in danger of going to the sack, as Prato',89 but it was probably 
their fear that the Viceroy would not insist on the Gonfalonier' s removal in order to 
come to an accord which prompted them to act. Indeed, as Bernardo Dovizi recalled 
a few days later, the Viceroy was drawing up terms of an accord with the Florentine 
orators and arranging a marriage alliance between the Soderini and Medici families to 
cement it, when Giovanni Rucellai rushed to the Medici with news of the coup, to 
notify them to agree to nothing further.90 
As contemporaries recognized, it was the `terror' and `stunned dismay' that 
filled Florence following the sack,91 the `common fear of everyone' and `seeing that 
no one was about to stop them',92 that encouraged Albizzi, Valori and Vettori,93 with 
87 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 29`: Jacopo Guicciardini to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September, 
1512. 
88 A.S.Mo., Canc. Duc., Firenze, 11 (unfoliated): Pierantonio Torello to the Duke, 29 August 1512; 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 279. 
89 F. Vettori, `Sommario della storia d' Italia dal 1511 al 1527', ed. A von Reumont, A.S.I., Ser. 1, 
appendix vi (1848), p. 292; `Raccolto delle azioni', p. 269. 
90 B. Dovizi, Epistolario di Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena, ed., G. Moncallero (Florence, 1955) i, p. 
509; Pesman Cooper, `Pier Soderini', p. 123. 
91 F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 231; Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxx. 
92 N. Guicciardini, `Discorso', p. 354. 
93 Anonymous, `Ricordi di storia fiorentina, 1493 -1512', B.N.F., F.P., II, II, 339, f. 5 "; F. 
Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', B.N.F., Fondo Baldovinetti, Ms. 244, f. 156`; Anon. `Diario istorico', f. 
94 "; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 279; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 231. 
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Gino Capponi,94 to lead an armed group to the Palace on 31 August and force 
Soderini to leave it, threatening him with defenestration according to one account,95 
and giving him the `mad sack' .96 They were no more than thirty in number,97 and that 
the leaders and their `few companions' met with `no resistance', and were allowed 
`almost disarmed' to remove the Gonfalonier `without any defence' being made, 
according to Nerli and Francesco Guicciardini, was because the Gonfalonier, in the 
aftermath of the sack, had lost his nerve.98 
Soderini neither offered nor inspired any resistance to the conspirators, and 
indeed was more than willing to leave office, and this, as has recently been 
recognized, was a major reason for the ease with which the coup succeeded.99 But it 
was also, as Buonaccorsi knew, because the city was `stunned and terrified' 'loo and 
the fear of the Spanish army and the sack so effectively deterred resistance to the 
conspirators that as Francesco Vettori recalled, it was more responsible for the return 
of the Medici than any of the actions of their supporters.'0' 
It was fear of that same Spanish army which allowed the forcing of the 
parlamento on 16 September 1512 to be achieved with equal facility, without any 
`resistance', as contemporaries remarked.102 Just as significantly, like the 31 August it 
was only because of the supporting presence of the Spanish army that the parlamento 
was attempted at all, and it is this aspect in particular that has received little emphasis 
in modern accounts.103 Yet it is in connection with the parlamento that we find one of 
the clearest statements of the importance of foreign support to conspiracy. On 15 
94 `Raccolto delle azioni', p. 268; Vettori, `Sommario', p. 292; Nerli, Commentari, p. 109; B. Segni, 
`Vita di Niccolò Capponi', in Storie fiorentine, (Milan, 1805), iii, p. 285. Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 497 is 
the only account to give the full Gino di Neri Capponi. I have found no evidence to support the 
assertion of Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 62, that it was Gino di Piero Capponi who took 
part. R. Goldthwaite found no evidence that a Gino di Piero Capponi ever existed, Private Wealth in 
Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968), p. 213. 
95 Anon., `Ricordi', f. 5 ". 
96 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 178, f. 67r: Filippo Strozzi to Lorenzo Strozzi, 2 September 1512. 
97 Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 497. 
98 Nerli, Commentari, p. 109; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, pp. 231 -2. 
99 Pesman Cooper, `Pier Soderini', pp. 124 -5; Eadem, `Caduta', pp. 253, 257. 
100 B. Buonaccorsi, Diario di successi più importanti seguiti in Italia 1498 -1512 (Florence, 1568), p. 
183. 
101 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 291; `Raccolto delle azioni', p. 269. 
102 L. Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, ed. I del Badia (Florence, 1883), p. 329. 
103 The matter is referred to briefly in Stephens, Fall, p. 62; Butters, Governors, p. 182. 
24 
September Bernardo Dovizi wrote to Giulio de' Medici on behalf of his `true friends' 
in Florence urging the Medici to force a parlamento. `You have abroad as much 
favour as you wish', he wrote, `and affairs inside Florence are always made with the 
favour of abroad'.'°4 
As Cerretani makes clear, those pressing the Medici for a parlamento 
believed, as they informed Cardinal Giovanni on 9 September, that although they were 
few there would be no `difficulty' overthrowing the regime. The Signoria was 
`united' to their purpose, and more importantly, the `readiness' of the Marquis of 
Palude, Ramazotto, Rinieri della Sassetta, and `other friends' amongst the captains in 
the service of the League was such that `the matter is done, so much is the general 
fear'.105 The partisan supporters of the Medici had been busily cultivating that fear 
themselves. On their instructions the Marquis della Palude, one of the Viceroy's 
captains, and Ramazzotto, a captain in the service of the Medici, told supporters of 
the Grand Council visiting the Cardinal that the Medici would burn, sack and kill if 
they were not `secure and content', and that the Spanish army was wanting to commit 
`every evil' that the laws of war permitted.106 It was the partisans, according to 
Cerretani, who arranged for some Spanish soldiers to ride around the city walls as if 
surveying for a possible sack of the city.107 As such activities illustrate, the partisans 
wanted to use the protective presence of the Spanish army in any attempted coup. 
Thus the Viceroy's consent would be necessary.108 
The Viceroy, like the Medici, had given his support to the reforms of 7 
September whereby the Great Council was maintained, the Council of Eighty 
reformed, the term of the Gonfalonier reduced to one year and the position of the 
Medici established as that of private citizens. Both Giuliano and the Viceroy's 
representative had spoken on the reform's behalf before it was voted on by the Great 
Council.109 On 11 September the Viceroy sent word to the Signoria assuring them 
that he had no wish to overthrow the government, and urging them to attend to the 
1 °4 Dovizi, Epistolario, i, p. 505. 
105 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 53. 
1°6 Ibid., pp. 52 -3. 
1 °7 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 283; Idem, Dialogo, p. 54. 
108 F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 234. 
i09 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 281. 
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city's financial obligations to him so that he could depart as soon as possible.10 This 
display of reluctance by the Spanish to serve their cause made the partisans wanting a 
parlamento fearful, according to Cerretani.'" But over the next two or three days, 
Cerretani recalled, the partisans galvanized the Viceroy's support,12 persuading him, 
according to Guicciardini, that since the new regime could not be trusted as a loyal 
ally of the League, and that there was a danger that Soderini would be recalled once 
the army of the League had departed, the good of the League lay in a regime in which 
the security and benefit of the Medici were assured.' 13 On the night of 15 September 
the Viceroy signalled to Cardinal Giovanni his consent to a parlamento, informing 
him of his imminent departure for Lombardy so that if the Cardinal needed their 
presence `he should not delay'.114 
This was what the partisans had been waiting for, and moreover, as Cerretani 
makes clear, it was the Viceroy's message that was crucial in persuading the 
previously reluctant Cardinal to force the parlamento, which occurred the next day."5 
The Medici decided to force a parlamento, Baldovinetti recalled, `having the Spanish 
close to the city' to be conducted inside to aid the undertaking if need be, and they 
clearly would not have gone ahead without them."6 It was above all the fear of the 
Spanish that deterred resistance to the coup and ensured its success. Cerretani 
recorded how in order to discourage opponents during the forcing of the parlamento, 
partisans of the Medici had spread the rumour that six thousand Spanish soldiers were 
approaching the city in favour of the Medici, and while `no opposition' had been 
raised by that point, the rumour extinguished any `spark' or `doubt'.' 17 Baldovinetti 
recalled that the parlamento had been held `without any scandal' and with `few 
persons', because everyone shut themselves up in their houses and the Spanish `were 
110 Ibid., p. 284. 
111 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 55. 
112 Ibid., p. 56. 
" F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 234. 
114 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 286. 
115 Idem, Dialogo, pp. 56, 57; Idem, Storia, p. 447. 
116 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 156 ". 
117 Cerretani, Storia, p. 449; Idem, Dialogo, pp. 58 -9. 
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armed and organized to come to Florence in aid of the Medici if anyone had wanted 
to impede them' l 1 s 
The crucial role of foreign support in all the conspiracies against the popular 
regime of 1494 to 1512 reveals the extent to which the internal security of the regime 
depended above all on its ability to defend itself from external military threat. Its 
greatest failures were diplomatic ones, and its greatest weakness its military incapacity 
in the face of the armies of the new powers in Italy after 1494. Yet the dependence of 
all the conspiracies on foreign support also testify to the internal strength of the 
popular regime, and to the weakness of its opponents within the city. Their greatest 
strength, and the cause of their easy success in the overthrow of Soderini, and later 
the parlamento, was not popular discontent, but popular fear. 
Where the popular regime had been overthrown only by force of foreign arms, 
the first plot against the Medici, uncovered in 1513, had no plans to use foreign arms 
at all, relying rather on popular, discontent. This is a stark illustration of the 
unpopularity of the Medici regime, but that was not by itself enough to encourage the 
plot. For the conspirators seem to have been depending on events abroad, that 
threatened to remove the protection afforded to the regime by its foreign allies. This 
has been completely ignored in modern accounts of the plot.' 19 Yet the conspiracy 
provides the clearest evidence of the extent to which the Medicean regime, having 
come to power in 1512 in the face of popular hostility only by the force of foreign 
arms, was then depending upon the protection of foreign arms for its internal security. 
Throughout the winter of 1512/13 the Pope was hoping to undermine Spanish 
power in Italy, and the position of the Medici, their allies, in Florence. Thus to 
encourage the discontented in the city, according to Cerretani, the Pope requested 
Spain to lift its protection from Florence, and had Cosimo de' Pazzi, Archbishop of 
the city and a vocal opponent of the Medici, understand that he wanted to make him a 
Cardinal.120 The plot of Pietropaolo Boscoli and Agostino Capponi may well have 
been encouraged by these developments, as Pitti argued. 
121 For while uncovered in 
118 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 157 ". 
119 Butters, Governors, pp. 210 -11; R. Ridolfi, The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C. Grayson 
(London, 1963), p. 135; P. Villari, Niccolò Machiavelli e suoi tempi (Milan 1895), ii, pp. 198 -204. 
120 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 73; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 239. 
121 Pitti, `Istoria', pp. 108 -9. 
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February 1513, it was first hatched, as the condemnation by the Otto makes clear, in 
November of 1512.122 
Moreover, Pazzi and Boscoli were close friends,123 and Pazzi may even have 
been deeply involved in the plot. Niccolò Valori confessed that knowing that the 
Archbishop was a `very close friend' of Boscoli, he had asked Pazzi to dissuade 
Boscoli from his plans,124 and Pazzi was blamed for not having reported Boscoli to 
the authorities. 125 Pazzi's involvement however, may have been deeper than this. 
According to Cerretani, the Archbishop `knew of and consented to' the plot, and an 
examination of one of those condemned which revealed him to be `smeared' and 
`culpable', was torn up on his death in April 1513.126 
Whatever hopes had been pinned on the Pope however, his illness intervened. 
Yet thereafter the conspirators seem to have been encouraged by the belief, 
widespread in Florence, that the Pope's imminent death would be followed by a 
French threat to the city, and that the League which protected the regime would soon 
dissolve.127 The examinations of Pandolfo Biliotti and Giovanni Folchi reveal that 
those close to Boscoli and Capponi discussed the `progress of the illness of the Pope' 
and certainly believed that the French were `strong', that the League `could not 
continue as it was and that it would easily.dissolve one day', and would do so `if this 
Pope dies'.128 It was probably these same beliefs that informed Capponi's remark to 
Biliotti that `matters were going well both inside and out',129 and explain why Boscoli, 
as Valori recorded, certainly saw the plot as a response to the Pope's impending 
death.130 
122 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 36 ". 
123 G. Busini, Lettere di Giovambattista Busini a Benedetto Varchi sopra l' 
G. Milanesi (Florence, 1860), p. 95. 
124 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', B.N.F., Manoscritti Panciatichiani, 134, f. 18`. 
125 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 300; Idem, Dialogo, p. 76; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 
123. 
126 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 80; Idem, Ricordi, p. 303. 
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128 A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 269: Examination of Pandolfo Biliotti; Ibid., LXXXIX, n. 38: 
Examination of Giovanni Folchi. Folchi's examination has been published in J. N. Stephens and H. 
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assedio di Firenze, ed. 
5; Nerli, Commentari, p. 
28 
The conspirators planned to kill Giuliano, Lorenzo, and Giulio,131 and seize 
the Palace.132 The belief that it would be followed by a French threat to the city, and 
the dissolution of the League that protected the regime was one reason why the 
conspirators planned, as they did, to strike after the death of the Pope, but it was not 
the only one. According to both the Dieci and Giuliano,133 as well as some 
contemporary chroniclers,134 the conspirators planned to move not only after the 
Pope's death, but after the Cardinal, as was `necessary', had left the city to attend the 
consequent conclave. With the absence of the Cardinal from the city, the conspirators 
clearly believed, as the Dieci wrote, `to find affairs here weak, and suitable to their 
malicious plans' .135 
Thus according to the conspirators the two main pillars upon which the 
security of the Medici regime depended were the protection of the Spanish and the 
presence of the Cardinal, which once removed would allow the regime to be toppled, 
and they were not far wrong to, believe so. Giuliano may have sought to impress upon 
the Venetians that the plot was of no danger to the regime, even if the assassinations 
had succeeded,136 but members of the regime had certainly been fearful that if the 
Pope's death were followed by a long conclave and thus the prolonged absence of the 
Cardinal from Florence, the city would be in danger, perhaps even from the French.137 
There were other weaknesses that the plotters hoped to exploit. Valori 
recorded that Boscoli believed that Giuliano could be assassinated on one of the 
evenings he went about with `little company' ,138 and Folchi revealed that Boscoli 
believed that the `guard of the city' was not as strong as it might be, since the Medici 
had not ensured that the neighbouring palaces to theirs were occupied by `friends and 
13' Sanudo, Diarii, xv, col. 572: Letter of Ser Vittorio Lippomano, n.d. Feb./Mar. 1513; L. della 
Robbia, `Recitazione del caso di Pietro Paolo Boscoli e di Agostino Capponi, l' anno MDXIII', ed. F. 
Polidori, A.S.I., Ser. 1, i (1842), p. 283; A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 207 ": Giovanni Borromeo to 
the Marquis, 26 November 1523. 
132 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 75; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 5; L. Morelli, Cronaca, ed. I. di San Luigi, 
Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xix (Florence, 1785), p. 206. 
133 A.S.F., Dieci di Balla, Missive, 39, ff. 161 " -2 ": Letters of 19 and 22 February 1513; Sanudo, 
Diarii, xv, col. 573: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, 19 February 1513. 
134 Anon., `Diario istorico', ff. 96" -71.; Vaglienti, Storia, p. 237; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 5. 
135 A.S.F., Dieci di Balia, Missive, 39, ff. 161". 
136 Sanudo, Diarii, xv, col. 573: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, 19 February 1513. 
137 Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 77 -8. 
138 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18'. 
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relatives'.139 Yet both Folchi and Valori refused to join up: Valori partly perhaps 
because he believed that the plot would have no effect without the death of the 
Cardinal;140 Folchi probably because, as he confessed to have told Boscoli, he thought 
that the regime was `most secure', partly because in Florence there were no `citizen 
soldiers' as there were in Bologna or Perugia.141 Boscoli and Capponi were 
attempting to overthrow the regime without outside help and Folchi may have 
believed that they were wrong to do so, however weak the regime might be when the 
Pope died. Thus the plot, while being a clear illustration of the unpopularity of the 
Medici regime at its inception, is no sign that opposition to the Medici was thus any 
stronger or more capable of overthrowing the regime without foreign support than 
opposition to the popular government had been. 
The plot of 1522 hoped to appeal to popular discontent, but it also sought the 
aid of foreign arms, and was depending on outside help just as much as any plot 
against the popular government had done. There were two parts to the plot, and the 
dependence of either on outside help has been little emphasized in recent accounts.142 
The first part was instigated from Rome by Cardinal Francesco Soderini, who had 
been looking for an opportunity to raise a foreign expedition against the Medici in 
Florence since at least 1518, when Benedetto Buondelmonti feared that he was 
encouraging the Spanish to launch an attack. Since the Spanish had been persuaded 
that year to turn the government of Siena `upside down', Buondelmonti wrote, `how 
much more would they be persuaded to do so to the government of Florence, having 
the means and knowing that the Great Council and that past way of governing was 
more loved than this' .143 
Soderini found the opportunity he had been waiting for in the war begun in the 
Summer of 1521 between France and the Medici Pope, Leo X, his Spanish allies and 
139 A.S.F., M.A.P., LXXXIX, n. 38. 
140 N. Valori, Ricordanze', f. 18`. 
141 A.S.F., M.A.P., LXXXIX, n. 38. 
142 Stephens, Fall, pp. 118 -20; H. Hauvette, Un exilé florentin à la cour de France au XVIe siècle: 
Luigi Alamanni (1495- 1556). Sa vie et son oeuvre (Paris, 1903), pp. 32 -3; Lowe, Francesco 
Soderini, pp. 126 -7. 
143 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXLIII, n. 154: Benedetto Buondelmonti to Goro Gheri, 25 September 1518, `se 
lloro hanno pensato et prestato orechi ad volgare sotto sopra lo stato di Siena questo anno ... quanto 
più lo fariano dello stato di Fiorenza havendo il modo et sapendo che quello consiglio grande et 
modo di reggimento era più amato che questo'. 
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Florence. But it was the death of the Pope in December 1521 that swung him into 
action. Niccolò Martelli later confessed that `immediately' on hearing of the Pope's 
death, Soderini began to try every means possible to `destroy' Cardinal Giulio and the 
Medici and remove them from Florence.144 Soderini sent instructions to his nephew in 
France, Bishop Giuliano Soderini, to urge the King that `then was the time to think to 
the affairs of Florence', which other Florentines around the King were also doing.145 
At the end of February it was reported from Rome that Soderini was preparing an 
expedition with French backing to be led by the condottiere Renzo da Ceri to 
`overthrow the regime' first in Siena and then Florence.146 
The importance of Leo's death in precipitating the plot reveals the extent to 
which the security of the Medici regime had depended on the elevation of Cardinal 
Giovanni to the Papacy following the plot of 1513, and thus helps to explain why 
there had been no plots against the regime during his Pontificate.147 As had Lodovico 
Alamanni in 1516,148 so had Niccolò Guicciardini remarked three years later, that in 
the face of popular discontent the survival of Lorenzo de' Medici depended `solely' 
on the powerful support of the Medici Pope which secured the regime against popular 
uprisings, plots, and expeditions by any but `the most powerful' army. Once that 
`obstacle' was removed, Guicciardini had predicted, expeditions, plots and uprisings 
would follow.149 
Renzo's expedition left for Tuscany at the end of March.150 Although often 
assumed otherwise,151 the second part of the plot, a conspiracy in Florence to 
assassinate Cardinal Giulio led by Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi Alamanni, had by 
then already begun. For whilst uncovered in May, it was first hatched in February, as 
144 Processo di Niccolò Martelli', ed. C. Guasti, `Documenti della congiura fatto contro il cardinale 
Giulio de' Medici nel 1522', Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani, iii (1859), p. 239. The original 
manuscript used, but not cited, by Guasti is in A.S.F., Miscellanea Repubblicana, VIII, 238. 
145 'Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 257; Nerli, Commentari, p. 135. 
146 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Responsive, 22, ff. 46 ", 731. -77r: Letters from Galeotto de' Medici, Rome, 
23 February, 11 March 1522; A.S.F., Archivio Urbino, Class 1, Division G, 132, ff. 24' -30 ": Gabriel 
de Guidolotto to Duke of Urbino, Rome, 24 March to 11 April 1522. 
147 Stephens, Fall, p. 75. 
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the condemnations by the Otto make clear.152 The plot had clearly arisen in response 
to news of Renzo's planned expedition, which had reached them from Rome through 
Battista della Palla.153 He had been sent to Rome after Leo's death by Buondelmonti 
and Alamanni, according to Nerli, to discuss with Soderini the raising of just such an 
expedition to support a plot in the city.154 Certainly the plot would not have gone 
ahead without foreign support. Niccolò Martelli later confessed that when he 
informed Buondelmonti in March of his plan to poison the Cardinal, sponsored by the 
French, Buondelmonti had told him that it was not `suitable'.155 `To wish to 
overthrow the regime in Florence', Buondelmonti had told him, not only was 
`necessary' the death of the Cardinal, but was also `expedient', the `assistance of a 
little of the army and favour of the King' in order to `resist the forces of the Medici 
family' .156 
Buondelmonti's remark reveals the essential weakness of opponents to the 
regime, despite the popular discontent with the Medici, and their inability to 
overthrow the regime without outside help. It testifies not only to the strength of the 
regime but also to one of the reasons for it. There was more to the strength of the 
Medici regime than its leader, and while the Cardinal's assassination was essential, the 
collapse of the regime would neither simply nor necessarily follow. 
Buondelmonti told Martelli that to gain the essential support of the French for 
the plot, he had despatched della Palla to France to ask for the `favour' of the King 
and request him to commission Renzo to do what they and Soderini asked of him.157 
Soderini also instructed his nephew, Giuliano, to request the King's favour for the 
plot.i58 Della Palla was despatched by the beginning of March,159 and his and 
Giuliano's mission was to request that the French send the Genoese galleys and the 
152 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 30', 39`. 
153 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 80. 
154 processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 241; Nerli, Commentari, p. 138. 
155 'Processo di Niccolò Martelli', pp. 241 -2, 267. 
156 Ibid., p. 242. 
157 Ibid., pp. 242 -3. 
158 Ibid., p. 260. 
159 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 342. 
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Duke of Ferrara in support of an advance by Renzo towards Florence from Siena.16° 
Renzo was to advance through Florentine territory under the banner of ` Libertas', and 
to notify the city that he was coming `to free it from tyranny and restore it to the 
popolo', according to the wish of the French King. 161 Buondelmonti told Martelli that 
such an attack on Florentine territory with `so many movements from every side', and 
coinciding with the conspiracy inside the city to admit Renzo's forces, would `stun' 
the ` popolo', and allow the conspirators to win their support and overthrow the 
regime.162 Thus the conspirators hoped to appeal to popular discontent with the 
regime, but as Giuliano Soderini remarked to Martelli, `that sluggish popolo had not 
enough courage to lift itself from servitude', yet what they would not do `for love', 
the King would make them do `by force'.163 
The conspirators were evidently not alone in believing that the regime could 
not be toppled without outside help. Buondelmonti told Martelli that he was waiting 
for the reply from the French King before attempting to recruit more citizens to the 
plot, convinced that they would join him more willingly if he could show them that he 
had French support.i64 The King acceded to all the conspirators' requests for support 
from Genoa and Ferrara,165 but in the meantime Renzo had failed to overthrow the 
pro- Medici regime in Siena and finally capitulated towards the end of May. 166 Renzo's 
defeat, as Nerli says,167 had stopped the plot in its tracks regardless of its uncovery a 
day or two later on 24 May due to the arrest of a courier.168 The regime in Florence 
had sent troops to defend their allies in Siena, rightly convinced, as Francesco 
Guicciardini later argued, that if Renzo had succeeded in overthrowing the regime in 
Siena, he would have succeeded in doing so in Florence.169 In attempting to 
16° `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', pp. 244, 246. 
161 A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 32 '; `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 248. 
162 Ibid., p. 245. 
163 Ibid., p. 259. 
164 Ibid., p. 244. 
165 Ibid., pp. 246 -9. 
166 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Responsive, 25, f. 193r: Galeotto de' Medici, Rome, 23 May, 1522; 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 403. 
167 Nerli, Commentari, pp. 138 -9. 
168 A.S.F., O.G., 223 (Libro di Bandi), ff. 184r, 185r; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 177 "; Masi, 
Ricordanze, p. 257; Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 403, 405; Sanudo, Diarii, xxxiii, col. 297; Nardi, lstorie, 
ii, pp. 84 -5. 
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overthrow the regime with foreign support, the plot of 1522 had posed a serious 
threat to the regime, arguably much more serious than that posed by the plot of 1513. 
With the elevation of Cardinal Giulio to the Papacy as Clement VII in 1523 
opposition to the Medicean regime might have been expected to be as subdued as it 
had been during the pontificate of Leo. That it was not was because Clement failed to 
prevent an expedition against the city by the `most powerful army', the imperial forces 
of Charles V of Spain, which had threatened to attack since the winter of 1526, and 
did so in March 1527. War between the imperialists and the League of Cognac, 
comprising France, Venice, the Pope, and Florence, had broken out in the Summer of 
1526. Luigi Guicciardini recalled how the 'popolo' had welcomed the war, believing 
that it would provide an `occasion' to free itself from the `servitude' of the Medici.170 
So it turned out, as historians have recognized, but accounts have focused mainly on 
the diplomatic failures of the regime, rather than the actions of opponents, and the 
relationship between the two remains to be examined.17' 
Both Nerli and Varchi describe how on account of the defeat of papal forces 
and the death of Giovanni delle Bande Nere de' Medici at Borgoforte in November 
1526 opponents of the regime became increasingly bold and encouraged a group of 
`young nobles' (giovani nobili) who shared their aims to request the Signoria for the 
right to bear arms, ostensibly to defend the city from the Imperialist threat.12 As the 
imperialist threat grew stronger these young nobles, led by Piero and Giuliano 
Salviati, and who were to be at the forefront of Tumulto del Venerdì in April 1527, 
became more bold, organized and subversive, as we shall see, encouraged no doubt by 
the prospect of imperialist help for a possible revolt.13 In January Pieradovardo 
Giachinotti, Battista Pitti, and Bartolomeo Pescioni, who were not involved in the 
demands for arms,14 were discovered with exiles in Venice to be attempting to 
persuade the imperialist forces in Lombardy under Bourbon to advance on Florence 
and overthrow the regime. 
170 L. Guicciardini, `Sacco', quoted in Stephens, Fall, p. 195. 
171 The best account is in Roth, Last Republic, 17 -23. 
172 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 92; Nerli, Commentari, p. 145. 
173 The activities of the young nobles are discussed in detail in Chapter Four. 
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This conspiracy is usually thought to have been solely the work of Florentine 
exiles in Venice.175 Certainly as Varchi and Busini have it, at the behest of 
Giovanbattista Soderini, then in Vicenza, solicitations to Bourbon were made by 
Messer Baldassare Carducci and Lodovico de' Nobili, to whom Busini also adds 
Lorenzo Salviati.176 Thus at Clement's request the Venetians detained Carducci in 
mid -February, and the Pope sent agents to examine him, although Nobili managed to 
flee Venice before he could be arrested.177 Yet the Venetian ambassador in Florence 
understood that not only had Carducci been attempting to `overthrow the regime', but 
that he was involved in a `certain plot discovered in Florence'.178 Baldovinetti records 
Carducci' s arrest in Venice with that of the three citizens in Florence because they had 
all `acted against the regime' .179 
At Clement's request,180 Pescioni was arrested on 15 January, Pitti and 
Giachinotti some two weeks later,181 for `matters against the regime of the Medici', as 
one contemporary recorded.182 Some later accounts,183 followed by the most recent 
modern account of the period,184 described their arrests as made because they had 
spoken contemptuously of the Medici and the regime. Yet there can be no doubt that 
they were arrested and examined `for suspicion of conspiracy' as the Venetian 
ambassador reported,185 and that they were found, as one anonymous diarist recorded, 
to have been negotiating with the imperialists.186 Thus it was understood in Rome at 
the beginning of March that in Florence the `principal parties' of `a conspiracy against 
175 Roth, Last Republic, p. 21; J. Hook, The Sack of Rome, 1527 (London, 1972), p. 149. 
176 Busini, Lettere, p. 80; B. Varchi, Storia fiorentina, ed. G. Milanesi, (Florence, 1857 -8), i, p. 174. 
177 Sanudo, Diarii, xliv, coll. 118, 120, 168 -9, 200. 
178 Ibid., coll. 168 -9, 170. 
179 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 186 ": `avevano fátto contro allo stato'. 
180 L. Guicciardini, `Il sacco di Roma', in Il sacco di Roma del MDXXVII, ed. C. Milanesi (Florence, 
1867), pp. 118 -9. 
181 A.S.F., O.G., 197, ff. 4`, 11' (15 January and 6 February). The record states simply their names 
and 'capiatur'. 
182 Anonymous, `Cronica da anonimo di Firenze dal 1521 al 1536', B.N.F., Magl., XXV, 366, ff. 
153' records the arrests for `i chase contro allo stato de Medici' (Pescioni), and `per conto di stato' 
(Pitti and Giachinotti). 
183 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 133; Nerli, Commentari, p. 147; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 97. 
184 Stephens, Fall, p. 197. 
185 M. Foscari, `Relazione di Firenze', ed. E. Albèri, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, 
Ser. 2, i (Florence, 1839), pp. 51, 84. 
186 Anonymous, `Diario dall' anno 1521 al 1532', B.N.F., Magl., XXV, 555, f. 16`. Only Pitti and 
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the present government' had been arrested.187 Describing the Tumulto del Venerdì 
one Medici servant noted the release of prisoners from the Bargello, including Pitti, 
Giachinotti and `the others recently arrested for the plot (trattato) they were 
making'.188 
The conspirators do not seem to have succeeded in acquiring Bourbon's 
support, for the Duke appears to have been uncommitted to any advance on Florence 
until sometime after the plot's discovery, when as Filippo Valori recorded, he 
summoned Nobili from his refuge in Ferrara to give `true accounts of the affairs of 
Tuscany' .189 Valori had joined Bourbon's camp after fleeing Florence in the aftermath 
of the arrest of Pitti and Giachinotti, and records how he had sought to persuade the 
Duke of the discontent in the city, and of the `facility' with which he could `overthrow 
the regime of Florence'. Soon after Nobili's arrival, according to Valori, Bourbon 
promised the pair the `restitution of the liberty of our city'.190 Valori had for long been 
a well -known opponent of thesegime, and together with his father, Niccolò, who had 
been involved in the plot of 1513, was amongst those detained in 1521.191 Those 
involved in the Pitti- Giachinotti plot were equally long- standing opponents of the 
Medici,192 and the imperialist threat to the city in 1527 had evidently provided a long - 
awaited opportunity to overthrow the regime with outside help. 
Bourbon began his advance on Florence at the beginning of April,193 and in 
response the young nobles headed by Salviati renewed their activities and plans for 
revolt with imperialist support. By the time of the Tumulto del Venerdì of 26 April, 
Bourbon's forces were only twenty miles from the city.194 Alessandro de' Medici was 
informed the next day that the `heads' of the revolt had been Giuliano, Piero and 
Averardo Salviati, and Niccolò Capponi, that it had been a `conspiracy of more than a 
thousand youths' and the work of Lorenzo Salviati, believed to be in the imperialist 
187 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, III, ii, p. 88: Perez to Lope de Soria, 2 March 1527. 
188 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 80: Fabrizio Peregrino to Alessandro de' Medici, 27 April 1527. 
189 F. Valori, `Ricordi', f. 4'. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Appendix C. 
192 Appendix A, vii. 
193 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, III, ii, p. 136. 
194 Roth, Last Republic, p. 23. 
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camp, and by which `conspiracy' Bourbon had approached the city to aid a revolt.195 
The `conspiracy' had actually planned an uprising for 27 April, Alessandro was later 
informed, but the departure of Cortona and the two young Medici from the city the 
day before to meet the forces of the League had provided an earlier `occasion' .196 
There seems little doubt, as Ughi later recorded, and as was widely rumoured 
in Florence at the time, that there had been a conspiracy in the city prior to the 
Tumulto to overthrow the regime with Bourbon's help.197 The Emperor was informed 
after the failure of the revolt that Bourbon was withdrawing his forces to Siena 
because certain secret `plots' (tratos) he had had in the city had been discovered.198 
The Tumulto itself however, was the result of accident rather than design, although 
the young nobles led by Salviati who assaulted the Palace may well have been 
intending to use the opportunity presented by Cortona's temporary absence from the 
city.199 Yet Bourbon was too far from the city to help them,200 and without foreign 
support the revolt was crushed. Its failure is the best proof of the weakness of 
opponents to the Medici, and of the inability of even a popular revolt to overthrow 
the regime without outside help. Indeed, as Francesco Guicciardini complained a few 
days later, the revolt would have been `tiny' if Cortona's `ignorance' had not 
prevented it from being dealt with when it started, and his indiscreet departure not 
then encouraged the belief that the Medici had fled the city.201 
Some of those involved in Tumulto were aware of their weakness, and sought 
to appeal for aid to the French and Venetian forces of the League, under the Duke of 
Urbino and the Marquis of Saluzzo, that were defending the city from Bourbon's 
advance. Indeed Paolo Benivieni described a few days later how the `young nobles' 
had assaulted the Palace, `trusting on their opinion that the Duke would help the party 
of liberty because of his enmity with the Medici family', and wrote that Saluzzo was 
195 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 80: Fabrizio Peregrino to Alessandro de' Medici, 27 April 1527. 
196 Ibid., n. 89: Fabrizio Peregrino to Alessandro de' Medici, 28 April 1527. 
197 Sanudo, Diarii, xlv, col. 26; G. Ughi, `Cronica di Firenze', ed. F. Frediani, A.S.I., Ser. 1, 
appendix vii (1849), pp. 140 -1. 
198 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, III, ii, p. 171: Perez to the Emperor, 30 April 1527. 
t99 Sanudo, Diarii, xliv, coll. 581, 583. 
zoo A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1109, f. 313r: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 April 1527; Sanudo, 
Diarii, xliv, coll. 581, 585. 
201 F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, xiv, ed. P. Ricci (Rome, 1969), p. 11: Francesco Guiccardini to 
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thought in Florence to have been `aware' of plans for revolt.202 Francesco 
Guicciardini was later blamed for having persuaded Saluzzo and Urbino to repress the 
revolt against their inclinations to let it run on, or even, in Urbino's case, to give it 
active support.203 
Capponi was of the opinion that it was not the `opportune time' for a revolt.204 
Nerli describes how Capponi and other 'primi' in the Palace during the Tumulto 
`knew that regimes are overthrown on other foundations than on the hopes of popular 
tumults', and had advised taking measures to secure the city and prevent the Medici 
returning, particularly that a message be sent to the heads of the League to confirm 
the city's loyalty in a new treaty. The League would have agreed, according to Nerli, 
but the popular clamour favoured measures for the immediate dismantling of the 
Medici regime.205 Capponi, Matteo Strozzi and other `principal citizens' gathered in 
the room of the Gonfalonier, and did eventually succeed in despatching Bartolomeo 
Cavalcanti with a letter to Urbino and the other heads of the League's forces. Drafted 
by Francesco Vettori, the letter sought to assure them that though the city no longer 
wanted to be governed by the Medici, it would continue to be loyal to the League.206 
But by then it was too late. Cavalcanti had not yet left the city when Cortona returned 
with Urbino, Saluzzo, and the city's garrison to quash the revolt.207 
Several contemporaries emphasized at the time the importance of the role of 
Urbino and the captains of the League in quelling the revolt,208 and in doing so 
emphasize the importance of foreign support not only to opponents of the Medici, but 
the regime itself. Benivieni wrote a few days later that the `young men' were judged 
to have made two errors. The first was in not coming to an understanding with 
Urbino, since he had been instrumental in restoring the Medici's control, and the 
202 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 142: Paolo Benivieni to Bernardo Segni, 29 April 1527. 
203 F. Guicciardini, Scritti autobiografici e rari, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1933), p. 222. 
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205 Nerli, Commentari, p. 149. 
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fiorentina di erudizione e storia, i (Florence, 1902), pp. 137, 139; Idem, Istorie, ii, p. 136; Varchi, 
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208 Sanudo, Diarii, xliv, coll. 581, 583; Foscari, `Relazione', p. 52; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, 
v, p. 132. 
38 
second was to have agreed too soon to vacate the Palace in return for an amnesty.2 °9 
They had made other errors, such as not guarding the gates of the city against the 
Medici's return, and it is this that has been emphasized in modern accounts.210 Luigi 
Guicciardini also emphasized the failure to close the gates, recalling that Urbino 
afterwards always maintained that if he had found them shut, he would not have 
attempted to force them, so little love did he bear the Medici.21' That remark 
however, serves to emphasize that the main reason for the failure of the revolt was 
that it lacked outside help. 
The imperialist threat to the city had provided the opportunity for opponents 
to attempt to overthrow the regime with outside help, and neither the Giachinotti -Pitti 
plot, nor the conspiracy preceding the Tumulto del Venerdì would have occurred 
without it. Yet the war with the imperialists provided not just the opportunity but the 
reason for revolt. One anonymous account describes that the young men declared 
during the revolt that they wanted to be `under the King of the France and not under 
tyrants' .212 The Venetian and Mantuan ambassadors emphasized that the revolt had 
desired to ally the city with France and Venice, even recounting that the young men 
had stormed the Palace to the cries of `France' and `Marco'.213 
Yet the best illustration of how far the failures of papal foreign policy 
provided the reason for the revolt is the presence of Niccolò Capponi, Matteo Strozzi, 
and Francesco Vettori at the head of the Tumulto, with Mainardo Cavalcanti, 
Agostino Dini, Francesco Serristori, Jacopo Gianfigliazzi and other 'grandi', all 
former supporters of the Medici.214 These had all been amongst those leading citizens 
in the room of the Gonfalonier directing the revolt,215 and all had been amongst a 
small group of around twenty citizens who had accompanied Piero Salviati that 
morning to support his request for the distribution of arms.216 They had probably been 
209 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 142: Paolo Benivieni to Bernardo Segni, 29 April 1527. 
210 Roth, Last Republic, pp. 27, 31; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 191. 
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April 1527. See also Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, III, ii, p. 175. 
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conspiring with Bourbon before the revolt, and Vettori, Strozzi and Capponi had 
certainly been conspiring against the Medici with Filippo Strozzi in the winter of 
1526/7. With the exception of Cavalcanti these were all leading members of the 
Medicean regime, and had sat in the Otto di Pratica in recent years.217 The failures of 
papal diplomacy not only furnished them with the means to overthrow the Medici, but 
were also the principal reason for their desire to do so. 
Clement's failures in the autumn of 1526 to prevent the growing threat of an 
imperialist attack on Florence exposed it to the danger of the sack, and did so at the 
increasing expense of the citizens themselves. The regime itself began to fear that 
Clement would lead the city to `manifest ruin', and in October the Otto di Pratica 
sent Francesco Vettori to inform the Pope of their desire to be consulted before he 
took decisions on the city's behalf, and to bring to his attention the need not to burden 
the city with `too much expense', for his reputation amongst the citizens was 
beginning to fall, and they could not be `squeezed' as they had been in the past.218 
Francesco Vettori later recalled the financial burden imposed on Florence to finance 
Clement's foreign policies, and remarked that although the Pope `loved the city of 
Florence much, he loved himself more', and he was prepared to put the city `at 
danger' to save himself from tuin.219 While largely unexplored in the only two modern 
accounts of the plot,220 it was the need to secure the city from the imperialist threat 
and save it from financial exhaustion that turned the minds of Vettori and Capponi to 
removing the city from papal control. 
According to Segni, Capponi told á pratica in December that since the Pope 
desired to `persevere in the war and in the min of Italy', citizens should think of the 
`peace of their afflicted country'.221 In January Capponi wrote to the Pope criticizing 
his involvement of Florence in the League, his pursuit of the war with the imperialists, 
and the resultant threat to the `welfare of the country' from an army that had assumed 
217 See Appendix A, viii and x. 
218 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 370. 
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the custom of `swearing by the glorious sack of Florence'.222 Capponi accused the 
Pope of desiring the war on account of his own `ambition', or to `satisfy some 
personal hatred' and of being more concerned with `the greatness of his own affairs' 
than `the good of his country'.223 He requested Clement's permission for Florence to 
`govern itself separately', to be able to do whatever appeared to the city `most 
suitable for its own welfare' .224 
In February Capponi wrote again complaining that matters had not improved, 
and describing the fear in the city of an imperialist approach.225 He again expressed his 
desire that the Pope let go of the reins' in Florence if his own interests and those of 
the Church precluded an accord with the Emperor. Capponi wrote that he did not 
think that the Pope desired to protect Florence, and would give the city up to the 
imperialists in order to save the domains of the Church, and that when he did so 
Florence would be able to buy them off with nothing other than the blood of its 
citizens.226 By this time Capponi, Vettori and Strozzi were already engaged in 
attempts to wrest the city from Medici control. 
In early December the Emperor was informed by his ambassador in Rome that 
the Florentines were `discontented with the Pope owing to the large sums of money 
he has drawn from them' and desired to come to terms with the Emperor 
independently of the Pope.277 In mid -December Filippo Strozzi was in correspondence 
with the outlaws Zanobi Buondelmonti and Battista della Palla.228 According to 
Varchi, the two outlaws travelled from Siena to Naples to discuss with Filippo Strozzi 
what could be done to ensure that the city did not suffer the sack on account of 
Clement's `stubbornness and indifference'. They did so, Varchi continues, with the 
secret consent of Francesco Vettori and other Florentine citizens, of whom Niccolò 
Capponi was the head, and they sought to persuade the imperial Viceroy in Naples, 
222 G. Ruscelli, ed., Lettere di principi (Venice, 1570), ii, f. 206': Giovanbattista Sanga to Niccolò 
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Don Ugo da Moncada, that the best way to hurt the Pope would be to overthrow the 
Medici in Florence and ally with the city.229 Filippo Strozzi's correspondence testifies 
to the involvement of Vettori, Capponi, and both Lorenzo and Matteo Strozzi in the 
intrigues.230 Lorenzo Strozzi, Filippo's brother, later recalled that Vettori had written 
to Filippo with the consent of others in the city and requested him to undertake secret 
discussions on behalf of the city with imperial agents in Naples concerning an accord, 
since the `men of condition' did not want to go to the sack on account of Clement's 
`obstinacy' .231 
As a hostage of the imperialists to guarantee a truce established in September 
Filippo Strozzi had particular reason to be `desperate' on account of Clement's 
policy. For the Pope had violated the truce and Strozzi's freedom depended on a 
settlement. Lorenzo later recalled that it was for this reason, and resentful at the way 
in which he had been treated by the Pope, that Filippo discussed with the two outlaws 
the means of `overthrowing the government of the city' and restoring it to the 
devotion of the Emperor.232 At the end of December Filippo wrote to Vettori of his 
doubt that there would be an accord and his certainty that the Pope was heading for 
`ruin' because `thus demands his fate and my disgrace'.233 The ship of St. Peter was 
sinking, he told Vettori, it was time `to throw away some part to save the lives of the 
rest' .234 
Strozzi's designs were offset by a truce of 15 March between Clement and the 
imperial Viceroy in Italy, Lannoy, and by which he was released.235 Returning to 
Rome, he excused himself with the Pope for having conversed with the two ribelli.236 
Yet his plans are of significance because he believed it might be possible to overthrow 
the regime without foreign support. Lorenzo Strozzi recalled that Filippo believed 
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236 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xlii. 
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that the city was in such `great fear' of the advancing imperial army, that if he could 
simply approach the city unsuspected by the Pope, the regime would be overthrown. 
Thus he had offered the Viceroy fifty thousand scudi to release him for three months, 
at the end of which time he would return to captivity if no revolution had taken 
place.237 Filippo wrote to the two outlaws at the end of January that there would be 
`no difficulty' in approaching the city, and he conjectured that no forces would then 
be needed. While `fear' inclined him to secure the use of the forces of Siena if need 
be, he would still prefer to do it without them if possible. He believed, he wrote, that 
`the matter would fall into my hands', if he was in `complete faith' with `whoever 
rules'. If he saw that he was not, he would have recourse to `the friends outside', the 
imperial armies in Lombardy or Naples. `Nothing else is necessary', he wrote, but the 
`occasion' of some imperialist success, even `a false news well -coloured', and the 
`fear' and discontent in the city was such that it lacked only a leader',238 
If opposition had come to embrace the regime itself, Strozzi believed, it would 
be strong enough to overthrow the Medici without foreign support. In the light of the 
failure of the Tumulto, Strozzi's confidence that the Medici regime could be toppled 
without outside help might seem misplaced, but Strozzi was planning not a popular 
revolt but an internal coup. If the leaders of the regime were willing, no forceful push 
would be necessary. If they were not willing then an imperialist threat could scare 
them into giving way. Such a moment followed the sack of Rome on 6 May, and 
237 Ibid., p. xlii. 
238 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 99, f. 20 ": Filippo Strozzi to Battista della Palla and Zanobi 
Buondelmonti, 30 January 1527. 
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resulted ten days later in the peaceful overthrow of the regime, in which indeed the 
arrival of Strozzi in the city was instrumenta1.239 
As the threat of attack from Bourbon grew, Capponi, Vettori, Matteo Strozzi 
and the other leading members of the regime at the head of the Tumulto will have 
been amongst those Florentines reported in mid -March to be imploring Clement to 
make peace, and not to be the cause of their `utter destruction and ruin', and urging 
the Pope that the city had contributed such large sums towards the war that they 
could bear the burden no longer.240 Francesco Vettori later recalled how despite 
warnings not to do so, Cortona had continued to burden the city `without discretion', 
even imposing on the possessions of the guilds and the churches, so that the whole 
city was `discontent'. He noted that the `love that peoples have for those who govern 
them proceeds entirely from utility, and when that is lacking, the love converts to 
hatred' ,241 
Discontent with the Medici on account of the financial burdens and imperialist 
threat in 1527 was both widespread and extreme, as Guicciardini recorded two days 
before the Tumulto, and played a large part in fomenting the popular hatred that 
erupted in the revolt.242 There had been popular discontent with the Medici since 1512 
however, waiting for an opportunity for revolt. Events in 1527 had merely turned 
discontent into desperation. 
During the Medici regime, as under the popular government, it was the failure 
of the regime to prevent an external military threat that above all else provided the 
239 Roth, Last Republic, pp. 40 -5; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 194 -6. 
240 Calendar of State Papers, Spanish, III, ii, p. 120: Perez to the Emperor, 16 March 1527. 
241 Vettori, Scritti, p. 279. 
242 F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, xiv, pp. 3, 5 -6: Letters to Gianmatteo Ghiberti, 24 and 26 April 1527. 
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opportunity to attempt to overthrow the regime. If Florence had been as able to 
defend itself as Venice, its political life would have been more peaceful. The 
dependence of conspiracy on foreign support meant that it was foreign events above 
all others that dictated the timing of plots. Plots were less frequent after 1494 than 
they had been a hundred years previously because regimes were stronger and 
opponents weaker than they had been, and thus plots were more dependent on outside 
help. The domination of Italy after 1494 by only two great powers meant that there 
were also fewer opportunities to obtain essential foreign support than there had been 
in the late fourteenth century. Nevertheless the Italian Wars ensured that there were 
more opportunities to gain outside help than there had been in the Laurentian era, 
when the Italian political scene had been more stable, and plots were more frequent 
after 1494 as a result. 
That conspiracy depended on foreign support testifies to the weakness of the 
opponents of both the Medici and the popular government, and their inability to 
overthrow the regime without outside help. The security of both regimes, whatever 
their popularity, was to depend in the end on their ability to secure the city from 
external military threat. It was above all the overwhelming presence of the Spanish 
army that explains the equal facility with which both Soderini was overthrown and the 
parlamento forced in 1512, and it was the lack of outside help more than anything 
else that explains the failure of the Tumulto in 1527. 
Yet whilst the Italian Wars provided the occasion for attempts to overthrow 
the regime, they did not, except in 1527, provide the reason for which they were made 
at all. Even in 1527 the failure of the Medici to defend the city from external threat 
only mattered because of the deeper underlying discontent with Medici rule. Support 
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for Soderini and the popular government had remained strong despite the equally 
serious failure of the regime in 1512, and the coup that did take place was the work of 
long- standing opponents of Soderini for whom the Spanish threat provided not the 
reason but the opportunity to overthrow the regime. To explain why there were plots 




Domestic Instability: Aristocratic Republicanism and the 
Re- establishment of the Past Regime 
Those who desired to overthrow the regime in Florence can be said to have 
generally sought to do so on one of two accounts. They were discontented either 
because they had always desired the re- establishment of the past regime, or because 
they desired to establish a regime in which leading citizens and those from the city's 
leading families, the ottimati, were dominant. For example, amongst those 
condemned for speaking against the regime during the last republic were those such 
as Carlo Cocchi and Ficino Ficini who both believed that the city `belonged to the 
Medici and not to others', and desired that they be restored to power.' Girolamo degli 
Albizzi however, railed against the `rabble' in government, declaring that `we 
gentlemen and nobles expect the government to be in our hands and not those of 
these riff. -raff and threatening that `we will soon push you out and chase away you 
louts' .2 
Albizzi had held no office himself, and his father, described by the Medici as 
`of good quality and judgement',3 was a prominent but not a leading citizen, having 
held positions in the Signoria, the Twelve Good Men and the Otto di Guardia 
between 1500 and 1516, but not in the inner circles of the regime.4 Nevertheless, 
Albizzi's was an ancient noble family with both wealth and a long record of political 
prominence, and the desire of members of such families, the ottimati, to secure for 
Busini, Lettere, p. 36; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 138. 
2 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), f. 131. These cases are discussed in detail in Chapter 
Three below. 
3 B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. 66`-": `Nota di cittadini di buona qualità e iuditio'. This list includes Zanobi di 
Lucantonio degli Albizzi. 
a Appendix A, xiii. 
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themselves an ascendant place in government dominated by neither the Medici nor 
the popolo, has been one of the most important and abiding themes of the 
historiography of Florentine political life in the early sixteenth century. Anzilotti 
long ago sought to explain the overthrow of regimes in Florence and the political 
instability of the city after 1494 in terms of the desire of the ottimati for a dominant 
role in the regimes More recently Gilbert has shown the importance of Venice in 
providing an example for the ideal of an aristocratic government expressed in 
political thought and programmes for reform throughout the period, in the hostility of 
aristocrats to both popular and Medicean regimes, and in the attempts to establish a 
form of government in which the ottimati were dominant which followed the 
overthrow of the Medici regime in 1494, of Soderini in 1512, and of the Medici in 
May 1527.6 
The idea that the instability of Florentine politics in the early sixteenth 
century was primarily due to the desire of the ottimati for a dominant role in 
government can be traced back to Donato Giannotti, writing in the 1530s. He argued 
that those who had overthrown regimes in Florence, `converting republics into 
tyrannies and tyrannies into republics' were those who were `resplendent for their 
prudence, nobility and riches', and because they had not been `honoured'. In 1494, 
he declared, the Medici were chased out of the city by the `most important and most 
honoured citizens of Florence', in 1512 the republic was converted into `tyranny' by 
the `most wise and experienced citizens of repute', the same `in great part' recovered 
`liberty' in 1527 and it was `ruined' in 1530 by those same citizens `with infinite 
detriment to the city' .7 
Yet if the overthrow of regimes would tend to highlight the importance of the 
ottimati and their desire for a dominant role in government in accounting for the 
instability of Florentine political life, the study of plots emphasizes another side to 
the story. Most plots sought not the establishment of an aristocratic form of 
government but rather the re- establishment of the past regime, and were the work of 
5 A. Anzilotti, La crisi costituzionale della repubblica fiorentina (Florence, 1912), pp. 41 -81. 
6 
F. Gilbert, `The Venetian Constitution in Florentine Political Thought', Florentine Studies: Politics 
and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 477 -499. 
Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, p. 134. 
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those who had always desired its return. The plots of 1497 and 1510 and the 
parlamento of 1512 were the expression of the desire of the Medici's loyal 
supporters for the restoration of the Medici regime overthrown in 1494. The 
conspiracy of 1513 and the Giachinotti -Pitti plot of 1527 were the work of those who 
had always sought the re- establishment of the popular government overthrown in 
1512, as was the Tumulto del Venerdì. 
The exceptions are the plot of 1512 that overthrew Soderini, the conspiracy of 
1522 and the plot of Capponi, Vettori and Strozzi in 1526/7. Those involved in the 
plot of 1512 desired a government in which the ottimati were dominant. The plots of 
1522 and 1526/7 against the Medici both sought to establish an aristocratic regime in 
which the ottimati, rather than the Medici or the popolo, were dominant, and both 
were the work of former supporters of the Medici regime. 
To characterize plots in this way simplifies what was in truth a more 
complicated picture. Most plots involved both those who had always desired the 
restoration of the past regime, be it Medicean or popular, and those who desired a 
form of government in which the ottimati were dominant. Those involved in most 
plots did not share the same aims, or did not share them for the same reasons and 
what most bound them together was often no more than the desire to overthrow the 
regime. This has not been recognized before, and with the exception of the plot of 
1497, the extent to which those involved in even particular plots had different aims 
has been largely ignored by modern historians. A full account of the plot of 1497 still 
remains to be made.8 Despite these differences, it is clear that most plots sought the 
re- establishment of the old regime, and were the work of those who had always 
desired its restoration. This too has not been recognized before, for where historians 
have looked at the aims of particular conspiracies no attempt has been made to 
examine or compare the aims of plots in general, against either particular regimes, or 
through the period as a whole. 
Yet an understanding of the extent to which conspiracy was the work of those 
who had always desired to re- establish the past regime reveals the extent to which the 
8 Villan, Savonarola, ii, p. 13. 
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political conflict in Florence in the early sixteenth century, was the conflict between 
supporters of popular government or supporters of the Medici on the one hand and 
Medicean or popular governments on the other. Plots thus demonstrate the extent to 
which the instability of Florentine politics in the early- sixteenth century was less the 
result of the failure of regimes to satisfy the desires of ottimati for a dominant role in 
the regime, than of their failure to extinguish the desire for the restoration of the 
oldregime. 
An understanding of the aims of plots helps put into perspective another 
grand claim concerning political conflict in Florence, that of the prominence of 
piagnoni in opposing the Medici. The followers of Savonarola, it has recently been 
declared, were the `rallying point' for opponents of the Medici.9 The plots do not 
bear that out, and indeed very few of those involved in conspiracies against the 
Medici can be found to have had any piagnone sympathies at all. Every plot against 
the Medici expressed above all the desire for a popular or an aristocratic republic 
rather than a godly one, and it was that same desire that lay behind the young nobles 
and leading citizens at the forefront of the Tumulto. It was supporters of popular 
government or an aristocratic republic guided by the traditional values of Florentine 
republicanism, and not followers of Savonarola who were at the forefront of 
opposition to the Medici, and who provided both its focus and its leadership. As we 
shall see much later, those who conspired against the Medici sought their inspiration 
and justification not from Savonarola, but from classical sources and the ancient 
doctrine of tyrannicide. Supporters or former supporters of Savonarola can be found 
at the head of conspiracies, but conspiracies against the popular regime, , and aimed 
to restore the Medici to power. Indeed such individuals provide the best illustration 
that support for the Medici and hostility to the popular regime did not imply hostility 
to Savonarola or vice versa. 
As in 1522 and of 1526/7, so there had been plots against the Medici in the 
fifteenth century, such as that of 1460, which aimed to establish an aristocratic 
9 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, p. 9. 
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republic based on the Venetian mode1.10 And where after 1512 opponents of the 
Medici looked back to the popular regime, so in the fifteenth century, in 1466 and in 
1494, they had looked back to the regime of before 1434. What was different after 
1512 was that plots sought the re- establishment of a popular rather than an oligarchic 
regime, and were the work of those who had always desired the overthrow of the 
Medici. By contrast, those who in both 1466 and 1494 looked back to the regime of 
1433 had been leading supporters of the Medici regime and sought to re- establish an 
oligarchic government free of Medici control,'' and indeed it was to thwart the 
oligarchic ambitions of some leading citizens in 1494, that others, notably 
Paolantonio Soderini, had encouraged the creation of the Great Council, with 
Savonarola's support, to establish a broader -based government of the `popolo'.12 
Membership of the Council was essentially restricted to those who 
themselves or their forbears had previously been eligible to office, and it has now 
been shown that the establishment of popular government did not alter the social 
composition of the ruling group in Florence.13 The real significance of the creation of 
the Great Council lay in the way in which it changed the forms of political 
participation, to an extent that has been compared to that of the establishment of the 
Signoria in 1282.14 The Council was the largest in Florentine history and had powers 
over legislation and elections to office which gave it an unprecedented control over 
the executive. The Great Council not only had greater powers than the councils of the 
Hundred, Popolo and Commune that it replaced and which were restored in 1512, its 
members had such powers for life, where members of the Council of One Hundred 
10 N. Rubinstein, The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 -1494) (Oxford, 1966), pp. 
121 -2; Gilbert, `Venetian Constitution', p. 475. 
11 Butters, Governors, p. 21. 
12 
F. Guicciardini, Storie florentine, pp. 107, 109; N. Rubinstein, `Politics and Constitution in 
Florence at the End of the Fifteenth century', Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, 
1960), pp. 150 -9. 
13 R. Pesman Cooper, `The Florentine Ruling Group under the " governo popolare", 1494 -1512', 
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, New Ser., vii (1985), pp. 71 -181; N. Rubinstein, 
`Oligarchy and Democracy in Fifteenth -Century Florence', Florence and Venice: Comparisons and 
Relations, ed. S. Bertelli, N. Rubinstein, C. Smythe, i (Florence, 1979), pp. 99 -115. 
14 
N. Rubinstein, `Machiavelli and Florentine Republican Experience', Machiavelli and 
Republicanism, ed. G. Block, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), p. 15. 
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sat for terms of six months, and those of the Councils of the Popolo and the 
Commune for terms of four months only. 
Plots against the Medici after 1512 testified to the extent to which the 
creation of the Great Council in 1494 had made the Medici weaker on their return 
than they had been in the fifteenth century. The most important internal weakness of 
the Medici regime which encouraged plots against it was the discontent of the popolo 
on account of its desire for the restoration of the Great Council. All plots against the 
Medici sought to appeal to that discontent, and would not have occurred without it. 
Having abolished the Great Council, as Machiavelli warned the Pope in 1519, the 
Medici after 1512 had the mass of political society (universale) for its `enemy', 
where in the fifteenth century it had been their `friend', and they were weaker for A.15 
For those who sought to overthrow the Medici knew that by reopening the Council 
they would have the support of the popolo,16 and no one, as he wrote elsewhere, 
would ever dare to conspire against a prince if they believed that his death would 
displease the people.17 Thus of all the causes of conspiracy against a prince, the 
`most important' was the `universal hatred of the people'.18 
The very fact of popular government, as well as affection for it, meant that 
the Medici regime after 1512 was weaker, and the possibility of its overthrow easier, 
than it had been in the fifteenth century. Alessandro de' Pazzi warned Cardinal 
Giulio in 1522 that his position was more perilous than that of his ancestors had been 
because of the `universal ill -will' on account of the abolition of the Great Council, 
and because it was seen that `in any revolution the future government was prepared', 
that of the Great Council, which `universally pleases', whereas in Lorenzo's time it 
had been unclear what would happen should he be overthrown.19 Thus, as Lodovico 
Alamanni explained in 1516, where opponents of the Medici before 1494 had faced 
the difficulty both of overthrowing a regime which the Medici had led for sixty years, 
and of having to establish a regime that was `so stable' that the Medici could not 
15 Machiavelli, `Discursus', p. 109. 
16 Ibid., p. 117. 
17 Machiavelli, `II Principe', xix, Opere (1954), p. 60. 
18 Idem, `Discorsi', III, vi, Opere (1954), p. 321. 
19 
Pazzi, `Discorso', pp. 424, 426. 
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`return and avenge themselves',20 after 1512, the `major difficulty' was being able to 
overthrow the regime, since then was created a `stable and strong regime against this 
one' .21 
In contrast to the Medici regime, the most important weakness of the popular 
government that encouraged plots against it was the discontent of leading citizens. 
The plot that overthrew Soderini in 1512 was not only encouraged by the discontent 
of ottimati on account of their desire for an aristocratic form of government, that 
discontent contributed to its success. Despite their discontent with popular 
government most leading citizens did not desire the restoration of the Medici, as their 
lack of support for the parlamento in 1512 was to demonstrate, yet conspirators 
could mistakenly assume that they did so, and be encouraged to plot against the 
regime on that account. 
The plot of 1497 was encouraged by just such a mistaken assumption. The 
plot was believed at the time to be encouraged by the knowledge that there were 
many citizens, particularly many 'uomini da bene', discontented with the popular 
regime and whom Piero thought thus desired his return.22 Certainly Pucci confessed 
that Fra Mariano had told him when the friar visited Florence in the summer of 1496 
to find support for a possible attempt to restore Piero to the city, that he `understood 
universally from everyone he was speaking to that the city was in the worst 
condition', that `there was not anyone who was content with this way of governing', 
and that `he knew for certain that all these primi were discontented with it'.23 In fact 
however, Piero had `few supporters' in the city, Parenti recorded at the time, and the 
'primati', who had once been his `partisans', were divided and had no desire to 
experience again the `juvenile appetite' of a man who had lost `all reputation' .24 
In terms of domestic developments however, the plot drew its most vital 
encouragement from the growing strength of Piero's old supporters, rather than the 
discontent of leading citizens. The most important spur behind the plot was the 
20 L. Alamanni, `Discorso ... sopra il fermare lo stato di Firenze nella devozione de' Medici', ed. 
Albertini, Staatsbewusstsein, p. 365. 
21 Ibid., p. 366. 
22 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 179; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 132, 138. 
23 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 16`: Examination of Giannozzo Pucci. 
24 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 179. 
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election as Gonfalonier at the end of February 1497 of Bernardo del Nero, as well as 
others to the Signoria who had been `old supporters and partisans' of Piero, 
`benefited by his family', and for the `old dependencies' were believed, according to 
Guicciardini, to support his return to `greatness'.25 Tornabuoni confessed that del 
Nero's election, in his judgement, `gave courage to all those who desired Piero's 
return', and that very day Pucci and he had sent news of it to Nofri Tornabuoni and 
Lionardo Bartolini in Rome inciting Piero to `put himself in order', urging that `now 
was the time' to attend to the `affairs and favour of Piero de' Medici' and soliciting 
Piero to come to the city.26 News of del Nero's election was greeted with `great joy' 
in Rome by Piero and Bartolini, and Piero is reported to have declared that since the 
Gonfalonier and `so many of his companions' supported him, `they were enough, in 
this time'.27 
The plot was the work of Bigi, those who had unwaveringly supported Piero 
until 1494, and had ever since desired his return. They were discontented with the 
regime on other grounds, to which Piero appealed, for example, when he sought their 
support. Niccolò Ridolfi had agreed with Fra Mariano that the city was in `bad 
condition',28 and Mariano also lamented with Pucci, according to Pucci's confession, 
`of the bad state of the city, and that thus it was impossible, by human means, that the 
city could govern itself in this way'. `When Piero returned', Mariano told Pucci, `he 
would be able to benefit the city'.29 Nevertheless, it was Piero's exile that was the 
main cause of the conspirators' resentment with the regime, and his return that they 
sought above all. No other regime would satisfy them. Tornabuoni for example 
confessed to the `great displeasure' he had felt on hearing that the imperial 
expedition of 1496 intended not to return Piero to the city but to make `another 
regime of particular citizens'. For he believed, he confessed, that he was `done for, 
every time that one changed this regime without the return of the sons of Lorenzo de' 
25 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 132, 138; Idem, Storia d' Italia, i, p. 284; Parenti, `Storia', ed. 
Schnitzer, p. 179. 
26 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, ff. 12e, 12": Examination of Lorenzo Tornabuoni; Cei, `Storia', f. 51`; 
`Processo di Lamberto dell'Antella', pp. vi, x. 
27 Ibid., pp. x, xiv. 
28 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 16 ": Examination of Giannozzo Pucci. 
29 
Ibid., ff. 14 ", 16". 
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Medici'.30 According to Guicciardini it was said at the time that Lorenzo Tornabuoni 
had feared that the Great Council would be replaced by a regime headed by the sons 
of Pierfrancesco de' Medici, his feared and hated enemies, and thus he had conspired 
in order to forestall this.3 I 
There were both supporters and opponents of Savonarola amongst the 
conspirators, a fact ignored in the only modern account of the plot,32 and which 
serves to emphasize that it was the desire for the re- establishment of the Medici 
regime which was the main cause of their discontent. Niccolò Ridolfi, Giovanni 
Cambi, Piero Alamanni and Piero Pitti were all opponents of the friar,33 and indeed at 
the time of the plot Bernardo del Nero was the leader of Savonarola's opponents in 
the city.34 Giannozzo Pucci and Lorenzo Tornabuoni however, were both supporters 
and defenders of Savonarola, and amongst those who signed a petition in his favour 
in June 1497.35 Pucci frequented San Marco in the months before the conspiracy,36 
and had a will drawn up there as Piero prepared to approach the city in Apri1.37 
Parenti alleges that the leaders of the plot had divided themselves between the 
two factions in order to deceive,38 and Nardi was one piagnone who believed that 
Pucci and Tornabuoni could not have been devoted to Savonarola's prophesy or else 
they would not have attempted to overthrow the Great Counci1.39 Savonarola's 
occasional attacks on the `tyranny' of the Medici regime before 1494 were no doubt 
as distasteful to them as that of February 1496 was to Francesco Cegia, another of the 
conspirators.40 But there were other reasons why, as Parenti reported in April 1497, 
under the `shade' (ombra) of religion many 'bigi' and `partisans of Piero' united with 
30 Ibid., f. 12`: Examination of Lorenzo Tornabuoni. 
31F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143. 
32 Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. 7 -16. 
33 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 211 -12; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 443. 
34 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 131. 
35 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 211; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 441. 
36 'Processo di Fra Silvestro', ed. Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. ccxxiii. 
37 L. Polizzotto, "`Dell' Arte del Ben Morire ": the "Piagnone" Way of Death 1494-1545', I Tatti 
Studies, iii (1989), p. 34 n. 17. 
38 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 211. 
39 Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 130. 
40 F. Cegia, `I ricordi segreti del mediceo Francesco di Agostino Cegia (1495- 1497)', ed. G. 
Pampaloni, A.S.I., cxv (1957), p. 222. 
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Savonarola,41 not least because the piagnoni were less inclined than their arrabbiati 
opponents to persecute Piero's supporters.42 Pucci confessed to have told Mariano 
regarding the utility of the French alliance that if it had not been for Savonarola, he 
would have `lost all hope,» 
Whatever the divisions between them regarding Savonarola, the plotters were 
united in desiring, as they confessed, to overthrow the regime and readmit Piero to 
the city, re- establishing the Medici regime of before 1494.44 Lamberto dell' Antella, 
hoping for a pardon for having worked with Piero in exile, supplied the Otto with 
what was intended to be a damning picture of Piero's plans if he ever returned to the 
city, arguing that he would do `much worse' than the `bestial blunders, homicides, 
tyrannies and usurpations' that had originally brought about his downfa11.45 Piero, he 
said, preferred to return to Florence by means of the Italian powers in order not to 
have any `obligation' with citizens and thus to be able `to tyrannize and do as he 
wished'. His first act on returning to the city would be to restore secretaries of the 
Medici family, who had been the target of so much popular anger in 1494, to the 
most important secretarial positions in the government.46 Piero often declared, 
according to dell' Antella, that he would never want the `counsel of anyone' if he 
returned to Florence, and that he would sooner desire `to fail by his own hands and 
counsel than succeed by the counsel of others'. When it was once put to him that he 
would be able to make a `fine regime' in Florence on his return, governing with the 
`mature and good counsel of twenty -five or thirty citizens', he replied that he did not 
want `the counsel of anyone'.47 
If there is some truth in such a self -interested hostile account of Piero's 
ambitions, and one which has been used quite uncritically in the past,48 those 
ambitions would not appear to have been shared entirely by the conspirators in 
41 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 181. 
42 Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. xxx: Paolo Somenzi to the Duke of Milan, 29 June 1497. 
43 A.S.F., C.Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 16`: Examination of Giannozzo Pucci, `se non fussi le cose di Fra 
Hieronimo n' harei perduto ogni speranza'. 
as Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 206. 
as 
'Processo di Lamberto dell' Antella', pp. xii, xvii, xxii. 
46 Ibid., p. xxi. 
47 Ibid., p. xxii. 
48 Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. 12. 
56 
Florence. Whilst they sought the re- establishment of the Medicean regime of before 
1494, Piero seems to have thought it necessary to assure them that he had learnt from 
the past and would govern with their counsel. Pucci confessed that Fra Mariano had 
assured him in the summer of 1496 that Piero `recognized his errors before God and 
the world', that he knew he had made `infinite errors' and was now of `much better 
mind'. Mariano had spoken of Piero's `good disposition and mind towards the city 
and its citizens' of whom Piero spoke `lovingly', and that `he had pledged his faith 
that if it pleased God that he should ever return to this city he would not perturb any 
citizen' .49 
Piero's reply to the solicitations of Pucci and Tornabuoni in March 1497 
encouraged them to seek the support of Niccolò Ridolfi and Bernardo del Nero to 
whom he sent word that he wanted them to be `in place of fathers', and `counsellors 
in everything he governed'.50 Ridolfi himself recalled the message that `if Piero 
returned to Florence by the work of Niccolò and Bernardo the government of 
everything would remain with them, and he would trust the two of them with 
everything concerning the regime'.'' Piero had included with his reply a letter 
addressed to the Signoria requesting them to wish to readmit him `as their son'.52 
Almost all those involved in the plot had desired the restoration of the Medici 
regime since the expulsion of Piero in 1494, but there was one notable exception. 
Bernardo del Nero's discontent arose more from his distaste for popular government 
than from Piero's exile. Despite the considerable reputation he enjoyed within the 
popular regime, del Nero was opposed to the Great Council, according to 
Guicciardini, less for any love he bore for Piero than because he was accustomed to 
the old regime and did not know how to bring himself to that `condition of equality 
and popularity' that was necessary in a popular regime, or because he needed to 
satisfy the wishes of his clients.53 
49 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, ff. 14 ", 16`: Examination of Giannozzo Pucci. 
5° 
Ibid., f. I 3`: Examination of Lorenzo Tornabuoni. 
51 Ibid., f. 13 ": Examination of Niccolò Ridolfi. 
52 Ibid., f. 13`. 
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Del Nero would have preferred to establish a regime in which the ottimati 
were dominant rather than to restore Piero. Del Nero, Bernardo Rucellai, 
Guidantonio Vespucci and other opponents of the friar had been hoping, according to 
Guicciardini, to overthrow the regime and make a `narrow regime of gentlemen' 
( uomini da bene) with the sons of Pierfrancesco de' Medici at its head, and had even 
been intriguing with the Duke of Milan to that end.54 Certainly Ridolfi had informed 
Fra Mariano in the summer of 1496, according to Pucci's confession, that del Nero 
was `in support of Lorenzo and Giovanni de' Medici, together with a good number of 
citizens', and that he was `not about to trust Piero' .55 According to Parenti, del Nero 
was widely suspected in March 1497 with Vespucci and others of having had `secret 
discussions of a new regime' with the Duke of Milan.56 
Pucci seems to have been of the opinion that del Nero would support Piero's 
return if the League did, and Piero was to `behave prudently'.57 Guicciardini argued 
that although del Nero's intention was not to readmit Piero but to make the sons of 
Pierfrancesco de' Medici heads of the regime, he had thought that difficult to 
accomplish, and having been informed by Niccolò Ridolfi of the plot to readmit 
Piero, which seemed an easy matter, he had supported the return of Piero in 
preference to the continuation of the popular regime of the Great Council.58 Thus it 
was that del Nero declared, as he and others confessed, that he `would feel twenty 
years younger' if Piero returned to the city.59 Del Nero had desired the return of the 
Medici because he despaired of ever establishing a regime in which the ottimati, 
rather than the Medici or the popolo, were dominant, and believed that the re- 
establishment of the Medicean regime would at least be better than the continuation 
of popular government.60 Most of those involved in the plot however, had always 
desired the restoration of the Medici, and the conspiracy was above all the expression 
sa Ibid., p. 135. 
ss A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f 16 Examination of Giannozzo Pucci. 
56 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 171. 
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of the desire of Piero's loyal supporters for his return, not of leading citizens for a 
more aristocratic regime. 
It was that same desire that seems to have lain behind the plot of 1510. Little 
is known of the young protagonist, Prinzivalle della Stufa, prior to the plot, except 
that he had been head of a company of children inspired by Savonarola who had 
propagated the `honest life' in adults.61 His father, Luigi, had been a supporter of 
Savonarola,62 and an occasional visitor to San Marco,63 but as with Pucci and 
Tornabuoni, such support for Savonarola did not prevent him being a `partisan' 
(partigiano) of the Medici family, according to one contemporary, by the time of the 
plot.64 Indeed Luigi and his son may always have been supporters of the Medici, ever 
since Luigi had been one of four citizens chosen to guard Lorenzo after the Pazzi plot 
in 1478,65 and who, as his intimate companions, had accompanied him everywhere.66 
The plot was variously understood in Florence. Parenti for example wrote that 
the plot was the work of `several' of the 'primati' discontented with popular 
government who desired a regime in which they were dominant, and who judged that 
the government would not be changed while the Gonfalonier lived, but would 
`easily' be so without him, and thus `together with the Pope, they thought of 
removing him from power'.67 Cambi however, described how the plot aimed to 
overthrow the Great Council and the popular government and was the work of della 
Stufa and a `good number' of ̀ powerful citizens' who desired to return to the 
`tyranny' to which they had been accustomed before 1494.68 
These views seem to have stemmed from Soderini himself, suspicious that 
leading citizens were involved, and displeased that the Otto were inclined to free 
della Stufa's father, who was accused of involvement in the plot, or to punish him 
lightly without examining him further. Seeing that Luigi was being defended by 
many of the 'primati' who desired to `overthrow the regime and draw it into their 
61 
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own hands', according to Parenti, Soderini sought the support of the 'popolo' to put 
pressure on the Otto. Thus in a speech to the Great Council the Gonfalonier sought to 
arouse `envy' and `hatred' against Prinzivalle and his `adherents' and emphasized 
that the plot was aimed not just against himself but against the Great Council and the 
popular regime.69 The result according to Cerretani was that amongst the 'popolo' 
and the `plebe' it was said that many `noble citizens' and `leading citizens of the 
leading families' (primi cittadini delle prime chase) had known of the plot, and there 
was a desire to punish them.70 There was talk, Cerretani reports, of burning and 
sacking the houses of those who did not like the popular regime, and of killings and 
executions to save the city.71 
Only Prinzivalle della Stufa was found to have been involved, and many 
contemporaries, including Cerretani and Nardi, thought it extremely improbable that 
della Stufa had found any accomplices amongst any men of `great importance'.72 
Whatever the truth of the matter, it is clear that della Stufa desired to re- establish the 
Medici regime rather than to establish an aristocratic form of government, and that he 
did so because he was a loyal partisan of the Medici `faction' ( fazione pallesca), as 
Lorenzo Strozzi described him.73 For della Stufa was to be a fervent supporter of and 
indeed a participant in the forcing of the parlamento in 1512. 
While the plots of 1497 and 1510 were the expression of the desire of 
partisans of the Medici for the re- establishment of the Medici regime the plot that 
successfully overthrew Soderini in 1512 was more the expression of the desire of 
ottimati for a more dominant role in the regime. Modern historians have largely 
neglected the aims of the young men involved in Soderini's overthrow, and have 
assumed, as did Guicciardini,74 that they all desired the restoration of the Medici 
regime,75 and urged and supported the forcing of the parlamento.76 However, this 
69 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 45'. 
70 Cerretani, Storia, p. 404; Idem, Ricordi, p. 235. 
71 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 237; Idem, Storia, p. 402. 
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was not the case. Cerretani described how the 'leaders' of Soderini's overthrow 
divided almost as soon as the Gonfalonier had departed the city. One part wanted 
only to be rid of Soderini, the other, who included Giovanni Rucellai, wanted to 
make a new regime, headed by the Medici.77 Cerretani may have been referring to a 
split amongst all those in favour of Soderini's overthrow, rather than amongst those 
directly responsible for it, yet it is clear that the young men themselves were divided, 
not just those who supported them. In a letter of 1513 to Paolo Vettori, his brother, 
Francesco, recalled that where Paolo had supported it, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi 
and Bartolomeo Valori were `opposed' (alieni) to the parlamento.78 
These were the three men, as Francesco explained, who were most 
responsible for Soderini's overthrow.79 That two of them would seem to have 
supported the reform of 7 September is a testament to the extent to which the 
overthrow of Soderini, and the conspiracy that preceded it were the work of those 
who desired not to re- establish -the Medici regime, but to establish an aristocratic 
regime in which the ottimati rather than the Medici or the popolo were dominant. For 
that is what was established by the reform of 7 September. The Medici were 
readmitted to the city as private citizens, and while the Great Council was 
maintained, the creation of a new Senate of a hundred and fifty or so life members to 
control fiscal policy and elect the most important magistracies established a 'stato de' 
primati' as Niccolò Capponi described it at the time, whereby three quarters of the 
'popolo' were deprived of the control of the regime.80 
Nardi argued that Albizzi had become `affectionate' of the Medici on account 
of the favour the Cardinal had done him in Rome concerning a law suit,81 and a letter 
survives of November 1511 from Valori to the Cardinal requesting his help on behalf 
of one Ser Vettorio di Lorenzo Ceccherini in regard to certain benefices in Arezzo.82 
These two leaders of Soderini's overthrow had clearly emerged from that group of 
77 Cerretani, Dialogo, pp. 48 -9. 
78 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 136, f. 219 ": Francesco Vettori to Paolo Vettori, 5 August 1513; cf. 
`Raccolto delle azioni', p. 269. 
79 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 136, ff. 216 ", 219 ": Francesco Vettori to Paolo Vettori, 26 June, 5 August 
1513. 
80 Butters, Governors, p. 181 n. 65. 
"Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 15. 
82 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 6, n. 129: Letter of 15 November 1511. 
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discontented citizens later described by Cerretani. These were men from families that 
had always been powerful in the republic, who had been freshly benefited by the 
Medici, and who wanted to be rid of Soderini and the primacy of the Great Council 
by means of the return of the Medici, but who would have wanted the Medici to 
return to Florence only `as citizens'.83 
Following Soderini's departure from the Palace, Albizzi and the other leaders 
of the coup had joined with Palla and Giovanni Rucellai and other `young men' to 
seize control of the Palace and force the necessary magistrates to depose the 
Gonfalonier, and create new ambassadors to the Viceroy with full commission to 
readmit the Medici to the city.84 If Albizzi and Valori desired to establish an 
aristocratic regime with the Medici as private citizens, most of those who had taken 
up arms to guard the Palace, those `young princes of the revolt', as Cerretani 
described them, do seem to have desired the overthrow of the Great Council and the 
re- establishment of Medicean leadership of the regime, and to have been 
discontented with the reforms of 7 September as a result.85 According to Cerretani, 
almost all those young men who had seized arms after Soderini had left the Palace 
were involved in forcing the parlamento on 16 September.86 
Certainly many of those involved in the coup against Soderini can be found to 
have supported and been involved in the parlamento. One account describes how 
when they seized the Palace the leaders of the coup were accompanied by `young 
men' of the Rucellai, Tornabuoni, Pitti, Bartoli, Corbinelli, and Buondelmonti 
families with `other relatives and followers of the Medici'.ß7 According to Cerretani, 
the `leaders' of those `supporters' of the Medici who urged them to force a 
parlamento and make themselves `lords' (signori) of Florence, included the 
Tornabuoni, Giovanni and Palla Rucellai, and Filippo Buondelmonti,88 whose son, 
83 Cerretani, Storia, pp. 396 -7. 
84 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 29r: Jacopo Guicciardini to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September, 
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Benedetto, was involved in the coup,89 and supported the parlamento.9° The sons of 
Luca di Maso degli Albizzi, and both Matteo and Cosimo Bartoli were also involved 
in the coup,91 and supported the parlamento.92 Thus while not all the leaders of 
Soderini's overthrow desired with Vettori and the Rucellai to restore the Medici to 
power, most of their accomplices did. 
As were the conspirators of 1497, most of those who successfully pressed the 
Medici to force a parlamento were long -standing partisan supporters of the Medici, 
such as the Tornabuoni, who had always desired their return. As in 1497, they wanted 
the re- establishment of those constitutional structures and electoral controls of the 
Medici regime of before 1494 that would guarantee them the dominant place in the 
regime. Prinzivalle della Stufa, who was one of those 'amici' of the Medici who took 
over the Palace on 16 September described a week later how it had been decided to 
force a parlamento in order to `make a government of all our friends'.93 Paolo Vettori 
was to advise the Cardinal a few months later that the counsel of leading citizens of 
the former popular regime could not be relied upon, and Giuliano should be advised 
by twelve trusted but unambitious friends of the Medici who would remain loyal 
whatever `the fortunes of your house' .94 Francesco Vettori later described how the 
Medici were persuaded to make a parlamento by `those elder citizens' who 
remembered the time of Lorenzo and thought that the government was not `arranged 
to their purpose'.95 The Medici were urged, according to Baldovinetti, `to govern 
themselves properly and in the manner of Lorenzo their father',96 and not just for their 
own sake and that of their supporters, but for the sake of the city. Young partisans 
reminded the Cardinal, according to Cerretani, that they were the sons of those who 
89 A.S.F., C. Strozz. Ser. I, 360, f. 29g: Jacopo to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September 1512; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxi, p. 309. 
90 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 157r. 
91 A.S.F., C. Strozz. Ser. I, 360, f. 29r: Jacopo to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September 1512; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxi, p. 309. 
92 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 287. On the Bartoli see Appendix A, iv. 
93 Sanudo, Diarii, xv, col. 141: Prinzivalle della Stufa to Piero da Bibbiena, 23 September 1512. 
94 P. Vettori, `Ricordi', ed. Albertini, Staatsbewusstsein, p. 346. 
95 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 293; `Raccolto delle azioni', p. 269. 
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with Lorenzo had made the city `great and regarded', but who had since `badly 
maintained it' .97 
Those pressing the Medici for a parlamento were under no illusion that the 
majority of citizens, including the primi, had no wish for it, and it was the fear that 
citizens had of the Spanish army, rather than any discontent with the new regime, that 
encouraged them. Nevertheless, they sought to persuade the Cardinal, according to 
Cerretani, that although they were few that would be no impediment to establishing a 
new regime, for it was `always' the case that the overthrow of regimes was the work 
of a few, after which the rest were always pushed by `ambition' and `avarice' to desire 
to be friends with the regime that was governing the city. They would do so even 
more readily in the case of a regime that could `help its citizens extraordinarily', which 
help the Florentines needed and desired on account of the large number of citizens 
who were `poor'.98 The partisans further argued, according to Cerretani, that the re- 
establishment of the Medicean regime as before 1494 could satisfy both the desire of 
ordinary citizens for office and that of the primi for `dignity', positions in the Seventy 
and the most important magistracies. After all, it had done so for sixty years, and 
Florentines were accustomed to such a regime.99 
If this was a fair reflection of the thoughts of most of those who urged the 
Medici to force a parlamento, there were those who seem to have judged that the 
Medici would need to be more forceful and more powerful than their fifteenth -century 
predecessors. Certainly Paolo Vettori for example, was to seek to impress upon the 
Cardinal within a few months of the parlamento that the memory of the last ten years, 
in which the city had been `most content', would `always make war' on him. Thus 
while his ancestors had held the regime with `more industry than force', he needed to 
use `more force than industry' because he had `more enemies' and `less means to 
satisfy them'. Unable to regain their support, the Medici needed to ensure that their 
enemies were `afraid' to harm them. Such `terror' was to be maintained by a military 
force guarding the city!°° 
97 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 54. 
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Clearly the overthrow of Soderini was in part, and the parlamento mainly so, 
the result of the desire of long- standing partisans of the Medici for a more partisan 
regime, rather than of the desire of leading citizens for an aristocratic regime in 
which they were dominant. However, there were those involved in the overthrow of 
Soderini and the parlamento who had not always desired the restoration of the 
Medici regime, but who did so in 1512 on account of their discontent with Soderini 
and the popular government. Filippo Buondelmonti for example, is recorded by both 
Baldovinetti and Guicciardini to have been a `capital enemy' of the Medici since 
before 1494, but to have been reconciled with them in 1506 on account of his enmity 
with Soderini.101 That was also the case with the Rucellai and their closest associates 
from the Rucellai gardens, and it is clear that their desire to restore the Medici 
stemmed from a desire for a regime in which the ottimati were dominant. Aspects of 
the political thought of the Rucellai circle are now well- known,102 but the reasons for 
their involvement in both the overthrow of Soderini and the parlamento, and how 
their aims differed from those of others involved in the events of 1512, has been 
wholly ignored in modern accounts, and is worth examining in some detail.103 
Amongst those Cerretani named with Palla and Giovanni Rucellai as the 
leaders of those urging the Medici to force a parlamento were Piero Martelli, 
Giovanni Corsi and Francesco da Diacceto,104 all of whom had attended the famous 
meetings from 1503 to 1506 in the Rucellai gardens, where Soderini, as we shall see, 
was routinely criticized.105 In December 1500 both the Rucellai and Martelli, with 
Bartolomeo Valori, were amongst those `principal enemies' of the Medici whose 
concern that Piero was about to attempt an advance on the city led to their choosing 
four of their number to `watch the affairs and the supporters of Piero'.106 However, in 
1509 Guicciardini reported that both Martelli and Corsi were amongst those `young 
gentlemen' whose fathers and families had been enemies of the Medici in 1494 but 
101 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 156`; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 325. 
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who at some time between the death of Piero de' Medici in 1503 and the trial of 
Piero Pitti in March 1506 had `publicly' visited the Medici in Rome, and seemed to 
become their `friends'. Valori, Gino Capponi, and Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 
three of the leaders of the plot against Soderini, were also amongst their number, 
according to Guicciardini, encouraged by the lack of action taken by Soderini against 
those consorting with the Medici in Rome.107 Guicciardini was unsure whether the 
purpose of these visits was to `spite' the Gonfalonier, or because they desired to 
readmit the Medici to the city, but he was clear that it was either discontent with the 
Great Council, or with Soderini's behaviour that drove them.'°8 
It was at this time too, that the Rucellai, together with their father, Bernardo, 
were reconciled with the Medici, and may even have conspired with them, on 
account of their greater hatred of the Gonfalonier.109 The Rucellai, according to 
Guicciardini, desired to restore the Medici because of a private enmity their family 
had held with Soderini since before he was Gonfalonier due to certain `slights' 
(sdegni) to Bernardo, and more particularly because of their `impatience' with the 
`equality' of popular government.110 When Bernardo left for Venice in 1506, both 
Corsi and da Diacceto gave sympathetic accounts of his departure from the city 
which he detested, they wrote, as if it were a `wicked' and `savage' stepmother, both 
bemoaning the `calamitous condition' of the city and lambasting the popular regime 
for its oppression of leading citizens.111 `The optimates are attacked and derided by 
the populace', wrote Corsi;112 the `nobility', wrote da Diacceto, especially those 
educated in the `good arts', were continually subjected to `envy', and `insults and 
injury' .113 
Clearly both for the Rucellai and the other leaders of the overthrow of 
Soderini it was above all their discontent with popular government and desire to 
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secure a dominant position for the ottimati, rather than simply with the Gonfalonier, 
which led them to conspire with the Medici against the regime. Soderini's overthrow 
was thus above all the expression of discontent with the settlement of 1494 rather 
than with events since 1502. However, that discontent had led Albizzi and Valori to 
desire to establish an aristocratic regime with the Medici as private citizens, and thus 
the question remains as to why by contrast it led the Rucellai, Giovanni Corsi and 
their associates to desire to restore the Medici to power and to urge the Medici to 
force a parlamento and overthrow the aristocratic regime of 7 September. 
The reason was that unlike Valori, Albizzi and other supporters of the reform 
of 7 September the Rucellai believed that an aristocratic regime was not incompatible 
with Medici leadership, but that it was incompatible with the Great Council. The split 
between the leaders of Soderini's overthrow in 1512 was a split between two 
different visions of an aristocratic regime. Corsi had contrasted the `calamity' of the 
era of popular government with the Athenian age of Lorenzo, when the `good arts 
and disciplines', generosity, modesty and restraint were dominant. In the present 
however, `ignorance and stupidity', avarice, ambition and luxury were dominant in 
the city, `from where are exiled, together with the Medici, the disciplines of all the 
good arts and the best institutions of our forefathers'. 114 In a dedicatory letter to 
Cosimo de' Pazzi of 1508 Corsi praised the qualities and achievements of Lorenzo as 
an example to other citizens.115 Pietro Crinito, another member of the Rucellai circle, 
had praised Lorenzo in 1504 as a man `who governed the Florentine republic no less 
with counsel than with fortune' .116 
Thus the Rucellai and their associates argued that a dominant role for the 
ottimati had been better secured in the Laurentian regime than under the popular 
government. Moreover, they evidently shared Bernardo Rucellai's vision of an 
aristocratic government in which there could be no place for the Great Council. 
Bernardo had been one of the leaders of the 'primi' behind the reform of 2 December 
1494 that re- established the constitution of before 1434, and had opposed the creation 
114 Corsi, Vita Ficini, in Kristeller, Studies, pp. 176 n. 8, 177 n. 9. 
115 Kristeller, Studies, pp. 177, 180; C. Dionisotti, Machiavellerie (Turin, 1980), p. 142 n. 23. 
116 
P. Crinito, De honesta disciplina, in Gilbert, `Bernardo Rucellai', p. 120 n.3. 
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of the Great Counci1.117 Ten years later Bernardo described for his son, Palla, how 
his attempt to establish an oligarchic regime had failed and the city had embraced a 
popular and `more lax form of government' which he had sought thereafter to 
persuade it to relinquish.118 Bernardo had restated his vision of the best regime for 
Florence during the years of his exile in his De bello Italico, in which he blames 
Piero for the events of 1494, for having governed without the counsel of ottimati, 
unlike Lorenzo had done.' 19 The best government, which was perceived to exist in 
Venice, is presented as an aristocratic regime with a monarchical head, in which 
popular elements played no part. 120 Corsi praised the Laurentian regime believing 
that it had mixed monarchical and aristocratic elements without popular ones in 
precisely that way.121 
Clearly the Rucellai and their associates urged the Medici to force a 
parlamento and overthrow the aristocratic regime of 7 September believing that a 
dominant role for the ottimati could be better secured with the restoration of the 
Medici and the abolition of the Great Council. And it was evident to supporters of the 
Council, such as Piero Parenti, that with its abolition and the creation of the Balia of 
fifty -five citizens, the parlamento had `taken government out of the hands of the 
mass of political society and placed it in that of the optimates'.122 Two days after the 
forcing of the parlamento in which he had been involved, Palla Rucellai wrote on his 
father's behalf to Lorenzo Strozzi about the `success' of their affairs which had `had 
a lot of trouble' in coming finally to a government that was `less popular and less 
French', in order to content the League. The authority of the city, he wrote, was now 
in the hands of sixty `gentlemen'. 123 Bernardo Rucellai himself added that `matters 
117 
F. Guicciardini, pp. 106, 107, 109, 284. 
18 B. Rucellai, De urbe Roma, in Gilbert, `Bernardo Rucellai', p. 109 n. 1. See also the useful 
remarks in W. McCuaig, `Bernardo Rucellai', pp. 89 -94. 
19 E. Giusberti, `Un mito del Cinquecento: Lorenzo il Magnifico', Bulletino dell' Istituto Storico 
Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio Muratoriano, xci (1984), pp. 220 -5. 
120 Gilbert, `Venetian Constitution', p. 483. 
12' Idem, `Bernardo Rucellai', p. 123. 
122 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 82 ": `trassasi al reggimento di mano allo universalità e ridussasi nelli 
optimati'. 
123 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, cod. 1487, ins. 84, f. 1`: Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo Strozzi, 18 September 
1512, `el sucesso di queste nostre chose ... hanno penato assai a venire a quello che era necessario per 
contentare la Legha di governo manco populare e mancho franzese. Hora l' authorità di tucta la città 
si è ridocta in circha sessanta homini da bene'. This letter was first brought to attention in Stephens, 
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are in the very best order, both for the uomini da bene and for our friends'.124 
Seeking to secure a dominant role for the ottimati rather than a party -based regime, 
the Rucellai evidently did not share the displeasure with the composition of the Balla 
felt, according to Cerretani, by most of those involved in the parlamento, who 
believed that it did not meet the needs of either the Medici or their `trusted 
friends' .125 
Despite the involvement of the Rucellai however, the parlamento was above 
all the expression of the desire of long- standing partisans of the Medici for the re- 
establishment of the Medici and a partisan regime, and it did not have the support, as 
those involved well -knew, of the vast majority of ottimati. Yet if the restoration of 
the Medici to power was not primarily the result of the desire of ottimati for a 
dominant position in the regime, the plot that brought the Medici to the city and 
overthrew Soderini was, and was also encouraged by the discontent of those leading 
citizens who desired an aristocratic regime and were behind the reforms of 7 
September. Here again it is evident how it was above all discontent with popular 
government rather than simply with Soderini himself, which led to his overthrow. 
There were many citizens `and all of them powerful', as Baldovinetti recalled, 
discontented both with Soderini `on many counts', and with the institution of the 
Gonfalonier for life.126 The reform eloquently expressed that discontent of leading 
citizens with the extent of Soderini's `greatness and authority'.127 The term of the 
Gonfalonier was reduced to one year to prevent the dominant position achieved by 
Soderini and to allow greater opportunity for the primi to obtain the dignity of the 
Fall, p. 63, where it is quoted at length. However, Palla Rucellai's involvement in its composition, 
which is not acknowleged, as well as what is known from other sources of the attitude of the Rucellai 
towards both the Great Council and the Medici, clearly suggest that the letter cannot bear the 
interpretation which is placed upon it. Contrary to assertions in Stephens, Fall, p. 62, Cerretani 
presents no evidence that Bernardo Rucellai sought to dissuade the Medici from forcing the 
parlamento when he visited the Cardinal on 15 September. See Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 286; Idem, 
Dialogo, p. 57; Idem, Storia, p. 447. 
124 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, cod. 1487, ins. 84, f. I`. 
125 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 59. 
126 Baldovinetti, 'Memoriale', f. 155`. 
'" F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 125. 
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office.128 Above all however, the reform expressed that discontent felt by some 
leading citizens with the popular government ever since its institution in 
1494. A Senate had been proposed in both 1494 and in the discussions of reform in 
1501 and 1502 which had resulted in the creation of a Gonfalonier for life.129 
Leading citizens such as the Salviati had hoped that would lead to the creation of a 
Senate, and the main cause of their discontent with Soderini was that it had not done 
so. 
The divisions that resulted, lamented Guicciardini, were the `origin and 
principal reason' for the return of the Medici.' For those citizens of `great 
authority' opposed to Soderini, whilst not desiring the return of the Medici, no longer 
sought to persecute or impede, as they had done in the past, those who consorted 
with the Medici. Indeed, in order to reduce Soderini's authority, they even sought to 
demonstrate support for the restoration of the Medici to power. This not only 
encouraged those who were `truely' the Medici's supporters, who were not of much 
importance, to hope for their return, but also encouraged many `young nobles' to 
seek the overthrow of the regime by means of the restoration of the Medici.131 
Moreover, the discontent of the Salviati and other leading citizens on account of their 
desire for a Senate helped to render the Gonfalonier and the popular government 
incapable of proceeding against the conspirators, as we shall see, and contributed to 
their success. 
Within two months of the Medici's return to power, Boscoli and Capponi had 
hatched a plot to overthrow the government, knowing, they are reported to have 
confessed, that the Medici regime `did not please anyone'.132 This first plot against 
the Medici, as the first against the popular government, in 1497, aimed to re- establish 
128 Cerretani, Storia, p. 444. 
129 
R. Pesman Cooper, `L' elezione di Pier Soderini a gonfaloniere a vita', A.S.I., cxxv (1967), pp. 
145 -85; Gilbert, `Venetian Constitution', pp. 477 -485; S. Bertelli, 'Petrus Soderinus Patriae Parens', 
Bibliothèque d' humanisme et renaissance, xxxi (1969), pp. 95 -8; Idem, `Pier Soderini', pp. 335 -8; 
Idem, `Constitutional Reforms in Renaissance Florence', Journal of Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies, iii (1973), pp. 139 -64; G. Cadoni, `La crisi istituzionale della repubblica fiorentina, 1499- 
1502', Bulletino dell' Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio Muratoriano, xcix (1994), 
pp. 341 -405. 
130 
F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, pp. 125, 235. 
131 Ibid., pp. 125 -6. 
132 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 75. 
70 
the old regime, and was the work of those who had loyally supported the past regime 
until its overthrow. Boscoli and Capponi both seem to have been supporters of 
Soderini and the popular regime, and to have desired the restoration of the popular 
government with Soderini as Gonfalonier, a fact ignored in modern accounts.133 
Biliotti confessed that in conversations with him Boscoli had often spoken `in favour 
of Soderini and of the other regime', and had occasionally entered a `long fantasy' 
saying that `he preferred the popular regime much more' than the present Medicean 
one, and that it was `the best government'.134 Niccolò Valori was recorded in 1509 to 
have been one of those `men of authority' who ordinarily supported the 
Gonfalonier.135 Giovanni Folchi had accepted a commission to aid the defence of 
Prato in August 1512,136 and Valori had also done all he could to oppose the 
Viceroy's demands for Soderini's deposition and the return of the Medici. He 
recounted in his Ricordanze at the time of the plot that as an orator to the Viceroy in 
August 1512 he had never agreed to the return of the Medici as private citizens, 
`knowing that they could not remain private for infinite reasons', and thus he had 
considered that the deposition of Soderini and the return of the Medici as private 
citizens in August 1512, had placed the city `in a manifest servitude'.137 
Boscoli is sometimes assumed to have been a follower of Savonarola,138 
based on Luca della Robbia's testimony that Boscoli admired Savonarola's approach 
to death and sought the counsel of a friar from San Marco on the night before his 
execution, although della Robbia also records that Boscoli did not frequent San 
Marco,139 and Polizzotto found no evidence that Boscoli was a Savonarolan.14° 
According to Biliotti however, Boscoli declared that `this government was not about 
to last, founding itself on great expenditure, and on vices and similar matters', and 
that he preferred the popular regime to the Medici because it was guided by 
133 Ridolfi, Machiavelli, pp. 135 -6; Butters, Governors, pp. 210 -1. 
134 A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 269: Examination of Pandolfo Biliotti. 
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`religion', was `without sodomy', and did not tolerate 'vices'.141 Such enthusiasm for 
the moral aspects of popular government suggests that Boscoli may have had 
piagnone sympathies. Yet Boscoli was a well -known student of ̀ letters',142 and it 
was Aristotle's Politics which he was accustomed to read with Giovanni Folchi, a 
fact considered significant enough by Folchi's examiners to be recorded, with the 
explanation that the work `speaks of the government of cities'.143 If Boscoli 
supported Savonarola's vision for the city at all, his preference for popular 
government was largely guided by classical republican values, and it was from these, 
as we shall see, that he sought the inspiration and justification for his deeds. 
Capponi seems to have been an opponent of Savonarola, at least he had been 
condemned in 1495 with Doffo Spini, head of the violently anti -Savonarolan 
Compagnacci, and twenty -three others for gambling,144 and Cosimo de' Pazzi had 
certainly been an opponent of Savonarola.145 Niccolò Valori however, was a 
supporter of the friar,146 and shortly after the plot he recalled in his Ricordanze the 
`wicked iniquity' of the burning of Savonarola, whom he described as the `light of 
his times, for religion, doctrine and sanctity'.147 He went on to describe the 
overthrow of the popular regime in Savonarolan terms, that following the `most 
violent' parlamento the Medici had created the Balìa, an `impious deed, outside of 
every promise' and thus `liberty was subsumed under their will'.148 
While both the leaders of the plot and the two others condemned desired the 
re- establishment of the popular regime as it existed in August 1512, with Piero 
Soderini as Gonfalonier for life, Cosimo de' Pazzi almost certainly did not. The 
extent of his involvement is unclear, but it is clear, as Cerretani records, that Pazzi, 
141 A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 269: Examination of Pandolfo Biliotti. 
142 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 5; Della Robbia, `Recitazione', p. 284. 
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Archbishop of Florence, was one of those who had wanted rid of Soderini as 
Gonfalonier, had worked for the Pope in his conflicts with the city, and had left the 
city a few days before the coup, afraid of the wrath of the' popolo'.149 Pazzi had 
supported the return of the Medici, according to Cerretani, but he wanted them as 
`citizens' not as `Signori' and thus he was aggrieved at the parlamento, and the 
`greatness' of the Medici, and it was for this reason that he had supported the plot.' 50 
Cerretani recorded that as early as December 1512 Pazzi and other members of his 
family were publicly declaring that the Medici should live `as citizens', and that they 
would have wanted the Medici to return only `as citizens'.'51 
Baldovinetti similarly recorded how Pazzi had grieved that `he was the reason 
that the Medici returned to Florence, through removing Piero Soderini from the 
Palace', for which he and the others responsible were now full of regret, since he had 
not desired that the Medici should make themselves `so great'. According to 
Baldovinetti, Pazzi was said to have supported the plot because he had not wanted 
the Medici to be `greater' than other citizens. Indeed Baldovinetti reported that for 
the same reason other `grand citizens' had also supported the plot, but that `for less 
harm' the whole of the conspiracy had not been sought out because it was `too great 
an affair' .' 52 Whatever Pazzi's desires however, the leading members of the plot of 
1513 sought the re- establishment of Soderini and the popular government of August 
1512 which they had loyally supported until its overthrow. 
By contrast the plot of 1522 was mainly the work of former supporters of the 
Medici, who sought to establish a regime in which the ottimati were dominant. 
However, that was clearly not the only or even the main aim of most of the 
participants, and the plot was no more united than other conspiracies of the period, 
for some of those involved desired the re- establishment of the popular regime 
149 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 48; Idem, Storia, p. 443. See also Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 79 "; Nardi, 
Istorie, i, pp. 479 -82. 
15° Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 300, 303; Idem, Dialogo, pp. 61, 80. 
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overthrown in 1512 and had always done so. It is both these aspects in particular that 
have received little or no attention in modern accounts. ' 53 
As in 1513 the conspirators aimed to restore Piero Soderini to his former 
position in the city, and to re- establish the Great Counci1,154 but they did not seek the 
unmodified re- establishment of the popular regime as it had existed in 1512. 
According to the confession of Niccolò Martelli, Buondelmonti planned not only to 
restore Soderini as Gonfalonier for life, but also to create a new office of eight 
citizens to serve for terms of three years, whose consent would be required to all 
decisions made by the Gonfalonier and the Signoria. The first eight were to be men 
deemed suitable by the plotters and were to include Buondelmonti himself, one of the 
Soderini, and perhaps Luigi Alamanni, as well as Niccolò Capponi and 
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, one of the leaders of the overthrow of Soderini in 
1512. Thus, Martelli concluded, `little by little they wanted to transform the 
Florentine government into one like that of the Venetians'.'55 That almost certainly 
meant the introduction of a Senate by which the ottimati, as was perceived to be the 
case in Venice, would have control of the regime.156 The establishment of a 
`government of the optimates', through the creation of a Senate of a hundred life 
members that would elect the most important magistracies and control fiscal policy 
had been explicitly compared to Venice in a proposal for reform put forward in April 
1522 by Alessandro de' Pazzi.157 Buondelmonti and della Palla were both to support 
Capponi's efforts during the last republic to establish a more aristocratic regime.'58 
Antonio Brucioli was one conspirator however, who would probably have 
preferred a more popular and less aristocratic regime than that envisaged by 
Buondelmonti. In his Dialogi published in 1526 Brucioli dismisses oligarchic rule 
whether by the rich, 'stato di pochi', or the virtuous, 'stato di ottimati', as well as rule 
by the poor, 'stato popolare e infimo', in favour of rule by the `multitude', by the 
153 Stephens, Fall, pp. 120 -1; Hauvette, Luigi Alamanni, pp. 29 -32; G. Silvano, 'Vivere civile' e 
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` mediocri' who were neither rich nor poor, of which Venice was held up as an 
example.j59 It is a measure of the hold exercised by the internal stability of Venice 
over the Florentine political imagination in these years, that advocates of both 
popular republicanism such as Brucioli, of an aristocratic republic with a popular 
base of the Great Council, such as Buondelmonti, as well as those such as the 
Rucellai who sought an aristocratic regime in which popular elements played no part, 
could all claim inspiration and justification from the Venetian model. 
Battista della Palla later claimed that when he had sought French help on 
behalf of the conspiracy he had presented the King's sister, Marguerite of Anjou, 
with a portrait of Savonarola, some manuscripts in the friar's hand, and all his 
writings and sermons. Thus della Palla had sought to impress upon Marguerite the 
obligation of her brother, as the `minister chosen by God', to be the instrument of the 
`liberation' of Florence and the destruction of those who were `tyrannizing' the city, 
as prophesied by Savonarola.169 If della Palla had piagnone sympathies however, 
Brucioli condemned prophesy as inimical to a healthy republic in his Dialogues of 
1526, and was a virulent opponent of the piagnoni during the last republic.161 The 
father of Jacopo da Diacceto was a devoted follower of the friar until his death in 
1527,162 but Buondelmonti and Alamanni were certainly not piagnoni, and during the 
last republic were to favour an alliance with the Emperor.163 The plot was rather the 
expression of the desire of ottimati for an aristocratic regime than of piagnoni for a 
godly republic. 
There was more to the plot however, than a wish to implement the long -held 
desire of leading citizens to establish a regime in which the ottimati, rather than the 
Medici or the popolo, were dominant. For in April 1522, in face of the French threat 
to the city which the plot itself had brought about, Cardinal Giulio had encouraged 
discussion to `transform the regime by agreement and not violently', according to 
Cerretani, knowing that as `head of the regime' he was `greatly hated by three 
159 
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quarters of the city', who would have wanted the re- establishment of the Great 
Council and the regime of before 1512. Giulio sought the opinion of individual 
citizens and five programmes of reform, including that of Alessandro de' Pazzi, were 
drawn up. According to both Cerretani and Nerli most desired the reopening of the 
Great Council, the creation of a Senate of 150 citizens for life and a Gonfalonier for 
one year, that is the aristocratic regime established by the reforms of September 
1512, and envisaged by Buondelmonti, who had by then been engaged for some 
months in conspiring to assassinate the Cardinal and overthrow the regime.164 
Florentines believed, as Silvano has recently detailed, that the re- opening of 
the Great Council and the establishment of an aristocratic republic were imminent,165 
and to that end on 11 May Alessandro de' Pazzi addressed an oration to Giulio on 
behalf of the `Senate' and ` popolo' of Florence, thanking the Cardinal for restoring 
liberty to the city. 166 Buondelmonti had been one of those who had put forward a 
proposal for reform in Apri1,167 and he too seems to have believed that reform was 
imminent, but rather than forestalling his designs the prospect of reform merely gave 
them an added sense of urgency. Thus Buondelmonti despatched Alessandro de' 
Monaldi to Siena to urge Renzo to hurry to Florence, instructing him, according to 
Monaldi's confession, to give Renzo news not only of the discontent of the city, the 
reluctance of the merchants to trade, the `desperation' of the ` popolo' and the desire 
for Renzo's arrival, but also of how the Cardinal `was thinking of a new reform of 
the regime'.168 Buondelmonti's instructions illustrate the importance of both foreign 
support and popular discontent to the plot, and that without either it would not have 
gone ahead. Yet they also demonstrate that, contrary to modern accounts, the 
conspiracy was more than just the expression of the conspirators' love of liberty.169 It 
also expressed, as we shall see, the desire of Buondelmonti and others involved to 
164 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 397, 398; Nerli, Commentari, pp. 136 -7. 
165 Silvano, Vivere civile', pp. 128 -136, 142. 
166 `Alessandri Pacci Oratio pro Senatu Populoque Florentino ad Julium Medicem Cardinalem 
Amplissimum de Republica', ed. Silvano, 'Vivere civile', pp. 182 -92; Nerli, Commentari, p. 137; 
Pitti, `Istoria', p. 126. 
167 Nerli, Commentari, p. 137; Stephens, Fall, pp. 114 -5. 
168 A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 32 ": 'cogitabat de nova reforma regiminis'. 
169 Hauvette, Luigi Alamanni, p. 29; G. Spini, Tra rinascimento e riforma. Antonio Brucioli (Florence, 
1940), pp. 34 -5. 
76 
avenge themselves of injuries received from Cardinal Giulio, to exact vengeance 
from the Cardinal with his assassination. 
Buondelmonti, Alamanni, and most of the others involved were former 
supporters of the Medici, but Cardinal Soderini and the other members of his family 
who participated, by contrast, had always desired the overthrow of the Medici. 
Moreover, rather than an aristocratic regime in which the ottimati were dominant, 
they sought the restoration of Piero Soderini as Gonfalonier for life, and would 
probably have preferred the re- establishment of the popular regime exactly as it had 
existed before his overthrow, rather than an aristocratic republic such as 
Buondelmonti planned. The extent of the involvement of the Soderini family in the 
plot has been questioned by the Cardinal's recent biographer,170 based on erroneous 
doubt of Martelli's confession and on Cambi's remark that the Soderini were held to 
have been condemned not for any participation in the plot, but only on account of 
their enmity with the Medici.171 However, as Cerretani and other contemporaries 
make plain, the Soderini were condemned because the examinations of the other 
conspirators testified clearly to their involvement in the plot, including that of the ex- 
Gonfalonier himself.172 Cardinal Francesco was found to be its `head'.173 Niccolò 
Martelli's confession firmly establishes the crucial role that the Soderini played in 
the plot, particularly in galvanizing French support. Whilst certainly aiming to give a 
full account of the extent of French involvement in the plot, Martelli's confession 
was clearly not intended to exaggerate the role of the Soderini to suit the Medici. For 
it was made in June 1526,174 two years after the death of Cardinal Francesco, and 
nearly three years after the Soderini had been absolved of their condemnation and 
punishment at Clement's request.175 
170 Lowe, Francesco Soderini, pp. 127 -8. 
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While the primary concern of many of those involved in the plot was not to 
establish an aristocratic regime in which the ottimati were dominant, that was the 
aim, together with the restoration of Piero Soderini as Gonfalonier, behind which the 
conspirators appear to have united. But in so doing it was an uncommon conspiracy, 
and the Giachinotti -Pitti plot of 1527, like the plot of 1513, sought the re- 
establishment of the popular government, and was the work of those who had loyally 
supported the popular regime until Soderini's overthrow, and had desired its 
restoration ever since the return of the Medici. As had Niccolò Valori of 1513, so 
Baldassare Carducci, when also an orator to the Viceroy in August 1512, had fiercely 
opposed the return of the Medici to Florence as private citizens because, as he 
advised the Dieci, accustomed to dominate the city they would never remain so.176 
Lodovico Nobili emerges from the examination of Pandolfo Biliotti in 1513 to have 
had a genuine distaste for aspects of Medicean government since its inception. 
`Justice is not being done', he complained to Biliotti, recounting how a partisan of 
the Medici, Cristofano Sernigi, had threatened and robbed a notary with impunity. 
He also bemoaned the money spent on carnivals declaring that `one cannot go on 
bearing these expenses'.177 All of those involved in the plot were to be enthusiastic 
supporters of the popular government of the last republic, and apparently opposed to 
the attempts of Niccolò Capponi to establish an aristocratic regime. Certainly 
Carducci was to be one of the leaders, with Tommaso Soderini, of the so- called party 
of the Popolo, opposed to that of the Oligarchia, during the last republic,178 and 
Battista Pitti one of his foremost supporters.179 
Similarly it was the re- establishment of the popular regime, rather than one in 
which the ottimati were dominant, which was the desire of the young nobles at the 
forefront of the Tumulto, and at their insistence it was the `popular regime and the 
Great Council', in the form that it was `before 1512, at the time of Piero Soderini', 
according to contemporaries, that the Signoria was forced to concede that day.180 
16 Guasti, ed., Sacco di Prato, ii, pp. 146 -7: Baldassare Carducci to the Dieci, 31 August 1512. 
177 A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 269: Examination of Pandolfo Biliotti. 
18 Segni, Storie, i, p. 232; Idem, `Vita', p. 309. 
19 Busini, Lettere, p. 17, 153. 
1ß0 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 187v; Nardi, `Lettera', p. 136; Idem, Istorie, ii, p. 134. 
78 
According to Cambi, one of the cries of those involved was that they did not want to 
be governed by priests,181 and the revolt did express hatred, as Foscari described at 
the time, for Clement's decision in 1524 to send Cardinal Cortona, from a subject 
town, and the two illegitimate Medici boys, Ippolito and Alessandro, to head the 
regime in the city, and the increase in Medici control that followed.182 But for most 
of those involved, such as Pierfilippo Pandolfini,183 the `ignominies' of `ministers 
prostituted', `bastards exalted' and `peasants honoured' were just part of a catalogue 
of `unworthy calamities' and `infinite evils' that the 'popolo' had suffered since it 
had been deprived of ̀ liberty' and entered `servitude' in 1512.184 For Pandolfini, as 
for the other young nobles, it was the desire for the restoration of the popular 
government, `the most natural and the best that this city can have' that was the origin 
of their discontent.185 
Not all those involved in the Tumulto however, wished to re- establish the 
popular government, a fact ignored in modern accounts.186 At the head of the revolt 
there were former supporters of the Medici such as the Salviati, the leaders of the 
young nobles,187 as well as Matteo Strozzi, Niccolò Capponi and Francesco Vettori, 
who had conspired against the Medici prior to the revolt with Filippo Strozzi, another 
leading member of the regime. They desired not to re- establish the popular 
government of before 1512, but to establish an aristocratic republic, along the lines 
perceived in Venice, and shortly before the 23 May 1527 Capponi requested a 
summary of the Venetian constitution from Donato Giannotti. His famous dialogue 
on the Venetian republic, completed in November 1526, in which he proposed a 
Florentine constitution on the Venetian model, was possibly encouraged by Capponi, 
181 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 306. 
182 Foscari, `Relazione', pp. 43 -4, 73 -4. 
183 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 122. 
184 
P. Pandolfini, `Sermone sopra l' elezione del Gonfaloniere di Giustizia', B.N.F., Magl., VIII, 18, 
ff. 65r, 80" -81`; Idem, 'Oratione di Pier Filippo di Alessandro Pandolfini al Popolo di Firenze nel 
tempio di San Lorenzo, a dì xxviii di gennaio MDXXVIII', ed. G. Canestrini, A.S.I., Ser. 1, xv 
(1851), p. 375. 
185 Pandolfini, `Sermone', ff. 65 ", 66". 
186 Roth, Last Republic, pp. 24 -8. 
187 On the roles of Piero and Averardo Salviati in the revolt see B.N.F., Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 143: 
Pagolo Benivieni to Bernardo Segni, 2 May 1527; Sanudo, Diarii, xlv, col. 28; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 
105, 117; Segni, `Vita', p. 301. 
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and was dedicated to Francesco Nasi,188 one of those who distinguished themselves 
during the revolt.189 
Vettori and Capponi were to be closely involved in the unsuccessful efforts of 
leading citizens to establish an aristocratic regime with the provisions of 16 May, 
when the Medici peacefully departed from the city after the sack of Rome,190 and 
Capponi was to continue to pursue his desire for a regime in which the ottimati rather 
than the Medici or the popolo were dominant when Gonfalonier of the last 
republic.191 Most of the young nobles at the forefront of the Tumulto were to oppose 
those attempts, as Pandolfini did in his Sermone of 1528 against Capponi, where a 
` stato degli ottimati' is called a `tyranny', for `liberty is none other than the equality 
of citizens'.192 Yet Piero and Averardo Salviati were to share Capponi's desire as 
Gonfalonier to establish a 'stato di pochi'.193 
The principal reason, as we have seen, for which Capponi and other former 
supporters of the Medici conspired against them was their desire to secure the city 
and themselves from imperialist threat, rather than any desire to establish an 
aristocratic republic. Capponi may have been `always opposed to the Medici house', 
as he was described in May 1527.194 Capponi, Vettori and the others may have 
always naturally preferred a regime in which the ottimati were dominant, that had not 
prevented both Vettori and Filippo Strozzi from supporting the potential despotism 
of Lorenzo before his death in 1519.195 Where Capponi and Matteo Strozzi were two 
leaders of the regime who had favoured the proposals for reform in 1522, both 
Vettori and Filippo Strozzi had been foremost amongst the palleschi in the regime 
who had opposed reform, complaining to the Cardinal, according to Cerretani, that he 
188 R. Stun, Donato Giannotti and his Epistolae (Geneva, 1968), pp. 19 -22. 
189 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 122. 
190 
Busini, Lettere, pp. 8, 55; Roth, Last Republic, pp. 45 -7, 349 -51; Devonshire Jones, Francesco 
Vettori, pp. 196, 198 -9. 
191 Roth, Last Republic, pp. 93 -4; Stephens, Fall, pp. 243 -5. 
192 Pandolfini, `Sermone', ff. 71 ", 77`. 
193 Busini, Lettere, p. 104. 
19" A.S.Mo., Canc. Duc., Firenze, 13 (unfoliated): Pierantonio Torello to the Duke, 31 May 1527. 
195 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 358; F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, iii, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Florence, 1943), p. 
51; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 112, 138 -42, 295. 
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wanted to `abandon' them, and that the reform was a `trick' that would `ruin' both 
the Cardinal and themselves.196 
Yet the imperialist threat did serve to expose an underlying discontent of the 
conspirators with Medici rule, a discontent that serves to explain why it was they, 
rather than other supporters of the Medici, who conspired against them. For it was 
their opposition to the rule of Cortona and the increase in Medici power following 
Cardinal Giulio's elevation to the Papacy in 1523 that ensured their desertion of the 
regime as soon as Clement's foreign policy was seen to fail. Vettori and Lorenzo 
Strozzi had both advised Clement against sending Cortona and the two young Medici 
to Florence,197 arguing, as Vettori himself later recalled, that since Cortona was from 
a subject territory he did not have the `affection of the city', and that it was neither 
`useful nor honourable' to appoint a `vassal' of the Florentines to the government.198 
Niccolò Capponi was one of those 'grandi', according to Segni, displeased with 
Cortona's appointment and preferring the restoration of ̀ civil government' ,199 
Segni's suggestion that both Capponi and Matteo Strozzi withdrew from the 
regime in disgust at Cortona's appointment is not substantiated by their record in 
office, and Strozzi remained, as Vettori did, a leading member of the government.200 
Yet following Cortona's arrival there was a division within the regime, according to 
Varchi and Nerli, between supporters of a narrower or a broader government, and all 
those who were to plot in 1526/7 and head the Tumulto can be found amongst the 
latter. According to Varchi, Filippo and Matteo Strozzi, Niccolò Capponi and both 
Piero and Averardo Salviati were foremost amongst those supporters of the Medici 
who were opposed to any further restriction of the regime. They favoured the Medici 
as `leaders and superiors' (capi e superiori) but not as `princes and bosses' (principi 
e padroni).201 Nerli includes Francesco Vettori in the group, which he says favoured 
a broadening of the regime. They were not yet contemplating the overthrow of the 
196 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 398 -9, 401. 
197 
F. Zeffi, `Vita di Lorenzo Strozzi', in L. Strozzi, Vite degli uomini illustri della casa Strozzi 
(Florence, 1892), p. xx; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 64 -5. 
198 Vettori, `Sommario', pp. 349 -50; `Raccolto delle azioni', pp. 276 -7. 
199 Segni, `Vita', p. 294. 
200 Ibid., p. 295. For their record in office see Appendix A, viii. 
201 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 67. 
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Medici but Capponi was already showing himself to be much in favour of the 
'universale' according to Nerli, and acquiring much popular goodwill, so that those 
who desired political change and a `more free means of government' believed they 
could count on the support of Capponi and the others when an `occasion' arose `to be 
able to alter the government'.202 
However, it was only in the face of the imperialist threat to the city that these 
divisions were to split the regime apart. Capponi, Vettori and the Strozzi were then 
not only to conspire against the Medici, but it was also with their encouragement and 
protection, as we shall see, that the young nobles led by the Salviati were to clamour 
their way towards revolt. Yet the Tumulto itself was the overwhelming expression of 
the long -held desire of the young nobles and others for the restoration of the popular 
government overthrown in 1512. And while fomented by resentment with Cortona, 
the financial burden imposed by the Medici and fear of the sack, the origin of the 
revolt lay not in the events of-1524 or 1527 but rather in the events of 1512. 
Grand claims have recently been made for the prominent role of Savonarolans 
both in the revolt itself and in opposing the Medici in the months preceding it, based 
on the piagnone sympathies of two of the seven condemned for their involvement in 
the revolt, and on the strong influence of Savonarolans during the last republic.203 Ser 
Giuliano da Ripa, brought in to act as notary to the proceedings when no one else 
could be found to do so, and one of those condemned, had certainly been a devoted 
supporter of Savonarola since 1494,204 a follower of Pietro Bernardino, and is 
recorded in November 1512 to have been the only piagnone not to have disowned the 
friar.205 He declared the exile of the Medici to be a `holy provision', and thereby gave 
the event a Savonarolan flavour, but it was not their victory.206 
202 Nerli, Commentari, p. 143. 
203 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, pp. 335 -6. 
204 Processo di Fra Domenico', ed. Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. cciii; Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 
125, 128. Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, f. 93 ", records that da Ripa had been in trouble with the Bishop 
of Florence in December 1505 as the leader of those of a `sect' who made orations at the Chapel of 
San Zanobi in the Duomo. He was made to promise not to observe such `superstition'. 
205 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 34 ": Pandolfo de' Conti to Francesco Guicciardini, 13 November 
1512. 
206 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 108. 
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Varchi describes that there were those in the Palace who recalled 
Savonarola's prophesy that God would free the city from servitude,207 and amongst 
these may have been Girolamo Buonagrazia and Francesco Tosinghi, who had both 
signed the petition in favour of Savonarola in 1497.208 Yet Varchi's is the only 
account of the revolt to make any mention of Savonarolan influence, and Matteo 
Strozzi was the only leading citizen involved who had supported Savonarola in his 
lifetime.209 For every Buonagrazia involved there were those, such as Giovanni 
Alberti,210 or Antonio Alamanni, who had both been vigorously opposed to 
Savonarola, and at the forefront of the assault on San Marco and the friar's downfall 
in 1498.211 More striking than the meagre evidence of Savonarolan influence is that 
many of the young nobles who distinguished themselves in the revolt, such as Jacopo 
Alamanni and Pierfilippo Pandolfini,212 and who had been at the forefront of the 
demand for arms in the preceding months, such as Castiglione, Machiavelli and del 
Bene, were to be leaders of the young arrabbiati in the last republic.213 Battista Pitti, 
whose father had been an opponent of Savonarola,214 Carducci and the other 
members of the plot of February 1527 were also to be leading arrabbiati. Piagnoni 
were involved in the Tumulto, but the leaders of the revolt, and of the plots that 
preceded it, were opponents of the Medici whose desire for popular government or an 
aristocratic republic was guided by the traditional values of Florentine republicanism 
rather than by any Savonarolan sentiment. 
That had been the case with the plots of 1513 and 1522 and would also appear 
to have been the case with the vast majority of those condemned for speaking out 
against the Medici regime.215 In as much as such detraction of the regime could be 
said to have expressed anything more than opposition to the Medici, most of those 
207 Ibid., p. 109. 
208 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, pp. 448, 459. 
209 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 445; `Processo di Fra Domenico', ed. Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. cciv. 
210 L. Passerini, Gli Alberti di Firenze. Genealogia storia e documenti, i (Florence, 1869), pp. 214 -5. 
211 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 261. 
212 
On Alamanni's role in the revolt see L. Guicciardini, `Sacco', p. 141; Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 133; 
Nerli, Commentari, p. 149; Segni, Storie, i, p. 75; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 107. 
213 Segni, `Vita', p. 323; Idem, Storie, i, p. 64. 
214 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 443. 
215 Those condemned are listed in Appendix A xii. Their cases are discussed in detail in Chapters 
Three and Four. 
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condemned, with the possible exception of Andrea Rinuccini,216 would appear to 
have desired the restoration of popular government rather than the establishment of 
an aristocratic regime, and both Jacopo Altoviti and Martino Scarfi for example, 
were certainly to support the popular party in the last republic.217 
A few piagnoni such as Bartolomeo Redditi in 1513 and Fra Spirito in 1521 
can be found amongst those condemned.218 To them one might add Francesco del 
Pugliese and Bartolomeo Pandolfini, who with Redditi had both been close friends 
and supporters of Savonarola,219 and Francesco Torrigiani, who is recorded with the 
three others to have signed the petition in support of Savonarola in 1497.220 Yet there 
were also those such as Duccio Adimari and Piero Orlandini who had been 
opponents of Savonarola, and were both amongst those condemned with Agostino 
Capponi and Doffo Spini, the head of the Compagnacci, for gambling in 1495.221 
Adimari had been one of the Compagnacci who attacked San Marco in 1498,222 and 
Orlandini is recorded to have-abused Savonarola as he was paraded through the city 
to his execution, and to have told the friar that he was going where he deserved.223 In 
the vast majority of cases there is no evidence that the opposition to the Medici of 
those condemned was based on, or accompanied by, support for Savonarola. If we 
are to assume that Martino Scarfi was a piagnone, as Polizzotto does, solely on the 
grounds that his father had been a supporter of Savanarola,224 then we must also note 
that the fathers of both Camillo Antinori,225 and Giusto della Badessa had been 
amongst the foremost opponents of the friar.226 
216 Busini, Lettere, pp. 151 -2. 
217 Ibid., pp. 57, 153. 
218 B. Redditi, `Breve compendio e sommario della verita predicata e profetata dal R. P. fra Girolamo 
Savonarola', ed. J. Schnitzer, Quellen and Forshungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas, i (Munich, 1902). 
This was composed about 1500. 
219 Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. ccxxviii, ccxxxii, cclxi, cclxx and passim; Parenti, `Storia', ed. 
Schnitzer, p. 275; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 441. 
220 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, pp. 456 -9. 
22! A.S.F., O.G., 102, f. 321`. 
222 Ser Lorenzo Violi, `Apologia', in Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. lxxxii. 
223 B.N.F., F.P., II, I, 138, f. 84 ": `Libro di varie notizie e memorie della venerabile compagnia Santa 
Maria della Croce al Tempio'. 
224 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, pp. 259 -60; Idem, `Medici', p. 144. 
225 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 443. 
226 Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 121, records that Piero della Badessa was one of those deprived of office in 
1496 for his part in the anti -savonarolan intelligenza uncovered that year. See Rubinstein, `Politics', 
pp. 174 -5. 
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However, whatever the Savonarolan inspiration behind open and public 
detraction of the Medicean regime may have been, the plots make clear that the focus 
and leadership of opposition to the Medici was provided by supporters of popular 
government or an aristocratic republic guided by traditional Florentine republicanism 
and not by followers of Savonarola who desired to establish a godly republic. Boscoli 
and others who conspired against the Medici sought inspiration and justification not 
from Savonarola, as we shall see, but from classical sources, from Aristotle, Livy, 
and the praise of Brutus in Roman literature. 
Plots against the Medici were always encouraged by support for the past 
regime, the popular desire for the reopening of the Great Council, and would not 
have occurred without it. Plots thus testify to the extent to which the creation of the 
Great Council and its abolition left the Medici weaker on their return in 1512 than 
they had been in the fifteenth century. By contrast the most important internal 
weakness of the popular government was the discontent of ottimati on account of 
their desire for a dominant role in the regime. The plot to overthrow Soderini which 
brought the Medici back to the city in 1512 was the expression of that discontent, it 
was encouraged by that discontent amongst the wider group of leading citizens, and 
that wider discontent contributed at least in part to its success. 
Despite these differences however, what characterized conspiracy against 
both the Medici and popular government regimes was less an attempt to establish an 
aristocratic government than to restore the old regime. Most plots were the work of 
those who did not share the same aims, or shared them for different reasons. It was 
above all opposition to the regime, rather than any shared desire for what was to 
replace it, that bound conspiracies together. Success, when it came with the 
overthrow of Soderini in 1512, revealed just how divergent the aims of those 
involved really were. Nevertheless it is clear that most plots sought the re- 
establishment of the past regime and were the work of those who had always desired 
its restoration. Plots thus demonstrate the extent to which the instability of Florentine 
politics in the early- sixteenth century was less the result of the failure of regimes to 
satisfy the desires of ottimati for a dominant role in the regime, than of their failure 
to extinguish support for the past regime. 
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Part Two 
Attitudes to Opposition 
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3 
The Condemnation of Political Crime 
Despite the interest shown in recent years in the history of crime and criminal 
justice in Renaissance Florence,' the condemnation and punishment of political 
crime remains amongst the least explored aspects of Florentine political history.2 
Historians of Florentine political life in the sixteenth century have referred on only a 
few occasions to condemnations of individuals for `political' crimes, and for crimes 
of speaking against the `state' or the `regime', and they have never sought to explain 
what was and what was not considered by Florentines to be a crime against the `state' 
or the `regime' and the reasons for it.3 Historians of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries have for long produced figures on the number of condemnations for 
`political crime' or `crimes against the state' in short periods, usually of only two or 
three years.4 Rarely however, have they made any attempt to explain what they 
See for example A. Zorzi, ed., `Istituzioni giudiziarie e aspetti della criminalità nella Firenze 
tardomedievale', Ricerche Storiche, xviii (1988), pp. 447 -637; M. Rocke, `Il controllo dell' 
omosessualità a Firenze nel XV secolo: gli "Ufficiali di Notte "', Quaderni Storici, lxvi (1987), pp. 
701 -23; A. Zorzi, `I fiorentini e gli uffici pubblici nel primo Quattrocento: concurrenza, abusi, 
illegalità', Quaderni Storici, lxvi (1987) pp. 725 -52; M. S. Mazzi, `Cronache di periferia dello stato 
fiorentino: reati contro la morale nel primo Quattrocento', Studi Storici, New Ser., xxvii (1986), pp. 
609 -637. 
2 
Some aspects have been briefly discussed by G. Pinto, `Controllo politico e ordine pubblico nei 
primi vicariati fiorentini: gli 'atti'criminali degli ufficiali forensi', Quaderni Storici, xlix (1982), pp. 
226 -41. There have been valuable examinations of the punishment of exile in R. Starr, Contrary 
Commonwealth. The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Berkely, 1982), and of 
pitture infamanti in S. Edgerton Jr., Pictures and Punishment. Art and Criminal Prosecution during 
the Florentine Renaissance (Ithaca, 1985). Of less value is M. Wolfgang, `Political Crimes and 
Punishments in Renaissance Florence', Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 
xliv (1953 -4), pp. 555 -81. 
Roth, Last Republic, pp. 67, 99, 135; Stephens, Fall, pp. 119, 221, 238, 249; Butters, Governors, p. 
287; Polizzotto, Elect Nation, pp. 263, 357. 
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U. Dorini, Il diritto penale e la delinquenza in Firenze nel secolo XIV (Lucca, 1923), p. 129, of the 
years 1352 -5 and 1380 -3; A. Zorzi, `Aspetti e problemi dell' amministrazione della giustizia penale 
nella repubblica fiorentina', A.S.J., cxlv (1987), pp. 428, 443, 535 (1400 -1, 1433 -5 and 1476 -8); 
Cohn, Labouring Classes, pp. 184 n. 12, 275 -80 and Idem, `Criminality and the State in Renaissance 
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understand by `political crime', or what criteria they have used to distinguish 
`political' from other crimes. Nor has any attempt been made to pursue contemporary 
Florentine definitions of political crime. The questions of what Florentines deemed to 
be a political offence and whether that changed from one regime to another have yet 
to be answered. 
Thanks to the surviving records of the magistracies responsible for criminal 
justice in Florence it is possible to trace the condemnation of political crime 
throughout the period, across both Medicean and popular governments. What is most 
striking is that the same idea of political crime was shared by all regimes. Both 
popular governments and the Medici regime shared the same understanding, for 
example, of what it was to speak against the regime, rather than against leading 
citizens, particular policies or individual magistracies and magistrates. Where they 
differed was in the extent to which the regime itself could agree on whether particular 
cases of outspokenness and other acts were crimes against it, or indeed crimes at all. 
Popular governments were divided to an extent that the Medici regime never was, 
and each side accused the other of crimes against the popular regime and the public 
welfare, and defended itself from the same accusation. 
Disagreements concerning what constituted a crime against the public welfare 
often centred on disagreements on what constituted the public welfare itself What 
emerges most clearly from an investigation of the condemnation of political crime is 
the uncertainty with which every regime in Florence identified itself. That 
uncertainty however, was particularly marked in popular governments. It was never 
as clear as it was under the Medici in whose interests popular government was to 
rule, where the public welfare of the city lay, and who were its guardians. That is one 
reason why, as we shall see, there were twice as many individuals condemned for 
speaking against the regime in the first two years of the Medicean regime after 1512 
than in the thirteen years of both popular governments.5 
Florence, 1344 - 1466', Journal of Social History, xiv (1980), pp. 211 -34 (1344 -5, 1374 -5, 1455 -6); L. 
Stern, The Criminal Law System of Medieval and Renaissance Florence (London, 1994), pp. 214, 219 
(1425 -8). 
5 See Chapter Four, Table One. 
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To describe plots and other attacks against the regime Florentines in our 
period occasionally referred, as they had in the fifteenth century, to the Roman notion 
of crimes of laesa maiestatis, concerning acts that diminished the greatness or 
security of the sovereign power. As the Signoria and the Council of Seventy had 
declared in 1481 that three men who had conspired to `take away liberty and 
overthrow this regime' had committed ` crimen lesae maiestatis',6 so the Otto di 
Guardia could condemn Piero Soderini in 1522 for conspiring to overthrow the 
regime and having thus committed ` crimen lese maiestatis'. Yet courts and 
legislators almost never delineated when a crime was of laesa maiestas, concerning 
themselves rather with whether a crime was 'caso di stato' or 'casus status'. 
Stato most commonly referred to the dominant regime, those in control of the 
power structure of the state. It also, and more traditionally, referred to the 
constitution or power structure itself. However, in 'caso di stato' or 'casus status', 
status means the public welfare, or the prosperous condition of the civitas or populus, 
a concept which had descended through the medieval glossators from the status rei 
Romanae of the Digest.8 As such it is distinct from maiestas, derived from the 
comparative maior (greater), concerned with the sovereignty and superioritas of its 
bearer, possessed by the populus romanus in republican Rome, the princeps in 
imperial Rome.9 Both could embrace the security of the territory of the res publica 
and the integrity of its constitution which is why they could be equated. 
Since the late thirteenth century laws and edicts in Florence had concerned 
themselves with the maintenance and conservation of the `bonus et pacificus status', 
the `good and peaceful condition', of the city, and the punishment of those who 
6 
A. Capelli, ed., `Lettere e notizie del Magnifico Lorenzo de' Medici' in Atti e memorie delle R. R. 
Deputazione di storia patria per le provincie modenese e parmenese, i (1863), p. 255: Antonio da 
Montecatini to Duke Ercole d' Este, 9 June 1481, `torre la libertà e mutare questo stato'. 
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A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 54f, 58`-°: 'tractasse et fecisse tractatum ... contra pacificum statum civitatis 
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pp. 269, 336, 340. 
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violated it or threatened to do so.10 In 1378 a special magistracy, the Otto di Guardia, 
was established to investigate crimes `against the status in the city and outside it'.11 
Exactly what was to be considered against the status seems to have been left to the 
magistracy itself. By 1478 the Otto were able not only to investigate but also, when 
awarded powers of balia, to judge and condemn whoever committed or attempted to 
commit a crime against the 'stato', condition, of the city `or its good government or 
in dishonour or contempt of it'. Again what acts were to be condemned on these 
grounds seems to have been left to the Otto and by the law of 1478 the Otto was 
authorized to act without reference to statutory law.12 During the last republic crimes 
recognized and investigated by the Otto as 'casi di stato' had to be accepted as such 
and judged in the court of the Quarantia.13 A new court was established in April 
1528 to judge 'casi repentini di stato', those that needed urgent resolution, and where 
the death penalty was to be imposed.14 Neither provision elucidated in any way what 
was a 'caso di stato'. 
That magistrates were never obliged to define clearly what constituted a casus 
status was deliberate, to enable the regime to prosecute more easily those acts of 
political opposition or disloyalty which it saw fit. Where there appeared an element 
of `public interest', Lorenzo Strozzi wrote, magistrates judged `more according to the 
free will of their minds than according to the written words of the laws'.15 For the 
Otto and the Quarantia were not, as Florentine criminal courts once had been, 
presided over by a supposedly impartial professional foreign rector, working 
independently of the political executive, the Signoria.16 Indeed the Otto was part of 
the political executive, in charge of maintaining public order, for which it was able to 
issue proclamations (bandi) concerning the meeting of confraternities, the carrying of 
arms and so on. The Otto was designed, according to Guicciardini, so that the regime 
would have `a club' to `beat the heads' of those who wanted to slander or alter the 
1° Dorini, Diritto, p. 129; W. Bowsky, `Anatomy of Rebellion', p. 230. 
11 
A. Antonelli, `La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze', A..S.L, cxii (1954), p. 5. 
12 Ibid., p. 26. 
13 A.S.F., Provvisioni, Registri, 206, f. 10" (June 1527). 
14 Ibid., 207, ff. 10 " -12`; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 295. 
15 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xiv. 
16 Zorzi, `Aspetti', pp. 391 -453; Stern, Criminal Law, pp. xx, 13 -14, 171 -5, 221, and passim. 
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government.17 The importance of the Otto, particularly to the internal security of the 
regime, was such that following the overthrow of regimes in 1494, 1512 and 1527 its 
members were replaced, new ones being appointed by the Signoria.18 
Although the Quarantia was just a court its personnel, like that of the Otto, 
was selected from members of the regime, in the form of the Council of Eighty. They 
were citizens qualified to hold political office and who would in the future or had in 
the past occupied seats in the executive. Furthermore, during the last republic some 
twenty additional members, from each of the executive magistracies also sat in the 
Quarantia.19 The emergency court was made exclusively of the executive 
magistracies, the Signoria, the Dieci di Balìa and the Otto.20 When they did not form 
part of the actual body of a magistracy or court itself, holders of political power 
could still affect their decisions. The Signoria could specify the outcome or penalty 
to be imposed in cases before the Otto through the use of bullettini.21 It could do so 
having deliberated the case amongst itself or, as with the sentence of execution of the 
five leaders of the conspiracy of 1497, having sought the counsel of other 
magistracies and citizens in a pratica.22 The Gonfalonier had de iure ability to 
intervene in judicial decisions of every magistrate with his own opinion and 
influence.23 The Medici had such ability de facto through the same unofficial 
channels of influence that they exercised over all magistracies. So the decision to 
condemn a crime as a casus status and even to condemn it at all, was always a 
political one. 
The Statutes of 1415 had laid down the penalties for those who knew of but 
did not reveal any `agreement, sedition and or conspiracy' against the `peaceful, free, 
tranquil and guelf condition (status) of the city of Florence' that intended to `subvert 
17 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 41. 
18 A.S.F., Tratte, 905, f. 4 "; Ibid., 906, ff. 85r, 89`. 
19 Busini, Lettere, p. 143; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 188. 
20 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 133, f. 74 ": A case of July 1530;Varchi, Storia, i, p. 295. 
21 
Stern, Criminal Law, pp. 176 -7. 
22 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 99, f. 72` (17 August 1497); Cei, `Storia', ff. 52` -3`; Parenti, 
`Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 207 -8; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 140 -1; Cerretani, Storia, p. 
237. 
23 Zorzi, `Aspetti', p. 565. 
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and overthrow that condition (status)',24 and for those who made and participated in 
any `gathering or congregation of persons, conventicle, or conspiracy' to `violate or 
subvert' the `peaceful condition' (pacificus status) of the Florentine Commune and 
popolo or `against its liberty' .25 It was for this crime that those who conspired against 
the regime in 1497,26 1510,27 1513,28 and 1522,29 were condemned and it was the 
crime of having conspired `to subvert and overthrow the present peaceful condition 
(status)' that was described by the Otto in 1522 as ` crimen lese maiestatis'.30 All the 
condemnations make it clear that a conspiracy, a `tractatus' or `coniuratio' had been 
made, and that not only was the crime against the status but that it aimed to overturn 
(subvertere) it and overthrow (mutare) it. This is an important phrase because it 
distinguishes attempts to overthrow the regime from other crimes against the status. 
It is important to note that conspiracy to overthrow the regime was 
condemned as a crime against the `prosperous condition', status of the city. It is true 
that Florentines since the early fourteenth century had referred to constitutional 
change as 'mutazione di stato'.31 It is also true that 'mutazione di stato' was how 
24 Statuta Populi et Communis Florentiae (Fribergi [Florence], 1778 -83), i, p. 278: `tractatum, 
seditionem, et seu coniurationem, qui nel quae fieret contra statum pacificum liberum, tranquillum et 
guelfum et pro subversione et mutatione ipsius status'. 
25 Ibid., pp. 278 -9: `invitatem, seu congregationem gentium, conventiculam, conspirationem, vel 
posturam pro violatione, vel subversione pacifici status populi et communis Florentiae, vel 
ordinamentorum iustitiae diciti populi, vel contra libertatem ipsius'. 
26 The condemnations of most of those involved are not extant but that of Francesco Cegia and Luca 
Speranzini survives. A.S.F., O.G., 108, f. 130" (November 1497): `tractaverunt ... in subversionem et 
violationem presentis pacifici et tranquilli status populi et communis Florentie et seu contra 
libertatem ipsius ... tractatum et seditionem .. contra pacificum statum preditti, et pro mutatione et 
subversione pacifici status preditti'. 
27 Ibid., 148, ff. 266 " -7` (December 1510): Condemnation of Prinzivalle della Stufa for having with 
others `tractaverunt eorum mala et perversa opera' to kill the Gonfalonier ` in subversionem et 
violationem presentis pacifici status populi et communis Florentie, occupationem et invasionem 
palatii populi Florentini et contra libertatem ipsius'. 
28 Ibid., 155, ff. 36" (February 1513): Condemnation of Pietropaolo Boscoli and Agostino Capponi 
for having made `tractatum, seditionem et coniurationem contra presentem pacificum liberum et 
tranquillum statum civitatis Florentie et pro subversione et mutatione ipsius status'. 
29 Ibid., 182, ff. 30", 39", 59'" (June and July 1522): Condemnations for `tractatum, seditionem et 
coniurationem contra presentem pacificum statum liberum tranquillum et guelfum civitatis Florentie, 
et pro subversione et mutatione presentis pacifici status civitatis Florentie'. The condemnations of 
those involved have been published in C. Guasti, ed., `Documenti della congiura fatto contro il 
cardinale Giulio de' Medici nel 1522', Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani, iii (1859), pp. 121- 
42. 
30 A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 53 ": `tractatum fecisse, illumque scivisse et non revelasse et in effectu durante 
eius vita conmisse crimen lese maiestatis et tractasse subvertere ac mutare presentem pacificum 
statum'. 
31 Rubinstein, `Notes', p. 316. 
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Florentines described the overthrow of the dominant regime, and the constitutional 
structures that maintained it, in both August and September 1512,32 and in May 
1527,33 and that 'mutare lo stato' was how magistracies described the aims of these 
conspiracies in their correspondence.34 But that is not what is meant in these 
condemnations, and as we shall see presently not all crimes against the status were 
understood to be an act against the regime. 
In condemning conspiracy against the regime as a crime against the status 
Florentines followed Roman practice closely. No open act was needed, for it was 
enough to have intended and consented to overthrow the regime. Trial of the accused 
could take place even after death, as of Piero Soderini in 1522, since although `being 
dead he cannot be damned, his memory can be damned, and his goods and privileges 
confiscated'.35 Failure to reveal plots was treated as complicity, and it was enough 
just to have known and not revealed that others had conspired to be condemned.36 It 
was on these grounds that Bernardo del Nero in 1497,37 Niccolò Valori and Giovanni 
Folchi in 1513,38 and Alessandro Monaldi in 1522,39 were condemned. As Antonio 
Strozzi argued in a pratica in 1497, the crime might have arrived in them `through a 
still, as a trickle', but it was still 'crimen lese maiestatis'.4° 
Yet there were occasions when that point was not so clear. In 1510 for 
example, Luigi della Stufa, father of the main protagonist of the conspiracy, first 
32 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 28T: Jacopo Guicciardini to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September 
1512; Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 83`. 
33 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Missive, 18, ff. 161 " -2`: Letters of 17 May 1527; Rubinstein, `Notes', p. 
320. 
34 A.S.F., Sig., Minutari, 21, f. 39`: Otto di Pratica to the Lucchese, 1 June 1522; A.S.F., Dieci di 
Balla, Missive, 36, ff. 9r, 11`-", 12": Letters of23 December 1510; Ibid., 39, ff. 161`- ": Letters of 19 
February 1513. On 1497 see Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 206; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, 
p. 132. 
35 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 53 " -4 ", 58 ": `mortuus non possit damnari; tarnen potest eius memoria damnari, 
et bona et iura eius confischari'. 
36 A.S.F., O.G., 108, ff. 130" -131, describes the crime as `in turbationem et grave damnum dicte 
libertatis et pacifici status'. 
37 His condemnation is not extant but see Cei, `Storia', f. 52 "; Parenti, `Storia' ed. Schnitzer, p. 212; F. 
Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 140. 
38 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 37`: Condemnation of Valori for `habuit intra colloquia cum dicto Pietro Paulo 
circa delicta predicte tam audiendo quam respondendo'; N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18`; Sanudo, 
Diarii, xvi, col. 25: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, 7 March 1513; Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 
75; Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 27. 
39 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 32` -3`. Monaldi was exiled to Naples for ten years. 
40 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 10`; Cei, `Storia', ff 52`- ": per lambicco, e distillatamente'. 
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denied knowing anything of the plot. He was then found to have been informed by 
his son of the plot on the morning of his flight from the city and to have given him 
some money. Luigi confessed to this, claiming that he had not informed the 
authorities because they already knew.41 Some, including the Gonfalonier, thought 
that the matter should be treated as a 'cosa di stato' and he summoned the Council of 
Eighty to deliberate the case. Soderini wanted Luigi examined further with torture, to 
see who else was involved, and punished severely. Some of those supporting the 
Gonfalonier wanted Luigi executed. Others argued that Luigi should be released 
since his only crime was a `venial lie' - not to have confessed to know of a plot when 
the Signoria already knew of it and its protagonist had already left the city.42 The 
Eighty did decide to have the case sent to the Otto as a 'cosa di stato', where the 
`republic' had been in danger of the `overthrow of its condition, of deaths and of 
burnings' .43 Yet the Otto did not examine Luigi further, and although he was exiled 
to Empoli for five years,44 he was punished, the Dieci explained, less because he had 
confessed to have known `not the fact, but the reason for his son's departure',45 than 
for having been obstinate to do so, having first lied to his examiners.46 
There were no condemnations for conspiracy during the last republic, but 
there were condemnations of attempts to rouse the popolo to arms. This was 
traditionally done, as it was during the Tumulto del Venerdì in 1527, with the 
exclamation of slogans such as ` popolo, popolo e libertà', and thus the cry of 
'popolo' in Florence was seen as none other than `a rousing of the popolo and the 
overthrow of the regime' and was prohibited by statute.47 Jacopo Alamanni's cry of 
'popolo, popolo' and 'guardia, guardia' in November 1528, in an attempt to `rouse 
the popolo' and the Palace guard was certainly seen in this way.48 Alamanni's crime 
41 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 231 -2; Idem, Storia, pp. 399 -400; Nerli, Commentari, p. 104. 
42 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 45r; Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 232 -4; Idem, Storia, pp. 400 -02; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxi, pp. 245 -7. 
43 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 232; Idem, Storia, p. 400: `dove fussi venuto a la republicha pericholo di 
mutatione di stato, di mortte et d' incendii'. Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 246. 
44 A.S.F., O.G., 148, f. 272r: Condemnation by the Otto iustis de causis ut dixerunt moti'. 
45 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 36, ff. 20 " -21`: Dieci to Roberto Acciaiuoli, 1 January 1511. 
46 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 235; Idem, Storia, p. 403. 
47 Statuta, i, p. 286; Segni, Storie, i, p. 81. 
48 B.N.F., F.P., II III 433, f. 80`: `Raguaglio del caso di Jacopo Alamanni per Lionardo Ginori'; 
Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1536', f. 22 "; Anon., `Cronica', f. 167 "; Sanudo, Diarii, xlix, coll. 144 -5, 152 -3: 
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was thus judged to be `against the regime', and indeed deserving of immediate 
capital punishment because he `has roused the popolo'.49 His action had resulted in a 
`little tumult though without scandal' because the Palace and the Piazza were full of 
citizens following a meeting of the Great Council, which seems to have referred to no 
more than a general state of excitement and alarm rather than a riot.50 Shops were 
closed and the Palace was locked.5 1 Since he had been the `cause' of a `tumult' in the 
Piazza the case was condemned as a 'caso repentino di stato' and Alamanni was 
sentenced to death by the emergency court of the executive magistracies.52 
Alamanni seems to have been thought by some to have been attempting to 
overthrow the regime.53 However, he was condemned simply for crying popolo and 
calling the guard `to his aid' whilst being led to prison following his assault on one 
Lionardo Ginori.54 Thus whatever intentions were perceived to lie behind it, the cry 
of 'popolo' seems itself to have been seen as an attack on the regime. In December 
1527 Benedetto Buondelmonti was condemned and imprisoned by the Quarantia for 
his cry in the contado that he would ring the church bells and `rouse the popolo'.55 
He was charged in a notification of wanting to rouse a tumult, make the contado 
revolt and `overthrow the regime'.56 Buondelmonti admitted having said that he 
wanted to ring the bells, but argued that he had been attempting not to overthrow the 
regime, but merely to protect his possessions from servants of the Syndics, there to 
confiscate his goods for non -payment of debts to the commune.57 Yet to have wanted 
Letters of Antonio Suriano and Lorenzo Bertolotti, 7 November 1528; B. Carnesecchi, `L' Assedio di 
Firenze', ed. L. Gentile, Studi Storici, xiv (Pisa 1905), p. 457; Nerli, Commentari, p. 176; Segni, 
Storie, i, p. 81; Idem, `Vita', pp. 325 -6; Busini, Lettere, p. 26; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 359 -60. 
49 Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, p. 197; Segni, Storie, i, p. 82. 
so Anon., `Diario, 1521 -1532', f. 22v; Sanudo, Diaro, xlix, coll. 144 -5, 152 -3; Carnesecchi, `Assedio', 
p. 457; Segni, Storie, i, p. 81. 
si Varchi, Storia, i, p. 359. 
52 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, ff. 197`-" (6 November 1528). 
53 Segni, Storie, i, pp. 81 -2; Idem, `Vita', p. 326. 
sa 
A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, f. 197`. 
ss 
A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 129, ff. 285v,291` (10 December 1527); A.S.F., Balle, 46, ff. 233v- 
41. 
56 B.N.F., F.P. I1 III 433, f. 831: `Raguaglio del caso di Benedetto Buondelmonti per Messer Filippo 
suo figliuolo'; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 209. 
57 `Raguaglio', f. 83". 
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to rouse the popolo was enough to have him condemned for a crime against the 
status whether he intended to overthrow the regime or not.58 
The cry of ` popolo' did not have to be judged in this way. A member of the 
emergency court, Messer Baldassare Carducci, had defended Alamanni on the 
grounds that his cry had been made in a quarrel with a private citizen and thus his 
crime was not `against the regime' or of `lesa maiestatis'.59 And at other times 
Carducci's view was the only one held by members of the regime. In 1504 Carlo 
Federighi violently broke out of the Stinche where he had been imprisoned for debt,6° 
and as he did so cried ` popolo, popolo'.61 A pratica on the case may have shown 
concern that Federighi had `called upon the public' and cried 'popolo' and ` libertà' 
as if ̀ he were living in a tyranny' and thus particularly required heavy punishment,62 
but the crime was not seen as an attack on the regime and the pratica was more 
concerned with the escape and the injury to creditors.63 Federighi's cry was seen as 
no more than a call for support and aid in his escape, a serious offence in itself, so the 
Otto ordered Federighi to return to jail under pain of sentence of death, and his 
brother and others were condemned only for helping him escape and were exiled.64 
The popular government of the last republic, under siege from the autumn of 
1529 until its capitulation in August 1530, had many cases of individuals who aided 
those threatening the territorial security of the republic, which could be tried by the 
Quarantia as casus status. For example a notification of October 1529 concerned a 
`plot' (trattato) of Fra Vittorio Franceschi to give the rampart of San Miniato to the 
enemy and his attempt to persuade a captain in Florentine service to join him.6' It 
was accepted by the Quarantia as a notification `de statu', and the friar was 
58 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 129, f 285 "; Busini, Lettere, p. 14; Nerli, Commentari, p. 167. 
59 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 161; Segni, Storie, i, p. 82; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 360. 
69 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 106, f 46`. 
61 A.S.F., O.G., 129, f 33% Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, f. 13`. 
62 Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, f. 13 '. 
6' Consulte e Pratiche della repubblica fiorentina, 1498 -1505, ed. D. Fachard, (Florence, 1993), pp. 
1002 -3. 
64 
A.S.F., O.G., 129, ff. 33 ', 36` (May 1504). 
65 Anon., `Diario, 1521 -1536', f 26'; Sanudo, Diarii, Iii, col. 104, 174 -5; P. Giovio, Historiarum sui 
temporis, ed. D. Visconti (Rome, 1964), p. 156; Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 202; Nerli, Commentari, p. 199; 
Busini, Lettere, p. 36; Varchi, Storia, ii, pp. 139 -40. 
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subsequently executed.66 Not only joining the enemy's camp but helping others to do 
so could be a casus status, and it was on these grounds that Zanobi Bracci and 
Agostino del Nero were condemned by the Quarantia in April 1530,67 having aided 
Zanobi's brother, Lorenzo.68 
Such aid to the enemy, although a casus status, was described very differently 
from a conspiracy to overthrow the regime. The condemnation of Fra Vittorio 
describes the dangers his acts posed to the `city' (città).69 Those found guilty of 
fighting for the enemy,70 or seizing control of forts for them, or giving away towns in 
the contado to the enemy,71 were condemned by the Quarantia for acts against their 
`country' (patria), `city' (civitas), or `republic' (res publica). The standard 
condemnation for joining the enemy camp, and aiding enemy forces, and as it was 
described in Statutes,72 was for acts against the men, persons, subjects and `populus' 
of the `commune of Florence' and `in great injury and shame of the republic of 
Florence'.73 Although casus status there is no hint that they were perceived as acts 
against the status or intended to overturn it, or as acts aimed against the regime, not 
just the territorial integrity of the republic. 
Yet during the siege Florence was facing an army dedicated to the overthrow 
of the regime, as in 1512. Then the Signoria could put a price on the head of a man 
who `came against the republic for the occasion of disturbing the peaceful condition 
of the commune of Florence'.74 Florentines did perceive that aid to the enemy during 
the siege was aimed `against this government', as the Venetian ambassador described 
66 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, ff. 219` 222` 
67 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, ff. 2361--7`. 
68 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Notificazioni e Querele, 1, ff. 23` -4`, 26`- "; Anonymous, `Diario d' incerto del 
1529 e 1530 dell' assedio', B.N.F., Magl., XXV, 555, f. 140`; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 226. 
69 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, f. 222`. 
70 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, ff. 61, 69` (16 December 1529); Ibid., 132, f. 154` (17 
February 1530), f. 162" (22 February); Ibid., 133, f. 48" (13 June 1530); ff. 94r, 101 (3 August 1530). 
71 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, ff. 192`, 193" (15 March 1530); Ibid., 133, ff. 83`-" (12 July 
1530). 
72 Statuta, i, pp. 283 -4. 
73 A.S.F., O.G, 206, ff. 261.-7` (30 September 1529), 47` (6 November), 53` (19 November); A.S.F., 
Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, f. 19" (15 November). 
74 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 114, f. 90` (23 August 1512): `venit contra rem publicam occaxione 
turbandi pacificum statum communis Florentie'. 
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the crimes of Fra Vittorio.75 One notification against a man who was giving news of 
the `government' to the enemy described him as wanting to `return to the condition 
he was in at the time of the tyrant'.76 Francesco Guicciardini was condemned by the 
Quarantia in March 1530 and declared an outlaw (ribello) for the `injuries' he had 
caused the 'city ',77 having been accused of working with the Pope and writing letters 
`against the city', yet the accusation also described his crimes as against the `liberty 
of the city' and `against the regime'.78 The Quarantia itself condemned a `traitor of 
his country' who raised parts of the dominion against the city on behalf of the 
imperialists as the `most capital enemy of his city' and `enemy of this most holy 
liberty'.7° Two others who fought with the enemy or otherwise aided them were 
condemned for working `against this regime' and committing acts against the `city 
and popular condition'.80 
When not actually using force to return to the city, the Medici were always 
suspected of conspiring to do so. Contact with outlaws (ribelli), as some but not all 
of the Medici were after 1494, such as forming commercial or marriage relations or 
even just consorting with them was regulated by statute,81 not least, it was explained, 
because it could encourage acts against the regime.82 However, such contact was not 
in itself seen as an act against the regime, but could be construed as part of a 
conspiracy to overthrow the government. This is what happened to Filippo Strozzi 
when news of his marriage to Clarice de' Medici, Piero's daughter, reached Florence 
in December 1508, although largely ignored in modern accounts.83 A trial in March 
1506 of Piero Pitti, whose son was alleged to have contracted a marriage with 
75 
E. Albèri, ed., Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, Ser. 2, i (Florence, 1839), p. 240: 
Letter of Carlo Capello, 29 October 1529. 
76 A.S.F., Dieci di Balia, Notificazioni e Querele, 1, f. 26" (April 1530). 
77 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, f. 197`. 
78 F. Guicciardini, Opere inedite, ed. G. Canestrini, x (Florence, 1867), pp. 141 -7: Francesco 
Guicciardini to the Otto di Guardia, 2 March 1530. 
79 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, ff. 186' (March 1530). 
80 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, ff. 82r, 87` (27 December 1529): `contro a questo stato'; Ibid., 
f. 157r (19 February 1530): `contra civitatem et popularem statum'. 
si Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 179; Idem, Storia, p. 360. 
82 A.S.F., O.G., 149, ff. 41-5" (January 1511), gives the text of a law of January 1497, reissued after the 
plot of 1510, and banning contact with Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano de' Medici, under pain of 
being declared an outlaw. The law states that such contact was not only "a disgrace to the whole city" 
but could produce "disorders ", by giving "courage and hope" to rebels to try return to the city. 
83 Bullard, Filippo Strozzi, pp. 47 -60; Butters, Governors, pp. 130 -34. 
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Clarice, seems to have proceeded solely on the basis that to contract marriage with 
the daughter of an outlaw was against the `orders and the law of the city', as the 
author of the notification of the crime to the Otto described it, although because the 
marriage had not been completed, Pitti was absolved by the Quarantia.84 
According to Guicciardini, the Gonfalonier, Piero Soderini, and other 
members of the regime, argued that Filippo had not acted by himself and that he had 
been encouraged by those of `greater authority' wanting, under the shade of making 
such a marriage, to conspire to `overthrow the regime' and readmit the Medici.85 
According to Guicciardini, Soderini and his supporters were behind a notification 
against Strozzi that accused twelve named citizens of being involved in the 
negotiations and were thought to have been behind a later one that alleged that 
Strozzi had contracted the marriage `in order to overthrow the regime'.86 Soderini 
certainly supported it, worked to persuade people that Filippo was `restless and 
seditious', and gave a speech to the Great Council aiming to emphasize that the 
marriage had been made to the end of ̀ overthrowing the regime'.87 The Signoria 
informed a Florentine ambassador that the marriage concerned the `liberty and unity 
of this republic', and could produce only `disorder and scandal'.88 Alfonso Strozzi, 
supporting the Gonfalonier, said that it was necessary to cut the heads off those 
involved in the negotiations in order to `heal the city'.89 Such views, according to 
Cerretani, were not restricted to Soderini and his supporters in the regime.90 Rumours 
spread around the city against those named as involved in the negotiations that they 
aimed to overthrow the regime and most `citizens of middle rank' were said to have 
suspected that the negotiations involved pratiche of ̀ overthrowing the regime'.91 
84 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 108, ff. 19 ", 22 " -23` (March 1506); Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, f. 
98`; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 289, 326; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 119; Idem, Storia, p. 344. 
85 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 326; Idem, Scritti autobiografici, p. 228. 
86 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 327, 329. 
87 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xvi, F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 329. 
88 
A.S.F., Sig., Missive., 56, ff. 128`-" (23 December 1508). 
89 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 331. 
90 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 179; Idem, Storia, p. 361. 
91 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 134, f. 52`: Giovanbattista Cei to Messer Giovanni Strozzi, 16 December 
1508; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 330, 332. 
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Strozzi denied that prominent citizens were involved in the negotiations,92 
and before the Otto he denied any intention of `disturbing the peaceful condition of 
the city'.93 His family and many members of the regime supported his case that he 
`had not acted against the regime' since the marriage had been made simply of his 
own impulse without the counsel of others, and without any concern for public 
affairs and there had been no `conspiracy' or discussions `against the regime'.94 In 
the end Strozzi was absolved of all charges but that of the marriage itself, for which 
he was fined and exiled to Naples for three years.95 
Throughout records of the Otto di Guardia and the Quarantia of the period 
there are condemnations for unnamed words said to be `against', or in `dishonour' or 
`shame' (dedecus, vilipendius, verecundia, vituperius), of the `present peaceful 
condition' (presentis pacificus status) of the city. Similar condemnations can be 
found in the fifteenth century during the Laurentian regime.96 During the Medici 
regime after 1512 such condemnations can occasionally be found for words against 
the `present peaceful and best (optimus) condition' of the city, while during the 
popular regime of the last republic they can be found, although on only two 
occasions, for words against the `present peaceful and popular (popularis) condition'. 
A condemnation for conspiracy in 1400 refers to the plot as against `the present 
popular, guelf and free condition of the city of Florence', but there appears to be no 
precedent for the Medicean description in a condemnation of the status, condition, of 
the city being 'best' .97 
That those who spoke against the `popular' regime of the last republic were 
condemned for crimes against the `popular' condition of the city is perhaps less 
surprising than that such descriptions were rare, and appear to be a revival not of the 
92 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 134, f. 51`: Filippo Strozzi to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 22 
December 1508. 
9s A.S.F., O.G., 143, f. 23 ": `turbandi pacificum statum civitatis Florentie'. 
94 
Strozzi, `Vita', pp. xviii -ix, xxi -ii; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 327; Idem, Scritti 
autobiografici, p. 229; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 177. 
9s A.S.F., O.G., 143, ff. 24'; Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 111, f. 8" (January 1509). 
96 Brown, `Public Opinion', p. 62 n. 4. 
9' 
Le `Consulte' e `Pratiche' della repubblica fiorentina, ed. E. Conti, i (1401) (Florence, 1981), p. 36 
n. 5: Condemnation for `tractatum factum et hactenus ordinatum contra presentem statum popularem, 
guelfum et liberum civitatis Florentie'. 
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practice of the popular regime of before 1512, but of the medieval commune, as was 
so much of the last republic.98 More remarkable however, in both its contrast and its 
novelty, is the hitherto unnoticed fact those who spoke against the Medicean regime 
after 1512 were condemned for crimes against the `best' condition of the city. Since 
condemnations by the popular regime did not use the term, it may well be that the use 
of optimus to describe the status, the condition of the city under the Medici, reflects 
not just a certain insecurity of the regime concerning its legitimacy but an attempt to 
attribute to it an `optimate' or aristocratic, as opposed to `popular', character.99 
In the Medicean period the records of the Otto contain sentences of exile or 
imprisonment where the only reason given is that the punishment was made `for the 
conservation of the present optimate and peaceful condition (status) and government 
(regimen) of the Florentine people (populus)'. This phrase contains no mention of a 
crime having been committed, and the conservation of the status was often used by 
both Medicean and popular regimes to justify measures by which magistracies could 
act beyond the law, such as the granting of balla to the Otto. m° Actions by the 
executive outside the law were traditionally sanctioned as for the public good and the 
`peaceful condition of the city 101 The Signoria for example justified the immediate 
execution of the five leaders of the plot of 1497 and the denial of their right to an 
appeal on the grounds of providing for the `undamaged health of the republic'.102 It 
was on the grounds of the `conservation' of the `peaceful condition of the popolo' 
that the Otto justified in October 1512 the exile of Piero Soderini and other members 
of his family,103 simply because, according to contemporaries, they were the deposed 
Gonfalonier and his family.104 
98 Albertini, Staatsbewusstsein, pp. 122 -46; Gilbert, `Venetian Constitution', p. 499. 
99 Rubinstein, `Notes', pp. 316 -7. 
10° A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 99, f. 79E (September 1497); Ibid., 108, f. 75" (September 1506); 
Ibid., 120, f. 88" (September 1518). 
1 °1 L. Martines, Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968), pp. 411, 426 -31. 
102 A.S.F., Sig., e Coll., Delib., o.a., 99, ff. 74 " -51. (21 August 1497); Martines, Lawyers, pp. 442 -4. 
103 A.S.F., O.G., 154, ff. 74"-5': Condemnation `pro conservatione presentis optimi et pacifici status 
et regilninis populi Fiorentini'. 
104 Anon., `Diario istorico', f. 961; F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, i, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bologna, 1938), 
p. 110: Luigi Guicciardini to Francesco Guicciardini, 23 October 1512; Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 292, 
294; Nerli, Commentari, p. 118. 
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The condemnation of Giovanni Folchi, who was found to have known of but 
not revealed the plot of 1513, to be imprisoned in the fortress of Volterra for five 
years and then banished from the city for life, was made on the grounds of the 
`conservation' of the `condition' of the 'popolo', so it is clear that the phrase was 
used to condemn overt acts against the regime.105 The legal records themselves 
occasionally show that a condemnation pro conservatione status populi was made to 
punish crimes, and one such in August 1513 of a linen weaver, Francesco di 
Giovanni di Monaldo,106 was described by the Otto elsewhere as for having 
`committed certain errors'.107 Indeed, following the exile of the Soderini, the 
condemnation seems to have been used only in this way. Only one of the ten other 
occasions when the regime punished individuals pro conservatione status populi, 
most of which occurred in 1513, cannot be shown from other sources to have been on 
account of an overt act against the regime, and that act was always, with the notable 
exception of Folchi, a verbal attack against the regime. Martino Scarfi and 
Alessandro Manetti for example, were both banished from the city for five years in 
January 1513 for the `conservation' of the `condition' of the `popolo',108 and while it 
has been recently suggested that they were plotting against the regime,109 Cerretani 
clearly records that they were condemned for `certain words spoken against the 
regime' .110 
Florentines did not have any doubt that, as Savonarola put it, `speaking 
contemptuously of the regime' was ` crimen lesae maiestatis'.111 Yet what constituted 
speaking against the regime was not always clear. Speech described in 
condemnations as concerning the status could take the form of actually stating that 
105 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 42" (2 March 1513): Condemnation `pro conservatione presentis optimi et 
pacifici status et regiminis populi Fiorentini'. 
106 A.S.F., O.G., 156, f. 78" (16 August 1513): Condemnation `pro conservatione presentis optimi et 
pacifici status et regiminis populi et communis Florentie' to be banished from the city for one year. 
Francesco is described as a 'textor pannorum lineorum'. 
107 Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 117`. 
108 A.S.F., O.G., 155, ff. 15`-" (22 January 1513): Condemnations `pro conservatione presentis optimi 
et pacifici status et regiminis populi Florentini'. Scarfi was exiled to Empoli, Manetti to the Mugello. 
109 Polizzotto, `The Medici', p. 144; Idem, Elect Nation, p. 260. 
110 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 298: `per certte parole dicte contro allo stato'. 
111 
G. Savonarola, Prediche sopra i Salmi, ed. V. Romano, ii (Rome, 1974), p. 191: `quelli che 
sparlano di questo stato paghino cinquanta ducati, quia est crimen lesae maiestatis'. 
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the regime should be overthrown. Thus the Quarantia judged as a 'casus status',112 
Carlo Cocchi's words against `the present government' at beginning of the siege in 
October 1529,113 in which he suggested that `here one should make a parlamento', 
try to accord with Pope and readmit the Medici rather than await war.114 Members of 
the Quarantia recalled more than once, according to Varchi, the lines of Savonarola 
that had been reinscribed in 1527 in the hall of the Great Council, that `whoever 
wants to make a parlamento, wants to remove the government from your hands' .11 s 
Those who outspokenly rejected the legitimacy of those in government could 
also be condemned for words against the status. This for example, would seem to 
have been the reason for the condemnation of Girolamo degli Albizzi's words 
concerning the `regime' (reggimento) as against the `present popular and peaceful 
condition' by the Quarantia in 1528.116 Albizzi had been accused of speaking `in 
contempt of the present good government' (governo), specifically that he had said 
that `he was of the Albizzi and that he did not want to be managed by this loutish 
rabble and riff -raff that at present governs the city, and that one did not expect such 
louts that govern today to govern it' as well as other words against the `present 
government' .117 
The Medici regime condemned those who spoke against the Medici family 
for crimes against the status. The condemnation of Francesco Marchi in April 1513 
for having in Parenti's words `spoken ill of the Medici',118 may have been the first 
112 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 132, ff. 208`, 210` (13 October 1529): Presentation of a 
`notificatione de statu' and decision to judge it as `casus status'. 
13 F. Rinnucini, Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dal 1282 al 1460 colla continuazione di 
Alamanno e Neri suoi figli fino al 1506, ed. G. Aiazzi (Florence, 1840), p. cxcii: `per avere sparlato 
qualcosa contro a questo reggimento presente'; Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, p. 194. 
14 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 65, n. 48: Gianbattista Tosinghi to Cechotto Tosinghi, 12 October 1529, 
`qui si dovrebbe fare parlamento'; A.S.Mo., Canc. Duc., Firenze, 15, (unfoliated): Alessandro Guarini 
to the Duke, 15 and 20 October 1529, `perchè havea havuto a dire che si vorrà fare parlamento et 
vedere di acconciarsi col Papa'; Anon., `Diario, 1521 -1532', f. 26r: `per avere ditto si fachiesi 
parlamento'; Nerli, Commentari, p. 199; Segni, Storie, i, p. 213; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 138. 
15 Ibid., p. 139. On this inscription see N. Rubinstein, The Palazzo Vecchio 1298 -1532: Government, 
Architecture and Imagery in the Civic Palace of the Florentine Republic (Oxford, 1995), pp. 72 -3, 96. 
16 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, f. 85` (3 May 1528): `contra presentem popularem et 
pacificum statum'. 
"' A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), f. 131` (27 March 1528). 
18 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 89y. 
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such prosecution after the Medici family's return to the city.19 Words against the 
Medici needed be no more than contemptuous, making no explicit threats or 
comments on the health of their position in the city to concern the status. When 
Francesco del Pugliese `contemptuously' described the younger Lorenzo, as `the 
Magnificent shit (merda)' in September 1513,120 he was deemed to have `spoken ill 
of the regime' ,121 and he was condemned for crimes in shame and dishonour of the 
`status', and banished from the city for ten years.122 Giovanbattista Petrucci may 
have been questioning the legality of that condemnation but in effect he repeated the 
insult in saying that del Pugliese had erred little in his speaking,123 and so he too was 
condemned for words in dishonour of the `status'. Since his words also questioned a 
judgement of the Otto they were also condemned as against and in dishonour of the 
office and magistracy of the Otto.124 
Words against Giovanni de' Medici, the Pope and head of the Medici family, 
could also be against the status. Larione Buonguglielmi was condemned for speaking 
against the `status' and the Christian religion for his `dishonest, indecent and 
shameful' words during the papal visit to Florence in December 1515.125 
Buonguglielmi's `disgraceful speech against the Pontiff , according to Parenti, had 
arisen as a result of the `increasing bother and expense' caused by the ornaments and 
19 A.S.F., O.G., 155, ff. 63`-" (18 April 1513): Condemnation for words `ignominiosa turpia et 
inhonesta ... contra presentem optimum et pacificum statum et regimen florentinum et contra officium 
et Magistratum dicti Octo et in vilipendium dedecus et verecundiam dicti status... et pro conservatione 
presentis pacificis optimi status et regiminis populi Fiorentini'. 
120 Anon., `Diario istorico', f. 98`; Landucci, Diario, p. 341; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 28. 
12' Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 310: `per havere sparlato dello stato'. 
"`'` A.S.F., O.G., 157, f. 24" (29 September 1513): Condemnation for ` errores et inconvenientibus ... in 
vilipendium et dedecus presentis pacifici status et regiminis populi fiorentini'; A.S.F., Baliè, 43, f 
198` (7 December 1515): Absolution from having `usato certe parole in dishonore di questo presente 
stato et governo'. 
123 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 99". 
124 A.S.F., O.G., 157, f. 37` (14 October 1513): Condemnation for words `vituperativa turpia et 
vilipendiosa contra officium et Magistratum dicti Octo et vilipendium ignominium et dedecus 
presentis optimi pacifici status populi Florentie et dicti Magistratus et personarum eiusdem' for which 
he was fined and confined out of the city for three years. Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 122r: `più 
parole vituperose contro al magistrato delli Otto et in vergogna del presente pacifico stato'. 
125 A.S.F., O.G., 163, f. 56" (16 December 1515): Condemnation for words `inonesta, indecentia et 
turpia ... contra Christianum Religionem et contra presentem pacificum statum et bonum regimen 
populi et communis Florentie'; Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 172 ": `più parole inhoneste contro 
alla religione Christiana e contro al presente pacifico stato'. 
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other preparations required for the Pope's passage near his villa, and he seems to 
have `spat out' the desire to make a mocking version of the papal entry to the city.126 
Such insults to the Medici were taken as insults to the regime. They were 
deemed to have questioned the legitimacy of the regime just as Albizzi had done, and 
it was on that basis that those who made them were condemned. For the leadership of 
the regime exercised by members of the Medici family had no official position 
within the Florentine constitutional structure. Yet since the time of Lorenzo the 
Magnificent the Medicean regime had identified an act against the Medici, with an 
act against the regime. At the time of the conspiracy to murder Lorenzo in 1481, the 
Signoria and the Council of Seventy declared that `who attacks (` offende') or will 
attack Lorenzo, will commit crimen lesae maiestatis', on the grounds that since one 
was governing `by means of Lorenzo' those who conspired against one of the 
`principal and optimate' men of the city, as the condemnation described him, were 
conspiring to overthrow the regime.127 No such declaration seems to have been made 
on the Medici return of 1512, and the condemnations for conspiracy do not refer to it. 
Yet a notification if not the Otto themselves could describe a conspiracy against 
Cardinal Giulio de' Medici to be `chrimine lese maiestatis'.128 Giulio was a 
`Florentine citizen', but since he was the `benefactor and protector and most eager 
defender' of the `country' (patria) and `present peaceful condition' who `should be 
called Pater Patriae by public decree', as one condemnation by the Otto in 1522 
described him,129 any act against him was an act against the status. That insults to the 
Medici family were condemned as crimes against the status because they were seen 
as insults to the regime was thus a measure both of the extent of Medici leadership as 
well as of its limits. 
Whilst insults to the Medici family were seen as insults to the regime, that 
does not seem to have been the case with insults to their servants, those such as Goro 
126 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 124`. 
127 A.S.F., O.G., 58, ff. 66r, 741. (1481); Capelli, ed., `Lettere', p. 255: Antonio da Montecatini to Duke 
Ercole d' Este, 9 June 1481. 
178 A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 67` (August 1522): Condemnation for a false accusation `de gravissimis 
delictis de chrimine lese maiestatis et de qualiter prefati conspirare volebant contra reverendissima et 
illustrissimum cardinalem de Medicis'. 
129 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 58r, 59". 
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Gheri who represented Medici interests in the city during their absence. In January 
1518 Gheri, a native of Pistoia, felt himself, and it seems `the regime', to have been 
insulted by a masquerade that showed that `the citizens in this time serve the 
peasants'. However, as Parenti records, the regime did not proceed `keenly' against 
the perpetrators. Although the youths responsible were summoned by the Otto, they 
confessed to have done it simply to show `precise things', rather than to attack Gheri 
or the regime, and only one was punished, with a fine.130 
Words that merely predicted the imminent overthrow of the regime were 
condemned as against the status. Carlo de' Medici was absolved from an accusation 
in January 1528 that he had said `the popular regime will have a short life',131 but the 
Quarantia had accepted the case for trial having judged the words to be against the 
`present popular peaceful condition'.132 Such prognostication was also condemned as 
in shame of the status by the Medicean regime, and it was on these grounds that 
Andrea Rinuccini and Francesco Carcherelli were each condemned in the summer of 
1518. They were found to have attacked `the regime', when Rinuccini said to a 
Medici supporter, Domenico Canigiani, that although Canigiani and his `friends' 
were `more powerful than he now', one day Canigiani `would lack friends and he 
would lack neither friends nor arms',133 which Parenti interpreted as meaning that the 
`faction opposed' (parte avversa) to Canigiani's `within a short time would have 
more favour in Florence.' 134 Since Canigiani was the commissioner of Prato, the 
words were condemned as in dishonour of that office as well as of the status'.135 
Forecasts of the imminent overthrow of the regime did not have to be so 
explicit. They were implied in any praise of the strength of the regime's foreign 
¡30 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 137`: 'haverlo facto semplicamente per mostrare chose strette'. No 
such fine is recorded in the partiti of the Otto. 
iii A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), f. 8 ": `lo stato popolano ora mai ha poca vita'. 
132 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, ff. 14`, 24`: `contra presentem popolarem pacificum statum'. 
'33 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, iv, ff. 270 " -271`: Goro Gheri to Lorenzo de' Medici, 6 August 
1518, `non offendeva solo el commissario ma lo stato di Firenze'. 
134 Parenti; `Storia', II IV 171, f 140". 
'35 A.S.F., O.G., 171, f 63` (30 July 1518): Condemnation of Rinuccini, `pro conservatione presentis 
optimi pacifici status et regiminis populi Fiorentini' to be exiled to Ascoli for three years; Ibid., f. 68" 
(3 August): Condemnation of Carcherelli for words 'contumeliosa et inhonesta' against the 
commissioner and his honour and `in dedecus presentis pacifici status et regiminis populi et 
communis Florentie' to be banished from the Florentine dominion for two years; c.f. Ibid., 230, f. 
230" (3 August) `parole ingiuriose al commissario di Prato in sua vergogna et dello stato Fiorentino.' 
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enemies. Thus Martino Scarfi's remarks in 1523 concerning the fortune of the French 
army in Lombardy, and the possible election of a pro- French Pope, `to which he was 
giving great favour' were taken as `against the regime',136 and he was condemned for 
words in shame of the `status'.137 Indeed even predicting a war with the regime's 
foreign enemies could be seen in this light. When the city was allied to Spain against 
France Bartolomeo Pandolfini was deemed to have `spoken contemptuously against 
the regime' in December 1514 having said that his cousin, Francesco Pandolfini, 
ambassador in France, had written that he would soon be chased out of France or 
recalled to Florence.138 Under examination Bartolomeo confessed that Francesco had 
written no such thing.'39 His words were deemed to have insulted Florence as well as 
the regime, so he was condemned for words against the honour of the `Florentine 
republic' as well as `a certain person'.140 Yet elsewhere the Otto described them as 
against the `present peaceful condition'.141 
Predictions of the overthrow of the regime occasionally came in the form of 
prophesy, when the process of condemnation appears to have been more 
complicated. In June 1513 the Otto arrested two friars of Ognissanti and Giusto della 
Badessa who `under the name of prophesy', Parenti recorded, `were foretelling 
revolution in the city and elsewhere'.142 Examined under torture the friars were found 
not to have `foundation', according to Parenti,143 and were sentenced to periods of 
banishment from the city which they could avoid on payment of a fine.144 Parenti did 
not mean, as has been claimed, that the charges were in any way `trumped up'.145 
Proceedings against prophesy were normally made on the basis that it was found not 
136 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 434: `parole contro allo stato'. 
137 A.S.F., O.G., 187, ff. 26 " -27` (1 October 1523): Condemnation for words `in dedecus et vituperium 
presentis pacifici status et boni regiminis civitatis et communis Florentie'. 
138 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVI, nn. 590, 608: Galeotto de' Medici to Lorenzo de' Medici, 16 and 20 
December 1514; Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 111`: `havea sparlato contro al presente reggimento'. 
139 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVI, nn. 611, 627: Galeotto de' Medici to Lorenzo de' Medici, 22 and 28 
December 1514. 
14° A.S.F., O.G., 160, f. 75" (31 December 1514): Condemnation for words `contra honorem et decus 
rei publice florentine ac etiam quamdam personam cuius nomen pro meliore tacetur'. 
141 A.S.F., O.G., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 155`: `certe parole contro al presente pacifico stato'. 
142 A.S.F., O.G., 156, f. 20 "; Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 93`. 
143 Ibid., f. 94`. 
144 A.S.F., O.G., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 108 ". 
148 
D. Weinstein, Savonarola and Florence: Prophesy and Patriotism in the Renaissance (Princeton, 
1970), p. 348. 
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to have `foundation' in scripture or to have been received from God, and that it did 
not have the `foundation' it was claimed to have.146 Parenti may have been referring 
to this or, more likely, he may have meant that the friars were not found to have been 
part of some grander scheme to attack the regime, for with regard to prophesy that 
foretold of the overthrow of the government, whether it was founded on scripture or 
the hopes and machinations of opponents of the regime were clearly part of the same 
question. 
In May 1505 a `peasant worker or factor' who was saying `openly' that there 
would soon be `confusion' in the city, that citizens would be killed and that the 
` Gonfalonier would be toppled from power', claimed to have received his vision 
from God.147 Soderini was suspicious, according to Parenti, that the contadino had 
been `induced by citizens', and so had him examined by the Otto. The contadino 
maintained his claim that what he had spoken was `the truth', that `as he had spoken, 
so it would be', that `God was showing him these things', and that `he had it from 
God and not from others'. 148 That the contadino does not seem to have been 
condemned whereas della Badessa and the friars in 1513 were, may be because he 
was more obstinate than they about the divine source of his prophesy and was not 
found to have been speaking `under the name of prophesy', or it may be an indication 
of a more nervous attitude towards such prophesy on the part of the Medici regime. 
Whether they had been induced by others was probably the focus of the 
examination of della Badessa and the friars in 1513, and Parenti records that it was 
discovered that Messer Bartolomeo Redditi had previously spoken with the friars `of 
the affairs of Savonarola'.149 Thus he and the provost of Ognissanti were also 
condemned with the three arrested, for the `conservation' of the `condition' of the 
`popolo'.150 There is no evidence in either their condemnation or the account of 
Parenti to support recent assertions that Redditi and the others were, or were 
146 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 303, 308. 
147 Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, ff. 58`-". 
148 Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, f. 58 ". 
149 Parenti, `Storia' II IV 171, f. 94`: `delle cose di frate Jeronimo'. 
150 A.S.F., O.G., 156, f. 22" (11 June 1513): Condemnation `pro conservatione presentis optimi et 
pacifici status et regiminis populi et communis Florentie'. 
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considered to be, `plotting against the regime'.151 Rather than being found to have 
engineered a `conspiracy' Redditi was condemned purely for having spoken against 
the regime with those who then publicly foretold its overthrow. 
In speaking of Savonarola, Redditi's crime may have been to express loyalty 
to or belief in the past republican regime and thereby to have attacked the present 
Medicean one. Ficino Ficini, nephew of the famous neo- platonist, was condemned in 
the last republic for words `in honour of the Medici house' and their past regime,152 
which were certainly seen as an attack on the present `regime'.'53 They were judged 
`contra statum' by the Quarantia and Ficini was executed.154 `Florence', he had said, 
`had been better under the Palle than under the popolo', and the Medici family, 
having decorated the city with so many churches and buildings, and held the 
`dominion' of it for such a long time, possessed of the city `a greater part than 
anyone else' .155 
Savonarola was a figure of religious as well as political significance in 
Florence, having been a heretic and schismatic burned by the Church, and so 
expressions of loyalty to his memory were of no less interest to the Archbishop than 
to the Otto. This is reflected in Redditi's sentence, banished for one year from the 
archbishopric, where the confines of those sentenced with him were defined by civil 
boundaries.156 Further, both in the middle and towards the end of his year long 
sentence, Redditi was summoned to appear before the Archbishop's court before the 
Otto released him.157 
Expressions of loyalty to Savonarola and his prophesy were not in themselves 
seen as attacks on the regime, but they were regulated for political reasons. Indeed 
any prophesy of an impending `scourge' (flagello) and renovation in the Church, 
even when not accompanied by an overt political message, was regulated for political 
151 Polizzotto, `Medici', p. 144; Idem, Elect Nation, pp. 261, 262. 
152 Segni, Storie, i, p. 266; Nerli, Commentari, p. 221. 
153 Anon., `Diario dell' assedio', f. 170 ": `per haver sparlato dello stato'; B.N.F., Magl., XXV, 555, f. 
210`: `Da un libro di Giovambatista Betti', `per haver cicalato contro lo stato'. 
154 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 133, f. 47` (11 June 1530): Presentation of a notification `de statu' 
concerning words `contra statum', and decision to judge it as `casus status'. 
155 Giovio, Historiarum, p. 156; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 140; Busini, Lettere, p. 36. 
156 A.S.F., O.G., 156, f. 22 "; Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), ff. 108`- ". 
157 
A.S.F., O.G., 158, f. 3` (January 1514); Ibid., 159, ff. 6 ", 58" (May and June 1514). 
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reasons. For, as Cerretani wrote, Savonarola's followers invested such prophesy with 
political significance, remembering their prophet's words that the popular regime 
would be remade if it was ever harmed, and were encouraged by it to expect and 
desire a `new revolution' and the return of `the past regime'.158 
The two most celebrated cases of the period, that of Francesco da 
Montepulciano in December 1513 and of Don Teodoro in February 1515, were both 
heard in the court of the Archbishop. There is no evidence from the contemporary 
accounts that the prophesy of either was understood to be an attack on the regime in 
itself, although Teodoro had praised Savonarola, claimed that he had appeared to him 
and that he was the Papa Angelico whose coming was prophesied by Savonarola.159 
Indeed in reply to requests from Giulio, then the Archbishop, that action should be 
taken against Francesco da Montepulciano, Lorenzo replied that `he has neither said 
nor done anything that merits taking account of it' .160 Yet the proceedings against 
both Francesco and Teodorc were begun at the behest of `the regime', according to 
Parenti, because their prophesy `aroused' and encouraged opponents of the regime. 161 
Immediately following the condemnation of Teodoro, the vicar of the 
Archbishop issued bans on preaching prophesy if not with the expositions of the 
`holy doctors' and on preaching the renovation of the church or other prophesy `if it 
does not come from God'.162 These bans were understood to have been clearly 
designed to curb the public avowal of prophetic sentiments close to Savonarola's 
own 163 From this point the ecclesiastical authorities seem to have been charged with 
the suppression of the cult of Savonarola's memory and the expression of his 
158 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 326; Idem, Dialogo, p. 97. 
159 B.N.F., Fondo Guicciardini, 3, 4, 46: `Predica di Frate Francesco da Montepulciano all' ordine di 
Frate Minore in Santa Croce di Firenze facta a di xxiii Decembre 1513' is one of the sermons for 
which Francesco was arraigned; `Processo di Don Theodoro monacho che si faceva chiamare Papa 
Angelico' ed. A. Prosperi, `Il monaco Teodoro: Note su un processo fiorentino del 1515', Critica 
Storia, i (1975), pp. 90 -97 gives the case against Teodoro. Contemporary accounts are to be found in 
N. Machiavelli, Lettere, ed. F. Gaeta (Turin, 1984), p. 431: Niccolò Machiavelli to Francesco Vettori, 
19 December 1513; Parenti `Storia' ed. Schnitzer, pp. 303, 305 -6; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 313, 324 -5; 
Idem, Dialogo, pp. 90 -1, 95 -7; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 39, 60 -2; Landucci, Diario, pp. 343 -4, 349. 
16° 
O. Tommasini, La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli, (Rome, 1911), ii, p. 987: Letter of 24 
December 1513. 
161 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 303, 306; Polizzotto, Elect Nation, p. 272 n. 146. 
162 `Processo di Don Theodoro', ed. Prosperi, `Teodoro', p. 98. 
163 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 326. 
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prophetic beliefs. So it seems to have been the ecclesiastical authorities, according to 
Cerretani, who dealt with Fra Spirito on both occasions in 1521 when he preached 
that Savonarola had appeared to him and told him that a great `scourge' would come, 
after which the `popular regime' would be re- established and a renovation of the 
Church take place.164 
The cases looked at so far have all been attacks on the regime and that is why 
they were condemned as offences against the status, the condition, of the city. The 
regime was the dominant group in government insulted by Albizzi, the party in 
power whose end was foretold by Rinuccini. It was the group in control of the offices 
of government, who sat in the offices of government, but it was not the offices 
themselves. Insults to communal officials and magistrates, even to the supreme 
executive magistracy of the Signoria or its most senior member, the Gonfalonier, 
were not seen as insults to the regime, and were not condemned as crimes against the 
status. 
Some verbal attacks against the regime, such as those of Rinuccini and 
Petrucci, did involve verbal attacks against communal officials or magistracies, but 
in these cases accounts make it clear that the attack on the regime was separate from 
the insult to the official, and the condemnations distinguish between the crime 
against the official and the crime against the status. For example, a weaver from 
Germany, Bartolo di Giovanni, was condemned in October 1513 for words both 
against the `status' and against the magistracy concerned, in his case the Otto.165 
Insults of the magistracy of the Otto or of individual members of it were not in 
themselves condemned as against the status under any regime.166 Nor were insults of 
164 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 383. 
165 A.S.F., O.G., 157, f. 38" (15 October 1513): Condemnation for words `inhonesta et ignominiosa 
contra presentem pacificum statum et magistratum' for which he was banished from Florentine 
jurisdiction for five years; Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 122e: `certe parole ignominiosa contra il 
presente pacifico stato'. Bartolo is described as á `theutonicus textor ... habitatus nella Via del Fiore' 
166 See for example A.S.F., O.G., 167, f. 44" (March 1517): Condemnation for words `contra quosdam 
de numero dicti eorum officii in dedecus personarum et contra ipsorum honorem'. Cf. A.S.F., O.G. 
127, f. 78` (October 1503), Ibid., 157, f. 96" (December 1513); Ibid., 168, f. 26r (June 1517); Ibid., 
187, f. 76" (December 1523); Ibid., 206, f. 41" (October 1529). 
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other communal officials and magistracies such as the Twelve Good Men or the Sea 
Consuls condemned as against the status.167 
Insulting the Priors or the Gonfalonier was considered a grave matter by all 
regimes, but there is no evidence that it was taken in itself to be an attack on the 
regime, although it could of course include such an attack. For example, a dyer in 
1522 who did not take off his hat before the Priors was condemned for an act `in 
shame of the Priors and of the whole Florentine republic', and not for an act against 
the status.168 The same condemnation was made of Giovanni Ridolfi's `indecent, 
insulting, and dishonest' words in the Palace of the Signoria in 1505.169 In June 1506 
some figures `in contempt' of the Signoria according to Parenti,170 `the most 
beautiful things you ever saw' according to Piero Pitti, were depicted on the back of 
the seats in the Duomo where the Signoria was to sit the next day to celebrate Corpus 
Christi.171 The Otto and the Signoria issued several bans calling for information 
concerning the depiction of what were figures, as the bans described them, `in great 
dishonour of God and of His most holy church, and of all the city' rather than against 
the regime.172 
Physical attacks on the servants of magistracies were also condemned as 
crimes against the magistrate concerned and not as against the status, even when 
such attacks resulted in the death of the servant concerned.173 Although there appear 
167 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 114, f. 77` (August 1512), insult of one of the Twelve Good Men; 
Ibid., 130, 174` (September 1528), insult of a servant of the Signoria; O.G., 131, f. 63" (April 1505), 
insult of the Sea Consuls; Ibid., 157, f. 401. (October 1513), insult of the commissioner of the plague. 
168 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 124, f. 138`: `in dedecus dicti Dominorum et totius Rei Publice 
Florentie'. 
169 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 107, f. 85 " -6`: `in maxime dedecus et vilipendium eorum 
Dominorum et totius populi Fiorentini'. 
170 Parenti, ` Storia', II II 134, f. 106 ". 
171 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 325, f 90`: Piero Pitti to Lorenzo Strozzi, 13 June 1506. 
172 A.S.F., O.G., 222 (Libro di Bandi), ff. 419`, 420` (10 and 11 June 1506). 
173 A.S.F., O.G., 137, f. 146` (July 1507), 152, ff. 60" -1` (January 1512), assaults on servant of the 
Otto; Ibid., 125, ff. 235 " -6` (April 1503); Ibid. 146, f 141` (March 1510); Ibid. 184, f 6` (September 
1522); Ibid., 200, f 215" (December 1527), all killings of servants of the Otto. See also A.S.F., O.G., 
145, f. 15r (September 1509); Ibid., 155, f. 78` (April 1513); Ibid., 203, f. 26` (September 1528), 
assaults on servants of the Captain of the Bargello; Ibid., 161, f 3` (May 1515), 195, f 32" (June 
1526), assaults on servants of the customs officials; Ibid., 192, f 100" (August 1525), assault on a 
servant of the Sei di Mercantia. Cf notifications in A.S.F., O.G. 145 bis (Libro di Notificazioni), ff. 
152`, 172" -3` (January 1510); Ibid., 147 (Libro di Notificazioni), f 170` (July 1510); A.S.F., Nove di 
Ordinanza e Milizia, Notificazioni e Querele, 1, ff. 151.-16` (April 1507), 31` (February 1508). 
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to have been no cases of the physical assault of members of the magistracies 
themselves, there is no reason to suppose that they would have been condemned as 
crimes against the status. The mortal injury of a senior member of the chancery of 
the Dieci for example, was not condemned in this way.174 
Thus we have not followed here historians of the popolo minuto and others 
and included individual attacks by the lower orders against the officers of the 
communal courts or magistracies as `political crime'.175 However, there are two cases 
in the period of 1502 to 1530 of physical assaults on servants of communal 
magistracies being condemned as concerning the status, the condition of the city. The 
assault and injury of a servant of the Otto by Donato Ridolfi and three others in July 
1513 was condemned as against the honour of the `status' .176 Ten years later four 
men who had broken out of the Stinche and assaulted a guard in the process were 
condemned for a crime against the status'.177 Such condemnations do not mean that 
either of these acts were seen in anyway to have been against the regime. Status here, 
as in all such condemnations, refers to the prosperous condition of the city. Yet as the 
public welfare of the city crimes could be committed against the status in which no 
act of opposition to the regime was perceived. 
The mutiny of captains in the militia for example, could be condemned as 
casus status. In 1528, Pandolfo Puccini, a captain of Florentine troops, in a dispute 
over pay killed another captain, resisted arrest, and attempted to escape with some of 
his company.178 His `sedition' was accepted and condemned by Quarantia as a 
'casus status', and Puccini was sentenced to death.179 The breaking of a peace 
174 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Notificazioni e Querele, 1, f. 22` (April 1530). 
15 Cohn, Labouring Classes, pp. 146, 161 -7, 184 n. 12; M. Becker, `Changing Patterns of Violence 
and Justice in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth -century Florence', Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, xviii (1976), p. 286. 
16; A.S.F., O.G., 156, f. 55 ": `contra honorem et decus presentis pacifici status et dicti officii'; Ibid., 
230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 113 "; A.S.F., Miscellanea Repubblicana, CXVII (Libro di Condanne), f. 
57` 
"' A.S.F., O.G., 187, ff. 11 " -12` (September 1523): `contra presentem pacificum et tranquillam 
statum'. 
178 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), f. 116 "; Cambi, Istorie, xxiii, pp. 20 -1; Nardi, Istorie, ii, 
p. 204; Busini, Lettere, pp. 55 -6; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 284 -6. He was neither accused nor condemned 
for speaking against the regime as in Stephens, Fall, pp. 235 -6. 
19 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, ff. 53', 62` -3` (April 1528). Ibid., 131, ff. 29 " -30` is the case 
of another captain, Giuliano di Niccolò Strozzi, in February 1529. 
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agreement between two families in Castro Foiano in 1504 which erupted into a 
brawling tumult was condemned as an act against the law, the agreement and the 
`condition' of the men and persons of Castro Foiano.180 Neighbourhood brawls in 
Florence had been commonly condemned as acts intended to `disturb' and `pervert' 
the `condition' of the city until at least the mid -fifteenth century, although the above 
example appears to be the only condemnation of its kind in the period from 1502 to 
1530.181 These condemnations are for acts rather than words against the status, and 
describe the crime clearly. Those crimes against the status of which the records give 
scant information concerning the nature of the crime are all for words, and we can 
assume that they were so condemned because they were perceived to be against the 
regime. 
As with insults to the Signoria and other magistrates, so criticism of policy as 
expressed in laws or the decisions of magistrates, made both inside and outside the 
legislature, was not in itself taken to be an attack on the regime, yet it could be 
construed as part of such an attack.182 In a pratica in May 1530 that concerned itself 
with the `slandering' of `magistrates, particular citizens, principal soldiers and 
captains' that followed the loss of Empoli, speakers distinguished between those 
involved according to their intentions.183 As one speaker put it, some of those talking 
contemptuously were `forced by the zeal of their patriotism' fearing that the loss 
would stun the Signoria into thinking of an accord, and these should be dealt with 
through `suitable words'; others were moved by `malignancy' or through `being 
given to chattering' and should be treated `not with words but with deeds and with 
justice' for `the example of others'.184 
Even if they contained no explicit threats or predictions concerning the 
imminent collapse of the regime criticisms of magistrates and citizens could be seen 
180 A.S.F., O.G., 130, f. 212v (November 1504): `contra formam dicti treghue et contra bonos mores et 
contra pacificum et tranquillum statum hominum et personarum dicti Castri Foiani'. 
181 Rodolico, II popolo minuto, pp. 111 -2: An example of July 1344; Cohn, Labouring Classes, p. 
146. 
182 A.S.F., O.G., 202, f. 133v -4` (12 August 1528) is a condemnation of two members of the minor 
guilds for speaking indecently of affairs `pertinentur ad publicam et rem publicam florentinam', to be 
lashed twelve times at the Ponte Vecchio, the Mercato Vecchio and Porta Santa Maria. 
183 
A.S.F., C.P., 73, f. 49v. 
184 Ibid., f. 51`. 
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as acts intended to arouse hostility to the regime and encourage dissension within it, 
and condemned, as they had been since the fourteenth century, for intending to 
`disturb the peaceful and tranquil condition' of the popolo and commune of 
Florence.185 It was on these grounds that the only condemnation was made for words 
concerning the status in the period of 1502 to 1512. As the case of Luigi Manelli 
makes clear, it was attacks on the motives of leading members of the regime which 
were particularly likely to have been interpreted in this way, for in the eyes of 
leading citizens the line between overzealous patriotism and sedition was always 
thinnest when their motives were questioned. 
Manelli's bitter attack in March 1503 was made in a pratica concerning 
taxes.186 Claiming to be speaking on behalf of those present from his gonfalone 
Manelli was found to have departed from his commission, although some testified to 
having given him a `free commission', to speak as he wished.187 However, the case 
against him was started because of his words alone, and it was what he said that 
mattered. What most outraged the author of the notification by which Manelli was 
eventually condemned was that he had `publicly and impudently' said that the 
'popolo' had been many times `deceived' and made to starve `by many and 
continuing wars and taxes', reducing them to begging for bread so that `constrained 
by hunger' they could not see the `wicked behaviour' of citizens. Those citizens had 
allowed and even aided Duke Valentino to approach the gates of the city and sack the 
countryside instead of seizing victory when it was at hand and done all they could to 
maintain the war and keep the 'popolo' continually hungry and `oppressed' by 
taxes.188 
Manelli's attack was against the leaders of the regime, rather than the regime 
itself, against the Gonfalonier, Piero Soderini, and `all the principal citizens', 
according to Cambi.189 He had, according to Parenti and Vaglienti, spoken against 
185 Rodolico, //popolo minuto, pp. 94, 108, 110: Examples from the 1340s; Brucker, Florentine 
Politics, pp. 108 -9. 
186 Consulte e Pratiche, 1498 -1505, pp. 900 -1 (16 March 1503). Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 75 and Idem, 
Storia, pp. 317 -8 give a fuller, un- notarised version. 
187 Consulte e Pratiche, 1498 -1505, pp. 900, 904 -7; Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, ff. 91`-"; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxi, p. 186; Vaglienti, Storia, p. 174. 
188 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 105, f. 38v. 
189 
Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 186. 
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the ` grandi', accused the ` primati' of oppressing the 'populo' with taxes, and showed 
the `outrages long used by the powerful' including how they had had Valentino 
approach the city in order to `remove liberty from the popolo and burden it with 
taxes' and to `put the regime in the hands of the grandi'.190 
Manelli's charge bears a striking resemblance to that made against leading 
citizens by Ser Giuliano da Ripa in a speech to the Great Council in June 1496, for 
which he was banished from the city for two years. 191 He too had accused the 
'primati', particularly those opposed to Savonarola, of whom he was a supporter, of 
using `lies and bestialities' to `frighten this poor popolo ' and keep it `impoverished 
and burdened with taxes', in order to bend it `more easily' to their own `wicked' 
purposes and `overthrow the regime'.192 Manelli's accusation concerning Valentino 
was also a repeat of popular suspicions in the past. Guicciardini informs us that 
Valentino's approach to the city in 1501 was judged by the ` popolo' at the time, 
wrongly he says, to have been arranged by `principal citizens', particularly Bernardo 
Rucellai and Piero Soderini, in order to `overthrow the regime'.193 
Thus it was the 'primati' and `especially' the Gonfalonier , according to 
Parenti, who were determined to have Manelli punished, `not seeming to them to let 
this matter pass unavenged, and to discourage others, and to secure themselves in 
their position'.194 Cerretani recorded that all powerful men' were demanding that 
Manelli be punished for having wanted to arouse `popular anger' and for having 
dared to say such things in the presence of the Signoria,195 and it was at their behest 
that Manelli was summoned before the Signoria to explain his accusations.196 
Examined as to his intent he was found to have prepared his speech,197 intending to 
`make the people afraid, and overthrow the regime' .198 Manelli was condemned by 
190 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, f. 91`; Vaglienti, Storia, p. 173. 
19' Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 127, 128. 
192 Ibid., p. 125. 
193 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 212 -214. 
194 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, f. 91 ". 
195 Cerretani, Storia, p. 318; Idem, Ricordi, p. 76. 
196 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 105, f. 24`. 
197 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, ff. 91`- Anon., `Diario istorico', f. 84 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 186; 
Vaglienti, Storia, pp. 173 -4. 
198 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 187. 
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the Quarantia not for words against the status but, as a `seditious and scandalous 
man', for having spoken `diligently, maliciously and thoughtfully', intending to 
excite `tumult and scandal' in the ` popolo' and to `disturb' the `peaceful condition' 
of the city.199 He was banished from the city for ten years and banned from office for 
life.20o 
However, some questioned whether Manelli had committed a crime against 
the regime or the `condition' of the city at all. Manelli himself had begun his speech 
saying that as a `free' man born of `free father' and `having always lived in liberty' 
he would speak `freely 201 Cerretani recorded that Manelli was praised by all the 
'uomini popolari', men from the common run of political society, saying that he had 
bravely spoken the `truth' and was a friend of the 'popolo' and the `public 
government' (vivere publico),202 and his treatment was criticized in handbills that 
accused Soderini of being an enemy of free speech, not wanting anyone to speak 
`freely' in favour of the ` popolo' even in pratiche.203 Indeed, Parenti records that 
support for Manelli amongst the ` popolo', whilst not total, was such that in order to 
avoid the possibility that the Great Council would absolve him on appeal, it was 
decided by the Signoria and the 'primati' to have the case heard by the Quarantia 
from where it was declared to have no appea1.204 
Accusations by some leading members of the popular regime in the last 
republic of the seditious nature and intent behind criticisms of their motives were met 
by similar defences and denials. In June 1528, as Florentines were about to elect a 
Gonfalonier for the year, an anonymous printed work concerning the qualities which 
should be found in the Gonfalonier was distributed throughout the city. The Sermone 
sopra l ' elezione del Gonfaloniere di Giustizia, soon after found to be by Pierfilippo 
199 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 105, f. 38" (21 April 1503): `animo et intentione di fare scandalo, 
rumore et tumulto nel popolo et con muovere et concitare el popolo a rumore et per turbare el 
presente pacifico (stato)...per fare scandalo et tumulto nel popolo, et per turbare el presente pacifico et 
tranquillo stato della città'. 
200 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 105, f. 39`. 
701 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, f. 91`; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 75; Idem, Storia, p. 317; Consulte e 
Pratiche, 1498 -1505, p. 900. 
202 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 76; Idem, Storia, pp. 318, 319. 
203 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, f. 95`; Vaglienti, Storia, pp. 175 -6. 
204 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, ff. 92r, 96 "; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 80; Idem, Storia, p. 319. 
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di Alessandro Pandolfini, was a thinly veiled attack against Niccolò Capponi, the 
sitting Gonfalonier standing for re- election,205 and was the work of members of the 
Adirati, young arrabbiati opponents of the Gonfalonier.206 It was considered by 
Capponi's supporters to have been intended to make the popolo suspicious of him 
and promote Messer Baldassare Carducci, the leader of the Arrabbiati, Capponi's 
opponents within the regime.207 Capponi's supporters may have been most struck by 
criticism of the Gonfalonier for protecting former supporters of the Medici from the 
investigations of the Syndics,208 but the main attack seems to have arisen out of fears 
that Francesco Guicciardini and others were encouraging Capponi to establish a stato 
di ottimati, dominated by leading citizens, and that Capponi was secretly attempting 
to accord with the Pope.209 
The Sermone declares its intention to prevent the popolo being moved by the 
`persuasions' of those who with their `false goodness' and `simulated speeches', 
keep `concealing and obscuring their intentions', in order to be able to fulfil their 
`annual desire' of making a ` stato di pochi', an oligarchical regime.210 It urges 
Florentines to choose a Gonfalonier who above all would be vigilant in defending 
and preserving liberty and the `popular regime', and argues that the Gonfalonier 
would have such vigilance only if `he has never wanted to be honoured by tyrants nor 
ever held pratiche with them concerning the republic'.211 The Florentine popolo are 
warned not to honour those `who are unashamed to receive letters from tyrants every 
day', hold pratiche with the enemies of the republic,212 have failed to restrain the 
ambition of the 'grandi', and desire to restrict government to the few, for who 
`prefers few nobles to the multitude, does not love the popular regime'.213 
205 Nerli, Commentari, pp. 169, 174; Busini, Lettere, pp. 25, 115. 
lob Varchi, Storia, i, p. 318. 
207 Segni, Storie, i, p. 65; Idem, `Vita', p. 318; Pitti, `Istoria', p. 172. 
208 Segni, Storie, i, pp. 65 -6. 
209 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 318. 
210 P. Pandolfini, `Sermone sopra l' elezione del Gonfaloniere di Giustizia', B.N.F., Magl., VIII, 18, f. 
21' Ibid., ff. 65 ", 70`. 
212 Ibid., ff. 71 ", 74`, 78 ". 
213 
Ibid., ff. 71", 76`, 79`. 
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According to Pitti, Capponi was responsible for a ban against retaining a copy 
of the Sermone, as an attack on the regime.214 A notification was made against three 
adirati involved in the printing and distribution of the work, Cardinale Rucellai, 
Piero de' Pazzi and Giovanni Ringadori, describes the Sermone as a `malicious and 
crooked invention' under cover of an admonitory sermon and accuses them of having 
had the `worst and malign intent' to disturb the `condition of the city' and excite in 
the ` popolo' an intrigue against it.215 However, the Sermone itself describes its 
warnings concerning the desires of leading citizens for an oligarchical regime as `for 
the popular benefit'. The author declares that `all that effort, which I make in this 
cause, I make for the universal benefit, and the health of the republic'.216 As during 
the Manelli case it was argued that those who wrote of `public affairs' in defence of 
the popolo and the popular regime had committed no crime against the `condition' of 
the city, but in the popular regime of the last republic that argument met with more 
success.217 For the case was-rejected by the Quarantia as a `casus status' and sent 
back to the Otto.218 The Otto condemned only one of the three originally accused, 
Cardinale Rucellai, and only for having left the city and having printed a work (in 
Siena), both without a licence. Rucellai was banished from the city for three 
months.219 Pazzi and Ringadori, as well as the author, Pierfilippo Pandolfini, whom 
they had named under examination, were released under a surety. 220 There is perhaps 
no clearer illustration of the extent to which leading citizens had lost that grip on 
popular government during the last republic which they had held before 1512 than 
that Pandolfini was released where Manelli had been condemned. 
The content of an oration given by Pandolfini to the militia on 29 January 
1529, concerning the reasons for the ruin of states, was also seen by many of the 
'primati' as an attack on the 'Ottimati', on Capponi and his supporters in the regime, 
that described `the suspect ways of who was governing', called them `tyrannical', 
214 Pitti, `Istoria', p. 172: `come cosa allo stato contraria'. 
215 A.S.F., O.G., 202, ff. 73 " -4`: `animo et intentione perturbandi pacificum statum civitatis Florentie... 
malitiosam et pravam inventionem... machinationem contra pacificum statum civitatis Florentie'. 
216 Pandolfini, `Sermone', ff. 60". 
217 Pitti, Istoria', p. 171. 
218 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, ff. 110 ", 114`. 
219 A.S.F., O.G., 202, ff. 74`-" (June 1528). 
220 A.S.F., O.G., 202, f. 61 "; Nerli, Commentari, p. 174. 
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questioned their loyalty to the popular constitution, and blamed the ottimati for the 
overthrow of popular government in 1512.221 `In the popular regime the nobility stir 
sedition', Pandolfini had declared, `since, judging themselves to be more fine, it does 
not seem reasonable to them to be equal to the others '.222 Pandolfini was accused of 
making a `very seditious oration' that was `capable of rousing all the popolo' and 
having `tried to excite tumults and provoke many civil discords'.223 Following 
discussion amongst magistracies on whether action should be taken, to which 
Pandolfini may have been summoned, it was decided not to bring a case against 
224 
Thus those who publicly accused leading citizens of attempting to oppress the 
popolo and subvert the popular constitution were accused in turn of attempting to 
arouse a popular revolt and disturb the status, the prosperous condition or public 
welfare of the city, and were then defended on the grounds that those who spoke in 
favour of the popolo and in.defence of the popular constitution had committed no 
crime against the public welfare of the city. The accusations and counter- accusations 
reveal the uncertainty at the very heart of popular government in Florence. It was not 
clear what the status, the condition, of the city was under popular government, nor 
who were its guardians. Popular government did not know in whose interests it was 
to rule. The Medicean regime had no such doubt, and there were more 
condemnations for verbal offences against the regime as a result. 
Exactly how many more is impossible to tell. Crimes that were perceived as 
against the regime, were not always condemned as against the status. The Otto was a 
summary court and the codification of its procedure in 1478 established expressly the 
possibility of its proceeding in any way it chose `summarily and de facto' without 
explaining the type of crime or the reasons that moved it to a particular sentence.225 
Piero Orlandini's remark in 1523 that the elevation of Giulio de' Medici to the 
Papacy was not legitimate since it had not been made `canonically' and was the 
221 Segni, Storie, i, pp. 128 -9; Busini, Lettere, pp. 70 -1; Pitti, `Istoria', pp. 168, 170. 
222 
P. Pandolfini, 'Oratione di Pier Filippo di Alessandro Pandolfini al Popolo di Firenze nel tempio di 
San Lorenzo, a dì xxviii di gennaio MDXXVIII', ed. G. Canestrini, A.S.I., Ser. 1, xv (1851), p. 365. 
223 
Segni, `Vita', p. 326; Idem, Storie, i, pp. 128 -9. 
224 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 384; Segni, Storie, i, p. 129. 
225 Antonelli, `Magistratura', p. 26. 
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result of simony, and Giulio himself was illegitimate, dishonoured the head of the 
Medicean regime in Florence as Buonguglielmi had done.226 The Otto condemned 
Orlandini to death, but only records that it was moved to do so by `just and 
reasonable causes' .227 
To punish individuals for crimes against the status, the Otto did not even 
need to condemn them officially to any punishment at a11.228 Chroniclers tell us of the 
examination, torture and imprisonment by the Otto of Fra Spirito, a Franciscan from 
Santo Spirito who had already been in trouble twice that year, and who cried 'popolo 
e libertà' outside the Palace of the Signoria on 21 December 1521.229 However, he 
does not appear to have been condemned,230 and the lack of news concerning his fate 
was said by some at the time to have been because he died under torture.231 Those 
arrested in Florence and Venice in early 1527 for suspicion of conspiracy were 
clearly found, as we have seen, to have been involved in negotiations with the 
imperialists to overthrow the regime. Having been examined at length,232 Carducci 
remained in Venetian custody,233 and Giachinotti, Pitti and Pescioni imprisoned, 
until the overthrow of the Medicean regime in May.234 Yet they were never 
condemned and sentenced and the Pope according to one diarist seems to have 
ensured that no action followed, `for love of Filippo Strozzi' then a hostage of the 
imperialists in Naples.235 Although Strozzi did make representations on Pitti's behalf 
226 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 208`: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 November 1523; Ibid., 
f. 224 ": 6 December 1523; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 180`; Anon., `Diario, 1521 -1532', f. 8 "; 
Anon., `Cronica', f. 149`; Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, p. clxxxi; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 437; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxii, p. 251; Nerli, Commentari, p. 141; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 63. 
227 A.S.F., O.G., 187, f. 69` (24 November 1523): `iustis et rationabilis causis moti'. 
228 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1107, f 132 ": Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 12 March 1519 records 
the torture and sentence made by the Otto only a few weeks before of one Jacopo Cavalcanti for `cose 
vituperose' of the Medici. The partiti of the Otto record no condemnation of Cavalcanti or a crime 
against the status at this time. 
229 Anon., `Diario, 1521 -1532', f 2`; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 383. 
zio The partiti of the Otto for the months of January to April 1522 are not extant. 
23' Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 
232 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 186 "; Sanudo, Diarii, xliv, col. 85; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 174. 
233 A.S.F., Sig., Minutari, 21, ff. 168 " -169`: Signoria to Alessandro de' Pazzi, 18 May 1527; A.S.F., 
Otto di Pratica, Missive, 18, f. 162 ": Letter to Alessandro de' Pazzi, 18 May 1527; Sanudo, Diarii, 
xlv, col. 170. 
734 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 143: Pagolo Benivieni to Bernardo Segni, 2 May 1527; Anon., 
`Cronica', ff. 153`. "; Nardi, Istorie, ii, pp. 133 -4. 
235 Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 16`. 
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to the Pope, as well as to the authorities in Florence through his brother Lorenzo,236 
Clement's main concern seems to have been not to anger the imperialists into taking 
reprisals. 
The Otto di Guardia was not the only magistracy able to sentence individuals 
summarily without explaining its motives. The Signoria had held this power since 
the early fourteenth century and on occasion it is clear from other sources that it was 
used to condemn acts against the regime.237 It did so in the case of Antonio Brucioli 
in June 1529,238 because the Otto was divided on ít.239 Brucioli had been accused of 
having written to France that the government of the city was in the hands of 
`plebians' ( homini plebei) and 'ciompi' and that the `nobles are maltreated and 
disliked so that if one does not take steps it will last a short time'.24o 
Even the condemnation of open revolt was not always specifically identified 
as a crime against the status. Contemporary accounts tell us of the fines imposed by 
the Signoria on six citizens-for their role in the Tumulto del Venerdì in April 1527,241 
and Alessandro de' Medici was informed of the particular activities that had singled 
them out.242 Maestro Girolamo Buonagrazia and Giovanni Rinuccini had both 
entered the Palace, and had been particularly involved, even threatening the Signoria, 
in demands to ban the Medici.243 Ser Giuliano da Ripa had drawn up the provision.244 
Bardo Altoviti had rung the bell calling the popolo to arms.24' These men, and the 
other two punished, Francesco de' Tanagli and Jacopo Paganelli, were involved in 
what the Balìa and the Signoria described in provisions as a `tumult' of `malicious 
236 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 108, ff. 104`, 105 ": Filippo Strozzi to Lorenzo Strozzi, 16 February and 
30 March 1527. 
237 Dorini, Diritto, pp. 128 -9; Stern, Criminal Law, pp. 177 -8. 
238 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, f. 93`; A.S.F., O.G., 205, ff. 33` -" (5 June 1529): Bullettino of 
the Signoria that they `hanno trovato contro a lui et considerati e sua demeriti'. 
239 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 422. 
240 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 67, n. 64: Ottaviano Ciaio to Cecchotto Tosinghi, 29 May 1529; Varchi, 
Storia, i, p. 421. 
241 Nardi, `Lettera', p. 139. 
242 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 92: Bernardo de' Medici to Alessandro de' Medici, 2 May 1517. 
243 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 310; Busini, Lettere, p. 230; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 215. 
244 Anon., `Cronica', f. 156 "; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 309; Nardi, `Lettera', p. 136; Idem. Istorie, ii, p. 
133. 
245 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 310. 
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and violent men who disturbed the present peaceful condition and government'.246 
Yet they were cited to appear before the Signoria only on account of alleged tax 
debts, probably to cover up the violation of an amnesty, and it was for this and other 
unnamed `just causes' that they were eventually fined.247 One more Florentine, the 
canon Messer Antonio Nerli, was also punished, Alessandro was informed, for 
having been `one of the first' who cried 'popolo e libertà' and then rung the bell, but 
the regime took the unusual step, given the political nature of his crime, of having 
him detained, as a cleric, by the bishop of Florence, and it was as Cardinal legate of 
the Pope that Cortona deprived him of his benefices and fined him a thousand 
scudi.248 Nor was that the only occasion on which the Medicean regime disguised the 
condemnation of that which it acknowledged to be crimes against the status. 
In 1517 Camillo Antinori harangued two members of the Otto, telling them 
that `he was enough to chase them out of the city, and that matters would not always 
last in this way' and that justice was not being done.249 Since he had declared that 
`one would soon see the end of the regime', Luigi Guicciardini was in no doubt that 
his crime was `speaking ill of the regime'.250 Antinori's words were described by the 
Medici servant, Goro Gheri, as `against the regime, the magistracy, and their 
persons' and it is for this that one would expect Antinori to have been condemned.251 
In fact Antinori was condemned only for insulting the Otto,252 and Gheri's 
correspondence with Alfonsina de' Medici suggests that the reason for this was that 
the Otto and leading citizens wanted to ensure that Antinori was severely 
punished.253 However, Gheri reported, they lacked the determination to punish errors 
246 
A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 129, f. 70 ": `tumulto nella città contro al pacifico stato di quella'; 
A.S.F., Balle, 44, f. 484r: `maligni et violenti turbatori del presente pacifico stato et reggimento'. 
247 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 129, ff. 68 " -70`, 74 ". 
248 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 92: Bernardo de' Medici to Alessandro de' Medici, 2 May 1527; 
Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 310; Pitti, `Istoria', p. 139. 
249 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, f. 137 ": Gheri to Alfonsina de' Medici, 7 April 1517. 
250 
F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ii, p. 86: Luigi Guicciardini to Francesco Guicciardini, 13 April 1517, 
`cominciò a sparlare dello stato ... e dire che presto se ne vedrebbe el fine'. 
251 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, f. 137 ": Gheri to Alfonsina de' Medici, 7 April 1517, `contro 
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A.S.F., O.G., 167, f. 59` (11 April 1517): Condemnation for words `contra honorem decus et 
dignitatem magistratus et personas dicti domini Octo'. See also Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 
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against the regime because they were finding that such condemnations were later 
revoked on the instructions of the Medici. They grieved that absolving people in this 
way only gave encouragement to opponents of the regime.254 
Following the election of Giovanni de' Medici to the Papacy in March 1513, 
Martino Scarfi and Alessandro Manetti, condemned for verbal offences, and Niccolò 
Valori and Giovanni Folchi, involved in the Boscoli -Capponi plot, were released 
from the sentences imposed on them only weeks before,255 and later absolved by the 
Balìa.256 Gheri may have been referring to this, or more probably to cases such as 
that of Francesco del Pugliese, who with Alfonsina's support,257 was absolved of his 
crime by the Balla in 1515 only two years into his ten year sentence.258 In effect the 
Otto did not condemn Antinori for words against the status but for the insult to the 
Otto, in order to punish him for the words against the regime, and it would seem that 
similar reasons had led two years previously to the ordinary condemnation of 
Niccolò Paganelli,259 for his- insulting remarks to a tax official.260 Those who 
condemned Antinori to be banished from the city for five years must then have been 
sorely disappointed when only six months later he himself was absolved by the 
Seventeen Reformers of the Monte,261 followed within weeks by the absolution of 
Larione Buongugliemi,262 who had been banished from the city for life in 1515.263 
During the last republic, the Quarantia was supposed to accept and judge all 
cases concerning the status, but is clear that not all such cases were heard there. 
Busini tells us that the Otto could consider cases not to be of the status in order to 
judge them itself, preferring to send cases to the Quarantia only if the error was great 
or had aroused popular anger,264 and the Otto that sat in the autumn of 1529 certainly 
254 Ibid., ff. 137" -8`. 
255 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f 50` (12 March 1513). 
256 A.S.F., Balle, 42, f£ 136`-" (4 April 1513). 
257 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXIV, f. 57': Alfonsina de' Medici to Lorenzo de' Medici, 16 February 1515. 
258 A.S.F., Balle, 43, f 198` (7 December 1515). 
259 A.S.F., O.G., 162, f 29` (10 July 1515): Condemnation for certain 'errores' to be banished from 
the city for four years. 
260 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f 118`: "non ci andrebbe un mese che ci si ghovernerebbe altrimenti ". 
261 
A.S.F., Balle, 40, f. 176" (October 1517). 
262 Ibid., f. 180` (November 1517). 
263 A.S.F., O.G., 163, f 63 ". 
264 Busini, Lettere, pp. 144 -5; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 192. 
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seems to have followed such a policy.265 These same grounds may have been behind 
the occasional rejection by the Quarantia as casus status of cases that clearly, and in 
the eyes of the Otto, concerned the status. Fra Bonaventura's declaration in March 
1529 that `if the Pope were not wicked he would be prefect of Florence' and that `the 
present regime could not last', questioned the permanence of the regime, and thus 
was sent by the Otto to the Quarantia as a `casus status'.266 A year earlier the Otto 
had been equally convinced of the nature of the assertions of one Fra Lodovico de' 
Guglielmi that the lanznechts were coming to put the Medici back in control of 
Florence. In agreement with the author of the notification against the friar, who 
described the words as against the `present liberty', the Otto sent the case to the 
Quarantia as a `casus status'.267 However, both cases were rejected by the Quarantia 
on the grounds that neither was a `casus status' ,268 and the friars were both 
condemned by the Otto which, unable to describe their words as against the status, 
did not describe them at al1.269 It is difficult to see in either of these cases how the 
Quarantia could have been moved by legal considerations to take its view, but what 
else moved it is far from clear. 
Popular and Medicean regimes were in basic agreement about what 
constituted an offence against the state. Those who declared that the regime should 
be overthrown or who questioned its legitimacy, rejecting its right to govern and 
praising the past regime, or who predicted the present regime's imminent demise, 
were deemed by both popular and Medicean governments to have spoken against the 
regime and condemned for crimes against the status, the condition of the city. The 
meaning of `speaking against the regime' remained the same throughout the period. 
The main difference between the regimes was that only in the periods of popular 
265 
A.S.F., O.G., 206, ff. 25 " -67" (September to December 1529): A number of condemnations for 
joining or otherwise aiding enemy forces, occasionally described as acts against the `Republic', as 
well as others for pronouncements or letters `resulting in the dishonour of the Florentine Republic', all 
made without recourse to the Quarantia. 
266 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, ff. 67`-"; A.S.F., O.G., 205, f. 6`: 'si Pontifex non se male 
habuisset, ilium prefectum fuisse Florentie et quod presentis status durare non posset'. 
267 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a, 130, f. 142' (July 1528); A.S.F., O.G., 202, ff. 120' 
268 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a, 130, f. 145 "; Ibid., 131, f. 72`. 
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government do we find the accusation and condemnation of words not as against the 
status, but intended to `disturb' it. 
It was a significant difference, and the debate surrounding such cases 
reflected the deeper uncertainty at the heart of popular government. It was never as 
clear under popular government as it was in the Medicean regime who were the 
guardians of the status civitatis, the condition of the city. This was one reason why 
there were more proportionately far condemnations of verbal offences against the 
regime in the Medicean era, as we shall see, than in the years of popular government. 
Yet to explain the pattern of condemnations throughout the period we need to look 
further than definitions of political crime to the willingness and ability of regimes to 
condemn those who spoke out against them. 
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4 
The Punishment of Political Crime 
In the decade from Piero Soderini's election to the new office of Gonfalonier 
for life in 1502 until his forceful expulsion from the Palace in 1512 only one 
individual was condemned for speaking against the regime. By contrast, as Table 
One below shows, after the Medici returned to Florence in 1512 the next fifteen 
months alone saw twenty -one individuals condemned for verbal offences against the 
regime, and by the time the Medici were expelled from the city in 1527 a total of 
forty individuals had been condemned for speaking out against them. In the three 
years of the restored popular government of the last republic nine individuals were 
condemned for speaking against the regime. 
It is not possible to give a completely accurate account of the numbers 
condemned throughout the period from 1502 to 1530 for verbal offences against the 
regime not least because there a few small gaps in the surviving archive records of 
the Florentine magistracies concerned with criminal justice in the city.' More 
significantly however, the records themselves do not always reveal, as we have seen, 
the nature of the crime for which an individual was condemned, and on occasion 
even disguised it. Nevertheless, it is clear that there was an enormous difference not 
only between the rates at which popular and Medicean governments condemned 
people for verbal offences against the regime, but also between those of the two 
popular governments of 1502 to 1512 and 1527 to 1530. 
' The records of the decisions and deliberations (partiti e deliberazioni) of the Otto di Guardia for the 
period of 1502 to 1530 are not extant for the following months: Sept. to Dec. 1508, May to Aug. 
1510, Jan. to Apr. 1522, May to Aug. 1523, Jan. to Apr. 1525, May to Aug. 1527, Jan. to Apr. 1528, 
Jan. to Aug. 1530. The records of the Quarantia, contained in the deliberations of the Signoria and 




Numbers of individuals condemned for verbal attacks against the regime from 1502 to 1530. 
Popular regime Medicean regime Popular regime of last republic 
November 1502 to August 1512 September 1512 to 16 May 1527 17 May 1527 to August 1530 
Year Numbers of Year Numbers of Year Numbers of 
Condemned Condemned Condemned 
1503 1 1512 3 1527 1 
1513 18 1528 4 
1514 5 1529 3 








Total 1 40 9 
Sources: A.S.F., O.G., 125 to 206; A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 105 to 114 and 129 to 133. 
The pattern of condemnations for verbal offences was irregular across 
regimes, but it is the lack of condemnations during the popular regime while Soderini 
was Gonfalonier that stands out most. For as Table One shows, both the Medicean 
regime and the popular regime of the last republic condemned an average of about 
three individuals a year. The similarity between the two regimes is of particular note, 
given the reputation of the popular regime of the last republic for extreme 
ruthlessness in its pursuit and punishment of political crime, including verbal 
offences.2 In fact, in its three short years the last republic condemned three times 
fewer individuals for verbal offences than had the Medici in the first three years after 
their return to the city in 1512, and half as many individuals as were condemned by 
the Medici in 1513 alone. 
2 A. Rossi, Francesco Guicciardini e il governo fiorentino dal 1527 al 1540, i (Bologna, 1896), pp. 
160 -4; Roth, Last Republic, pp. 65 -7, 99, 134 -5, 206, 241; Stephens, Fall, pp. 230, 235, 240, 249; 
Polizzotto, Elect Nation, p. 357. 
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No equivalent study has yet been made of the Medicean regime before 1494 
or of the years of the popular regime from 1494 to 1502 but there were, for example, 
no condemnations by the Otto di Guardia for words against the status in the years 
from 1489 to 1494.3 The period of eight years from 1504 to 1512, when there were 
also no condemnations for a speaking against the `condition' of the city, was thus not 
a wholly exceptional one, even in terms of the city's recent past. There were 
condemnations for verbal offences in both the Laurentian era and after 1494,4 but one 
can speculate that the rate,at which both the Medicean regime after 1512 and the 
popular regime of the last republic condemned individuals for speaking against the 
regime was not only high compared to the popular regime under Soderini, but also, 
though less remarkably so, compared to the Laurentian regime and the popular 
regime from 1494 until 1502. 
Strikingly, the pattern of condemnations was not only uneven across regimes, 
it was also irregular within them. The Medicean regime for example, condemned 
nearly as many individuals in 1513 alone, as in all the other fourteen years of its 
duration put together. Over three -quarters of those condemned under the Medicean 
regime were condemned in the first seven years after the Medici returned to the city, 
and there were no condemnations at all in 1516, 1520, 1524, 1525 and 1527. 
Such large shifts in the rate of condemnations, both between and within 
regimes, might reflect shifting patterns in open and public verbal attacks, or in the 
willingness or ability of regimes to condemn such attacks. Certainly all these factors 
can be found at work. There was no continual flow of open and public detraction of 
any regime, although some historians seem to have assumed one.5 No regime always 
sought ruthlessly to condemn those who spoke out against it. Indeed the lenient 
treatment of verbal offences needs to be seen as part of a more general use of 
clemency by regimes and with which they could prefer or were compelled to deal 
with those suspected, or found to have committed acts against them, even conspiracy 
and revolt. 
' Based on an analysis of A.S.F., O.G., 81 to 98. 
4 See for example A.S.F., O.G., 108, f. 177` (9 December 1497): Condemnation for `verba in dedecus 
et infamiam presentis pacifici et tranquilli status communis Florentie'. 
5 Stephens, Fall, p. 230. 
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Francesco Valori, for example, ensured that no action was taken against 
Lucrezia Salviati for her part in the plot of 1497 partly out of friendship for her 
husband, according to Guicciardini, and partly because it seemed to him an `ugly 
matter' to proceed against a woman.6 To quieten the `rumours' stirred up `in 
vendetta' by the friends and relatives of those who were condemned it was decided 
not to proceed against any more citizens. Cosimo de' Pazzi was not condemned for 
his involvement in the plot of 1513 partly because he was a close relative of the 
Medici, according to Cerretani, and partly because the plot `had not taken root'.8 The 
leaders of the Tumulto del Venerdì in 1527 were not punished because the regime 
feared the potential opposition of the Duke of Urbino to any break in the amnesty he 
had guaranteed,9 and the consequences of doing so while there remained an 
imperialist threat to the city.10 Contrary to the assumptions of historians of criminal 
justice in Florence, regimes did not always engage in the harsh and resolute 
repression of those who committed acts against them." On occasion regimes 
preferred to be lenient. On occasion leniency was forced upon them. 
In so far as historians have looked at all at the punishment of verbal offences 
in Florence, apart from assumptions concerning the extreme ruthlessness of the last 
republic, no attempt has been made to examine or compare the willingness and 
ability of particular regimes to condemn those who spoke out against them.12 Yet 
there were some significant differences, and surprising similarities between the 
regimes. When Soderini was Gonfalonier a more lenient attitude towards verbal 
offences prevailed than it ever did in the Medicean regime or the popular regime of 
the last republic. That was often the result rather of the weakness of the regime and 
6 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 145. 
Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 212 -3; Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 134. 
8 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 303. 
9 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 142: Paolo Benivieni to Bernardo Segni, 29 April 1527; Carnesecchi, 
'Assedio', p. 448. 
10 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 80: Fabrizio Peregrino to Alessandro de' Medici, 26 April 1527; 
Varchi, Storia, i, p. 123. 
" J. Brackett, Criminal Justice and Crime in Late Renaissance Florence, 1537 -1609 (Cambridge, 
1992), p. 1 15; Zorzi, 'Aspetti', pp. 549, 551 -3; Idem, `The Judicial System in Florence in the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth centuries', Crime, Society and the Law in Renaissance Italy, ed. T. Dean and 
K. J. P. Lowe (Cambridge 1994), p. 55; Becker, `Changing patterns', pp. 281 -2. 
12 Some remarks concerning specific cases only can be found in Butters, Governors, pp. 54, 62, 222; 
Stephens, Fall, p. 165. 
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its inability to proceed against those who engaged in verbal attacks, than of a natural 
preference for leniency. Divisions within the regime obstructed action against verbal 
attacks, and gave shelter to those who spoke out against the regime. Unable to deal 
resolutely with verbal offences, the popular regime before 1512 was for the same 
reasons equally unable to take action against those consorting with the Medici, even 
those suspected of intriguing with them. These weaknesses were to have serious and 
significant consequences for they encouraged and enabled opponents of the regime in 
1497 and 1512 to conspire against it, and thus were one reason for the overthrow of 
the regime in 1512. 
By contrast there was a greater willingness and ability in both the Medicean 
regime and the popular government of the last republic to condemn verbal offences. 
Both sought, for the same reasons, to be more ruthless towards those who spoke out 
against them than Soderini had been, although it was for quite separate reasons that 
they both succeeded. The last republic was no more extreme than the Medici in the 
regularity with which it condemned verbal offences, but during the siege it was more 
severe in its punishment of them. Whatever their preference for ruthlessness however, 
both regimes could still find themselves incapable of resolute action against those 
suspected of intriguing against them, with consequences just as serious as they had 
been for the popular regime in 1497 and 1512. The Medici regime split apart in the 
winter of 1526 and, as before 1512, those desiring to overthrow the regime were able 
to exploit the gap. That was ultimately to result in the revolt of April 1527 known as 
the Tumulto del Venerdì. 
The very important relationship between conspiracies against the regime, and 
the degree of resolution with which it dealt with those suspected or found to have 
committed crimes against it has not been recognized before.'3 Yet that conspiracies 
against the popular regime, and in particular that by which it was overthrown in 1512, 
were encouraged, and made easier by the failure of the regime to deal ruthlessly with 
its enemies was the judgement of most contemporaries including both Machiavelli and 
Guicciardini. Florence knew to its cost, Antonio Brucioli wrote lamentedly 
13 The matter is referred to briefly in relation to the overthrow of Soderini in Pesman Cooper, 
'Caduta', p. 256. 
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in 1526, `what it was not to punish the violators of liberty'.14 Indeed that the popular 
regime had been overthrown in 1512 on account of its lack of resolution, and that of 
Soderini in particular, in dealing with verbal offences and those suspected of 
intriguing against the regime, was an argument frequently used by members of both 
the Medicean government and the popular government of the last republic, as we 
shall see, to justify calls for the harsh repression of acts against the regime. The 
desire to avoid the mistakes of Soderini was thus one reason for the more ruthless 
attitude after 1512 towards verbal offences of both the Medicean regime and the last 
republic. If the Medici were more ruthless after 1512 than they had been in the 
fifteenth century, this was why. 
However, to understand fully the attitudes of regimes towards verbal 
offences, it is necessary to understand a little more about the offences themselves, 
about the public nature of such crimes, and the purposes that lay behind them. Those 
condemned for speaking against the regime had usually been denounced to the 
authorities by private individuals, often in formal notifications to the Otto.15 As 
happened to del Pugliese, their words could be reported by someone, in this case a 
soldier, who had overheard them.16 Often however, as in the case of Piero Orlandini, 
it was the very people with whom the condemned had been speaking who informed 
the authorities." Both Cocchi and Ficini were `discussing with one other', as Segni 
put it.18 Their words were spoken to and in the presence of only one other person, 
who then informed on them.19 Where those condemned for words against the regime 
had been reported by communal officials or magistrates this was because, as with 
Andrea Rinuccini and Francesco Carcherelli,20 or Camillo Antinori,21 their words 
were spoken to or in presence of those officials who reported them. 
14 Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 306. 
15 
For example, the cases against both Larione Buongugliemi in 1515 and Giovanni Buoncompagnio 
in 1517 originated with formal notifications to the Otto. A.S.F., O.G., 163, f. 55`; Ibid., 167, f. 62`. 
16 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 28. 
17 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 437; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 251. 
18 Segni, Storie, i, pp. 213, 266. 
19 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. 1, 65, n. 48: Gianbattista Tosinghi to Cechotto Tosinghi, 12 October 1529; 
Busini, Lettere, p. 36; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 138. 
Z° A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, iv, ff. 270 " -1`: Gheri to Lorenzo de' Medici, 6 August 1518. 
21 Ibid., ii, f. 152r: Gheri to Ser Bernardo Fiamminghi, 12 April 1517. 
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There were a few exceptions to this. One was the condemnation of Pandolfo 
Biliotti, Duccio Adimari and three others in the aftermath of the plot of 1513.22 They 
were arrested and examined in connection with the conspiracy,23 probably because 
their names appeared on a list drawn up by the plot's two leaders, Boscoli and 
Capponi, of those whom they believed would support the plot.24 However, Biliotti 
and the others were found to have had no knowledge of the conspiracy.25 While 
Biliotti denied that Boscoli or Capponi had told him anything of the plot, he did 
confess to having had conversations with Boscoli concerning their preference for the 
popular regime and mutual dislike of the `present government', and with Capponi 
concerning internal and external affairs.26 
Biliotti and the others had spoken against the regime with those who then 
conspired against it and that is why they were condemned. Indeed they seem to have 
been considered to have unconsciously encouraged the plot, and thus Giuliano de' 
Medici reported that whilst-they had had no knowledge of the conspiracy they were 
punished for `having some participation'.27 Others examined on the list who were 
`not at fault', as Giuliano put it, including Piero Orlandini, Lodovico de' Nobili and 
Daniello Strozzi, were released, in return for sureties of between one and three 
thousand florins.28 Biliotti and the others were banished from the city for terms of 
three and four years, but within days were released from their sentences, on the 
election of Cardinal Giovanni to the Papacy, and absolved by the Balìa.29 
Biliotti and the others were opponents of the Medici grumbling of the regime 
amongst themselves, and thus if it had not been for the conspiracy it is unlikely that 
22 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 39` (26 February): Condemnation of Ubertino Boncianni and Francesco 
Serragli `pro conservatione presentis optimi pacifici status et regiminis populi Fiorentini'; Ibid., f. 42` 
(1 March): Condemnation of Pandolfo Biliotti and Duccio Adimari `pro conservatione presentis 
optimi pacifici status et regiminis populi Fiorentini'; Ibid., f. 45` (5 March): Condemnation of 
Giovanni di Ser Antonio Bartolomei for `just and reasonable causes'. 
23 
Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 159 °; Sanudo, Diarii, xv, col. 574: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da 
Bibbiena, 19 February 1513; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 5; Vaglienti, Storia, p. 237. 
24 
Sanudo, Diarii, xvi, coll. 25 -6: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, 7 March 1513. Cerretani, 
Ricordi, p. 299, gives Adimari, Bartolomei, and Biliotti as having been on the list. 
25 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18`; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 299; Idem, Dialogo, pp. 75 -6; Cambi, Istorie, 
xxii, p. 5; Vettori, `Sommario', p. 295; Nerli, Commentari, p. 123. 
226 A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 269: Examination of Pandolfo Biliotti (25 February 1513). 
27 Sanudo, Diarii, xvi, col. 26: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, 7 March 1513. 
78 A.S.F., O.G., 155, ff. 39 " -40` (26 February): Andrea Marsuppini was also one of their number. 
29 Ibid., f. 50` (12 March); A.S.F., Balle, 43, ff. 136`-" (4 April). 
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they would have come to the attention of the Otto. Bartolomeo Redditi's 
conversations concerning Savonarola had also only come to light because the others 
involved, two friars, were then examined after preaching against the regime. As were 
the friars, almost all those condemned for speaking against the regime, were 
condemned because they had spoken where they could be overheard or with those 
who might inform on them. They had spoken not with friends but with strangers, not 
at home but in piazze, churches and shops, not in private but in public. 
This difference between private and public criticism of the regime was 
recognized by contemporaries. Notifications accused individuals of `publicly' 
speaking ill of the regime.30 Diarists and chroniclers refer to occasions when 
criticism of the regime by `citizens' was made `secretly', such as in March 1503 and 
March 1515,31 or in their villas as in August 1523.32 They refer also to times when 
such criticism was made `openly' and `publicly', such as in May 1505, December 
1507 and in the days before the peaceful overthrow of the Medici in May 1527,33 and 
on a number of occasions during the last republic.34 No one seems to have been 
condemned in connection with any of these instances of outspokenness, and so while 
it is clear that open and public detraction of the regime was never continuous, it is 
equally clear that the pattern of condemnations for verbal offences bears little 
reflection of the pattern of public criticism as recorded by the chroniclers. 
While those condemned for verbal offences had spoken openly against the 
regime, their purposes in doing so are often difficult to discern. Certainly it cannot be 
assumed, as it has been, that those condemned for verbal attacks were engaged in any 
deliberate form of `open rebellion' or challenge to the power of the regime.35 If there 
were instances of attempts to arouse hostility to the regime or even hostile acts 
against it. there were as many cases, if not more, that were the result of carelessness, 
even thoughtlessness. One reason for the lack of condemnations during the 
30 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), f. 92" (March 1528). 
31 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, f. 88" (March 1503); Ibid., II IV 171, E 114` (March 1515). 
32 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 431. 
33 Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, E 59" (May 1505); Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 156 (December 1507); L. 
Guicciardini, `Sacco', p. 212 (May 1527). 
34 
Segni, `Vita', p. 312 (1527); Nerli, Commentari, p. 169 (May 1528); Varchi, Storia, i, p. 207 
(September 1527); Ibid., ii, p. 10 (July 1529). 
35 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, pp. 259 -60, 321; Idem, `Medici', pp. 142 -3. 
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Republican regime of 1502 to 1512 may well have lain in what may best be 
described as the less nervous attitude of the regime under Soderini to such outbursts. 
There are a very few clear cases where those condemned do seem to have 
been attempting to arouse hostility to the regime and even hostile acts against it 
amongst the popolo. Fra Spirito was reported to have told his examiners that he had 
cried ` popolo e libertà' in the Piazza in 1521 because he `wanted to be king and 
tyrant as the Cardinal and wicked as those who examined him' and he `wanted to see 
whether the popolo would help him as it helped them'.36 Luigi Manelli was found to 
have been wanting to arouse popular anger against leading citizens, and while the 
purposes of those who publicly questioned the motives of leaders of the regime was 
always a matter of dispute, even to his supporters it was evident that his speech had 
been made, as Vaglienti put it, to please the ` popolo' and in the belief that he would 
have its `favour'.37 
Manelli was condemned for intending to arouse the popolo and to disturb the 
status. All the others condemned however, were condemned for their words alone 
and not the purposes for which they may have been intended. This was no doubt 
because, unlike Manelli, they were found to have spoken directly against the regime 
which was enough on its own to condemn them. Yet it is possible that they were 
attempting to arouse and incite hostility against the regime. Certainly the 
condemnation of Giovanbattista Petrucci tells us that his words had been spoken `in 
the presence of many and various men and persons standing by and hearing',38 while 
those of Francesco Marchi, Francesco Torrigiani and Fra Bonaventura emphasize 
that the words were said in `more and different places and times'.39 Three 
Augustinian friars from Santo Spirito40 were banished from the city for three years in 
October 1512 for words spoken `in the presence of other persons' and over a period 
36 Anon., `Diario, 1521-1532', f 2v. 
37 Vaglienti, Storia, p. 174. 
38 A.S.F., O.G., 157, f 371 (October 1513): `coram pluribus et multis hominibus et personis astantibus 
et audientibus'. 
39 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 63` (April 1513): `in pluribus et diversis locis et temporibus'; Ibid., 187. f. 421 
(October 1523); Ibid., 205, f 6` (May 1529). 
ao 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f 34`: Pandolfo de' Conti to Francesco Guicciardini, 13 November 
1512. 
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of some weeks.41 One Simone di Gabriello was fined in April 1526 for words 
described as spoken in various places and in the presence of many people,42 as were 
those of Larione Buonguglielmi, whose crimes were described as `malicious', over a 
decade before.43 The prophesy of Giusto della Badessa and the friars in 1513 was no 
doubt made before gatherings large or small, although since they were condemned 
`for the conservation' of the status the record does not specify this. 
Such evidence is suggestive but inconclusive. And if any of these individuals 
were hoping to arouse hostility to the regime and even hostile acts against it, in the 
cases of most of those condemned there is nothing to suggest that their offences 
amounted to anything more than the simple public expression of hostility to the 
regime. There is no evidence for example, to support the recent assertion that 
Bartolomeo Pandolfini and Francesco del Pugliese were `agitating against the 
regime'.44 Galeotto de' Medici wondered if Pandolfini had `done it in order to speak 
much of similar matters', but as he informed Lorenzo, Pandolfini confessed `that he 
said it to no other effect than to talk a lot', pointing to a crime of idle chatter.45 
Florentines, as we have seen, distinguished between those who spoke 
`through wickedness' and those `given to chattering'; the `populus iniquus' and the 
`populus murmurans' or `dolens' once referred to by Savonarola.46 While both 
`grumble and complain about the regime', the `populus iniquus' keep `inciting those 
turned to the public good, continually trying to turn them round and to harm the 
public good', and were responsible for handbills (polizze).47 Distributed in churches 
and squares, handbills were not uncommon within our period, particularly when 
ai A.S.F., O.G., 154, f. 821 (13 October 1512): Condemnation for words spoken `coram aliis personis 
... in dedecus et vilipendium presentis pacifici status et dicti domini Otto'. Magister Jacopo was exiled 
to San Castello di Montefalcho, Fra Simone to Genoa, Fra Piero to Padua. 
42 A.S.F., O.G., 194, f. 93` (27 April 1526): Condemnation for `mala vita et moribus maloque animo 
contra presentem pacificum et tranquillum statum ... verba contumeliosa ignominiosa et inhonesta in 
dedecus et vilipendium presentis pacifici status et ... maxime civitatis Florentie et civium dicte 
civitatis' 
as A.S.F., O.G., 163, f. 56" (December 1515). See also Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 124`: `disse 
queste parole al urchio'. 
44 Polizzotto, `Medici', p. 144. 
as 
A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVI, n. 627: Galeotto de' Medici to Lorenzo de' Medici, 28 December 1514. 
46 
G. Savonarola, Prediche sopra Amos e Zaccaria, ed. P. Ghighieri, i (Rome, 1971), p. 152. 
47 Ibid., p. 155. 
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Soderini was Gonfalonier, although no one was ever condemned for them.48 On 
occasion they were clearly intended to encourage hostility to the regime. In February 
1505 handbills were found throughout the city urging the 'popolo' not to vote for 
taxes for thus it would be free of the Gonfalonier, the Cardinal his brother, and the 
French alliance and `you will recover your liberty'.49 Parenti thought that these 
words came from those citizens `discontented of being deprived of the supreme 
dignity, and not being raised to that outstanding grade above the others as they 
desired'.5° 
'Idlers and chatterers' (cicale) were described by Niccolò Martelli and 
carnival songs of the period as those 'old men' who spent all their time at the so- 
called 'Tornaquinci corner' or on the benches around Santa Trinità and the palace of 
the Ufficiali dei Pupilli, `discussing maliciously and speaking ill of all the passers- 
by'.51 When either the weather or `bad times' meant that everyone stayed indoors and 
no one passed they would be `forced' to speak ill of the regime, and particularly of 
`the fantasy and the design' of the regime and of those things which the regime `has 
in fantasy of doing'.52 `They are so accustomed and loosened -up in their ill- 
speaking', Martelli wrote, `that it seems to them sooner to offend when they speak 
well, than when they speak ill'.33 To have `chattered (cicalato) foolishly as he does' 
was how Pandolfini's crime was described by Francesco Guicciardini, a member of 
the Otto that condemned him.54 Ficini too was described by one contemporary as 
having `chattered' against the regime." Savonarola also spoke of the `populus 
inutilis': the `foolish men who complain and do not know what they are saying'.56 
Piero di Bartolo, condemned for `speaking ill of regime' in 1513,57 and banished 
48 
See for example, Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, f. 3" (March 1504). 
49 
Ibid., f. 45`. 
50 Ibid., ff. 45'". 
51 
N. Martelli, `Discorso', ed. C. Guasti, `Documenti', p. 217; `Canzone delle pancaccie', Trionfi e 
canti carnascialeschi toscani del rinascimento, ed. R. Bruscagli, i (Rome 1986), pp. 185 -9. See also 
Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 87. 
52 Martelli, `Discorso', ed. Guasti, `Documenti', pp. 217 -8. 
53 Ibid., p. 218. 
54 
F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, i, p. 232: Francesco to Luigi Guicciardini, 3 January 1515. 
55 
B.N.F., Magl., XXV, 555, f. 210r: `Da un libro di Giovambatista Betti'. 
56 Savonarola, Amos e Zaccaria, i, p. 152. 
5' Landucci, Diario, p. 334: `dissono che gli aveva isparlato dello stato'. 
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from the city for six years,58 seems to have been one of these. Landucci records him 
to have been a macebearer and describes him as a `simple man' who often spoke 
thoughtlessly, `characterizing the citizens, without thinking any harm'.59 
So some open verbal attacks against the regime were clearly not a 
premeditated or deliberate attempt to arouse or encourage hostility to the regime. 
Often indeed, they amounted only to the careless remarks of men made in the midst 
of a non -political argument. Moreover, in such cases it is clear that the nature of 
insult made to the regime was directed by the nature of the argument in which it 
appeared. In December 1522 Francesco Tosinghi was condemned for words in 
dishonour of the `status', having said that `Florence does not render justice'. His 
assertion was made to a woman who, rejecting his extremely threatening sexual 
advances, had told him she would have recourse to Florentine justice.60 Girolamo 
degli Albizzi's snobbish `chattering' about the regime, as the Quarantia described 
it,61 was directed at a pressing creditor whom he obviously considered to be socially 
inferior.62 Orlandini's denial of the legitimacy of Cardinal Giulio's elevation to the 
papacy was made to the man to whom he had lost a bet on whether Giulio would be 
elected.63 He was apparently heard by many bystanders in the Piazza and Orlandini 
may even have begun to address them to find support for his argument, but it was the 
argument and not the crowd that mattered.64 Thus Cambi considered that he had been 
moved `either by passion of money lost, or by rashness, or by not wanting to pay 
up'. 65 
58 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 15` (22 January 1513): Condemnation `pro conservatione presentis pacificis 
optimi status et regiminis populi Fiorentini'. 
59 Landucci, Diario, p. 334. 
6° A.S.F., O.G., 184, f. 83 ": "Florentia non reddit ius' in verecundiamque vilipendium presentis 
pacifici status'. Her words are recorded as `io mene andrò alla ragione di Firenze'. 
61 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, f. 85`. 
62 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), f. 131`. 
6' A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 2081-: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 November 1523; Ibid., 
f. 224`: 6 December 1523; Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 8 "; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 437; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxii, p. 251; Nerli, Commentari, p. 141; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 63. 
64 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 208`: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 November 1523; Ibid., 
f. 224 6 December 1523; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 180`. 
65 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 250. 
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In many cases, such as Antinori's `chattering' as Luigi Guicciardini described 
it, the argument was with communal officials or their servants,66 and was the result of 
an individual being `pushed by passion', as Benedetto Buondelmonti explained to the 
Otto of his own outburst against servants of the Syndics in 1527.67 All accounts of 
the case of Jacopo Alamanni, for example, concur with that in his condemnation that 
he had called on the popolo and Palace guard to help him whilst he was being chased, 
arrested, and led to prison by servants of the Otto following his assault on a fellow 
citizen.68 Verbal attacks directed at communal officials and members of the 
magistracies were often the result of confrontations produced by the wider political 
conflict, as we shall see, but the attacks themselves, as were many others, were 
usually made to no other purpose than the relief of the frustration and anger of those 
who made them. 
Thus while some of those condemned may have been attempting to arouse 
popular hostility to the regime, perhaps with the intention, however vague and 
however distant, that popular activity against the regime would result, only Fra 
Spirito could be said to have made any direct attempt to arouse a popular revolt. The 
offences of probably most of those condemned however, were the result of 
carelessness even thoughtlessness. One reason for the relative lack of condemnations 
during the popular regime before 1512 may be because there was less concern to 
condemn careless outbursts and idle chatter that did not intend to arouse hostility to 
the regime. Thus Manelli was pursued with vigour and Soderini endeavoured to have 
the authors of polizze punished. In 1503 handbills were found in churches and piazze 
in `shame and blame' of the Gonfalonier, calling him a tyrant and saying other 
`harmful and spiteful' things. Others reproached him for having his wife move in to 
the Palace and take over a room there belonging to the Dieci. Parenti says that 
66 
F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ii, p. 86: Luigi to Francesco Guicciardini, 13 April 1517. 
67 B.N.F., F.P. II III 433, f. 83 ": `Raguaglio del caso di Benedetto Buondelmonti per Messer Filippo 
suo figliuolo'. 
68 B.N.F., F.P., II III 433, f. 80`: `Raguaglio del caso di Jacopo Alamanni per Lionardo Ginori'; 
Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 22 "; Anon., `Cronica', E 167 "; Sanudo, Diarii, xlix, coll. 144 -5, 152 -3: 
Letters of Antonio Suriano and Lorenzo Bertolotti, 7 November 1528; Carnesecchi, `Assedio', p. 457; 
Nerli, Commentari, p. 176; Busini, Lettere, pp. 26, 69; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 359 -60. 
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Soderini's attitude was to pretend not to care while secretly investigating the 
authors.69 
Yet in February 1505 Soderini sought to counter public praise for the Medici 
excited, according to Parenti, when a wax statue of Giuliano was placed by his sisters 
in the church of Santissima Annunziata, by having the Otto order that the statue be 
removed from public view on the grounds that images of ribelli could not be 
represented in public.70 Rather than move against those who were speaking in 
Giuliano's favour, Soderini sought to remove the source that encouraged such talk, 
and no attack on the regime was perceived in Carlo Federighi's cry of ` popolo', 
where the popular regime of the last republic dealt harshly with the equally careless 
cries of Buondelmonti and Alamanni. This raises the question of why it was that both 
the Medicean regime and the popular government of the last republic condemned so 
ruthlessly verbal offences that intended no threat to the security of the regime. The 
cases themselves provide some answers. 
The condemnation of Francesco Tosinghi in 1522 explained that for his `most 
enormous and most wicked crimes' he was to be exiled to Livorno for ten years, to 
give an `example' to others, and so that he could not `glory' in his crimes.71 Such 
was the official explanation for the punishment of many crimes, and exactly the same 
words can be found for example, in the condemnations of some of the conspirators in 
1497.72 Yet these expressions were not just cant, and the need to punish verbal 
offences in order to provide an example that would discourage others expressed the 
very real fears held by members of the regime of the consequences of allowing those 
who spoke out against it to go unpunished. 
In a pratica concerning the case of Luigi Manelli, magistrates advised that he 
deserved punishment `with respect to the example of the city',73 and Cerretani reports 
that it was argued that if Manelli was not punished it would lessen the `dignity' and 
`reputation' of the Signoria, and encourage further attempts to arouse some 
69 Parenti, `Storia', II II 133, f. 95`; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 73. 
70 Parenti, Storia', II II 134, ff. 46" -7`. 
71 A.S.F., O.G., 184, f. 83v. 
72 Ibid., 108, ff. 131% 141'. 
7' Consulte e Pratiche, 1498 -1505, p. 912 (March 1503). 
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`dangerous popular revolt'.74 It was this same argument, that `if they were not so 
punished it would cause others to perpetrate a similar crime', as the Otto once put it 
in a condemnation for conspiracy,75 that was applied by the Medicean regime and the 
popular government of the last republic to careless outbursts and idle chatter. Thus as 
Parenti recorded in April 1513, the punishment of Francesco Marchi with fifteen 
lashes in the Mercato Vecchio, fifteen at the Ponte Vecchio, a fine and a twenty -five 
year term of imprisonment in the Stinche,76 was `all in order to give terror to 
others' .77 
Nardi describes the year from the parlamento until the re- establishment of the 
Seventy and the other institutions of the Laurentian era in November 1513 as a period 
of particular nervousness and suspicion for partisans of the Medici.78 There can be no 
clearer demonstration of this than that there were more condemnations in those 
thirteen months alone than in the entire following fourteen years of the regime.79 
The Medicean regime seems to have been particularly determined to deal 
ruthlessly with verbal offences when foreign enemies of the city were threatening to 
attack it, and indeed condemnations for verbal offences provide the clearest 
illustration of the nervousness and insecurity of the regime in the face of external 
threat. This was especially so when the enemy in question was France, for her close 
association with popular liberty meant that any new French expedition in Italy such as 
that in May 1513 aroused, as one contemporary recorded at the time, the hopes and 
expectations of opponents of the Medici within the city of a `fresh revolution'.80 Such 
a climate may have encouraged outspokenness against the regime, but it was also one 
in which no public detraction of the regime was to be tolerated. Thus Parenti records 
that in June some `malcontents' began to `speak against the present regime' and that 
the arrest of Giusto della Badessa and the friars for prophesying revolution was made 
`in order to give terror'. Indeed it succeeded in giving an `example 
74 Cerretani, Storia, p. 318; Idem, Ricordi, p. 176. 
75 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 60', 68" (July 1522). 
76 A.S.F., O.G., 155, f. 63 "; Ibid., 230 (Libro di Condanne), f. 103`; Ibid., 223 (Libro di Bandi), f. 
22`; A.S.F., Soprastante delle Stinche, Carcerati, 126, f. 1 ". 
77 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 89 ". 
78 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 24. 
79 See Table One above. 
80 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 88 ". 
141 
many', as intended, and `the city seemed to have fallen into melancholy, because 
everyone was held back by fear'.81 The Otto itself explained their punishment as `to 
allay disturbances and prematurely remove scandal that can arise',82 and the same 
terms were used two months later to explain the five year sentence of banishment 
from city imposed on the weaver Francesco di Giovanni.83 
The condemnations for verbal offences in December 1514 of Bartolomeo 
Pandolfini, in July 1515 of Niccolò Paganelli, and in October 1523 of Francesco 
Torrigiani ,84 and Alessandro Manetti,85 as well as Martino Scarfi, were all at times 
when opponents of the Medici were encouraged by a possible French attack on 
Florence, to expect and hope for the overthrow of the regime.S6 In the face of new 
French expedition in Italy the fear that the popolo would turn against the regime was 
such in July 1515 and October 1523 that troops were brought into the city.87 In these 
circumstances ruthless action against those who spoke out against the regime was 
considered imperative, particularly if they spoke of a French attack as imminent, as 
Pandolfini did, or of their strength, as Scarfi had done. For his `lying' and 
`inconvenient words' of `great importance' Scarfi was fined a hundred gold florins, 
exiled to Arezzo for three years, and banned from office for life.88 
Francesco Guicciardini, a member of the Otto that condemned Pandolfini in 
1514, explained in a letter to his brother how the popolo had `pricked up its ears' to 
reports of a French expedition and begun to speak `as is its custom', so that `it was 
judged necessary that with the first one who erred an example should be given to the 
81 Ibid., f. 93`. 
82 A.S.F., O.G., 156, f. 22 ": `Ad turbationes sedandas et scandala que orii possint maturius 
removenda'. 
83 Ibid., 156, f. 78 ". 
84 Ibid., 187, f. 42` (19 October): Condemnation for words `non convenientia' and of ̀ magnam 
importantiam' and `in dedecus et vituperium presentis pacifici status et boni regiminis civitatis et 
communis Florentie' to be banned from office for life, imprisoned in the fortress of Volterra for six 
months and then exiled to Pietra Santa for six years. See also Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 435. 
85 A.S.F., O.G., 187, f. 43` (20 October): Condemnation for words `contra presentem pacificum 
statum' to be banned from office for life and exiled to Città di Castello for life. 
86 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 116" (July 1515); Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 433 -4 (October 1523); 
Butters, Governors, pp. 248 -9 and Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 322 (December 1514). 
87 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, ff 1161.-" and Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 113 -4 (1515); 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 433 (1523). 
88 A.S.F., O.G., 187, f. 27`. 
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others', and `chance desired that it fell on him'.89 Pandolfini was condemned, as 
Galeotto informed Lorenzo, `to give example to the chatterers who do not have any 
respect' and to ensure that others `do not become too courageous',90 and he was 
banned from office for five years.91 In the atmosphere created by a threatened attack 
on the city, the regime was particularly fearful that open and public detraction of the 
regime, even if idle chatter, could encourage more serious acts against it if left 
unpunished. 
Yet the most striking illustration of the fears of the Medicean regime 
concerning the inflammatory effects of careless outbursts had little to do with an 
external threat to the city. The immediate execution of Piero Orlandini in November 
1523,92 only hours after his public dispute of the legitimacy of Giulio's elevation to 
the Papacy as Clement VII, struck contemporaries as particularly ruthless and 
severe,93 and was described by opponents of the Medici as an act of `tyrannical' 
excess.94 The only execution by the Medicean regime for a verbal offence, it was 
done, both Cambi and Nardi recorded, to ensure that the subject was disputed no 
further.9' Clement himself was displeased by the hasty execution, or so he sought to 
demonstrate, but it was necessary that he approved it, according to Nerli, as a matter 
concerning his 'honour'.96 
Nerli's remark reveals that there was more behind the condemnation of verbal 
attacks in general, and Orlandini's execution in particular, than the nervous desire of 
the regime to deter further and more serious acts against it. There was the vengeful 
desire to exact retribution from those who made offensive insults to the honour of the 
Medici and the regime. The regime and its supporters found some verbal attacks so 
89 F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, i, p. 232: Francesco to Luigi Guicciardini, 3 January 1515. 
90 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVI, nn. 627, 629: Galeotto to Lorenzo de' Medici, 27 and 28 December 1514. 
91 A.S.F., O.G., 160. f. 75v. 
92 Ibid., 187, f. 69r: Condemnation to be beheaded in the courtyard of the Bargello within two hours. 
93 Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 8 "; Anon., `Cronica', f. 149`; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 180`; 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 437; Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, p. clxxxi; Masi, Ricordanze, p. 271; Varchi, 
Storia, i, p. 64. 
94 Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 262; Guasti, ed., `Documenti', p. 194: Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi 
Alamanni to Battista della Palla, 2 March 1524. 
9s 
Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 251 -2; Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 94. 
96 Nerli, Commentari, p. 141; Busini, Lettere, p. 59; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 64. 
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offensive as to call them `bestial', and their perpetrators 'beasts'.97 The man to whom 
Orlandini voiced what was described as his `bestial fantasy' of Clement, was 
reported to have told Orlandini that `you debase your soul to say such words of our 
lord Pope'.98 Orlandini's execution reflected not only the nervousness of the regime 
but the extremely offensive nature of his insult. 
Camillo Antinori's insult of the regime in 1517 was another that was 
described at the time as having been made `very filthily', the result of his having 
`come into so much bestiality'.99 Goro Gheri wrote to Alfonsina of how Antinori's 
`dishonest words' and `brutish villany' had `stunk sharply' in the noses of the Otto 
and the 'primi cittadini' and thus seemed to them to deserve `great punishment'.'°° 
Indeed Gheri reported that Antinori's error had been `so great' that some wanted him 
executed, although Gheri had been opposed to this,10' and Antinori was eventually 
sentenced to be banished from the city for five years.' °2 
The same desires to discourage other more serious acts against the regime and 
to exact retribution were behind the condemnation of careless outbursts, idle chatter 
and other verbal offences by the popular regime of the last republic. The notification 
against Carlo de' Medici recalled the execution of Piero Orlandini `for a single 
word', and recommended that Carlo be hung, `to give example to the others'.103 That 
against Girolamo degli Albizzi, for which he was eventually banished from the city 
for five years,104 spoke of the `ugly' nature of his crimes and urged that his 
punishment would `turn the minds of others away from proceeding in the same 
manner' .105 In this respect the last republic was no more extreme than the Medicean 
regime, and it thus condemned on average no more individuals each year than the 
Medicean regime had done. Yet there was a more extreme insecurity, nervousness 
and desire for retribution felt by the popular regime which was displayed in the 
97 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1107, f. 132 ": Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 12 March 1519. 
98 Ibid., 1108, f. 208`: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 November 1523. 
99 
F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ii, p. 86: Luigi to Francesco Guicciardini, 13 April 1517. 
100 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, f. 137 ": Goro Gheri to Alfonsina de' Medici, 7 April 1517. 
10' Ibid., f. 150": Gheri to Ser Bernardo Fiamminghi da San Miniato, 11 April 1517. 
1 °2 
A.S.F., O.G., 167, f. 59"; F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ii, p. 86. 
1 °3 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), ff. 8" -9`. 
1 °4 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, f. 85`. 
105 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), ff. 131`-". 
144 
greater use of execution for verbal offences in the last republic and of public 
execution in particular. 
The Pazzi conspirators of 1478 and the plotters of 1481 had been hung from 
the windows of the Bargello for public view.106 Yet thereafter it became increasingly 
frequent practice to hold the executions of those sentenced to death for crimes against 
the status out of the public eye, in order to avoid civic disorder and, in the case of the 
nobility, to spare their families the infamy of any spectacle.107 The execution, by 
beheading, of those condemned to death for conspiracy in 1497, 1513 and 1522 all 
took place at night in the courtyard of the Bargello,108 no doubt, as in 1497, with the 
gate closed and only a `few gentlemen' present.109 Likewise, the beheading of Piero 
Orlandini, described by one contemporary as `not in public' ,11° took place in the 
courtyard of the Bargello with the gate closed.l 11 
Orlandini's execution had been an isolated case amongst forty individuals 
condemned for verbal offences during the Medici regime, and had not taken place in 
public. By contrast, the last republic executed three of the nine individuals it 
condemned, all in public. Girolamo degli Albizzi feared execution for his offence in 
February 1528, and it was for this reason, as he later explained to the Gonfalonier, 
that he fled the city, to be condemned to exile in absentia.112 The first execution for a 
verbal offence during the republic took place only a few months later, that of Jacopo 
Alamanni in November. It occurred on account of the disturbance that resulted from 
his call to the popolo and the Palace guard for aid against his pursuers, and aimed to 
106 B.N.F., F.P., II, I, 138, ff. 771.-78`: `Libro di varie notizie e memorie della venerabile compagnia 
Santa Maria della Croce al Tempio'; Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, pp. cxxvii, cxxxv; Landucci, Diario, 
pp. 19 -21. On 1481 see also Capelli, "Lettere ", p. 254: Bartolomeo Sgnippi to Antonio Montecatini, 6 
June 1481. 
107 A. Zorzi, `Le esecuzioni delle condanne a morte a Firenze nel tardo medioevo: tra repressione 
penale e cerimoniale pubblico' Simbolo e realtà della vita urbana nel tardo medioevo, ed. M. Miglio 
and G. Lombardi (Rome, 1993), pp. 190, 199 -201. 
108 B.N.F., F.P., II, I, 138, ff. 80r, 82 ", 84 "; Landucci, Diario, pp. 157, 334. 
109 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 109; Cerretani, Storia, p. 239; Pitti, `Istoria', p. 49. 
10 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 224 ": Lettere of 6 December 1523. 
B.N.F., F.P., II, I, 138, f. 84 "; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 437. 
12 B.N.F., F.P., II, III, 65, ff. 341` -2 ": `Proposizione proposta al Gonfaloniere di Giustizia da 
Girolamo degli Albizzi'. This is a plea for the sentence of banishment imposed on him to be lifted, in 
which Albizzi expresses the desire to come to the aid of his city during the siege, offers advice on 
how best to conduct its defence, and gives information on the enemy's forces. 
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quell the disturbance and give `example to others'.13 To that end and `so that all the 
insolent see the necessity of living quietly',114 and to prevent the `great disorder' and 
`travail' of the Republic that would have resulted if the punishment he deserved was 
not immediate,115 Alamanni was beheaded within a matter of hours of his offence. 
Furthermore, the highly unusual step was taken to have him executed on the 
balustrade of the Palace of the Signoria, from where his head was shown to the 
'popolo' gathered in the Piazza.116 The last time such a demonstration had been made 
was in 1499 when the head of the condottiere, Paolo Vitelli, had been shown to the 
popolo from the Palace after his execution for treachery.117 Then it answered a 
popular demand for blood, where in 1528 it expressed the extreme nervousness and 
insecurity of the Gonfalonier, reported to have been almost overcome with alarm at 
the disturbance, and his fear that it would result in some move against him by his 
arrabbiati opponents.118 
The two other executions for verbal offences, those of Carlo Cocchi and 
Ficino Ficini, came towards the beginning and the end of the siege respectively, and 
were seen by some contemporaries as excessively severe punishments `for having 
simply spoken words and nothing else in benefit of the Medici', indeed unexpectedly 
so.119 Cocchi had fled the city and been unwilling to obey a summons to appear 
before the Otto under pain of being declared an outlaw,120 yet his friends and relatives, 
confident that his error was `light' and `not serious', urged him to obey the summons 
rather than become an outlaw.121 In a remarkable letter, Cocchi's brother, Donato, 
warned him that `you cannot do anything more to your ruin than not appearing here 
tomorrow'. Believing that his case would be treated lightly, Donato 
113 Sanudo, Diarii, xlix, coll. 145, 153. 
114 Segni, Storie, i, pp. 82 -3. 
115 Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, p. 197. 
116 B.N.F., II, I, 138, f. 86'; Anon, `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 22 "; Segni, `Vita', p. 326; Busini, Lettere, 
p. 27; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 360. 
117 Landucci, Diario, p. 203; Busini, Lettere, p. 27. 
118 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 359; Busini, Lettere, p. 69. 
119 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 197'. 
120 A.S.F., O.G., 206, f. 25 ". 
121 Nerli, Coninientari, p. 199; Busini, Lettere, p. 36; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 139. 
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assured him that he could come `safe and secure', and pleaded with him not to let his 
wife and family suffer the costs of his impending banishment.122 
Ficini was condemned to be beheaded during the day in the courtyard of the 
Bargello with the gate open,123 and Cocchi also seems to have been beheaded there in 
daylight, and in public,124 despite the support of his friends and relatives and others 
in the Quarantia who favoured leniency.125 Their severe and public punishment was 
the evident result of the regime's intense desire to deter other more serious acts 
against it, and of its desperate fear of the consequences of allowing those who spoke 
in favour of the Medicean enemy during the siege, as Ficini had done, or even of 
overthrowing the regime in favour of the Medici, as Cocchi did, to go unpunished. 
Thus the Quarantia demanded Cocchi's execution for `if we decide otherwise, it 
means calling the Medici into Florence and going in danger of the sack through 
sullying the law'.126 There can be no clearer illustration of the extreme insecurity of 
the popular regime during the siege. The difference with the Medicean regime 
however, was only one of degree. The Medici no less than the popular regime had 
ruthlessly condemned public detractors of the regime in the face of an external threat 
to the city. The more extreme treatment of Cocchi and Ficini during the siege was 
mostly an expression of the more extreme fears of a regime under a more extreme 
threat. 
Cocchi's treatment was also a reflection of how `hateful to the popular 
government', was the name of parlamento, as well as of the desire, according to 
Nerli, of those in the regime absolutely opposed to an accord to frighten, which it 
did, those in favour of negotiating an agreement with the Pope and his allies.127 
Cocchi and his brother, Donato, were named on lists of ̀ supporters' of the Medici 
regime drawn up by 1518,128 and his execution was also an expression of resentment, 
122 B.N.F., Magl. XXV, 552, f. 6`: Donato Cocchi to Carlo Cocchi, 8 October 1529. 
123 
A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 133, f. 52`; Anon., `Diario dell' assedio', f. 170 ". 
124 
A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, f. 212r. 
125 Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 139; Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 203. 
126 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, f. 212 ". 
f27 Nerli, Commentari, p. 199; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 139. 
128 B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. 99`- ": `Confidenti e amici', names the Cocchi family. Lanfredino Lanfredini 
(d. 1518) is on this list. See also Appendix A, xiii. 
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Busini recalled, towards a man who was a `factor' of the Medici family.'29 Cocchi's 
treatment was thus partly the result of the desire for vengeance against those too 
closely associated with the old regime. That same desire may have played a part in 
the condemnation by the Quarantia in 1528 of Michele Modesti da Prato,130 to a 
three year term of imprisonment in the Stinche, for some `filth' he had spoken 
against the regime.131 Michele's father, Messer Jacopo Modesti, had been one of the 
officials mostly closely involved with the Medici as Chancellor of the Riformagioni 
from 1515 to 1527, when he was dismissed with the overthrow of the regime.132 
When Cardinal Giulio was absent from Florence in 1521 and 1523, Messer Jacopo 
was left to represent and execute the interests of the Medici and he was one of the 
five citizens who met to decide the fate of Piero Orlandini in 1523.133 The Mantuan 
ambassador described him in 1524 as agent in Florence for the Pope, as Giulio had 
become, and `head of the city' .134 
The condemnation of Benedetto Buondelmonti to imprisonment for four 
years in the fortress of Volterra in December 1527 for his threat to summon the 
popolo of the countryside to his defence against the servants of the Syndics,135 was 
also partly the expression of a desire for vengeance against those who had been close 
supporters of the Medicean regime, and this was one reason why some in the 
Quarantia had wanted him executed.136 Indeed, as we shall see, his crime itself was a 
reaction to the official pursuit of revenge in the form of the Syndics. Yet Busini 
explained that the severity of Buondelmonti's punishment was the result of the desire 
of 'uomini popolani', men from the lower end of political society, and who 
dominated the Quarantia that condemned him, to defend liberty, the result of their 
fear of the consequences of allowing him to go unpunished.137 Thus it would be 
129 Busini, Lettere, p. 36. 
130 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 130, ff 21 " -22' (3 February 1528): Condemnation for 'blasfemia' 
and words `contra presentem pacificum statum civitatis'. 
131 Varchi, Storia, n, p. 140. 
132 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 324; D. Marzi, La cancelleria della repubblica fiorentina (Rocca S. 
Casciano, 1910), pp. 309 -10, 319. 
133 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 367 -8, 437; Nerli, Commentari, p. 139; Stephens, Fall, p. 112. 
134 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 284r: Baldino Alessandri to Federico Gonzaga, 25 Febuary 1524. 
135 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 129, f. 291'. 
136 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 208. 
137 Busini, Lettere, p. 145. 
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wrong to view the punishments of Buondelmonti and Modesti, as they have been, as 
solely or even mainly the result of the vindictive desire of members of the popular 
government to attack former supporters of the Medicean regime, and they were not 
protected by law.138 Nevertheless it was because Buondelmonti was a former 
supporter of the Medici that he was perceived to pose a threat to liberty and 
punished, where Carlo Federighi had not been in 1504. 
The summary condemnation by the Signoria of Antonio Brucioli in 1529 to 
two years exile from the city was also the result of a desire to persecute him, but it 
was not in his case because he was a former supporter of the Medici.139 Brucioli 
rather had aroused the enmity of the friars of San Marco, partly because of his 
Lutheran sympathies, and partly because he had continually and openly attacked their 
involvement in public affairs. Thus they sought his persecution and Fra Benedetto da 
Foiano attacked Brucioli in his sermons.140 It would appear to have been at the 
instigation of the friars that a Signoria composed ofpiagnoni had Brucioli detained 
and investigated by the Otto for writing letters to the King of France that spoke ill of 
the regime, and the decision by the Signoria to have Brucioli banished was seen at 
the time as the work of the friars.141 Moreover, according to Varchi, the Signoria 
were said to have intervened because the investigation had discovered only coded 
correspondence between Brucioli and Luigi Alamanni. Support for Brucioli from 
friends of Alamanni meant that the Otto was divided on the case, and the Signoria 
was concerned not to appear to have had Brucioli wrongly detained without 
reason. 142 
Some members of the popular regime believed, as Giannotti later did, that the 
executions of Cocchi and Ficini for having spoken `very few words against the 
regime', produced more `harm' than `utility' to the Republic, because they made `so 
many enemies of the Republic', and their crimes were not so serious that had they 
138 Roth, Last Republic, pp. 67, 99; Stephens, Fall, p. 221. 
139 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 131, f. 93`. 
140 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 67, n. 64: Ottaviano Ciaio to Cecchotto Tosinghi, 29 May 1529; Busini, 
Lettere, p. 34; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 420 -1. 
141 
Busini, Lettere, p. 34; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 421 -2. 
142 Busini, Lettere, pp. 34 -5; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 422. 
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remained unpunished, much harm would have resulted.143 And it would appear that 
those who sought to be ruthless did not always get their way. At the beginning of 
November 1529 the new Signoria deposed the members of the Otto because they 
were not using enough `diligence' and `severity' in proceeding against those `who 
show themselves against the present regime'. 
144 Divisions between members of the 
party of the Ottimati and the party of the Adirati or the Popolo, according to Varchi, 
had paralysed the Otto, and the adirati, finding their calls for executions continually 
opposed, had themselves called for its deposition.145 
Busini reports that the 'popolani' were grieving in April 1 530 that the 
magistracies were not in agreement nor punishing those who committed crimes 
against the Republic. According to Busini the rich and noble who invariably 
inhabited the executive offices were reluctant to proceed against others of their ilk, 
and since members of the executive magistracies had seats in the Quarantia they 
could influence the court.146 Busini thus explained that the severity of 
Buondelmonti's punishment was the result of the time at which it took place, because 
at the beginning of the regime all the magistrates and thus the Quarantia were 
'popolani' and so were keen to be severe.147 
Not all members of the popular regime viewed former supporters of the 
Medici with the fear and hatred that were directed towards Buondelmonti, and indeed 
the Gonfalonier, Niccolò Capponi, was their foremost protector and may have sought 
to defend Buondelmonti.148 Yet Capponi was later responsible for the execution of 
Jacopo Alamanni for his equally thoughtless cry partly because as Varchi says, `he 
was Jacopo Alamanni', and an opponent of the Gonfalonier.149 Busini records that as 
a result of the execution Capponi lost the support of many gentlemen 'popolani' who 
had believed him to be a `lover of peace' in the city and now saw him to be the 
143 Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, p. 194. 
144 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 66, f. 25`: Gianbattista Tosinghi to Cecchotti Tosinghi, n.d. November 
1529; Albèri ed., Relazioni, 2, i, p. 242: Letter of Carlo Capello, 2 November 1529. 
145 Nerli, Commentari, p. 200; Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 151. 
146 Busini, Lettere, p. 145. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Busini, Lettere, p. 14. 
149 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 360; Pitti, `Istoria', p. 165. 
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contrary.150 Alamanni's execution is a sharp reminder that Capponi's desire for 
peace, unity and moderation with regards to former supporters of the Medici, so 
emphasized in modern accounts of the period, did not extend to his opponents within 
the regime.151 Indeed, the episode is a stark illustration of the ruthlessness with which 
the so- called `moderate' Capponi was as equally prepared as the so- called `extremist' 
arrabbiati to pursue the opportunity provided by a crime to despatch a feared and 
hated opponent, and is thus worth examining in detail. 
Alamanni was one of a band of young noble arrabbiati, often referred to as 
adirati, deeply suspicious and resentful of former supporters of the Medicean regime 
and of the attempts of the Gonfalonier, Niccolò Capponi, to give them a place in the 
popular government.152 They grieved that Capponi often consulted with Filippo 
Strozzi amongst others in his private quarters, and Alamanni had infamously 
threatened Strozzi as a man under `suspicion' to desist from frequenting the Palace, 
with the result that Strozzi had left the city.153 These young arrabbiati were foremost 
amongst the Palace Guard and were known to Capponi to have discussed seizing the 
Palace in the house of Dante da Castiglione, one of their number.154 Capponi's fear 
that they would make some extraordinary attack against his position or even his life 
was such that he gave his support to the creation of a citizen militia, in order to 
counteract the forces of the Palace Guard and even as a prelude to dismissing it.155 
That was certainly the view of the young arrabbiati, including Alamanni himself, 
who on the day that the provision for the establishment of the Militia passed before 
the Great Council to become law, declared that all those who had voted for it were 
`wicked', enemies of the popular government and `traitors of Liberty', while one of 
Capponi's supporters mocked the `child's play' of the Guard with its impending 
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dismissal. Thus began the argument that was to end in violence and Alamanni's 
desperate call to the Guard and the Popolo for aid.' 
56 
Alamanni's fellow arrabbiato, Giovanbattista Busini, later recalled how 
Capponi and his supporters in the Signoria used the `occasion' to `batter the opposite 
faction ( parte)', although they failed in an attempt to have Alamanni examined in 
order to uncover and punish those who sought to `perturb the government'.'57 
Armed supporters and relatives of Capponi had taken control of the Palace and thus, 
according to Busini, 'popolani' in the emergency court were afraid to defend 
Alamanni.158 Baldassare Carducci, one of the leaders of the arrabbiati, cited 
Alamanni's love of the `liberty of his country' and recommended clemency,159 but 
`adherents' of the Gonfalonier outnumbered those opposed to execution.16o 
Capponi's opponents were to recall the death of Alamanni simply because `he 
favoured this Republic', when the Gonfalonier was prematurely dismissed from 
office six months later.161 
Alamanni's execution was a rare victory for Capponi and his supporters. 
They had failed to have Pandolfini and the others most responsible for the printing 
and distribution of the Sermone punished in 1 528 on account of divisions in the 
magistracies and widespread suspicion concerning Capponi's dealings with the Pope, 
according to Nerli.162 Giannotti later recalled that in general magistracies were 
hesitant to proceed against arrabbiati.163 Following the lack of action against 
Pandolfini for his oration in February 1529, Capponi's supporters complained that 
because `the magistrates are all in their party', arrabbiati were able to do 
`licientiously' whatever they wished, without being `held back nor justly punished by 
virtue and force of the laws' .164 
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Alamanni's execution was reported to have pleased the 'universale' because 
he was `a great madcap, and dangerous' .165 As had been the case with Buondelmonti, 
it was fear as much as hatred that lay behind the severity with which he was treated. 
Alamanni's treatment was the result of the deep divisions within the regime, and 
indeed that he was so ruthlessly and publicly condemned for a crime against the 
status provides the clearest illustration of just how intense the conflict between 
Capponi and his arrabbiati opponents had become. That Carlo Federighi had not 
been so condemned for his equally careless cry in 1504 was because the divisions 
within the regime had not broken out into a conflict serious enough to affect his case. 
Federighi was remembered in 1504 to have been one of those most responsible for 
the storming of San Marco, and the seizure and ultimately the execution of 
Savonarola in 1498. Cerretani, a supporter of Savonarola, thus recorded the order for 
Federighi to return to jail under pain of being sentenced to death as evidence of some 
divine retribution against him.166 Yet there were no calls to condemn him to 
Alamanni's fate. Federighi's case is thus perhaps the best indication that however 
divided the popular regime was under Soderini, it was never as split as the popular 
regime of the last republic. 
The divisions of the first years of the popular regime after 1494 between 
supporters and opponents of Savonarola clearly still persisted after 1502 and they did 
play a small part in the severe punishment of Luigi Manelli in 1503. Cerretani 
recorded that the 'popolari' who lamented the treatment of Manelli for having spoken 
the `truth' noted that the desire of leading citizens to have him punished ruthlessly 
was such that those chosen to examine him were `all of the sect of the friar' because 
Manelli had been extremely hostile to Savonarola.167 Manelli had been one of 
twenty -four citizens banned from the Great Council for a year in April 1496,168 for 
having been a member of an 'intelligenza' of those opposed to both Savonarola and 
former supporters of the Medici and intending to favour each other in elections to 
165 
Sanudo, Diarii, xlix, coll. 152 -3: Lorenzo Bertoletti to Bartolomeo Gualterotti, 7 November 1528. 
166 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 447 -8. 
167 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 76; Idem, Storia, p. 319. 
168 Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 121. 
153 
office.169 Following the friar's execution Manelli had spoken in favour of the 
merciless repression of his supporters.' 7° Giovanni Cambi was one follower of 
Savonarola who recorded his dissatisfaction that Manelli did not lose his life in 1503, 
recalling that it had been the second time he had been punished for `seditious' 
behaviour and crimes against the 'stato'.171 
As did the popular government of the last republic, the Medicean regime may 
have sought to condemn certain verbal offences ruthlessly partly on account of fear 
and hatred of the offender. Ten of those condemned appear on a list of opponents of 
the regime drawn up before the plot of 1513. Two others appear on later lists drawn 
up before they were condemned,'72 including Jacopo Altoviti, banished from the city 
for five years and banned from office for life in 1519.173 However, the most eloquent 
expression of the particular need to take action against a well -known opponent 
concerns a case which was not condemned, and illustrates that the Medici could 
prefer to be lenient even with their enemies when they spoke out against the regime. 
In December 1516 Gheri wrote to Alfonsina of how Giovanni Rinuccini 
`displays so much hatred to the family and speaks so dishonestly', and requesting 
permission to arrest him and proceed against him.'74 Rinuccini was accustomed to 
say that the year of 1512 when the Medici returned was the year he died, which Gheri 
advised if it did not merit death did merit some punishment.175 Rinuccini, wrote 
Gheri, was one of the most `malicious men of this city, very bold and impudent and 
so full of poison that he cannot contain himself.' He was a `capital enemy, impudent, 
bold and presumptuous' and thus given his `quality', Gheri argued that he should be 
punished `so that at other times he cannot do worse than talk'.176 Opponents such as 
Rinuccini should be given no quarter, and when the opportunity arose, Gheri argued, 
169 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 116; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 125. 
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it was necessary, `with the colour of justice, to batter enemies and weaken them'. 
Gheri did not believe that `with forgiving, the regime would be secure', and argued 
that it was neither an error nor a sin to want to punish those whom one knew to be 
`waiting for the right time to do us harm'.177 Gheri urged that `clemency and 
kindness' in princes was `laudable and necessary', but not when directed at men who 
were `obstinate and hardened in their hatred', for to `tolerate' and `put up with' such 
men, was to `use clemency and charity against oneself .178 The Medici evidently did 
not agree, for Rinuccini was not condemned, and Gheri's plea, at the end of the first 
year of the Medici regime in which there had been no condemnations for verbal 
offences, implies that this was not the first occasion when the Medici were guided by 
clemency. 
The Medicean regime may have been particularly concerned to condemn 
feared and hated opponents, yet it also condemned friars, as did the popular regime 
of the last republic. Amongst those condemned were also obscure individuals such as 
the tinker, Andrea di Simone in 1514,179 and the parishioner, Giovanni 
Buoncompagnio, in 1517.18° Indeed men from outside the guild structure and 
political society account for one third, fourteen, of those forty condemned during the 
Medici regime as they do of the nine condemned during the last republic.181 Soderini 
may have been less concerned with such individuals than with more prominent 
citizens, and thus his main concern was to establish if the contadino in 1505 had been 
induced by them. 
That regimes after 1512 pursued friars and members of the popolo minuto as 
ruthlessly as prominent citizens, and condemned careless outbursts and idle chatter as 
much as offences intended to arouse hostility to the regime, was on account of the 
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belief that whatever its intention and whoever its author, open and public detraction of 
the regime aroused hostility to the regime and encouraged more serious acts against it 
and would do so further if left unpunished. This was a measure of the greater general 
nervousness and insecurity of both the Medici regime and the popular government of 
the last republic compared to the popular regime under Soderini. Regimes after 1512 
were more fearful of the consequences of allowing verbal offences of whatever nature 
to go unpunished. 
Contemporaries were conscious that a more ruthless attitude towards verbal 
offences prevailed after 1512 than it ever had during the popular regime under 
Soderini, and they knew the reason for it. Luigi Guicciardini recalled how in the days 
of Soderini groups of citizens had spoken `freely and safely' in churches and 
elsewhere `reproving the errors of citizens, of magistrates and of the Supreme grade', 
and `damning without fear' those who `unworthily' held positions in the highest 
magistracies, where during the last republic it had been continually forbidden `to 
speak openly '.182 The reason for the prohibition of such `license' in the last republic, 
Guicciardini recorded, was the belief that `so licentious talk' in the days of Soderini, 
made so `openly' and outside the councils, had been very `harmful' to the popular 
regime and had even caused its `ruin'.183 The `unbroken grumbling' under Soderini 
had caused the return of the Medici in 1512.184 This belief, as Guicciardini makes 
clear, was part of a more general view amongst the arrabbiati that the popular regime 
had been overthrown in 1512 because of the `faint -heartedness', `patience' and `too 
much respect' with which Soderini had dealt with opponents of the regime and those 
found or suspected to have committed acts against it.185 
That one cause for the overthrow of the regime in 1512 was that Soderini had 
been `too gentle and too respectful' appears to have been an opinion common 
amongst members of the popular regime of the last republic, not only the arrabbiati, 
and thus in 1529 critics of Soderini's gentleness could also damn the harshness and 
182 L. Guicciardini, `Dialogo', ed. R. von Albertini, Das Florentinische Staatsbewusstsein im 
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resolution of the arrabbiato Gonfalonier, Francesco Carducci.186 It was arrabbiati 
however, who most often referred to the causes of the overthrow of Soderini when 
they warned of the consequences of not being suspicious enough of former 
supporters of the Medicean regime or proceeding ruthlessly against those who acted 
against the popular government. Authors of notifications saw evidence of `a plot 
against this peaceful and holy popular condition', in any trace of correspondence 
between papal circles and Florentine citizens, particularly those who were relatives of 
the Medici and `wholly of the past regime', and urged the Otto to investigate by 
warning that `if you do not provide that justice has its place God will punish you and 
we will lose this liberty as in 1512, that is through not even believing, and enter into 
the worst tyrannical servitude'.187 
The young adirati of the Palace Guard called on the Signoria through their 
spokesman, Pierfilippo Pandolfini, to be wary that Capponi's supporters included 
those who were `more brave, more rich and more malicious' than those who had 
overthrown Soderini, and that `in 1512, through not removing the evil humours, 
liberty had been taken away by only two young men (giovani)'.188 In his Sermone 
Pandolfini urged the election of a Gonfalonier who would punish `public injuries' 
even by his relatives, `avenge liberty severely' and `guard it with diligence for the 
future', denouncing `the deceptions of certain of those one trusted in 1512' and the 
`clemency, not to say dementia, of the whole goodness of Piero Soderini', that had 
caused his overthrow and the return of the Medici.189 
These views were not new. Partisans of the Medici had also urged, during the 
crisis produced by the French expedition of 1515 for example, the crushing of their 
opponents before it was too late, arguing that Piero Soderini had been overthrown 
because he had not done so.190 It was also the judgement of Niccolò Guicciardini 
writing in 1519,191 and of Machiavelli, when he argued some five years or so after 
the events of 1512 that new states needed a `memorable execution' to secure 
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themselves from opponents,192 and that a citizen in a republic who wishes to use his 
authority for `good works' needed to kill those moved by `envy' who opposed his 
designs, in order to ensure obediance of the laws.193 Machiavelli, who had been 
Chancellor of the Dieci when Soderini was Gonfalonier, argued that Soderini had 
been overthrown because he had not dealt ruthlessly with opponents of the regime, 
and killed `the sons of Brutus', as was `necessary' to maintain newly acquired 
liberty.i94 Rather he had `deceived himself with the belief that with `patience and 
goodness' he would overcome the `appetite' that there was in some of `returning 
under another government', and thus be able to extinguish the `bad humours' and 
overcome his opponents `without any scandal, violence, or tumult'.195 Soderini had 
never wanted, as was a `necessity', to use the `occasion' presented by chance and 
their own `ambition' to weaken those who were attacking him.196 
Perhaps the most detailed attack on Soderini's lack of ruthlessness was that 
by Francesco Guicciardini- written during the last republic in a rhetorical exercise in 
which he assumed the guise of an arrabbiato calling for the ruthless persecution of 
former supporters of the Medici.197 Rhetorical though it was, the argument in the 
Oratoria accusatoria was also based on Guicciardini's own belief, expressed 
elsewhere, that a principal cause of the events of 1512 was that Soderini had been 
`negligent' and `allowed the enemies of the popular regime to become too 
courageous'.198 `Inexperienced youths of little reputation' had been able `to 
overthrow the government so easily', the Oratoria lamented, because the `dangers' 
had not been regarded or dealt with `at their origins', since the regime under Soderini 
had been too `negligent' and `respectful' through too much `goodness' and feeling 
too `secure'.199 Soderini's own `negligence' or `patience' or `faint -heartedness' 
caused his overthrow since he had not `remedied' matters `at their beginnings' when 
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it would have been `easy', but had `allowed them to run on' so that when he did want 
to take action `it was not in time.' Soderini had not been `suspicious' enough to be 
concerned about `wicked citizens', nor forceful enough in securing himself from 
them. Conspiracies had gone undiscovered since his `goodness' meant that Soderini 
had been reluctant to proceed against individuals on the basis of `suspicions' alone, 
because he had considered it either not `just' to do so, or dangerous to himself or not 
useful to the city.2oo 
It has recently been argued that Soderini treated his enemies with prudence 
and it is true that he was able to have supporters of the Medici detained as the 
Viceroy approached the city in 1512.201 Yet there can be little doubt that those who 
conspired against Soderini in 1512 were encouraged and enabled to do so by the 
mildness with which the Gonfalonier dealt with opponents of the regime, and that the 
desire to avoid Soderini's failures and his fate was a major reason for the greater 
ruthlessness and severity with which regimes after 1512 sought to treat opponents in 
general, and verbal offences in particular. Thus we find that when the conspirators 
themselves later urged regimes, both the Medici and the popular government of the 
last republic, to deal resolutely with their opponents, they blamed Soderini's 
overthrow on his failure to do so. Benedetto Buondelmonti wrote to Cardinal Giulio 
in May 1519 concerning `malcontents' and that `if they are not remedied in good 
time, they cannot be remedied when man wants to do so'. To illustrate his point he 
argued that `if Piero Soderini had cut the heads off two people all those who were 
working and intriguing that your family might return to Florence, would have been 
routed by fear' and the regime would not have been overthrown.202 Antonfrancesco 
degli Albizzi similarly argued in a personal and prepared address to a pratica in 
1529,203 that the popular regime would not have been overthrown in 1512, `if Piero 
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Soderini, most worthy Prince of the city, had been less respectful in the repression of 
the insolence and ambition of some few citizens'.204 
In the aftermath of the overthrow of the popular regime in 1512 most 
contemporaries blamed the mildness with which Soderini had dealt with opponents 
of the regime. Not all however, placed the blame for that lack of ruthlessness solely 
on the misplaced `goodness' and `patience' of Soderini. Machiavelli criticized 
Soderini for his reluctance to break with the laws and `civil equality', and seize the 
`extraordinary authority' that would have been necessary to attack his opponents 
`vigorously' and `batter' his adversaries.205 Soderini judged, as he often told his 
supporters, that to seize such authority, even if not used `tyrannically', would erode 
confidence in the office of a Gonfalonier for life, which he deemed essential to 
maintain liberty. Soderini's concern was `wise and good', according to Machiavelli, 
but `one should never allow a bad to continue, out of respect for the good, when that 
good can be easily oppressed by the bad'.206 
These lines, largely ignored by students of Soderini, contradict Bertelli's 
argument that Soderini used his position as Gonfalonier to make a personal bid for 
supremacy in Florence,207 and confirm the view that his aspirations concerned civic 
leadership rather than princely power.208 They also demonstrate Machiavelli's belief 
that Soderini's failures were on account of the limitations of his position as well as 
his attitude. Other contemporaries drew attention to the fact that Soderini, far from 
preferring leniency, often found it forced upon him. Certainly, it does appear that the 
lack of condemnations for verbal offences while Soderini was Gonfalonier, as well as 
the general lack of ruthlessness with which opponents were treated, were both the 
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result in large measure of the weaknesses of the regime that compelled it to be 
lenient. The cases of Bernardo Rucellai and Filippo Strozzi bear that out, and indeed 
their outcomes were to prove of enormous significance. 
Guicciardini argued in the Oratoria that if these two episodes in particular 
had been `remedied' it would have scared others, `making them for fear abstain from 
thinking of plotting against the regime', and `liberty would have been secured for 
ever'.209 For two men not being punished of their `insult', lamented Antonio Brucioli 
in 1526, `perfidious tyranny' returned to `our wretched country' .21° Filippo Strozzi's 
marriage alliance with the Medici in 1508 had been `counselled and encouraged', the 
Oratoria declared, by those who intended to `prepare the road for the return of the 
Medici', increasingly encouraged by `the patience' with which the regime treated 
those consorting with the Medici.211 That it was not treated as a 'caso di stato' as it 
should have been, `gave great courage and license, and that which could have been 
the foundation of securing liberty, was the beginning and origin of the ruin' .212 That 
no action was taken against Bernardo Rucellai and the meetings held under his 
auspices in the Rucellai gardens from 1502 to 1506, led directly to the overthrow of 
the regime in 1512 because `from that garden', Guicciardini wrote, `as is said of the 
Trojan horse, emerged the plots, emerged the return of the Medici, emerged the flame 
that burnt this city'.213 As we shall see much later, not only had those responsible for 
Soderini's overthrow, such as Paolo Vettori, attended the Rucellai gardens in those 
years, but they had also been involved in the Strozzi marriage. Thus the reasons for 
which the popular regime failed to take action in these matters, were reasons for 
which it was ultimately overthrown. 
Guicciardini described how following Soderini's election in 1502 Bernardo 
Rucellai was his `capital enemy', and greatly discontented with Soderini and the 
popular regime, subsequently withdrew from all participation in public affairs, 
demonstrably to pursue his literary interests in discussions in the Rucellai gardens.214 
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Many of the `discontented', as well as learned younger men frequented meetings 
there,215 and Nerli describes how `a certain quality of young men' who met there, 
including Paolo Vettori, had begun to attack Soderini, and `without any respect one 
spoke ill of him and his every action was condemned', all of which was known to the 
Gonfalonier.216 Despite calls from some of the regime for him to do so, Soderini took 
no action against Bernardo Rucellai or the young men.217 Rather he continually 
tolerated them according to Nerli, either through too much `goodness' or through not 
believing `as he should have done' that they could harm him, or because he believed 
he would be able to overcome the difficulties with `patience', or because it seemed to 
him `dangerous' to attempt any undertaking.218 
Guicciardini gave much the same reasons in the Oratoria for the `incredulity' 
or `cowardice' behind Soderini's decision not to proceed against Bernardo 
Rucellai,219 but Nerli added another much more significant reason for Soderini's 
leniency. The young men meeting in the Rucellai gardens could attack Soderini with 
increasing `security', according to Nerli, because they knew they would be protected 
from the magistrates and the Quarantia by the opponents of Soderini within the 
regime, headed by Alamanno and Jacopo Salviati.22° Discontented with Soderini on 
account of their desire for a Senate, according to Nerli,221 the Salviati and their 
supporters were powerful enough in the magistracies, councils and pratiche to 
impede Soderini's designs, and under their protection the young nobles became 
increasingly bold and less respectful, according to Nerli, attacking Soderini in 
masquerades.222 
Parenti recalled that the Salviati and other 'primati' had been the `authors' of 
the Gonfalonier for life, intending shortly by means of such a `leader' (capo) to 
`transform' the government of Florence into an aristocratic regime, a ` stato di pochi', 
215 Idem, `Oratoria accusatoria', Scritti autobiografici, p. 230. 
216 Nerli, Commentari, p. 98. 
21 F. Guicciardini, `Oratoria accusatoria', in Scritti autobiografici, p. 230. 
218 Nerli, Commentari, p. 98. 
719 F. Guicciardini, `Oratoria accusatoria', Scritti autobiografici, p. 230. 
220 Nerli, Commentari, p. 99. 
22! Ibid., pp. 93 -4. 
222 Ibid., pp. 98 -9. 
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one `of the powerful and noble'.223 Discontented with Soderini by March 1504 that 
this had not come about, according to Parenti, the Salviati had joined forces with 
Bernardo Rucellai, Soderini's `chief opponent' .224 In the winter of that year Parenti 
reported that the Rucellai family, headed by Bernardo, an `open opponent of the 
government of the Gonfalonier', felt `certain injuries from private slights' and so was 
`looking continuously for an occasion to produce political change if it could', or at 
least `to give burden to the Gonfalonier'.225 Thus Soderini was suspicious of the 
purposes behind meetings of the Rucellai family in their church of San Pancrazio and 
sought to prevent Bernardo's `machinations' by having the Sixteen Gonfaloniers 
command that no more than four of the Rucellai could gather together. Yet the 
support for Bernardo amongst the other discontented 'primati' was such, according to 
Parenti, that Soderini did not dare to arrest him, despite his consideration that 
Bernardo would soon `produce scandal'.226 
While Bernardo Rucellai was supported by the Salviati, Soderini was 
unwilling to attempt proceedings against him, and the extent to which the leniency 
afforded Rucellai was forced upon the Gonfalonier can be seen from the 
consequences of a rapprochement between Jacopo Salviati and Soderini in 1506. 
Salviati had drawn closer to Soderini believing that the regime would successfully 
recover Pisa, and thus had permitted a marriage alliance between the families of the 
Gonfalonier and Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, which he had until then 
successfully prevented.227 By then, according to Parenti, Rucellai had been occupied 
`solely' with criticizing affairs as `neither well- considered nor examined, of which 
would follow the greatest dishonour and damage to the city' .228 Soderini grieved of 
Rucellai on account of these `criticisms' and thought to `avenge himself .229 Rucellai 
saw himself `abandoned' from the support and help of Salviati, according to Parenti, 
223 Parenti, `Storia', II II 134, ff. 1`- ". 
224 Ibid., f. 1 ". 
225 
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and thus in danger of arrest in the event of `some revolution', and so he left the city 
in April 1506 for a period of voluntary exile.230 
The case of Rucellai makes it clear that the main reason that Manelli was the 
only individual condemned for verbal offences while Soderini was Gonfalonier was 
because Manelli's case was the only occasion when leading citizens were united in 
condemnation of a verbal offence. And it was Soderini's opponents within the regime 
that hampered his attempts to have Filippo Strozzi condemned. As well as his own 
relatives and supporters of the Medici, Strozzi was supported by the Salviati, 
Giovanbattista Ridolfi and other opponents of Soderini who hoped to damage the 
Gonfalonier with a defeat.231 Had they not helped Strozzi, the outcome of the case, as 
contemporaries recognized, might have been very different.232 To ensure a severe 
judgement Soderini was attempting to have the case heard in the Quarantia, where 
the greater number would be less open to the influential marriage and patronage ties 
of his opponents.233 The Strozzi family were well aware of the dangers to Filippo 
should the case go to the Quarantia,234 which, according to Guicciardini, if it were 
composed of `men of the middle rank' might have punished Strozzi more harshly or 
even found him guilty of acting against the regime.235 It was the support for Strozzi 
from the Salviati and other opponents of Soderini as well as from his family that 
ensured that the Otto heard the case itself and cleared him of any intention to disturb 
the status.236 That Soderini failed in his efforts in 1510 to have Luigi della Stufa 
examined with torture, or condemned for a crime against the status, was also due, 
according to contemporaries, to the strength of Luigi's friends and relatives, 
opponents of Soderini, and those "discontented with the popular regime' who 
defended him.237 
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Having failed to have the Strozzi case heard in the Quarantia where his 
opponents would be less influential, in the winter of 1510 Soderini attempted to 
establish a provision, as was done later in the last republic, that casi di stato had to be 
heard in the Quarantia. The measure he affirmed concerned the `health' of the city 
and was made to `save liberty'.238 He hoped, according to Cerretani to be able to 
`avenge himself against those ` grandi' and 'primi' of the city who were condemning 
his actions, particularly his adherence to the French alliance, to `threaten his 
enemies' and `batter' them,239 and to counter the rising numbers and fearlessness of 
those who desired the overthrow of the regime.240 Although it passed in the Council 
of Eighty, the measure was rejected in the Great Counci1,241 opposed by Soderini's 
adversaries and many others anxious that it would increase the Gonfalonier's 
power. 242 
In the aftermath of Soderini's overthrow, Guicciardini was not alone in 
finding great significance in these events. Less than two years later Cerretani 
particularly emphasized the `little justice' of the Strozzi case and the failure to reform 
the Quarantia as encouraging opponents of the regime not to fear the magistracies 
and thus to conspire against it.243 Since the `negligence' of the magistracies was also 
believed to have allowed the conspirators to do things `that even children had to 
discover', for example during Pucci's visit to the city in July 1512,244 the failure of 
the Quarantia reform was the moment, for Cerretani, when `the popolo lost the 
regime . 245 
The `weakness' of the magistracies was such, Guicciardini wrote in August 
1512, that citizens who had dared to `intrigue and plot against the regime' were 
`tolerated' even where there were `suspicions' and `probable indications' of what 
238 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 228; Idem, Storia, p. 397. 
239 Idem, Ricordi, p. 236. 
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241 A.S.F., Libri Fabarum, 72, ff. 121 " -122` (November and December 1510). 
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they were up to,246 and the conspiracy of 1512 was not the first against popular 
government to have been encouraged and enabled by the weaknesses of the 
magistracies. Writing elsewhere of the plot of 1497 Guicciardini recalled how Fra 
Mariano da Ghinazzano had been sent to Florence by Piero de' Medici to prepare 
support from those in the city plotting in his favour. Fra Mariano's visit, and his 
`privately' held discussions with `supporters' of Piero, `publicly' aroused suspicion 
of what he was up to, yet the `divisions of the city', according to Guicciardini, meant 
that no examinations or punishments were made of it.247 Those same divisions 
moreover, had meant that an ever -growing `license' of `publicly' speaking ill of the 
regime and in favour of the Medici had gone unpunished and thus encouraged the 
conspirators to plot, believing they would have wide support.248 It was `usual' in 
divided cities, Guicciardini noted, that crimes against the regime went unpunished, 
for public affairs went neglected and `whoever has the disfavour of one part, has the 
favour of the other'.249 
That the Medici regime condemned more individuals for verbal offences in 
1513 than were condemned in the entire thirteen years of popular government was 
due greater ability to condemn those who spoke out against it. Tight control of the 
membership and deliberations of the Otto meant that the Medici regime had no need 
of a Quarantia,250 but it was more able, ultimately, because it was less divided. The 
best illustration of that was the inability of the regime to deal ruthlessly with those 
suspected of intriguing against it when the regime split apart in the winter of 1526 in 
the face of a growing imperialist threat to the city. This was to lead directly to the 
Tumulto del Venerdì in April 1527, although one will find no mention of it in modern 
accounts of the crisis.251 
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As a result of the increasing boldness of opponents following the defeat of 
papal forces at Borgoforte in the winter of 1526, as we have seen, there arose a 
demand from young nobles for the distribution of arms. At the head of these young 
nobles were the cousins Piero and Giuliano Salviati, and amongst the `multitude' of 
their followers, according to Varchi, Dante da Castiglione was one of the 
`principals'.252 While partisan supporters of the Medici opposed the concession of 
arms, the young nobles were supported and favoured in the magistracies and in 
pratiche, according to Nerli, by Niccolò Capponi, Matteo Strozzi and Luigi 
Guicciardini and other members of the regime who favoured the enlargement of the 
government, and the divisions that had always existed within the regime finally 
became a split.253 
The young nobles were not conceded the right to bear arms, but favoured by 
part of the regime they became increasingly bold, organized and subversive, 
according to Nerli, the more so that Cortona was irresolute and, having to wait for 
instructions from Rome, unable to remedy their 'intelligenze segrete'.254 Both Varchi 
and Nerli record how under Salviati's leadership the young nobles formed 
themselves into an armed brigade that went around the city at night and clashed with 
the police squads of the Captain of the Bargello, injuring some of their number, yet 
the Otto did not dare to take any action against them.255 However, Pitti says that 
whilst thanks to the support of leading citizens no action was taken against Salviati, 
the others were severely punished, particularly Castiglione as head of the episode.256 
Castiglione is certainly recorded to have been arrested and examined in the 
Bargello,257 and then condemned by the Otto on 24 January 1527 for certain `just 
causes', to be exiled to Città di Castello for two years.258 The clash was probably the 
`popular commotion' which foreign observers referred to at the time,259 and the 
252 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 93. 
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`tumult' concerning the request for arms which Foscari claimed to have quietened 
with assurances of Venetian aid against the imperialist threat.26° 
On 6 February Pitti and Giachinotti were arrested on suspicion, as we now 
know, of conspiring against the regime. Filippo Strozzi wrote to his brother that he 
found it hard to believe that Pitti would be guilty of anything more serious than 
`words' and remarked that the regime had evidently `regained vigour and 
courage'.261 Pitti, Giachinotti and Bartolomeo Pescioni, who was arrested with them, 
were not favoured by some of the 'ottimati' as were the young nobles, according to 
Nerli, and that they were never condemned nor sentenced was because of the 
hesitancy which characterized all proceedings at that time.262 It was on account of the 
arrests, according to one contemporary, that on 8 February Niccolò Valori, Pitti's 
father -in -law, left for Rome with Filippo, his son, and that both Carlo Federighi and 
Girolamo di Andrea Cambini also left the city.263 Like the Valori, both Federighi and 
Cambini were well -known and listed opponents of the regime,264 and both were 
amongst those opponents sent into exile or to their villas in 1517 and Federighi was 
also one of those detained in the Palace by the Signoria in 1521.265 They fled, clearly 
fearing similar summary imprisonments or worse. 
The young nobles seem to have been subdued, but they had not been 
restrained and their intrigues had only been suspended while the imperial army 
stopped in Lombardy. 266 As soon as the imperialists began to move towards Tuscany 
in March, the young nobles organized themselves again with Salviati at their head, to 
demand even more forcefully for permission to bear arms.267 In the light of the 
Tumulto del Venerdì that followed on 26 April all contemporaries, whether the 
26° Foscari, `Relazione', p. 84. 
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magistracy of the Otto di Pratica,268 the Mantuan and Venetian ambassadors,269 or 
opponents of the regime such as Paolo Benivieni,270 agreed that though some were 
demanding arms because they wanted to defend the city, others did so because they 
wanted to `overthrow the regime'. Again their demands were favoured by Capponi, 
Strozzi, and Luigi Guicciardini, and by others, according to Segni, who desired 
through placing arms in hands of the 'popolo' to be able more easily to overthrow the 
regime.271 Guicciardini, who was now Gonfalonier of Justice, held secret discussions 
with them in his house. While Cortona and partisans of the Medici opposed the 
demand for arms they could do little as the young nobles became more insistent, 
clamorous and violent and a member of the guard on the Palace was killed with 
impunity.272 
Francesco Guicciardini arrived in Florence on 23 April and reported the great 
discontent amongst the `supporters of the regime and of the country' for `the worst 
and most inept way of government' of Cortona, incapable of conducting even 
`mediocre business' well. Cortona `wants to do everything and knows how to do 
nothing'.273 Nothing was concluded, and if concluded was not executed and his way 
of proceeding `would ruin a world'. The revolt followed three days later and was 
partly the result, as Guicciardini predicted, of `some great error' of the `inept' 
Cortona.274 Yet matters had progressed as far as they had because the regime had 
fallen apart, and the young nobles had been able to clamour their way through the 
gaps. 
That only one individual was condemned for verbal offences in the years 
1502 to 1512, where the Medici regime and the popular government of the last 
republic condemned on average three individuals a year, was because the popular 
regime under Soderini was both less willing and less able to condemn such offences. 
There appears to have been less concern before 1512 to condemn open and public 
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detraction of the regime that amounted to no more than careless outbursts and idle 
chatter, and to condemn those from outside political society who engaged in such 
verbal attacks. Yet that Rucellai and his young associates were not pursued with 
more vigour was because Soderini's opponents within the regime compelled him to 
be lenient. 
The popular regime of the last republic was more divided than the 
government before 1512, and indeed the greater intensity of the conflict between the 
factions within the last republic was one reason for the greater desire to deal 
ruthlessly with offences that were no more than careless outbursts. The last republic 
was more able than the popular regime under Soderini to condemn verbal offences 
not because it was any less divided, but because the balance of power more often, if 
not always, favoured those who sought to be ruthless. Their desire to condemn verbal 
offences vigorously was backed up by the belief that the popular regime had been 
overthrown in 1512 as a result of the negligence, patience, goodness and respect with 
which Soderini in particular had treated opponents of the regime. That same belief 
had informed the calls of partisans of the Medici for the crushing of their opponents, 
and Machiavelli's famous advice to kill the sons of Brutus. If there was a new 
emphasis on force in Florentine political thought after 1512, as Gilbert argued,275 
then the desire to avoid the failures of Soderini was a major reason why. 
Soderini did not kill the sons of Brutus, and that is why he was overthrown. 
But he had been unable as much as unwilling to do so. Those who successfully 
conspired to overthrow Soderini had not feared the magistracies and had not needed 
to, both Nerli and Giannotti later argued, having seen that Soderini, for whatever 
reason, was not working ardently to ensure that those who were acting against the 
regime were severely punished, and because they knew that in the magistracies they 
had so many friends that they would be defended.276 Their earlier activities in the 
Rucellai gardens and involvement in the Strozzi- Medici marriage had gone 
unpunished thanks to the divisions within the regime. When the Medici regime split 
275 
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apart in 1526 it was also to find itself incapable of dealing ruthlessly with opponents, 
with equally disastrous results. Faced with an irresolute and divided regime the 
young nobles were encouraged and enabled to clamour their way towards revolt. 
Yet there had been conspiracies against the Medici before then, and even in 
1512 and 1527 the inability of the regime to deal ruthlessly with its opponents was 
not the only or even the main weakness of the regime that encouraged the formation 
of conspiracy and explained its success. If we want to understand why plots occurred 
when they did, and succeeded when they did, we need to look beyond the 
punishment of political crime to the conduct of foreign affairs, and the ability of 
regimes to deal with their opponents not inside but outside the city. 
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5 
Ideas about Conspiracy 
Conspirators in Florence asserted the legitimate right of the individual to overthrow 
the regime, and risked their lives to do so. They also sought to justify their actions to 
their contemporaries, and declare them good and glorious. How they did so, and 
whether that accorded with common Florentine attitudes towards the legitimacy and 
utility of plots are the questions that concern us here. Was there a clear potential for 
conspiracy within Florentine political beliefs and assumptions out of which plots 
emerged? To what extent can the Florentine proclivity to violent political conflict be 
explained in terms of the commonly accepted notions in Florence concerning the 
utility of conspiracy to oneself and one's city? 
These questions have not been asked before. The warnings of Machiavelli 
and Guicciardini concerning the dangers and difficulties involved in plots are well - 
known,' but there has never been any attempt to explore the attitudes of Florentines 
in general towards the utility of conspiracy. It was certainly common currency in 
Florence that it was `madness' to plot against the regime since it was bound to end in 
the ruin of the conspirators and their families. Nevertheless, it emerges that there was 
a clear and hitherto unrecognized strain of thought that despite all the dangers and 
difficulties involved, the risks were worth taking in pursuit of certain purposes. 
Florentines were generally agreed on the reasons for which men took such risks, and 
sought to explain conspiracies in terms of them. To that extent Florentines were 
generally agreed on the reasons for which the risks involved in conspiracy were, or 
least might be, worth taking. Conspirators were exceptional men and it was their 
decision to conspire against the regime rather than their discontent that made them 
I See for example, F. Ford, Political Murder from Tyrannicide to Terrorism (London, 1985), pp. 141- 
145. 
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so. But that decision was formed in a society that understood that there were reasons 
for which attempting to overthrow the regime might be worth the risks involved. 
Conspirators themselves sought to explain the reasons that moved them, and 
did so in two ways, for two purposes. One was to appeal for clemency and mercy in 
their confessions, where they assured the government that it was not to blame, and 
declared themselves to be repentant sinners, enemies of the public good, and moved 
by their own self -interest, greed and ambition. When they were not pleading for their 
lives, conspirators sought to justify their actions, and as was customary in Florence 
did so by claiming that they were moved by love of their country (patria) to save it 
from destruction, and by love of liberty to restore freedom to the city. Della Robbia's 
description of the inspiration that Brutus provided for Boscoli in 1513 is famous, but 
it was not the only such description before the cult of Brutus reached its apogee with 
Lorenzino in 1537, and there has been no attempt to examine how Florentine 
conspirators in general justified their actions. For it was to justify Boscoli's plot that 
was the purpose of della Robbia's description, which Burckhardt and other historians 
who have accepted it at face value have failed to acknowledge.2 
In a republican city -state such as Florence civic virtue began with the notions 
that there was no higher good than to act in the defence of liberty and the benefit of 
the patria, and no more glorious end than to give one's life in doing so. Conspirators 
in Florence had always been able to assert without any hesitation that to attempt to 
overthrow a government declared to be tyrannical and destructive of the country was 
good, legitimate and praiseworthy. The government did not dispute that when it 
condemned conspirators, but merely asserted that it was the conspirators who were 
the enemies of liberty and the public welfare. Conspiracy it will be recalled, was 
condemned as a crime against the liberty and public welfare (status) of the popolo 
and the city. 
The idea that it was legitimate and praiseworthy for the individual to attempt 
to overthrow the government in order to restore liberty to the city or to benefit the 
2 J. Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. Middlemore (New York, 
1960), pp. 74 -5; M. Piccolomini, The Brutus Revival: Parricide and Tyrannicide during the 
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patria was instrumental to plots and every conspiracy depended on it. The best 
illustration of this is that it was an idea that was increasingly being questioned from 
within the ranks of the discontented themselves. This was particularly so amongst 
supporters of republican liberty during the Medici regime. Machiavelli's `golden 
sentence' from Tacitus, warning against attempting to restore liberty to the patria on 
the grounds that it often did more harm than good, is famous though often 
misunderstood.3 It was a line of thinking that was to culminate in the 1540s when 
Donato Giannotti, another supporter of Florentine republican liberty, wondered 
whether Brutus and Cassius had been wrong to murder Caesar, since his death had 
resulted in the infinitely worse tyranny of the Roman Emperors. Was not tyrannicide, 
Giannotti pondered, an act of great presumption when it was not known what good or 
harm would come of it ?4 Tyrannicide was not a good in itself, but was to be judged 
by its consequences, and since the individual could not know the course of events, he 
should not attempt to intervene in them. Florentine republicanism, as is now well - 
known, had entered the Tacitean age.5 
What is less well -known is that Machiavelli was not the only supporter of 
republican liberty before 1530 to question the benefit to the city of attempts to restore 
its liberty. There were others moreover, such as followers of Savonarola, who 
expressed the belief that all government came from God, tyrannical government was 
permitted by God to purge the sins of the popolo, and thus the Medici should be 
endured until God saw fit to remove them. The Savonarolans, it has recently been 
declared, provided the ideological justification for opposition to the Medici.6 This 
was clearly not the case. It came not from Savonarola but rather from classical 
sources and the ancient doctrine of tyrannicide, from Aristotle, Livy and the praise of 
Brutus in Roman literature. Far from providing the justification for opposition to the 
Medici, most piagnoni believed that the Medici should be endured as a punishment 
from God, and in this they followed the teaching of Savonarola himself 
' K. C. Schellhase, Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought (London, 1976), p. 72. 
4 D. Giannotti, Dialogi di Donato Giannotti de' giorni che Dante consumò nel cercare l' Inferno e' I 
Purgatorio, ed. D. Redig de Campos (Florence, 1939), pp. 96 -7. 
5 Piccolomini, Brutus, pp. 92 -93. 
6 Polizzotto, Elect Nation, p. 9. 
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Savonarolans believed it was wrong to plot against the Medici and even criticized 
those who did so. This belief was probably the main reason why the piagnoni were 
not, as is also claimed, at the forefront of opposition to the Medici. Plots against the 
Medici were the work of supporters of popular government or an aristocratic republic 
guided by the traditional values of Florentine republicanism rather than by 
Savonarola's vision of a godly republic because it was those values and not 
Savonarola that provided a justification for opposition to the Medici. 
The most wide -ranging and detailed examination in our period of the dangers 
and difficulties involved in conspiracy was made by Machiavelli in the third book of 
his Discourses. There he described plots as the `most dangerous and rash' 
undertaking men could enter, of which extremely few had the desired end,7 a point he 
was to reiterate in the Florentine Histories.8 He outlined the dangers and difficulties 
conspirators faced and the causes for their failure before, during and after the 
execution of their plans,9 concluding for example that if to plot against one prince 
was an `uncertain thing, dangerous and little prudent', to plot against two was 
`wholly vain and thoughtless', because it was so difficult that it was almost 
impossible to succeed.10 
In the 1520s Guicciardini recorded for the benefit of his sons that `I would be 
prepared to seek the overthrow of regimes that did not please me if I could hope to do 
it by myself', but since accomplices were needed, and could only be found amongst 
`mad' and `malicious' men, who `do not know how to do it or how to keep silent', 
there was `nothing that I abhor more than to think of it'." It was `madness', 
Guicciardini wrote, to attempt to overthrow the regime for no other end than one's 
`private interest' ( interesse particulare), and whoever did so was not `wise', for it 
was `difficult' and `dangerous', and few plots had ever succeeded.12 Even if it 
seemed `easy' to plot, this should not encourage any one to conspire against the 
regime, `much less for their own interests', because success never brought the 
Machiavelli, `Discorsi', III, vi, in Opere (1954), pp. 320, 325. 
8 Idem, `Istorie fiorentine', VI, xxix, in Opere (1954), p. 861. 
9 Idem, `Discorsi', III, vi, in Opere (1954), pp. 325 -338. 
io 
Ibid., p. 333. 
11 F. Guicciardini, Scritti politici, p. 274: `Ricordi', B. 158. 
12 Idem, Dialogo, p. 85; Idem, Scritti politici, p. 250: `Ricordi', B. 53. 
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satisfaction intended to those who conspired for their own `private interests', and 
condemned them to a `perpetual travail', having to fear the return of the past regime. 
And the restoration of the old regime `would be a thousand times more harm to him, 
than he has had use (utile) from its overthrow.' 13 
Thus had Florentines always advised their sons. Giovanni Morelli warned his 
in the early fifteenth century never to work against those in power no matter what 
their discontent.14 `Watch', Morelli counselled, `that you do not criticize nor speak ill 
of their activities and undertakings, even if they are wicked; stay silent and do not 
speak if not to commend them, and do not desire to hear anything against them, nor 
work against them in any way, even if you were wronged by them.' 1 s 
To men like Morelli, those who did engage in acts against the regime seemed 
foolish and imprudent. Indeed, the slim chances of success, and high price of failure 
contemporaries perceived of conspiracy in general or of a particular plot, meant that 
it was a common reaction to conspirators to tell them that they were madmen. When 
rumours that Niccolò Martelli had agreed in France to poison Cardinal Giulio 
reached his cousins, they told him on his arrival in Florence in March 1522, that `I 
was a madman (matto) and that I was looking for an unlucky end' and that `I would 
have done better to stay at home and enjoy what I have, and not to enter into these 
fancies'.16 `He is a madcap (pazzerello), send him out of the city', Cosimo de' Pazzi 
told Niccolò Valori, when informed by him of Boscoli's plan to overthrow the 
regime in 1513.17 `You seem a madman to me', Filippo Strozzi testified to have told 
Prinzivalle della Stufa when asked to join his plot in 1510.18 Fearful that news of the 
plot was bound to reach Florence from Bologna, Strozzi gave della Stufa time to flee 
the city before informing the government.19 
If conspiracy was seen as crazy, so much more so was open and public 
detraction of the regime, the result of which, according to one contemporary, was 
13 
F. Guicciardini, Dialogo, p. 86. 
14 G. Morelli, Ricordi, ed. V. Branca (Florence, 1956), p. 377. 
15 Ibid., p. 275. 
16 `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 254. 
17 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 300; Idem, Dialogo, p. 76. 
18 Idem, Ricordi, pp. 230, 231; Idem, Storia, p. 399. 
19 
Cei, `Storia', f. 114 "; Strozzi, `Vita', pp. xxvii -xxviii. 
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simply to `show the desire to do bad without any effect and to give occasion to who 
governs of remedying it'.20 Contemporaries were occasionally so stunned by what 
they saw as the futility of particular verbal offences against the regime, that they 
could only explain them as the result of a complete loss of reason. Thus the Otto was 
reported to have found that it was `melancholic humours', having examined him 
under torture, that moved Fra Spirito to cry ` popolo e libertà' in the Piazza in 1521.21 
The case of Piero Orlandini in 1523 was also explained in these terms, 
particularly because it was recalled that Orlandini had been `gratified' and given 
`honour, caresses and favour' by Cardinal Giulio, only to insult him on his elevation 
to the Papacy.22 Supporters of the Medici were at a loss to understand his 
`ingratitude', and how it was that `in the most beautiful time, and when he could 
hope for more, he had wanted to show his bad soul and in a matter unable to give 
him either utility or honour'.23 The Mantuan ambassador reported of Orlandini's 
insult that it was judged in Florence that `the melancholic humour, which begged 
strongly in him sometimes, put in his heart such a bestial fantasy and one from a man 
without reason, making him throw out his wicked soul against His Holiness, or God 
had wanted to punish him for some ancient sin of his'.24 
Conspirators were well aware of the dangers and difficulties involved in 
plots. Buondelmonti and the other conspirators of 1522 from the Rucellai gardens 
had gone ahead with their plot, as Nerli remarked, despite the warnings of the 
dangers and difficulties of conspiracy that Machiavelli had written for them in the 
Discourses three or four years earlier.25 Niccolò Martelli, on indicating that he was 
involved in some intrigue, had been told by his teacher -confessor to `consider well to 
what I was doing and not to burden myself with such things, that could be the ruin of 
myself and all my family'.26 Giannozzo Pucci confessed that only months before the 
plot of 1497, he had warned his brother in Rome that he was `in no condition to be 
20 N. Guicciardini, `Discorso', p. 361. 
21 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 383. 
22 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 207 ": Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 November 1523. 
23 
Ibid., f. 208`. 
24 Ibid., f. 208 ". 
25 
Nerli, Commentari, p. 138. 
zb Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 267. 
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able to do anything in Piero's benefit' and would only `bring ruin on both himself 
and us' if he did so.27 Tornabuoni confessed that while they corresponded with Piero 
and prepared for his approach in March, the conspirators began to fear the plot would 
be uncovered, and so had a courier from Piero, Fra Serafino, leave the city.28 Pucci's 
concern that Serafino would be arrested was such, he confessed, that he had told the 
friar that `he was looking to bring us to a bad end', and that `he would come to a bad 
end, and us together with him'.29 
Conspirators took such risks, having decided that the reasons for which they 
took them made it worth doing. And they made that decision, exceptional as it was, 
partly because there was an understanding amongst Florentines in general that the 
risks involved in plots were, or at least might be, worth taking in pursuit of certain 
purposes. Guicciardini for example never dismissed conspiracy completely or 
consistently. Even when he did warn of the `madness' of conspiring against the 
regime, that was only intended to refer to conspiracy made for reasons of self - 
interest, and indeed he emphasized to his sons that his advice was not intended to 
dissuade those who `inflamed by the love of their country endangered themselves to 
restore its liberty'.30 
Moreover, Guicciardini was prepared at times to accept the prudence of 
conspiracy even in advance of private interests. In 1509 for instance he wrote that the 
death of the conspirators of 1497 should serve as an example to all citizens that when 
they had a `reasonable share of things' they should be content and not seek a better 
one, for they would usually fail.31 For those who did not have `a reasonable share of 
things' however, matters might be different. Guicciardini gave similar advice to his 
sons in 1530:32 
Whoever in Florence struggles to overthrow regimes, if he does not do it for 
necessity, or will become head of the new government, is little prudent, because he 
27 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, ff. 17` -": Examination of Giannozzo Pucci, `egli non era in termine 
potessi fare opera niuna in beneficio di Piero, ma rovinare se e noi faccendo altrimenti si'. 
28 Ibid., f. 11 ': Examination of Lorenzo Tornabuoni. 
29 Ibid., f. 18`. 
30 
F. Guicciardini, Scritti politici, p. 250: `Ricordi', B. 53. 
31 Idem, Storie Florentine, p. 144. 
32 
Idem, Scritti politici, p. 296: `Ricordi', C. 51. 
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endangers himself and all that he has if it does not succeed; succeeding, he has scarcely a 
tiny part of what he had designed. And how much madness it is to play a game where one 
can lose without comparison more than one can win. 
Thus Guicciardini could consider that despite all the dangers and difficulties 
it was not imprudence or madness to attempt to overthrow the regime if it was done 
for reasons of necessity or to become head of the new regime. For in these cases, to 
continue the paraphrase, one was playing a game where one could win without 
comparison more than one could lose. Indeed it was at the very time when he was 
writing the passage above, as we shall see, that Guicciardini himself had been forced 
by necessity to join the Pope during the siege. 
Guicciardini was not alone in believing that the risks involved in conspiracy 
were worth taking for certain purposes. Indeed Florentines were broadly agreed on 
which purposes would, or at least might, make attempting the overthrow of the 
regime worth risking one''s life, and thus always explained the reasons for particular 
conspiracies in terms of them. Francesco Vettori made this clear in a letter to his 
brother, Paolo, written after the overthrow of Soderini in 1512 in which Paolo had 
played a leading part:33 
whomever tries to overthrow a regime or burdens himself with it as you did, men 
judge that he did so for one of these reasons: either to make himself great, or to make great 
one of his friends with whom he believes to be very powerful, or for some injury received 
from who governs the regime that he seeks to overthrow, or for finding himself in financial 
difficulties and judging that every movement has to profit him. 
Vettori went on to explain to his brother that men could only conclude that in 
his case he had been moved by financial difficulties. For he did not have a following 
with which he could presume to rule the city, nor such `friendship' with the Medici 
to be able to aspire to govern with them, nor had there been any signs of any enmity 
with Piero Soderini or his family, but rather the contrary, `that is you were always at 
ss A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. 1, 136, f. 219`: Francesco to Paolo Vettori, 5 August 1513, `chi cerca mutare 
uno stato o se ne impaccia chome facesti tu, li huomini iudicono lo facci per una di queste chose che 
io dirò: o per fare grande sè, o per fare uno amico suo chol quale creda potere assai, o per qualche 
iniuria ricevuta da quello che governa lo stato che lui cercha mutare, o per trovarsi in disordine e 
iudicare che ogni movimento habbia a fare per lui'. 
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his side'. Only the desire to escape financial problems, Francesco advised, could 
explain to contemporaries Paolo's apparent sudden change of heart.34 
Vettori makes no mention of any reasons other than those of self -interest, and 
it shows what contemporaries thought in practice of endangering one's life 
attempting to overthrow the regime in order to benefit the patria. Guiccardini gave 
much the same reasons as Vettori did when he described the purposes for which men 
had risked their lives to overthrow tyrants, and he concluded that few had been 
moved `merely by love of the liberty of their country', which rare few deserved the 
`highest praise'.3' Whatever roles private and public interest may have played in 
them however, it is clear that plots were formed in a society that understood that 
there were reasons for which it was, or at least might be, worth the risks involved to 
attempt to overthrow the regime. 
Conspirators always acknowledged the government's view that they had been 
moved by self -interest, when they appealed to it for mercy and clemency. The Otto 
considered in 1522 `how pleasing and no less useful is the present peaceful condition 
of our city to our most sweet country', and declared that the conspirators had been 
moved by `ambition and envy rather than love of their country'.36 The Dieci and the 
Signoria both wrote to the Florentine ambassador in Rome that the conspiracy of 
1497 against `liberty' was the result of the `avarice, ambition and perfidy' of `wicked 
men and malicious citizens'.37 Thus it was that Giovanni Cambi ended his 
confession, which was read with the examinations of the other leaders of the plot of 
1497 to the pratica that was to decide their fate,38 with this request to his examiners: 
`all that I have worked for, that is the return of Piero, has been from the desire that I 
had of his return, which I considered had to be in my benefit, not thinking to any 
other thing that could follow of it, and of this I accuse myself a sinner and I ask you 
34 Ibid. 
35 
F. Guicciardini, Dialogo, pp. 39 -40. 
36 A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 58`: `quantum sit dulcissime patrie nostre gratus et non minus utilis presens 
pacificus nostre civitatis status ... ambitione invidiaque, potius quam amore patrie'. 
37 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 20, f. 74`; Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. xlix -I: Letters of 21 August 
1497. 
38 Cei, `Storia', f. 52`; Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 207; Pitti, `Istoria', p. 45. 
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for mercy for the love of God'.39 The same motives can be detected behind Jacopo da 
Diacceto's admission in a letter, recorded by Cerretani and read together with his 
examination to the pratica that was to decide his punishment in June 1522,4° that 
Buondelmonti and Alamanni `induced him to do this with benefits because he had 
always had good from the Cardinal and loved him, but being poor the assistance 
induced him' .41 
In emphasizing the good he had received from the Cardinal, da Diacceto 
reassured the government of its innocence. He had not been moved by hatred because 
there had been no cause for hatred. It was a common view amongst contemporaries at 
the time that the plotters of 1522 had been moved by the desire to avenge injuries 
received from the Cardinal, but the regime naturally denied this. That the 
conspirators planned to murder Cardinal Giulio was explained by the government in 
condemnations and letters to the Lucchese purely as a means `to the execution by 
easier ways' of the overthrow of the regime.42 The Otto emphasized how Piero 
Soderini, the ex- Gonfalonier, `had received the most great and boundless benefits 
from this country and from the renowned family of the Medici'.43 
Thus it was that conspirators emphasized their ingratitude. When Giannozzo 
Pucci appealed to his examiners in 1497 to have the `infinite and immense piety and 
mercy of Christ our lord' in their hearts, he set out to recount the `sins committed by 
me after all the benefits received first from our lord Jesus Christ, then from this most 
merciful people' from whom together with his examiners, Pucci asks `for mercy not 
justice'.44 Niccolò Ridolfi similarly ended his confession to note the `benefits and 
honours' the Florentine popolo had conferred on him and his family.45 
When they were not pleading for mercy however, conspirators claimed to 
have been moved by the love of their country to save it from destruction, or the love 
39 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I., 360, f. 11 ": Examination of Giovanni Cambi. 
ao A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 30 "; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 406. 
41 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 405. 
42 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 30 ", 59 "; A.S.F., Sig., Minutari, 21, f. 39r: Otto di Praticato the Lucchese, 1 
June 1522. 
43 
A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 58 ": `infinita pene numero beneficia magna ac maxima ab hac patria et ab 
inclita Medicis familia receperat'. 
44 
Cei, `Storia', f. 49`; A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I., 360, f. 15". 
45 
Cei, `Storia', ff. 501-- ". 
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of liberty to restore its freedom, often both. In so doing they justified their actions 
and declared them to be good, legitimate and praiseworthy. Those who conspired 
against the Medici claimed to have been moved by love of liberty to free the city 
from tyranny, just as they had in the fifteenth century, such as in 1481.46 Thereby 
they sought to justify their deeds by appealing to the `universal consensus of men', as 
Giannotti described it, particularly as found in Roman historians, who celebrated, 
honoured and exalted those, such as Brutus, who in order to restore liberty to their 
country killed those who usurped its freedom.47 In accordance with the commonly 
accepted doctrine of tyrannicide, Florentines from Salutati in 1400 to Giannotti in the 
1540s had always denied the right of a private individual to kill a tyrant with a 
legitimate title.48 While the Medici were accused of ethical tyranny the justification 
for plots against them was that they had usurped the liberty of the city as Caesar had 
done. This doctrine of tyrannicide had deep roots in the Florentine political 
consciousness. Florentines still celebrated the anniversary of the overthrow of the 
Duke of Athens in 1343 on St. Anne's day, which had been declared a second Easter, 
a perpetual holiday, to celebrate the `liberation of the popolo from tyranny by the 
grace of God and the virtue of good men'.49 
It was this that lay behind Agostino Capponi's reported declaration on the 
night before his execution in 1513, that `I die willingly, still innocent'.50 Boscoli and 
Capponi are recorded to have had told their examiners that they had planned to kill 
the Medici `in order to free their country', the `love' of which had `driven' them to 
plot.5 ' Parenti, who was evidently one contemporary who believed them, records that 
they died always affirming that they had aimed `to free their country from tyranny'.52 
Niccolò Valori wrote in his Ricordanze that Boscoli aimed `to free his country'.53 
46 Capelli, `Lettere', p. 255: Antonio Montecatini to Duke Ercole d'Este, 9 June 1481. 
47 Giannotti, Dialogi, pp. 89 -90. 
48 O. Jászi and J. Lewis, Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide (Glencoe, 
Illinois, 1957), pp. 27 -8; Giannotti, Dialogi, pp. 92 -3. 
49 
R. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (London and New York, 1980), p. 222; J. Heers, 
Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West, trans. D. Nicholas (Oxford -New York -Amsterdam, 
1977), pp. 164, 274. See also Rubinstein, Palazzo Vecchio, pp. 71 -2. 
59 Della Robbia, `Recitazione', p. 299. 
51 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 299; Idem, Dialogo, p. 75. 
52 
Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 841 . 
5' 
N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18`. 
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In a poem of December 1522 Luigi Alamanni mourned the death at the hands 
of the `perfidious tyrant' and `horrendous monster' of his two co- conspirators, da 
Diacceto and Alamanni, the soldier, referred to as Menalca and Mopso, and who 
`with so much love' had placed their `faithful hand' to draw the city out `from so 
dark a prison' where it had lain `for so many years'.54 Their act was `just', they were 
in heaven with the `highest glory in the world', and he proposed an epitaph 
describing them as `full of eternal honour'.55 Antonio Brucioli's 1526 dialogue `On 
Fortitude' clearly includes both executed conspirators and Alamanni the poet among 
the group of speakers given invented names.56 The group is described as `the greatest 
lovers of the liberty of their country, which it happens is in the height of tyranny and 
pestiferous servitude, and of whom there are none who would not give their life, 
believing to recover that liberty' .57 Speakers in other dialogues mourn that the 
executed pair had been `unjustly' killed by a `cruel tyrannical monster'.58 
In one dialogue, da Diacceto and Alamanni the soldier appear condemned and 
awaiting death `for their country' .59 They lament their fate for having always been 
`most ardent lovers of the public liberty'.60 Alamanni grieves that he had not 
achieved his `laudable' aims, but is assured that God judges the `right intentions' of 
men, not their success.61 Since they met their death attempting to `benefit their 
country ( patria)' and acting in the `benefit of their own republic', Brucioli declared it 
`laudable' and `greatly to be chosen', and assures them of immortality.62 
In poems grieving for the death of Zanobi Buondelmonti in November 1527, 
Alamanni recognized that his friend had `raised his eyes to mortal glory' more than 
sa 
L. Alamanni, Versi e prose, ed. P. Raffaelli (Florence, 1859) i, pp. 60 -64: `Che forza ha più la 
nostra ria fortuna'. See also Ibid., pp. 65 -8. 
ss Ibid., p. 63. 
56 Brucioli, Dialogi, pp. 309 -10. Amongst the speakers are `Eufronio, l'uno e l'altro Leutideno'. 
Eufronio is praised for his lettere grece e latine' so indentifying him as Jacopo da Diacceto. One 
Leutideno is praised for his `perizia militare' while the other's `onorata poesia' is praised, clearly 
referring to Luigi di Tommaso Alamanni, the soldier, and Luigi di Messer Piero Alamanni, the poet. 
s' Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 309. 
58 
Ibid., pp. 262, 269. Referred to as Eufronio and Leutideno, `el più alto ingegno d' uomo che si 
potessi numerare fra sapienti, onore delle grece e latine lettere de' nostri tempi, e d' una vera luce 
della milizia'. 
59 
Ibid., p. 504. The speakers are again called Eufronio and Leutideno. 
60 Ibid., p. 500. 
61 Ibid., p. 501. 
62 Ibid., p. 502. 
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to the life hereafter, and wondered if that had been the reason why it had not pleased 
God to grant the plot success. But he praised the `zeal for the common good of his 
country' with which Buondelmonti had sought `liberty more than a long life' and 
defended the hope that he and his friends had held that it would have been God's 
pleasure to end the city's servitude `by their work' in that `honoured enterprise'.63 
Neither `gold and silver' nor the `desire to climb more than is fitting to the civil 
power', had moved Buondelmonti to plot, but the `just wish to have all equal, and no 
masters'. Buondelmonti had not been moved, as he had been commonly accused of 
being, Alamanni wrote, by `the spur of avenging himself', and he had sought 
`humility more than blood or death from his enemy'. Only `true goodness', the desire 
of `awakening liberty' and of not seeing his `blossoming home so rolled up in the 
mud under another's yoke ... this alone directed and drove him'.64 Buondelmonti had 
been moved by the desire for `mortal glory' but that was the `just love that he had 
more for his country than -for himself, because his `generous heart resented being 
weighed down by the impious burden of unjust servitude that then oppressed it'.65 
As well as claiming that they had been moved by love of liberty to attempt to 
free their country from tyranny, the conspirators in 1513 and 1522 made a further 
claim: that they had been inspired by the example of Julius Caesar's assassin, Brutus. 
Most famously, Luca della Robbia reported within six years of Boscoli's execution,66 
that Boscoli had recalled the inspiration of Brutus. Della Robbia states his belief in 
the veracity of Boscoli and Capponi's claim in their examinations to have wanted to 
`free the city', and declares his intention to show Boscoli's `distinguished piety 
towards his country'.67 He records that Boscoli had told him on the night before his 
death that he was finding it difficult to `unite' or `convert' his spirit to God, and ask 
for His forgiveness and mercy, since his head was full of thoughts of Brutus.68 
Boscoli asked him to `remove Brutus from my head, so that I might make this step 
entirely as a Christian.' According to della Robbia, Boscoli was conscious that, from 
63 Alamanni, Versi, i, pp. 357, 358: `Alto Signor, che dal celeste nido'. See also Ibid., pp. 341, 354 -5. 
64 Ibid., p. 357. 
65 Ibid., pp. 358, 359. 
66 
G. Fragniti, `Luca della Robbia', D.B.J., xxxvii, pp. 291 -3. 
67 Della Robbia, `Recitazione', pp. 283 -4. 
68 Ibid., pp. 286 -9. 
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a Christian point of view, the classical ideas of the glory of tyrannicide which had 
inspired him `do not have the true end', and had led him to act in pursuit of earthly 
rather than heavenly glory.69 To Capponi's claims to die still innocent on account of 
the virtue of his deed, Della Robbia had replied that only Jesus died innocent, and 
told him to `let go of every fantasy of justification' and ask Christ to forgive his 
sins. 70 
Less well -known, indeed apparently unnoticed before, are similar sentiments 
in a poem by Alamanni written after Buondelmonti's death, extolling their `honoured 
enterprise'. Alamanni praises his friend in lines addressed to Brutus, declaring that 
`after you left the world, there was no more beautiful imitator of your great deeds'. 
While regretful that Buondelmonti had not succeeded as Brutus had, Alamanni 
praised his `learned search of ancient books, to reform our laws and customs', whose 
authors were his `teachers and guides' and who `showed the way to the civil life of 
peace or arms'.71 
Since the early fifteenth century Brutus had been revered in Florence for his 
assassination of the usurper of Roman liberty, a reverence based on the praise which 
classical writers accorded him. Bruni for example had recalled the praise heaped on 
Brutus by the Senate for restoring liberty and the virtue attributed to him by Roman 
historians and declared that he ought to be `extolled to the sky'.72 In emphasizing that 
Buondelmonti and Boscoli had been inspired by Brutus, Alamanni and della Robbia 
were further emphasizing that they had been moved to plot by love of liberty, and 
justifying their attempts to restore freedom to the city by reference to the praise with 
which classical literature extolled the glory of Brutus for doing the same. In a similar 
way Filippo Strozzi claimed the influence of classical sources when he wrote in 
January 1527 to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Battista della Palla, with whom he was 
then intriguing against the Medici. To assure them of his desire to show citizens that 
`I know that mind and will that every good gentleman should have', he wrote that: `I 
69 Ibid., p. 290. 
70 Ibid., p. 299. 
71 Alamanni, Versi, i, pp. 339 -40: `Poichè nuovo dolor quaggiù m' involva'. 
72 
H. Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1955), p. 455; Piccolomini, 
Brutus, p. 57 
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read Livy and The Politics of Aristotle continually, and from the one I think of 
drawing the practice, and from the other the theory of a good gentleman and virile 
citizen; from where I feel myself more confirmed every day, and I feel the desire in 
me increase.' 73 
Such appeals to classical examples had been made by conspirators in the 
fifteenth century, such as Girolamo Olgiati, the assassin of the Duke of Milan in 
1476, and were to reach their height with Lorenzino de' Medici in 1537. Burckhardt 
and more recently Piccolomini have both seen such appeals as evidence of a 
conscious attempt by conspirators to model themselves on classical examples, and 
thus as striking evidence of the extent to which Renaissance Italians sought to imitate 
antiquity.74 That ignores the purpose for which such appeals were made, but at the 
very least the claim to have been inspired by Brutus reveals the authority in which 
classical sources were held, to the extent that conspirators sought justification for 
their deeds directly from classical examples, and from the glory which classical 
sources attached to Brutus for having attempted to restore liberty to his country. 
For there were other sources in which Florentines found justification for plots 
against the Medici. Della Robbia, for example, presented an argument that Boscoli 
was `blessed' and `a martyr', because he had the `best intention', and because St. 
Thomas Aquinas said it was `worthy' to conspire against a tyrant who usurped his 
power.75 That it was justified for a private individual to kill a usurper to free his 
country had been a common part of medieval and scholastic thought, upheld by John 
of Salisbury and Bartolus as well as Aquinas.76 Della Robbia was a follower of 
Savonarola, but it was clearly not Savonarola, as has been asserted, who provided the 
justification for opposition to the Medici. It was from classical sources that the 
conspirators themselves found the justification for their deeds. 
Where those who conspired against the Medici claimed to have been moved 
by love of liberty to restore freedom to the city, those who conspired against the 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 99, f. 21`: Filippo Strozzi to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Battista della Palla, 
30 January 1527. 
74 Burckhardt, Civilisation, pp. 75 -6; Piccolomini, Brutus, pp. 62 -6. 
75 Della Robbia, ` Recitazione', p. 309. 
76 Jászi and Lewis, Against the Tyrant, pp. 1, 17 -27. 
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popular government before 1512 claimed to have been moved by patriotism to save 
their country from ruin. In doing so they sought to justify their actions by appealing 
to one of the fundamental notions of civic virtue in Florence, that there was no act 
more praiseworthy to benefit one's country, and no end more glorious than to give's 
one life doing so. The best illustration of that is how conspirators were condemned 
for betraying and damaging the patria. To the government, conspirators were 
`perverse', as the Balk' described them in 1522, `malicious citizens and enemies of 
the public good', whose `most cruelly ordered' and `wicked counsels and perverse 
machinations', would have resulted, if they had had their `wicked effect', in 
`universal harm' in the city, and untold `detriment' to the republic.77 Those who had 
brought Bourbon to the city before the Tumulto in 1527, Alessandro de' Medici was 
informed, were `scoundrels, treacherous enemies not only of us, but of their 
country'.78 The conspirators of 1497 were `parricidal and perfidious citizens', who 
had `wanted to betray their country', according to the Dieci,79 and a speaker in a 
pratica had called for their execution, `in fact they should not even be buried', 
because `one can find no greater crime than that against one's country' since 
`everyone is more obliged to their country than to their father.'80 
The conspirators themselves however, justified their deeds by claiming to 
have sought to benefit the city. Lucrezia Salviati was reported to have confessed that 
she had conspired to have Piero return in 1497, because `when the Medici were 
governing the land, it was luxuriant, and was not as it is now, burdened by war, 
hunger, disease and sedition'.81 Piero himself, to rouse support on his entry into 
Florentine territory, had made it known that he was coming `not as an enemy, but as 
a citizen in order to enter his house', to give bread to the starving, and `to remove the 
77 A.S.F., Balle, 43, f. 205`: `quanta lactura et danno universale sarebbe seguito nella nostra città, et 
quanto detrimento alla republica se i nefandi consigli et perversi machinationi et tractati d' alcuni 
maligni cittadini et inimici del bene publico havessino havuto el loro desiderato et iniquo effecto, 
secondo che per loro crudelisimamente era stato ordinato'. 
78 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 89: Fabrizio Peregrino to Alessandro de' Medici, 28 April 1527, 
`ribaldi, traditori nemici non solamente nostri ma della patria loro'. 
79 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 20, ff. 74r-v, 76e: 21 and 22 August 1497; Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. 
xlix -1: 21 August 1497. 
80 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 10`; Cei, `Storia', f. 52 ": 17 August 1497. 
si Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 723: Letter of Antonio Vincivera, 24 August 1497. 
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city and the countryside from the hands of those who, through their wicked 
governance, were holding it in war and in hunger'.82 
In 1512 first Soderini and then the popular government were overthrown by 
force, but the new government sought to deny to foreign powers that compulsion had 
been used at all. On the day of Soderini's overthrow, the Signoria wrote to Florentine 
orators with the Viceroy and elsewhere explaining how the Gonfalonier had 
`spontaneously renounced and resigned his office, as he has offered to do on many 
occasions both in public and in private'.83 The Dieci wrote repeatedly to Florentine 
ambassadors that Soderini had `resigned his office',84 and did so even when it 
described how Soderini had continually acted `against the universal disposition of all 
the city'.85 The Medici emphasized to their representative in Venice that the 
deposition of the Gonfalonier and the parlamento had both been made at the instance 
of the Signoria.86 Lorenzo was praised in procession and song during the festival of 
San Giovanni in 1514 as a new Camillus, the `liberator' of his country who had 
saved his city from the disastrous alliance with France.87 But there is no hint that 
there was any attempt in the aftermath of the events 1512 to explain them as the 
result of the justified use of force. 
Yet during the coup itself, the leaders of Soderini's overthrow are recorded to 
have told the Gonfalonier and those magistrates and colleges present in the Palace 
that he should `go home in order not to ruin this people'.88 Lorenzo Strozzi remarked 
that `under the shade' of conserving their country from the sack they had declared 
during the take -over that Soderini should not be permitted to `ruin the city, for the 
sake of his personal enmities'.89 Niccolò Valori accused the `restless' and `poverty - 
stricken citizens' involved of being `unashamed' to force entry to the Public Palace, 
82 `Frammenti istorici', in Opere minori di Niccolò Machiavelli, p. 78. 
83 A.S.F., Sig., Missive, 57, f. 110" (31 August 1512): `spontaneamente come più altre volte haveva 
offerto in publico et in privato ha renuntiato et deposto lo offitio suo'. 
84 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 39, ff. 901.-91`, 92 ": Letters of 1, 8, 14, September 1512. 
85 
Ibid., ff. 94` -5`: Dieci to Francesco Guicciardini, 24 September 1512. 
86 Sanudo, Diarii, xv, coll. 53, 101: Letters to Piero da Bibbiena, 31 August and 16 September 1512. 
87 `Trionfo della fama e della gloria', Trionfi, ed. R. Bruscagli, i, pp. 74 -6; Trexler, Public Life, p. 
508. 
88 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 29r: Jacopo Guicciardini to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September 
1512. 
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or with their `sedition' to put the city, with an army so nearby, in danger of the 
sack.90 To supporters of popular government, such as Valori, Nardi, and Cerretani, 
those involved in Soderini's overthrow could only have been moved by `ambition 
and avarice'.91 Thus it was that Cerretani described how some had been moved by 
age, some by private and public debts, some by the desire to `live with that license 
that they desired', some to enrich themselves with the possessions of others, and 
several to `make a prince thinking to govern him and all the city'.92 The same 
sentiments, that only vice could explain the desire to overthrow the liberty of popular 
government, lay behind Guicciardini's accusation that Valori and Vettori had been 
moved by debts incurred as a result of their overspending.93 
Valori had been an official of the Monte in 1508, a sign of his wealth,94 and in 
accusing them of profligacy, Guicciardini reveals the moral context of his account. 
But there were other reasons, as we have seen, for which contemporaries concluded 
that Paolo Vettori had been moved by the desire to escape financial difficulties. His 
brother, Francesco, advised him to counter this, and in so doing demonstrates 
emphatically how conspirators could seek to justify their deeds with claims other 
than that they had been moved by love of their country, and for other purposes than 
to declare them glorious. 
The charge that Paolo had been moved by financial difficulties was a 
damaging one, and appears to have made by the Soderini on their return to the city in 
April 1513. Francesco told him that he could only remedy that judgement with 
words, which meant `none other than to deceive'. He needed to show that he had had 
`just causes of enmity' with members of the Soderini family, `and those that are not, 
to fake them'. Paolo was instructed to show that the cause of his financial difficulties 
had been Piero Soderini who `was seeking every way to have you ruined'. That he 
had appeared close to Soderini, he was to explain, was because `attending to your 
own business and to the city, you wanted to free yourself from suspicion, but not to 
90 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f 17 ". 
91 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 47; Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 454. See also Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, pp. 
148 -9. 
92 
Cerretani, Storia, p. 442. See also Ibid., p. 396. 
93 
F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 231. See also Ibid., p. 126. 
94 Appendix A, iii. 
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be unfaithful to him, because you saved him',95 a reference perhaps to Paolo's 
apparent role in preventing Albizzi from taking Soderini's life during the coup.96 
Paolo was to tell this version of events to those he thought were supporters of 
Soderini or the popular government. To supporters of the Medici however, he was to 
show that he had `never desired anything other' than the Medici's return. In this way, 
Francesco hoped, Paolo would be able to mitigate the desire of supporters of popular 
government to persecute him for his role in the events of 1512, and at the same time 
to reap the full rewards for it, in terms of the favour and protection of the Medici. 
`Words greatly justify men' Francesco told him, `but it is necessary to choose with 
whom they are spoken' .97 
Paolo was to justify his actions not in terms of benefiting the city, but in 
terms of just enmity and loyal service to a particular family that were inadmissible 
and condemnable in Alamanni's poetry. The reason for the difference, was the 
separate spheres of public life with which they dealt, and in which they took place. 
Public life on one level was the relationship between the citizen and the city, defined 
by notions of civic virtue. Thus when conspirators addressed the city, in 
examinations, poems and political tracts, they sought to justify their deeds in terms of 
civic virtue. However, public life on another level, that addressed by Vettori, 
involved the relationship not between citizens and the city, but between the citizens 
themselves. On this level, conspiracy could be explained and justified in terms of the 
notions of just enmity and loyal service that defined the relationships between 
citizens. 
Thus Filippo Strozzi had no difficulty in emphasizing to Buondelmonti and 
Alamanni not only his desire to be a good citizen inspired by classical literature, but 
also his `just anger', as Segni described it, and desire to avenge the way in which 
Clement had treated him by breaking the truce, endangering his life and leaving him 
as a prisoner at the discretion of the Viceroy.98 To assure them of his commitment to 
the overthrow of the Medici, Strozzi wrote that `I desire more than ever to show as 
vs 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I., 136, f. 219e: Francesco to Paolo Vettori, 5 August 1513. 
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98 Segni, Storie, i, p. 11. 
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soon as I can to who has not respected me that I am worth very little, but not 
however, so little that I should have been treated in such a way'.99 If his 
circumstances improved, he assured them, he would recognize it to have been 
worked `by chance, and not by the faith or love of men', reminding himself ̀ in any 
event, that I have been played with without any respect, as if I was a slave'.100 
Similarly, when Guicciardini wrote to the Pope at the beginning of the siege he 
proclaimed himself ready to do whatever was asked of him in benefit of the 
campaign against the government of the last republic because therein lay the 
`exaltation of our lord Pope and of his family, the benefit of his servants and the 
utility of the city 101 
To supporters of popular government, those such as Bartolomeo Valori who 
joined and aided the imperial forces during the siege were fighting `against the city', 
an act `as wicked as one has ever heard of any iniquitous and perverse citizen'.102 A 
notification against one such citizen in 1530 described him as a `wicked traitor to his 
country', and declared that men should `sooner wish to die than act against their 
country' to which `everyone is as naturally obliged as to their father and mother' .1 °3 
`The devil entered a scoundrel', Cambi recorded of Lorenzo Soderini in 1530, who 
planned `to betray his country in favour of the Pope' on account of his `ambition' to 
be the leading member of the Soderini family.104 
Soderini himself claimed, as opponents of the popular government before 
1512 had done, to have been moved by the desire to save his country from 
destruction. According to Varchi, Soderini told his examiners that he had acted `with 
good zeal and in benefit of the city, afraid that if it was taken by force, it would go to 
the sack'.105 However, those who joined the imperialist forces during the siege also 
99 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 99, f. 21`: Filippo Strozzi to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Battista della Palla, 
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made another claim, not made by those who had conspired against the popular 
government before 1512: that they were aiming to free the city from tyranny. In 
September 1529 the Pope issued bans declaring that he was making war on the city 
`to readmit the noble citizens into Florence, and to free the city from the tyrannical 
government that under the name of popolo and libertà was usurping all the public 
authority.' 106 Ughi records that at the height of the siege Florentines fighting with the 
imperial forces beneath the city walls used to shout to those defending them that they 
were `better citizens than them, and that they sought to lift away the multitude of 
popular tyrants'.107 
It was because the popular government of the last republic was `tyrannical 
and destructive of the country' that Guicciardini could justify to himself his support 
for the Pope, despite his belief that to support the Medici was to support the 
establishment of tyranny. This he could agree with Machiavelli was a `shameful act', 
but it became an excusable one, as he wrote in the Considerations, if, as during the 
siege, it was done in order to save oneself from persecution from what was itself a 
tyrannical regime:108 
sometimes the forms of liberty are so disordered, and cities so full of civil discords, that 
necessity drives some citizen, unable to save himself by other means, to seek tyranny or to 
support someone who seeks it. Those who put love of their country before their personal 
safety in these circumstances would be more praiseworthy; but because this love or this 
fortitude is more often desired than found in men, those who are moved by such a cause 
deserve to be much excused, and so much more so if the government against which they act 
is disordered, because many things are often called liberty which are not so. 
Guicciardini's remark reveals how instrumental it was for those who 
attempted to overthrow the regime to be able to justify their actions and declare them 
honourable. On occasion the notion that there was no more glorious act than to risk 
one's life for the liberty of the city and the benefit of the patria may have even 
played a fundamental role in plots. Guicciardini argued that the majority of those few 
enemies of tyrants who were moved by love of liberty, were moved not so much for 
lob 
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that as because `knowing this defence to be most glorious, they have sought with this 
means to acquire name and glory; and thus they come to have been moved not for the 
common good, but for the purposes of their own interests'.109 Cosimo Rucellai, the 
friend and companion of Buondelmonti and the other conspirators of 1522 from the 
Rucellai gardens,11 ° had written a sonnet about Brutus before his death in 1519 
extolling how `this example alone' was such to be the reason that the world still 
derived some `drop' from the `holy river of Justice'.111 There were purposes for 
which conspirators in 1513 and 1522 claimed to have been inspired by the glory of 
Brutus, but some contemporaries did believe that they had been moved by the desire 
for glory. 
Nardi, for example, believed della Robbia's claim that Boscoli confessed that 
his `studies' had `swelled' his mind with the glory of tyrannicide, inspiring him to 
follow Brutus.112 Nerli wrote of how the conspirators of 1522 had been inspired by 
their study of history to `imitate the ancients' by `working some great thing that 
might make them illustrious' and thus they had decided plot against the Cardinal to 
re- establish the `free government' and restore `liberty' to the 'popolo' as before 
1512.113 Cerretani concluded that the plotters had been moved more by the `vanity of 
glory' than by hatred for the Cardinal, and appears to have done so partly on account 
of a remark in da Diacceto's confession. Da Diacceto related that Buondelmonti had 
wanted to include in the plot Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, one of the leaders of 
Soderini's overthrow. Alamanni had refused to countenance this, saying `he is a 
traitor, let us keep all this honour for ourselves'.114 The Ferrarese ambassador had 
similarly concluded in 1481 that one of the conspirators, Amorotto Baldovinetti, had 
been moved solely by the desire for `immortal glory'.115 To the extent that these plots 
109 F. Guicciardini, Dialogo, p. 40. 
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were moved by the desire for glory, the ancient doctrine of tyrannicide provided not 
only the justification but the inspiration for conspiracy against the Medici. 
Where they were not fundamental however, the notions that it was legitimate 
and laudable to plot against the regime in order to restore liberty to the city and 
benefit the patria were instrumental to conspiracies. For plots depended on the 
ability of conspirators to justify their attempts to overthrow the regime and declare 
them good. The best illustration of that is the extent to which the praiseworthiness of 
conspiracy was questioned from within the ranks of the discontented themselves. 
That was particularly the case amongst supporters of republican liberty during the 
Medicean regime. 
Machiavelli for example, noted in the third book of the Discourses the 
consequences of the failure of the Pazzi conspiracy to assassinate both Giuliano and 
Lorenzo in 1478. He concluded that since conspiracies against more than one prince 
were bound to fail, and since their failure would lead, as it had in 1478, to a prince 
becoming more `intolerable' and more `harsh', men should abstain from plotting 
against more than one prince because `it does no good either to oneself or to one's 
country (patria), .116 Following his examination of the Pazzi plot in his Florentine 
Histories, Machiavelli wrote that since conspiracies so rarely succeeded, they most 
often brought `ruin to who ever moves them and greatness to the one against whom 
they are moved', and often indeed turned a good prince into a bad one.117 
Machiavelli commended in the Discourses the `golden' sentence of Tacitus that men 
should desire good princes, but should tolerate them if they were not, for `whoever 
does otherwise will more often than not ruin both himself and his country 118 
Much effort has been exerted in attempting to show that Machiavelli either 
did not believe his `golden' sentence or did not intend to sanction tyranny with it.119 
But it is clear that Machiavelli did wish to point out the dangers involved in plots 
against a prince both to oneself and one's country, and that in so doing he was 
questioning the ancient classical doctrine of tyrannicide with which conspirators 
116 Machiavelli, `Discorsi', III, vi, Opere (1954), p. 334. 
117 Idem, `Istorie fiorentine', VIII, i, Opere (1954), pp. 923 -4. 
118 Ibid., p. 320. 
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against the Medici justified their deeds. Alamanno Rinuccini for example, had 
praised the Pazzi conspiracy at the time as an attempt to restore liberty to the city, 
and thus `a glorious deed' and `worthy of the highest praise', which should be 
`praised forever'.120 Machiavelli by contrast, while he agreed that those who 
succeeded in restoring liberty to their country were worthy of the highest praise, 
questioned the worth of attempting to do so when the chances of success were so 
slim, and the costs of failure to oneself and one's country so high. 
It is less well -known that other Florentines also questioned the value of 
tyrannicide on the grounds that it often did more harm than good to the city. It was 
partly on this account that Francesco Vettori condemned Brutus in 1528, some years 
before Giannotti was to do so more famously in the 1540s. Vettori noted that Brutus 
and Cassius were often given as inspirational examples of men moved by love of the 
liberty of their country, but argued that these were `fables to be told at the fireside', 
for Brutus and Cassius were moved to conspire, just as Florentines were, `by 
ambition' and self- interest.121 He condemned them because on account of their 
`ambition', it had not concerned them to `turn the world upside down' and have 
Rome become the `slave of so many cruel tyrants' and `bestial men' who ruled the 
city after Ceasar's death.122 
Guicciardini warned in the 1520s that one could do nothing `more pernicious' 
to a city under a tyranny, than to give the tyrant cause for suspicion, and thus force 
him to become worse.123 When a citizen was made `great', Guicciardini wrote, `the 
city does not have to be obliged to those who attempt new things against him without 
good occasion, because it increases the suspicion, and from that the evils of 
tyranny , . 124 Guiccardini often warned that whatever the intention behind them, plots 
rarely succeeded in benefiting the city. Those who overthrew regimes, he instructed 
his sons, were never able to ensure that the new government was established 
120 A. Rinuccini, `Dialogus de libertate', ed. F. Adorno, Atti e memorie dell' accademia toscana di 
scienze e lettere: La colombaria, xxii (1957), p. 273: `facinus gloriosissimum et omni laude 
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according to their design, and thus when the city had a `tolerable regime', although 
with some `defects', one should not attempt to overthrow it `to have a better one, 
because almost always it worsens.' 125 Whether they lived in a free city, an oligarchy 
or under prince, they should be content if they had a reasonable position, for 
otherwise `you will cause trouble for yourselves, and sometimes for the city'.126 
Guicciardini believed, like Machiavelli, that while it was praiseworthy in 
principle to attempt to overthrow the regime to restore liberty to the city and benefit 
the patria, it was hardly ever so in practice, for such attempts hardly ever succeeded, 
and their failure did more harm to the city than good. There were others in Florence 
who believed that even in principle it was not justified for an individual to attempt to 
overthrow the government. This was a belief held by many followers of Savonarola 
during the Medici regime, and was neatly expressed by Luca Landucci in his Diary 
following his account of the parlamento of 1512:127 
everyone should be content with that which Divine Goodness permits, because all 
governments and lordships are from God, and if in these revolutions there should happen 
some penury, damage, expense or discomfort to the popolo, consider that it is for our sins 
and to the end of some greater good. 
Girolamo Benivieni is reported to have told Cardinal Giulio that although he 
was a supporter of Savonarola and thus desired the restoration of liberty to the city, 
he would never commit `treason' (fellonia) on that account or attempt to overthrow 
the regime by force but rather `pray well to God' and the Cardinal that `it be 
conceded'.128 It has recently been asserted that few piagnoni shared such passive 
beliefs, and that the majority of Savonarola's supporters, inspired by the friar's own 
teaching, refused to accept that the Medici should be endured for God's love, and 
worked actively against them.129 Della Robbia, as we have seen, was one piagnone 
125 Ibid.: `Ricordi', B. 21. 
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who did believe that since the Medici were usurpers, it was justified and praiseworthy 
to attempt to overthrow them to restore the city's liberty, as Boscoli had done. Yet 
his source was Aquinas rather than Savonarola. Most piagnoni seem to have believed, 
as Landucci and Benivieni did, that since tyrannical government was a punishment 
from God, the Medici should be endured until God saw fit to remove them, and in this 
they followed the teachings of Savonarola himself. 
In his sermons and writings Savonarola had taught that for a Christian, 
`tyrannical government is permitted by God to punish and purge the sins of the 
people', and would be removed by God once those sins were purged.130 On one 
occasion he did declare that it was the office of the popolo, where it was lord, to 
banish the tyrant, but based on St. Paul's famous injunction to the effect that since 
powers were ordained by God they should be obeyed in every matter that was not 
against God, Savonarola denied that it was legitimate for any `private individual' to 
kill a tyrant, for that would be to act against God.131 Savonarola's followers sustained 
themselves with his words that the popular government would be remade if it was 
ever harmed, and during the Tumulto, according to Varchi, they thanked God for 
`miraculously' freeing the city from `servitude' as Savonarola had prophesied He 
would,' 32 but they believed that individuals should wait for such a miracle rather than 
actively attempt to overthrow the Medici. Far from providing the justification for 
opposition to the Medici, as has been claimed, most Savonarolans believed that it was 
wrong to plot against the Medici, and this was probably the main reason why they 
were not, as we have seen, at the forefront of opposition to the Medici regime. Indeed 
it was because `their confidence is more in miracles than in anything else' that 
Lodovico Alamanni assured the Medici in 1516 that they should hold little account of 
the `sect of the friar', who were to be feared only for their `votes' and not their 
`arms' .' 33 
130 G. Savonarola, Trattato del reggimento e governo della città di Firenze, ed. G. Pella and G. 
Lapira (Turin, 1954), p. 29; Weinstein, Savonarola, p. 154. 
131 Savonarola, Amos e Zaccaria, i, pp. 150 -1. 
132 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 109. 
133 L. Alamanni, `Discorso', ed. Albertini, Staatsbewusstsein, p. 366. 
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Both the Machiavellian idea that attempts to restore liberty to the city were 
not praiseworthy in practice, and the Savonarolan notion that they were unjustified in 
principle, meant that some supporters of popular government not only rejected 
conspiracy for themselves but were also critical of those who did attempt to 
overthrow the Medici. Niccolò Valori for example, one of the few piagnoni involved 
in plots against the Medici, records that he had sought to discourage Boscoli in 1513 
partly because he `did not like violence', and that he had warned Boscoli that the city 
`abhors the spilling of blood'.134 The plot of 1 522 was vehemently condemned by 
Giovanni Cambi, another follower of Savonarola, as an act of ̀ cruelty and madness', 
motivated solely by the `little' causes of resentment the conspirators felt for the 
Cardinal, rather than the desire to free their country.135 Cambi noted that their plan to 
raise a revolt came at a time when the price of grain was high and the silk trade was 
at a standstill due to the war with France, and concluded that the plotters were `so 
insolent and wicked', that for the `little cause of their resentment' they desired to put 
their country at risk of the sack.136 Cerretani, also a piagnone, believed the plot had 
been moved mainly by the desire to free the city from the `servitude' of the Medici, 
but he warned that `every power comes from God', and noted that if popular 
government had been restored, the city would have immediately allied itself to 
France, which would have resulted in its `ruin', for France was to be 
comprehensively defeated by the Spanish that summer.137 
It was the Tumulto del Venerdì however, which was to be most roundly 
condemned by supporters of popular government, and in terms not dissimilar to those 
used by the regime. The Otto di Pratica wrote to the Florentine ambassador in 
Venice of how the young men responsible `had not been concerned that the city, 
surrounded by three armies, might be subjected to fire and the sack, as long as they 
might vent their anger', and had proceeded to compel the Signoria `as dishonestly as 
was ever done for two hundred years'.138 Supporters of popular government were to 
134 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18`. 
135 
Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 202 -3. 
136 
Ibid., pp. 203 -4. 
137 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 408. 
138 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Missive, 18, f. 158r: Letter to Alessandro de' Pazzi, 29 April 1527. 
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make similar criticisms. Nardi supported the revolt but condemned the violence 
directed at the Signoria,139 and he and Guicciardini agreed that day that although they 
desired the restoration of liberty the revolt was `a great madness' that endangered the 
city with the sack.140 Diarists and chroniclers condemned the revolt as an `ugly 
matter' and the young nobles as `madmen' (matti, pazzi) for putting the city in 
danger of the sack from the armies outside it.141 `It was not the time to do such a 
thing', the young nobles are recorded to have been told by those who encouraged 
them to accept an amnesty in return for leaving the Palace, to which they initially 
replied that they `would rather die than live under tyrants and the house of the 
Medici'.142 
Such criticism of attempts to overthrow the regime from within the ranks of 
the discontented serves to emphasize the instrumental role in plots of the notions of 
republican civic virtue with which conspirators were able to assert the legitimacy and 
glory of their actions. Such assertions were to become far less easy to make in the 
years after 1530 when Florence ceased to be a republic. The charge that the Medici 
had usurped the liberty of the city could be countered by the Medici Dukes with the 
claim to be princes with a legitimate title granted by the Emperor. In an attempt to 
overcome that, Lorenzino was driven in 1537 to assert the right of a private 
individual to assassinate a tyrant with a legitimate title.143 In so doing he adopted the 
most radical, and hitherto unnoticed, position on tyrannicide put forward in Europe 
since Luca da Penna, the fourteenth century civilist. It was to be another thirty years 
before Buchanan brought the Protestant Reformation to an unequivocal statement 
that the right to kill or remove a tyrant with a legal title lay with every individual 
citizen.144 
139 Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 133 -4; Idem, `Lettera', p. 136. 
140 Ibid., p. 138. 
141 Anonymous, `Memorie del seguito nella città di Firenze dal 1524 al 1530', B.N.F., F.P., II, IV, 
404, ff. 1291-30 "; Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', ff. 171.- "; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 187 ". 
142 Anon., `Diario, 1521- 1532', f. 18`. 
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L. de' Medici, Scritti e documenti, ed. C. Teoli (Milan, 1862), p. 6. If Alessandro had been as 
legitimate a prince as the King of France, Lorenzino argued, his `dissolute life, his avarice and his 
cruelty' made him a tyrant and justified his murder. 
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Jászi and Lewis, Against the Tyrant, pp. 25, 53. 
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Despite Lorenzino's efforts there was a growing doubt amongst supporters of 
republican liberty in the two or three decades after 1530 that it was right to attempt to 
overthrow the Medici. An abiding theme of Florentine historians in the mid -sixteenth 
century, such as Benedetto Varchi, was that plots against the Medici in the past had 
only ever served, as they had in 1478, 1513 and 1522, to increase the Medici's 
greatness.14' The Machiavellian warning against attempts to restore liberty to the city 
on the grounds that they were bound to do more harm than good, combined with a 
Tacitean belief that destiny had ushered in the Medici, and that the age for the 
Florentine republic was over. Thus even an exiled supporter of republican liberty, 
such as Giannotti, began to wonder whether it was right for the individual to 
intervene in the process of history as tyrannicides did. If there were to be fewer plots 
against Duke Cosimo I than against his predecessors in the early sixteenth century, 
this was one reason why. 
It was their decision to plot against the regime, rather than their discontent, 
which distinguished conspirators. Yet there was a clear potential for conspiracy 
within the common Florentine assumptions and beliefs regarding the utility and 
legitimacy of attempting to overthrow the regime, and it was out of that potential that 
plots emerged. It was common currency in Florence that it was `madness' to conspire 
against the regime, since it was bound to end in the ruin of those involved. 
Nevertheless, Florentines were generally agreed on the self -interested reasons, 
including the desire for glory, for which it might be worth risking one's life to plot 
against the regime. 
Conspirators claimed to have been moved by love of liberty to free the city 
from tyranny, or love of their country to save it from destruction. In doing so they 
sought to justify their deeds and declare them legitimate and praiseworthy by 
appealing to what were generally accepted notions of civic virtue and the legitimacy 
of tyrannicide. These notions were instrumental to plots, and every conspiracy 
depended upon them. To the extent that conspirators against the Medici were ever 
moved by the desire for glory, as some contemporaries believed they were, the 
145 
Varchi, Storia, i, p. 51. 
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doctrine of tyrannicide even played a fundamental role in plots, providing not only 
their justification but their inspiration. 
That doctrine was not unquestioned from within the ranks of the discontented. 
There were those such as followers of Savonarola who believed that tyrannical 
government should be endured as a punishment from God, and that belief was the 
main reason why Savonarolans were not at the forefront of opposition to the Medici. 
Plots against the Medici were the work of supporters of popular government or an 
aristocratic republic guided by the traditional values of Florentine republicanism 
rather than by Savonarola's vision of a godly republic because it was those values 
and not Savonarola that provided a justification for opposition to the Medici. There 
were also those, of whom Machiavelli was only one, who argued that tyranmicide was 
hardly ever praiseworthy in practice, and counselled against attempts to restore 
liberty to the city. That argument was to hold increasing sway in the decades after 
1530, and conspiracy was to become less frequent as a result. 
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6 
Insiders and Outsiders 
Almost all plots in early sixteenth -century Florence were the work of 
patricians. Most of those involved, as Table One shows, whether against the popular 
government or the Medici, were noble, in that their families were magnates, or had 
entered the Priorate before 1350.' This is a precise date for what was in truth an 
imprecise distinction between those major guild families who were `new' (di fresco) 
and those who were `ancient' (popolani antichi), whom with magnates, (uomini di 
famiglie), were agreed to compose the nobility in Florence.2 Magnate families were 
banned from communal office in the late thirteenth century, and can therefore be 
identified, but no particular year of entry marked off the popolani antichi who were 
nobili, from other major guild families who were not, and their distinction lay only in 
the recognition of their exalted status by their peers and the popolani below them. 
Where we have them however, contemporary descriptions of the social status of 
those involved in conspiracies confirm that almost all plots were the work of the 
nobility. Only the conspiracy of 1497 could not be said to have been mainly the work 
of those from noble families, in that a small majority of its members were either from 
new families in the major guilds, or from the minor guilds. 
All conspiracies were the work of prominent citizens or those from prominent 
families in that most of those involved in each plot had either held important political 
office, or were the sons of those who had.3 Indeed, as Table Two shows, about half 
On this see Martines, Lawyers, pp. 64 -6; Butters, Governors, pp. 4 -9; Pesman Cooper, `Florentine 
Ruling Group', pp. 87 -9; D. Kent, The Rise of the Medici. Faction in Florence 1426 -1434 (Oxford, 
1978), pp. 1 14 -1 18. 
Piero Guicciardini in Rubinstein, Government, pp. 322 -3. 
' Important political office has been defined as the Signoria, Twelve Good Men, Sixteen Gonfaloniers 
of the Companies, Otto di Guardia, Dieci di Balla, Otto di Pratica, Captains of the Guelf Party, 
Officials of the Monte, Seventeen Reformers, Twelve Procurators, and Accoppiatori. 
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of those involved in most plots were leading citizens or from leading families, in that 
either they or their fathers had held positions in the inner circles of the regime, in the 
Dieci di Balìa, the Otto di Pratica, the Accoppiatori and the Council of Seventy, or 
had been called to speak in pratiche on their own behalf.4 
Table One 
Social Background of Conspirators 
Nobles Major Guilds Minor Guilds Other Total 
1497 13 13 3 1 30 
1510 1 0 0 0 1 
August 1512 14 2 0 0 16 
Sept. 1512 22 8 3 0 33 
1513 4 1 0 0 5 
1522 12 3 0 1 16 
1526/7 5 0 0 0 5 
February 1527 3 3 0 0 6 
April 1527 32 13 0 0 45 
Total 106 43 6 2 157 
Sources: See Appendix A, i -xi. 
As Table Two shows, the overthrow of Soderini in 1512 was almost entirely 
the work of those from leading families, as was the plot of Filippo Strozzi and others 
against the Medici in 1526/7. These were two plots that sought the establishment of a 
regime in which the ottimati were dominant, but the extent to which those from 
leading families were involved in all plots, including those such as 1497 which aimed 
to re- establish the past regime, show that the different aims of conspiracies did not 
reflect any significant difference in the social and political backgrounds of those 
involved. There are some distinctions to be made, as we shall see, between the social 
and political backgrounds of the leaders of different plots. Yet all conspiracies, 
whether intended to establish an aristocratic regime, re- establish the Medici regime, 
On this see Martines, Lawyers, p. 388; Brucker, Civic World, pp. 264 -5; Pesman Cooper, `Florentine 
Ruling Group', pp. 99 -104; Kent, Rise, pp. 109 -113. 
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or restore the popular regime, were generally the work of the same group: those from 
noble families of some political prominence, often the leading families in the city. 
Table Two 
Political Background of Conspirators 
Inner Circles Prominent 
Office 
No Office Unknown Total 
1497 14 10 4 2 30 
1510 1 0 0 0 1 
August 1512 13 3 0 0 16 
Sept. 1512 9 15 6 3 33 
1513 2 1 2 0 5 
1522 8 4 3 1 16 
1526 -7 4 1 0 0 5 
February 1527 2 4 0 0 6 
April 1527 17 21 6 1 45 
Total 70 59 21 7 157 
Sources: See Appendix A, i -xi. 
It was men from those same leading noble families who were at the head of 
the Tumulto del Venerdì in April 1527. This was a popular revolt, in which the 
'popolo' participated,5 but at the forefront of the Tumulto were young men from the 
city's leading noble families, and those forty or so individuals who most 
distinguished themselves in the revolt, as the tables show, were also almost all from 
prominent or leading families of the city, just as those who conspired against popular 
government had been. It was these same families who had conspired against the 
Medici in the fifteenth century and were responsible for their overthrow in 1494. 
Political conflict in Florence in the early sixteenth century was thus not the 
conflict between ottimati on the one hand and the Medici or popular government on 
5 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXVI, n. 80: Fabrizio Peregrino to Alessandro de' Medici, 27 April 1527; A.S.M., 
A.G., Estera, 1109, f. 312 Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 April 1527; Anon., `Diario, 1521- 
32', f. 17`; Anon., `Cronica', f. 155`; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 187V; Sanudo, Diarii, xliv, coll. 
205 
the other. Rather it was the conflict between the ottimati themselves, between those 
from the city's principal families, as it had been since the two or three decades 
following the Ciompi revolt of 1378. Moreover, to the extent that most plots sought 
the re- establishment of the past regime, political conflict in Florence was mostly the 
conflict between those patricians who supported popular government as it existed 
under Soderini in 1512 and those patricians who desired a party -based regime with 
the Medici as party bosses. 
The main distinction between conspirators that was reflected in their different 
aims was not the socio- political group from which they came, but whether they were 
in or out of power. Those plots that sought to establish a regime in which the ottimati 
were dominant were the work of discontented former supporters of the regime. In 
most cases they or their fathers were prominent or leading members of the regime 
which they sought to overthrow. Most plots by contrast were the work of those who 
had always desired the restoration of the past regime. In many cases they or their 
fathers had been prominent or leading citizens of the past regime which they sought 
to re- establish, and excluded from the ruling circles of the regime which they sought 
to overthrow. Others shared long- standing bonds of loyalty to the deposed leaders of 
the past regime. Most plots were thus the work of those who had been thrown out of 
power. 
This has not been recognized before. Indeed, even in the cases of particular 
conspiracies there has been no systematic examination of the social and political 
background of conspirators, nor of their political careers, nor of the ties of 
association between them. Yet it is clear that as most plots sought the re- 
establishment of the past regime, so most plots were the work of members of the past 
regime and their loyal supporters, excluded from the present. And with the 
restoration of the past regime, most plots sought in turn the exclusion and persecution 
of the leading members of the regime they sought to overthrow. They sought 
revenge. That was as much the case with plots that sought the re- establishment of the 
581, 590; L. Guicciardini, `Sacco', pp. 138 -9, 141, 148; Segni, Storie, i, p. 8; F. Guicciardini, Storia 
d' Italia, y, pp. 131 -2; Varchi, Storia, i, pp. 104 -106, 1 1 1. 
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popular regime, many of whose members were to be leading arrabbiati in the last 
republic, as it was of plots that sought the return of the Medici. 
Francesco Vettori was a victim of this exclusion and persecution in the last 
republic and he concluded in 1528 that no one in Florence thought to a `free 
government' (vivere libero), but only to their own `utility' (utile). Political conflict in 
Florence, Vettori wrote, was still the conflict between `factions' (parti ed fazioni) 
over honours and office, as it had been for two hundred years; between that faction 
that had all the honours and office, and that faction that had none. `The dominion is 
not so great, nor the revenues so many, that they can feed everyone; and so one part 
feeds itself and the other is discontented and awaits the time to do the same'.6 
Florence could never have a stable republic, Vettori argued, and he was well -known 
for doing so,7 unless the dominion and revenues increased, or the number of citizens 
halved.8 
Almost all plots after 1494 were the work to some extent of those who had 
been thrown out of power and their loyal supporters, and some plots wholly so. In 
that sense the nature of political conflict in Florence in the early sixteenth century 
was, as Vettori recognized, part of a long tradition of factional conflict in Florence 
that stretched back to the early fourteenth century and beyond.9 It was a marked 
change from the fifteenth century however, when after attempts in the 1440s by the 
banished Albizzi to return to the city, most plots against the Medici, including that of 
1478,10 were the work of disgruntled former supporters of the regime. 
Thus the conflict between supporters of popular government and supporters 
of the Medici that was to account for most plots after 1494 was a conflict between 
those in power and those they had thrown out of power. It was a conflict that in some 
respects dated back to the earliest decades of the Medici regime in the fifteenth 
century and even to the conflicts that preceded the rise of the Medici in 1434. Some 
6 Vettori, Scritti, p. 281; Idem, `Sommario', p 293. 
7 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 295. 
8 Vettori, Scritti, p. 281. 
s 
J. Heers, Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West, trans. D. Nicholas (Oxford -New York - 
Amsterdam, 1977), pp. 54 -78. 
1° Machiavelli, Lettere, pp. 271 -2: Filippo Casavecchia to Niccolò Machiavelli, 30 July 1507, makes 
this point concerning the events of both 1466 and 1478. 
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of the supporters of popular government or the Medici involved in plots after 1494 
were descendants of those who had opposed or supported the Medici in 1434 and the 
decades to follow. 
For the most part however, the conflict after 1494 between supporters of 
popular government and supporters of the Medici first originated in the last years of 
the Medici regime in the fifteenth century, concerning the increasing predominance 
of the Medici and particularly of Piero. It was in 1494 that it first erupted. Those 
long- standing supporters of the Medici who conspired against the popular 
government had either loyally supported the Medici until their overthrow in 1494 and 
desired their return ever since, or were the sons of those who had. In the cases of 
most of those supporters of popular government involved in plots and other attacks 
against the Medici after 1512, either they or their fathers had been supporters of the 
Medici but had opposed them in 1494, had remained implacably opposed to the 
return of the Medici until 1512, and had sought the restoration of the popular 
government ever since. 
The conspiracy of 1497 provides the most well -documented example of a plot 
by those thrown out of power and their loyal supporters, although the political 
careers of the conspirators and the bonds of loyalty they shared with Piero have been 
ignored in the only modern account of the plot.11 Of the twenty -seven Florentines 
known to have been involved whose careers are known, eleven had held office under 
the Medici, and of those eleven, ten had held no office in the popular regime before 
the conspiracy.12 Bernardo del Nero, Gonfalonier at the time of the plot, was the only 
conspirator to have held office after 1494. Indeed having sat in the Dieci, and been 
Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. 9 -11. 
12 Appendix A, i. The condemnations of those involved are not extant, but lists of those condemned 
can be found in chronicle accounts. The fullest, and that which I have used, can be found in Cei, 
`Storia', ff. 52` -59`. See also Landucci, Diario, pp. 156 -8; Sanudo, Diarii, i, coll. 711, 726, 759, 802; 
Cambi, Istorie, xxi, pp. 109, 114; Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 212; F. Guicciardini, Storie 
fiorentine, p. 139; T. Ginori, `Libro di debitori e creditori e ricordanze', ed. J. Schnitzer, Quellen and 
Forshungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas, i (Munich, 1902), p. 101; Cerretani, Storia, p. 239; Nerli, 
Commentari, p. 72. 
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one of the Paciali appointed in 1497, del Nero was a leading member of the inner 
circles of the regime he was attempting to overthrow. 1 3 
Three of those conspirators who held no office after 1494, Piero Alamanni, 
Filippo dell' Antella and Niccolò Ridolfi, one of the executed leaders of the plot, had 
sat in the Seventy, and thus had been members of the inner circle of the Medici 
regime, as del Nero had been. Indeed, Ridolfi and Alamanni had both been, with del 
Nero, amongst the leading members of the Medicean regime before 1494, having 
been in the Accoppiatori and the Otto di Pratica.14 Both are reported with del Nero to 
have been amongst the nine individuals in April 1493 with whom Piero was 
governing the regime,15 and amongst the twelve members of the 'pratica stretta' with 
whom Piero was conferring in the summer of 1494.16 Lorenzo Alamanni, Piero's 
son, was involved in the plot, and like him, one of the leaders of the conspiracy, 
Lorenzo Tornabuoni, was the son of a member of the inner circles of the Medici 
regime who had held no office after 1494. Five other conspirators, including Carlo 
Gherardi, Francesco Martelli, and Giannozzo Pucci, one of the leaders of the plot, 
had been prominent but not leading members of the Medicean regime, and having sat 
in Signoria or the Otto once or twice after 1490 would have expected further 
positions had the regime continued. Three of the plotters, including Gherardi, were 
all to be prominent citizens following the restoration of the Medici to power in 1512, 
while Martelli, dell'Antella, Alamanni and three others were to be members of the 
Seventy and in the inner circles of the regime.' 7 
The leaders of the plot had all been amongst Piero's closest supporters before 
1494 and had remained so until his overthrow. Both Pucci and Lorenzo Tornabuoni 
were called upon by Piero in late- October to accompany him on his ill -fated mission 
to treat for peace with the French as they approached Florentine territory. ] 8 They and 
another conspirator, Jacopo Gianfigliazzi, were foremost amongst those `friends' 
13 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 171, 203 -4; Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. xxvi: Paolo Somenzi to 
the Duke of Milan, 2 April 1497. 
14 
See Appendix A, i. 
15 P. Parenti, Storia fiorentina, ed. Matucci, in progress, i (Florence, 1994), pp. 46 -7. 
16F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 91. 
17 Appendix A, i. 
18 Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, p. 1 1 1. 
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with Piero when he conceded the fortresses of Pisa and Livorno without an official 
mandate,19 and it was Tornabuoni, as one of his `companions', whom Piero sent back 
to Florence to request that he be given full powers to negotiate on behalf of the city.20 
Outraged both at the concession of the fortresses and the manner in which it was 
made, leading citizens sent official ambassadors to negotiate with the French. When 
Piero returned on 8 November to re- establish his authority in the city he was visited 
by three `principal citizens' two of whom were del Nero and Ridolfi.21 The next day, 
according to Parenti, Tornabuoni and Pucci were foremost amongst the `friends' of 
Piero who were armed and preparing to take control of the city on his behalf.22 
Jacopo Gianfigliazzi and Francesco Martelli were amongst those in Piero's company 
during his unsuccessful attempt to seize the Palace, following which Piero was forced 
to flee the city.23 
After the overthrow of Piero, an amnesty was granted to those who had 
supported him, but it did- not reconcile the future conspirators to the popular 
government, and one reason for that was their inability to find a place in the new 
regime. According to Guicciardini, Pucci had desired Piero's return partly because he 
had seen that he was unable to have much influence in the popular government since 
he was not from a noble family, and had little `favour' amongst the popolo because 
of the `wicked conduct' of his father.24 Pucci was excluded partly because his 
family's rise had depended solely on Medici favour, and partly because he was too 
closely associated with the Medici regime. Both Alamanni and Pucci's father, 
Antonio, as well as del Nero, according to Guicciardini, had been amongst those 
without relatives or `credit' given favour by Lorenzo because he did not need to fear 
them.25 With del Nero they were both amongst those to whom Lorenzo was giving 
`reputation', and to whom he entrusted the supervision of scrutinies and taxes, and 
confided `essential secrets', since they were of a `quality' that without his support 
19 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 95. 
20 Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, pp. 115, 117. 
21 Ibid., p. 121. 
22 Ibid., pp. 124, 126. 
23 Ibid., p. 128. 
24 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 142. 
25 Ibid., pp. 24 -5. 
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they would have had no following.26 Alamanni, according to Cerretani, was enriched 
by Lorenzo, and made by him one of most reputed citizens in Florence.27 
Without nobility or relatives, it was only by means of the Medici, according 
to Guicciardini, that Pucci's family, Alamanni and del Nero had arisen to a position 
of political prominence before 1494 equal to those who ordinarily would have 
preceded them.28 Evidently however, the position of Pucci and Alamanni remained 
dependant on the Medici. They lacked those qualities which enabled del Nero, after 
eighteen months `banished' from public affairs by the `great suspicion' in which 
those who had supported Piero were held, to acquire a position in the popular 
regime.29 Due to his old age, wealth, prudence and other qualities, according to 
Guicciardini, del Nero was of such authority that he came to lead Savonarola's 
opponents.30 Yet Guicciardini wondered on more than one occasion whether 
Bernardo del Nero's distaste for popular government, despite his leading position 
within it, had not been moved by the `hurt' (sdegno) from some injury done to him 
during the popular regime, particularly by the many `dishonest' taxes, that were 
imposed on him.31 
Parenti records that Ridolfi was thought by the popolo at the time to have 
disliked the government of the new regime, because `he himself did not possess it'.32 
Guicciardini argued that since Ridolfi was of noble family and had enjoyed honours, 
authority and power to be compared to any other citizen of his time, if he had wanted 
to accommodate himself to the popular government as other leading members of the 
Medicean regime had done, he would not have lacked `honours and reputation' in the 
regime. Yet because he was the father -in -law of Piero's sister, Contessina, and on 
that account had been extremely powerful in the Medici regime, he had not been 
26 Ibid., pp. 78 -9. 
27 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 407. 
28 F. Guicciardini, Dialogo, p. 11. 
29 Ibid., p. 4. 
30 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 131, 143. 
31 F. Guicciardini, Dialogo, pp. 5, 53; Idem, Storie fiorentine, p. 143. 
22 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 209. 
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content with the position he could have had in the popular government and was 
moved by `ambition', according to Guicciardini, to plot.33 
Tornabuoni was too young to have held office, but his father had been a 
member of the Seventy before 1494, and had held no office in the popular regime 
before his death in 1497.34 Yet according to Guicciardini, Tornabuoni was not 
moved, as Pucci had been, by any inability to find position in the popular regime. For 
like Ridolfi and unlike Pucci, Tornabuoni was noble as well as renowned for his 
virtues, and thus had the `universal favour and benevolence' of all the popolo, indeed 
more so than anyone else his age,35 as other contemporaries also recalled.36 Rather, 
argued Guicciardini, Tornabuoni was moved, like Ridolfi, partly by the loss of the 
extraordinary influence he enjoyed under Piero, and partly because of marriage ties 
with the Medici. Tornabuoni was a close relative and blood cousin of Piero, since his 
aunt, Lucrezia Tornabuoni, was Piero's grandmother.37 
It was the strength of their ties to the Medici rather than their exclusion from 
popular government that moved Ridolfi and Tornabuoni, and indeed it was long- 
standing bonds of loyalty to the Medici, as Guicciardini recognized, that were the 
main reason too, for Pucci's involvement in the plot. Pucci was `wholeheartedly of 
Piero', on account of his father and his ancestors (his grandfather had been a close 
supporter of the Medici since before 1434),38 and through having then been himself 
Piero's `companion' (compagno).39 Parenti records that Pucci was thought by the 
popolo at the time to have been moved by the `benevolence of Piero de' Medici' and 
by `habitually being with him'.40 Piero was to urge Pucci not to forget that `good 
friendship' in `past years', Pucci later recalled, when he sent Fra Mariano to Florence 
in the summer of 1496 to request Pucci's support for a possible attempt to return to 
Florence.41 
'' F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143. 
34 See Appendix, A, i. 
35 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143. 
36 
Cerretani, Storia, p. 239; Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 130. 
37 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143; Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 130; Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 725. 
38 Kent, Rise, p. 353. 
39 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 142. 
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Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 209. 
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Unlike the other executed leaders of the plot, Giovanni Cambi was neither a 
leading citizen, as were Ridolfi and del Nero, nor the son of a leading citizen, as were 
Pucci and Tornabuoni.42 He was recognized to be of less `quality' than the others,43 
but like them he was moved by long- standing bonds of loyalty to the Medici. A man 
of `little authority', according to Guicciardini, he was a supporter of the Medici not 
on account of his ancestors or dependence on the Medici for political prominence, as 
Pucci was, but through having been involved in their businesses in Pisa,44 which 
Cerretani and other sources inform us he `governed' for Lorenzo and then Piero from 
the mid 1480s.45 
Others involved in the conspiracy also had long- standing ties with Piero and 
the Medici family through their employment, like Cambi, in Medici businesses. 
Galeazzo Sassetti had worked for the Lyons branch of the Medici bank with his 
brothers from 1485 until 1492, and his father had been general manager of the bank 
from 1459 until his death in 1490.46 The father of Francesco Martelli had worked for 
the bank since the 1420s and managed the branch in Rome from 1439 until his death 
in 1464.47 The branch had then been managed until 1494 by Lorenzo Tornabuoni's 
father, in whose absence in 1487 it had been run by Nofri Tornabuoni.48 
Francesco Cegia and Sforza Bettini had both been in the service of the Medici 
family since the 1470s. Bettini had been a personal agent of Lorenzo, sent on 
missions of diplomatic and military significance, although he does not seem to have 
served Piero.49 Cegia, described at the time of the plot as a `governor of the Medici 
household',50 had entered Medici service in his youth under his father, living in 
Lorenzo's house, then being in the service of Giovanni from 1483 to 1487, and in the 
early 1490s in Pisa administering some business affairs of the Medici, while 
42 
See Appendix A, i. 
43 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 209. 
44 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 142. 
45 Cerretani, Storia, p. 239; M. Troncarelli, `Giovanni Cambi', D.B.1., xvii, pp. 97 -8. 
46 
R. de Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397 -1494 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 
389. 
47 Ibid., pp. 212, 368. 
48 Ibid., pp. 223, 377. 
49 D.B.I., ix, p. 755: `Sforza Bettini'. 
5° 
Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 724. 
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Giovanni Cambi ran the bank and their interests in iron ore.51 Andrea de' Medici was 
not a close relative of Piero's branch of the family, but had been one of four noble 
citizens chosen to guard Lorenzo after the Pazzi plot,52 and who, as his intimate 
companions, had accompanied him everywhere.53 Following Piero's departure, 
Andrea was dismissed from an official post by the Signoria.54 
Thus the conspirators had bonds of loyalty to Piero and the Medici family 
which went back at least to the Laurentian era and sometimes beyond. The nature of 
these bonds partly explains why, uniquely amongst plots of the period, three of the 
five executed as the `leaders and authors' of the plot,55 and a small majority of their 
accomplices, were not noble but from ordinary families in the major guilds. While 
Ridolfi and Tornabuoni had marriage ties with the Medici, most had either served the 
Medici household or businesses, as Cambi did, or risen to political prominence with 
Medici favour despite their lack of nobility, as had Pucci and del Nero. It was these 
bonds, rather than any inability to find a place in the popular government, which 
ensured that despite the amnesty they remained loyal to Piero after 1494, and 
conspired for his return. For it was these bonds which ensured that they had 
supported Piero until his overthrow, and had desired the re- establishment of the 
Medici ever since. 
Parenti and Cerretani report that just days after Piero's expulsion, Pucci, 
Tornabuoni and other `accomplices' and `partisans' of Piero began trying 
unsuccessfully with Piero's wife to persuade the French that Piero had been `unjustly 
thrown out of Florence' and that they should have him return so that he could defend 
himself from the `falsehoods' of other citizens and `justify himself before the 
King.'6 If the King found that Piero had lived `like a citizen' and not `tyrannically', 
and had been expelled `through envy' and by `the opposing faction' he should allow 
51 Cegia, `Ricordi', pp. 191 -2; R. Ristori, `Francesco Cegia', D.B.I., xxiii, p. 324; Roover, Rise, p. 
277. 
52 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 67. 
5' F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 77 -8. 
54 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 96, f. 105" (3 December 1494). 
55 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 20, f. 74°; Villari, Savonarola, ii, pp. xlix -l: Letters of 21 August 
1497; Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 212. 
56 Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, pp. 135, 137 -40; Cerretani, Storia, p. 217. 
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Piero to remain in the city, where the King should compose the differences and 
establish `concord and union'.57 Piero's `accomplices' were known to be making 
armed preparations, according to Parenti, and it was widely believed that once Piero 
entered Florentine territory he would seize back control of the city with the favour of 
the King and his own partisans.58 
In the autumn of 1495 Giovanni Cambi, via `his man', Luca Speranzini, 
provided funds for Piero and Giuliano, according to Lamberto dell' Antella's later 
confession, which helped to finance an eventually aborted advance on Florence with 
Virginio Orsini.59 With the funds came letters from Florence, according to dell' 
Antella, urging Piero to come to the city, and to which Piero replied that he would do 
so, but that he desired to know what those `fathers' whom he addressed would do if 
he did approach.60 Cambi and Speranzini seem to have confirmed all this in their 
own examinations.61 Dell' Antella said that Messer Bernardo Accolti, who was 
condemned in 1497, had -also provided Piero with money for the enterprise, but he 
did not know who in Florence, apart from Cambi, was involved in the 
correspondence.62 
Whether other plotters of 1497 were involved in soliciting Piero to come to 
Florence in the autumn of 1495 is not known, but it is clear from Cegia's Ricordi 
segreti,63 and the examinations of the plotters,64 that by this time both Cambi and 
Tornabuoni had been collaborating with Cegia for some months in a sustained and 
covert campaign to provide the outlawed Medici with financial assistance, principally 
through the recovery of their goods, transforming them into cash and having the 
funds transferred. Other future conspirators were also involved, particularly Lucrezia 
Salviati, Piero's sister, as well as Galeazzo Sassetti, Andrea de' Medici, and 
Francesco Naldini.65 
57 Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, p. 135. 
58 Ibid., pp. 135 -6. 
59 `Processo di Lamberto dell' Antella', pp. v, ix. 
60 Ibid., pp. vi, ix -x. 
61 Cei, `Storia', ff. 49`, 50` 51 
62 `Processo di Lamberto dell' Antella', p. xi. 
63 
Cegia, `Ricordi', pp. 198 -200, 204 -7. 
64 
Cei, `Storia', ff. 50` -1`; `Processo di Lamberto dell' Antella', pp. v, viii, ix, xi. 
6s 
Cegia, `Ricordi', pp. 207 -227. 
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The involvement of Tornabuoni, Sassetti, and Cambi in Medici businesses 
before 1494 seems to have bound their own affairs so closely with those of the 
Medici that they had little choice but to assist them after their possessions were 
confiscated, and to desire their return. Thus it was that Tornabuoni took over various 
Medici business interests with the agreement of the new regime including the Lyons 
branch of the Medici bank in partnership with the Sassetti, and the Rome branch in 
partnership with his father.66 According to Guicciardini, having entangled his affairs 
in those of the Medici, as well as being `munificent' and having spent a great deal, 
had put Tornabuoni's affairs in so much disorder that he would have shortly gone 
bankrupt, and his search for a way `to get back on his feet' partly explained why he 
conspired against the regime.67 Certainly, without capital or credit the bank 
stagnated,68 and as Pucci later recalled in his examination, Tornabuoni was having 
`difficulty' at the time of the plot `making up for his business affairs, which were 
putting him in some predicament'.69 Cambi too was partly moved to plot by being 
`impoverished' according to Guicciardini, a fact which he explains as the result of 
the Pisan rebellion against Florence that accompanied the overthrow of the regime, 
but which may also, since Cambi was their factor, have been partly the result of the 
fall of the Medici and the confiscation of their goods.70 
Thus bound to the Medici by business and marriage ties, the conspirators had 
been Piero's most loyal supporters before 1494, and they had lost most with his 
overthrow. For the same reasons that they had supported Piero to the end, they had 
desired his return ever since, to restore the Medici's loyal supporters to power and to 
avenge his overthrow. Parenti reports that Pucci and Cambi confessed that they had 
aimed to overthrow the regime and readmit Piero, with the `undoing of many 
opposing families and citizens' and `to benefit their friends and adherents and 
especially those of the old regime and whom they tacitly knew to be their 
partisans'.71 
66 
Roover, Rise, pp. 169, 224, 310. 
67 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143. 
68 Roover, Rise, p. 370. 
69 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I., 360, f. 18 Examination of Giannozzo Pucci. 
70 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 142. 
71 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, pp. 206 -7. 
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Where the plot of 1497 was the work of prominent and leading members of 
the Medicean regime before 1494 and others with long- standing bonds of loyalty to 
the Medici family, the plot by which Soderini was overthrown and the Medici 
returned to the city was very different. For this was the work of those who 
themselves or whose fathers were members of the ruling circles of the popular 
government. Whilst the political background of those involved has been largely 
neglected by modern historians,72 it emerges that three of the leaders of the plot, 
Valori, Vettori and Capponi, and one of their accomplices, Benedetto Buondelmonti, 
had all held office in the Signoria, the Colleges or the Otto di Guardia in the five 
years before the conspiracy. They were prominent, though not leading, members of 
the regime they were attempting to overthrow. Albizzi and the Rucellai, the other 
leaders of the plot, were all the sons of men who had been leading members of the 
inner circles of the popular government, as were seven of their ten identifiable 
accomplices.73 
The leaders of the plot, as Cerretani recognized, were all the sons of those 
who had been enemies of the Medici in 1494,74 and it was their discontent with 
Soderini and the popular government, rather than any loyalty to the Medici, that led 
them to conspire against the regime. It was in the Rucellai gardens between 1503 and 
1506 that the leaders of the plot were first associated with opposition to Soderini, due 
in no small measure, according to Guicciardini, to the influence of Bernardo Rucellai 
himself. Discontented with Soderini and the Great Council, Rucellai had begun the 
meetings in the gardens demonstrably as an academy where scholars and young 
students of letters met to talk of their studies, but in fact, according to Guicciardini, 
in order to become a `refuge' for the `discontented' and a `corrupter of young men'.75 
Certainly discussions in the gardens concerning the history and institutions of Rome 
and Venice seem to have focused on Rucellai's belief that the best constitution for 
72 See the brief remarks in Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 59; Pesman Cooper, `Pier 
Soderini', p. 109. 
73 See Appendix A, iii. The list is based on the accounts in A.S.F., C. Strozz. Ser. I, 360, f. 29r: Jacopo 
to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September 1512; Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 309; Nardi, Istorie, i. pp. 496 -7. 
74 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 47; Idem, Storia, p. 447. 
75 F. Guicciardini, `Oratoria accusatoria', Scritti autobiografici, pp. 229 -30. 
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Florence was an aristocratic regime with a monarchical head.76 Through the meetings 
in the gardens, Rucellai was able not only to keep the discontented united, argued 
Guicciardini, but to `corrupt the soul' of many young men, for his eloquence ensured 
that he was heard `like a Siren'. Since it was these young men who overthrew 
Soderini in 1512, the Rucellai gardens, declared Guicciardini, were the plant that 
produced the `poison' which killed the city's liberty'.77 
It was having emerged out of the political discussions in the Rucellai gardens 
discontented with Soderini and the popular government, that the leaders of Soderini's 
overthrow became reconciled with the Medici and began to work for their return, 
becoming involved in the Strozzi- Medici marriage alliance of 1508. Antonfrancesco 
degli Albizzi, a companion of Strozzi's, Palla and Giovanni Rucellai, as well as their 
father, Bernardo, were amongst those twelve citizens, whom Cerretani described as 
Bernardo's `friends',78 accused in a notification of being `authors and counsellors' of 
the alliance. Giovanni Corsi and Filippo Buondelmonti, two of those who with the 
Rucellai were to urge the Medici to force the parlamento were also amongst the 
accused, whom Guicciardini recorded were all already suspected of wishing to 
overthrow the regime.79 
Strozzi denied having been counselled by others and Bernardo wrote to the 
Signoria from Venice denying any involvement.80 However, Bernardo's 
responsibility for the marriage was remarked upon in the correspondence of the 
Strozzi family at the time,81 and the tutor to Strozzi's sons was later to recall that 
both Bernardo Rucellai and Filippo Buondelmonti had `conspired' (congiurato) with 
Strozzi's mother to make the alliance.82 Strozzi's brother, Lorenzo, was later to recall 
that their mother had sought Bernardo's advice on the matter, and being no friend of 
Soderini he had urged her to proceed.83 According to Segni, the idea of an alliance 
76 Gilbert, `Bernardo Rucellai', pp. 122 -3. 
77 F. Guicciardini, `Oratoria accusatoria', Scritti autobiografici, p. 230. 
78 
Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 176, 177. 
79 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 327, 331. 
80 A.S.F., Signori, Carteggi, Responsive, 31, ff. 2551.- ": Letter of Bernardo Rucellai, 31 December 
1508; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 331; Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 179 -80; Idem, Storia, p. 361. 
ß1 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 134, f. 49`: Giovanbattista Cei to Giovanni Strozzi, 2 December 1508. 
82 
F. Zeffi, `Vita', p. xv. 
8' 
Strozzi, `Vita', p. xiii. 
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was proposed to Strozzi by Bernardo Rucellai and his sons, and both Gino Capponi 
and Paolo Vettori were his `counsellors' in the affair.84 Strozzi certainly wrote to 
Albizzi to seek his advice on whether to appear in Florence to defend himself.85 
There seems little doubt that those accused were involved, and that they were so 
because, as Cerretani argued, discontented with Soderini and the popular government 
they saw no better way to undermine both than by favouring the Medici.86 
While the leaders of Soderini's overthrow were discontented members of the 
ruling circles of popular government, some of their accomplices were long- standing 
partisans of Medici family who had always desired their return. Amongst those 
involved in the coup were the `sons and nephews' of Piero Tornabuoni, and the 
`sons' of Piero Pitti,87 who had both conspired in 1497 and had held no office in the 
popular government. Tornabuoni was to be one of the twenty citizens appointed on 
the day after Soderini's overthrow to advise the Signoria on constitutional reform 
and a member of the inner circles of the Medici regime after 1512.88 Also involved 
were the sons of Luca di Maso degli Albizzi, who had been amongst those `friends' 
of Piero detained in April that year,89 and the `sons' of Jacopo Pitti, brother of Piero, 
and one of three men who had killed Francesco Valori in 1498 in revenge for his role 
in the execution of the plotters the year before.9° 
Another of Valori's killers, Simone Tornabuoni, was himself involved in the 
coup of 1512.91 Tornabuoni had signed the petition in favour of Savonarola in 1497, 
and provides a further example of how support for the friar and the Medici were not 
mutually exclusive.92 He been amongst those in Piero's company when he went to 
seize the palace in November 1494,93 and is recorded to have been condemned by the 
84 Segni, `Vita', pp. 281 -2. 
S5 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 134, ff. 51`-": Filippo Strozzi to Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, 22 
December 1508. 
86 Cerretani, Dialogo, pp. 41 -2. 
87 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 309; Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 496. 
88 
See Appendix A, i. 
S9 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 181. 
9° F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 151; Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 264. 
91 Ughi, `Cronica', p. 128. 
92 
Polizzotto, Elect Nation, p. 459. 
93 Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, p. 128. 
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Otto in April 1499 for having intrigued with him.94 Having been declared an outlaw, 
his sentence was commuted in 1501 to a term of banishment from the city for five 
years and exclusion from the Great Council for twenty.95 This was overturned by the 
Signoria on the day of Soderini's overthrow,96 and Tornabuoni was to be a prominent 
member of the Medici regime after 1512.97 
The Tornabuoni family was to be at the head of those urging the Medici to 
force a parlamento, and as were the Tornabuoni most of those involved were long- 
standing partisans of the Medici who had always desired their return. The 
Tornabuoni were recorded by Landucci to have been the only family to go to the 
Medici's aid in 1494.98 As well as Piero, three other Tornabuoni were involved in the 
plot of 1497, including his brother, Messer Luigi. Gianfrancesco, another brother of 
Piero,99 had been amongst those `friends' of the Medici detained in April that year.10° 
Three members of the Tornabuoni, including a son and a nephew of Piero, are 
recorded to have taken part in the forcing of the parlamento,1 ° 1 and others amongst 
the thirty -three individuals listed, such as Girolamo degli Albizzi and Antonio Lapi, 
were from families with an equally long- standing tradition of support for the Medici, 
dating back to before 1434.102 Giovanni Davanzati had himself been suspected of 
participating in the plot of 1497, and had fled to Bologna, as did Piero Tornabuoni, 
when summoned to appear before the magistrates.103 
Members of the Tornabuoni family had sat in the Seventy before 1494 and 
were to do so after 1512, but none had held seats in the Council of Eighty during the 
94 Landucci, Diario, p. 195. 
95 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 96; G. Guidi, Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella repubblica fiorentina 
dal 1494 al 1512 (Florence, 1992), p. 738. 
96 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 114, f. 97`. 
97 Appendix A, iii. 
98 Landucci, Diario, p. 74. 
99 
Litta, Famiglie, disp. 54 (Tornabuoni), tay. i. 
ioo Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 181. 
101 See Appendix A, iv. The list is that in B.N.F., F.P., II III 433, f. 59r: `Nota di quelli che nel giorno 
del parlamento armati presono tutto il palazzo e sconpartironsi convenientemente, 1527'. The date 
probably refers to the year the list was made, for it is clearly a list of those involved in the parlamento 
of 1512. See Butters, Governors, pp. 183 -4; Stephens, Fall, p. 63. 
102 Lapi and Albizzi were both the direct descendants of men who had supported the Medici in the 
1420s, Kent, Rise, pp. 352 -4. 
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Sanudo, Diarii, i, coll. 712, 724. 
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popular regime.1 °4 Others involved in the parlamento were also from families that had 
lost political position after 1494, a fact unnoticed in modern accounts, which have 
largely neglected the political backgrounds of those involved.1p5 Of the thirty whose 
background is known, fifteen, one half, were from families with little or no political 
influence in the popular goverment, in that neither they nor their fathers had held 
office during the popular regime.! °6 Nine of those fifteen, about a third of those listed, 
had held such influence under the Medici, in that their fathers or, in Baccio Cini's 
case, they themselves, had held office before 1494. The positions they had held were 
modest, in the Priorate, the Colleges, and the Otto di Guardia rather than the Seventy 
and the inner circle of the regime, but the loss was no less significant for that. 
Girolamo Tornabuoni can be added to their number, for having held positions in the 
Signoria and the Otto before 1494, his only contribution to political life before 1512 
was to attend two pratiche around 1502. The two brothers, Matteo and Cosimo 
Bartoli were amongst this group. Their father was one of those, according to 
Guicciardini, whose rise to political prominence under Lorenzo had depended solely 
on Medici favour.107 
Following the parlamento, all but one of the ten individuals involved who 
were from families that had lost their position in the regime after 1494 were to return 
to power. Three, including Matteo Bartoli, were to be in the inner circles of the 
Medici regime, while Cini, Tornabuoni and four others were to hold prominent 
positions in the government after 1512. Three others from families outside the ruling 
circles of popular government were to rise to prominence in the Medici regime.'°8 
Thus clearly amongst those who sought a parlamento there were many, as 
Guicciardini argued, who had held no influence during the popular regime,109 and 
most of those had lost that position their families had held under the Medici. Yet it 
would be wrong to see the parlamento solely as the work of those from families 
outside the ruling circles of government after 1494. It is true that while the vast 
10.4 Pesman Cooper, `Florentine Ruling Group', p. 177. 
105 Some brief remarks can be found in Butters, Governors, pp. 183 -4. 
10o' See Appendix A, iv. 
1°7F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine. pp. 78 -9. 
1 °R See Appendix A, iv. 
109 Idem, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 234. 
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majority of those listed were old enough to have held office sometime during the 
popular regime, only five of those twenty -two eligible had done so.110 Many may 
thus have been looking to the Medici to satisfy their personal desires for political 
influence which the popular regime left unfulfilled. Yet half of those listed had either 
held office during the popular regime, or were the sons of men who had. Nine, one 
third, were the sons of prominent and even leading members of the inner circles of 
popular government» Amongst these was Prinzivalle della Stufa, the protagonist of 
the plot of 1510. Too young to have held office himself, della Stufa's father had been 
in the Dieci in 1505 and 1506, and is recorded by Cerretani in 1507 to have been 
amongst those twenty -five citizens regularly attending pratiche called by the 
Dieci.112 
Thus many of those supporters of the Medici involved in the parlamento were 
the sons of leading members of the popular government they sought to overthrow. In 
six cases, including Cristofano Sernigi and Francesco Salviati, their fathers were still 
alive in 1512, and they were probably acting in accordance with the political 
sympathies of their fathers. Certainly the fathers of all six were to be members of the 
Balla created by the parlamento, and leading members of the inner circles of the 
Medici regime thereafter.113 Some, such as della Stufa and Girolamo degli Albizzi, 
were long -standing supporters of the Medici, as their fathers were. Others, such as 
Giovanni and Palla Rucellai, supported the Medici on account of their discontent 
with popular government, as their father did. Those associates of the Rucellai who 
had urged the Medici to force the parlamento were from a similar background. 
Filippo Buondelmonti was himself a leading member of the inner circles of popular 
government, as had been the fathers of both Giovanni Corsi and Piero Martelli, 
whose brother, Domenico, took part in forcing the parlamento itself" 14 
The Rucellai and their associates had supported the Medici on account of 
their desire for a regime in which the ottimati were dominant, and were pleased with 
1° See Appendix A, iv. The ages of twenty -nine of the thirty-three listed are known. 
"' See Appendix A, iv. 
"` Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 137. 
13 See Appendix A, iv. 
14 On Corsi see F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 324; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 136. On the others see 
Appendix A, iii and iv. 
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the prominence afforded to ottimati, including supporters of the popular government, 
on the Balia. Thus they urged Lorenzo Strozzi, Bernardo's son -in -law, to return from 
Pisa whence he had fled as the Medici approached the city.' 15 However, the 
prevailing tenor of the parlamento was the return to power of the Medici's loyal 
supporters who sought, Cerretani recorded, to `avenge themselves and stuff 
themselves with possessions'.116 Only the Medici themselves prevented the vengeful 
persecution of leading members of the popular government longed for by their 
partisans. The day after the parlamento Filippo Strozzi urged his brother, Lorenzo, to 
return to Florence, assuring him that the Medici had `impeded every injury against 
the rage of many who called for blood' despite having had in the Palace `all their 
enemies in their hands'.117 Cerretani recorded that many of those `friends of the 
Medici' who accompanied Giuliano during the take -over of the Palace had wanted to 
take some action against some of those citizens assembled there, `some in order to 
avenge the Medici, and some in order to avenge their own particular injuries', 
although Giuliano had prevented this.118 Cerretani believed that from the moment of 
the parlamento some of the palleschi would have wanted `to avenge themselves', 
banish many from the city and remove their possessions, but the Medici, he recalled, 
had ensured that `the dogs were bound' .119 
In 1518 Cerretani recorded that since 1512 the palleschi `had never been 
satisfied' because `on their return they were almost all bankrupts and poor, and full 
of resentment (sdegno)', and would have wanted, `having won', to `plunder the 
possessions and persons of their enemies and make a regime as that of 1434', but the 
Medici had not consented to ít.120 Cerretani remarked on the difference between 1512 
and earlier revolutions in Florentine history, such as those of 1433 and 1434, when 
one faction ( parte) had chased out the other, and `the victors had acquired the 
possessions and positions of the vanquished'.121 Yet Piero Soderini, his brother, 
15 B.N.F., Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 84: Bernardo Rucellai to Lorenzo Strozzi, 18 September 1512. 
116 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 282. 
117 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 178, f. 90r: Filippo to Lorenzo Strozzi, 17 September 1512. 
118 
Cerretani, Storia, p. 448; Idem, Dialogo, p. 58. 
119 
Ibid., pp. 60, 61. 
120 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 350. 
121 Idem, Dialogo, p. 61. 
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Giovanvettorio, and three of their nephews were exiled, albeit for terms of two or 
three years,122 and as after 1494 not all members of the ruling circles of the past 
regime found a place in the new. Like the plot of 1497 against the popular 
government, the first plot against the Medici, in 1513, was the work of those who had 
loyally supported the past regime until its overthrow. And also like the plot of 1497, 
the plot of 1513 was, at least to some extent, the work of those who had been thrown 
out of power and their loyal supporters, a fact wholly unrecognized in modern 
accounts.123 
Niccolò Valori, as contemporaries remarked, had been one of the 'primi' of 
the past regime,124 a leading member of the inner circles of the popular government, 
twice a member of the Dieci, and regularly called to pratiche strette.125 Yet although 
he was one of two hundred citizens appointed for the new scrutiny in October, he 
was not a member of the Balla established by the parlamento, and thus was outside 
the inner circles of the new regime.126 However, both Boscoli and Capponi, the 
leaders of the plot, as well as, Giovanni Folchi, had never held office, nor had any of 
their fathers held office in the popular government, although Folchi's father, who had 
worked for the Medici bank in the 1460s and 70s, had held office before 1494.127 
Boscoli and Capponi must be considered, although both from noble families, to have 
been obscure men in political terms,128 since neither they nor their fathers had ever 
held office, and in that sense they were unique amongst the leaders of conspiracies in 
the period. 
Whilst the leaders of the plot were not, as Valori was, former leading 
members of the popular government excluded from the new regime, Capponi and 
Folchi at least did have bonds of loyalty to the deposed Gonfalonier and the Soderini 
family. It appears from the examination of Pandolfo Biliotti that in the weeks after 
122 
A.S.F., O.G., 230 (Libro di Condanne), ff. 88`- "; A.S.F., O.G., 154, ff. 74 " -5`. 
123 Butters, Governors, pp. 210 -1; Ridolfi, Machiavelli, pp. 135 -6; Villari, Machiavelli, ii, pp. 198- 
204. 
124 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 75. 
125 
Idem, Ricordi, p. 138; Appendix A, v. 
126 
A.S.F., Balie, 43, ff. 54" -6`; Appendix A, v. 
127 Appendix A, v. For Folchi's career in the Medici bank see Roover, Rise, pp. 295, 316. 
128 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 75. 
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the parlamento Capponi had gone to meet the Soderini in Siena, and had spoken to 
Biliotti about the fortunes of the deposed Gonfalonier. Biliotti had also spoken to 
Giovanni Folchi about the whereabouts of Giovanbattista Soderini.129 Folchi himself 
confessed to have spoken with Machiavelli about the `deeds' of the Gonfalonier and 
also of Giovanbattista Soderini.139 Folchi's connections to the Soderini are unknown, 
except that he and the Gonfalonier had for long both shared Machiavelli's friendship, 
as indeed had Niccolò Valori.131 It may have been Machiavelli's relationship with the 
Soderini which accounted for his inclusion on the list of potential supporters drawn 
up by Boscoli and Capponi.132 Capponi shared marriage connections with the 
Soderini, since his maternal uncle, a member of the Lenzi family, was married to the 
sister of the Gonfalonier, and being of no political standing himself he had probably 
looked to the Soderini for protection before 1512.133 
Cosimo de' Pazzi, the only one involved in the plot to have desired the 
establishment of an aristocratic regime rather than the re- establishment of the popular 
government, was the only one involved in the plot to have been a member of the 
ruling circles of the Medici regime which the conspiracy sought to overthrow. As 
Archbishop, Pazzi had held no office, but his father, Guglielmo, was a member of the 
Balia.134 It was at Cosimo's request that Cardinal Giovanni agreed, despite the Pazzi 
family's public displeasure with the parlamento, to have Guglielmo appointed 
Gonfalonier in January 1513.135 On assuming office Guglielmo declared that the 
Medici should be `as citizens', according to the agreement following Soderini's 
overthrow, and hung the old communal banner emblazoned with the word `Liberty' 
from the windows of the Palace.136 Cerretani noted that the Pazzi had been content 
neither with the Medicean regime of before 1494, nor with Savonarola, nor the Great 
129 A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 269. 
130 
Ibid., LXXXIX, n. 38. 
131 Machiavelli, Lettere, pp. 120, 135, 139 -40, 197, 200; Ridolfi, Machiavelli, pp. 56, 78, 84, 290 n. 
13; Tommasini, Machiavelli, i, p. 356; Dionisotti, Machiavellerie, p. 69. 
132 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 299; Sanudo, Diarii, xv, coll. 573 -4. 
133 Lina, Famiglie, disp. 165 (Capponi), tav. xvii; Ibid., disp. 141 (Soderini), tav. iv. 
134 
See Appendix A, v. 
Iss Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 296; Idem, Dialogo, p. 71. 
136 
Idem, Ricordi, p. 297, Pitti, `Istoria', p. 108. 
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Council, nor Piero Soderini nor the parlamento, because `they themselves would 
have wanted to govern' 137 
The plot of 1513 was the work of loyal supporters of Piero Soderini and the 
popular government, at least one of whose leaders had bonds of loyalty to the 
Soderini family apart from any preference for popular government, and that may be 
one reason why they had opposed the regime since its inception. The plot of 1522 by 
contrast was led by former supporters of the Medici, although the political 
background of those involved has been largely neglected in modern accounts.138 Both 
Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi di Messer Piero Alamanni, the poet, the leaders of 
the plot, were `principal citizens',139 but neither had held office and were too young 
to be members of the ruling circles of the regime, as were most of the others 
involved.140 Alamanni's father however, who had plotted with the Medici in 1497, 
had been one of the four or five leading members of the inner circles of the Medicean 
regime until his death in 1519,141 whereupon his son, according to Cerretani, was 
amongst those most reputed by the Medici.142 By contrast, the father of 
Buondelmonti had supported the overthrow of the Medici in 1494,143 had purchased 
confiscated Medici estates in its aftermath,144 and had occupied no position in the 
Medici regime before his death in 1515.145 Yet Buondelmonti, as Alamanni, was 
amongst the 'primi' at the time of the plot, according to Cerretani, on account of his 
nobility and wealth, and the fact that his mother was a first cousin of Cardinal 
Giulio.146 
137 Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 71. 
lss Some brief remarks can be found in Hauvette, Luigi Alamanni, pp. 28 -9. 
139 B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. I`, 107`-": `Cittadini principali'. 
140 Appendix A, vi. Those listed, with the exceptions of Cardinal Francesco and Bishop Giuliano 
Soderini, were those condemned. See A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 59`-°. 
'a' Appendix A, vi. See also Nerli, Commentari, p. 128; Segni, Vita, p. 286; cf. F. Guicciardini, 
Carteggi, i, p. 252. 
142 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 407. 
143 Parenti, `Storia', ed. Schnitzer, p. 13. 
144 Tommasini, Machiavelli, ii, p. 1053, records that these estates were bought back by the Medici 
after the plot, in 1524. They may have been purchased by Bartolomeo Buondelmonti when he was 
one of the Ufficiali dei ribelli in 1504, A.S.F., Tratte, 905, f. 54`. 
145 
See Appendix A, vi. Bartolomeo Buondelmonti seems to have been considered as a possible 
official of the Monte before his death, see A.S.F., M.A.P., XCVII, n. 20. 
lab Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 407. Buondelmonti's mother was the daughter of Bianca de' Medici, the 
Cardinal's aunt. See Litta, Famiglie, disp. 24 (Buondelmonti), tay. ix. 
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Buondelmonti played host to Lorenzo's mother and daughter following the 
Duke's death in 1519,147 and is on a list of citizens to be `remunerated' drawn up 
before the plot.148 Cambi recorded at the time of the conspiracy that Cardinal Giulio 
had considered both Buondelmonti and Alamanni as `friends', and thus they had 
often dined with him at his house.149 Jacopo da Diacceto was also a familiar and 
much loved dining companion of the Cardinal, according to Nardi, and it was the 
Cardinal who had him appointed to a lectureship at the Florentine Studio in Pisa in 
1521.15° Battista della Palla, according to Nardi, had cultivated the benevolence of 
Lorenzo de' Medici since before 1512,131 and he is recorded to have been one of four 
young men in 1514 that Lorenzo took around with him.152 At some stage in the next 
few years he and his elder brother, Mariotto were named on a list of `faithful popular 
citizens',153 and it was in response to a request from Battista to Lorenzo in February 
1517 that Mariotto was drawn as a Prior later that year.154 Thus it was probably on 
Battista's account that the name of his family appears on a list of `confidants and 
friends' drawn up by 1518.155 Della Palla was amongst those supporters of the 
Medici who were covertly granted monies from public funds at Lorenzo's behest,156 
and he had held office in the Colleges in 1519 and the Signoria in 1521.157 Thus he 
was a prominent member of the regime he conspired to overthrow. 
As with those who conspired against Soderini in 1512, it was at discussions 
in the Rucellai gardens that the leaders of the plot first became associated together, 
this time as students and admirers of Roman republican liberty.158 Buondelmonti, 
Alamanni, della Palla, da Diacceto, as well as Antonio Brucioli had all frequented 
literary discussions in the gardens, and concerned themselves particularly with `the 
147 F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, iii, p. 47. 
148 B.N.F., N.A., 988, f. 67": `Nota di cittadini che è bene remunerargli'. 
149 Cambi, (storie, xxii, p. 202. 
150 Nardi, (storie, ii, p. 85. 
151 Ibid., p. 254. 
152 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 50. 
153 
B.N.F., N.A., 988, f. 18`: `Cittadini populari fideli'. 
154 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 8, n. 65: Battista della Palla to Lorenzo de' Medici, 18 February 1517. 
Mariotto sat in the Signoria of May and June 1517, A.S.F., Tratte, 61, f. 34 ". 
155 B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. 99': `Confidanti e amici'. Lanfredino Lanfredini (d. 1518) is on this list. 
156 Bullard, Filippo Strozzi, p. 139 n. 70. 
157 
Appendix A, vi. 
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See the useful remarks in Dionisotti, Machiavellerie, pp. 145 -50. 
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lessons of the histories', according to Nerli, for which, at their instance, Machiavelli 
had composed the Discourses, dedicated to Buondelmonti in 1519.159 It was their 
study of history, according to Nerli, that had inspired them emulate the glory of the 
ancients and conspire against the regime, and their regard for all Machiavelli's works 
was such, Nardi recalled, that he was held somewhat responsible for the thoughts and 
actions of the conspirators.16° 
However, there was clearly more to the plot than simply the desire to re- 
establish the Great Council and to create an aristocratic regime, as we have seen. 
While there is no doubting the common admiration for the Roman ideal of public 
liberty which bound these conspirators together, it was the desire of Buondelmonti 
and the others for revenge, as we shall see, which precipitated and drove the 
conspiracy. Moreover, there were others in the plot who had not attended the 
Rucellai gardens, such as Luigi di Tommaso Alamanni.'61 He was an obscure 
individual in political terms, but as the others was reported to have been a supporter 
of the Medici family, who had received many benefits from the Cardinal.162 
Niccolò Martelli by contrast had no such background of support for the 
Medici. His father had held office in the Colleges in 1514 but was on a list of nemici 
drawn up by 1517.163 Little is known of Martelli himself except that having been 
banished from the city for a year for certain `inconveniences and scandals' in August 
1518,164 he was in France by the winter of 1521 saying that he had been `chased out' 
of his home by the Cardinal, and that he did not want to be in Florence while the 
Cardinal was there because the Cardinal had once made him leave.165 It was in 
France, according to his confession, that being `very eager to serve the King' he was 
commissioned `with many offerings' to deliver letters to Buondelmonti. Later he was 
159 Nerli, Commentari, p. 138. 
160 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 86. 
161 
His name is absent from the lists given by Kristeller, Studies, pp. 299 n. 51, 323 n. 201. 
162 Sanudo, Diarii, xxxiii, col. 297. 
163 Appendix A, vi. See also Busini, Lettere, p. 231; F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, i, pp. 246 -7. 
164 
A.S.F., O.G., 174, f. 28e; Ibid., 176, ff. 87", 92r, 93`; Ibid., 177, f. 3`; Ibid., 223 (Libro di Bandi), f. 
129` 
165 `Processo di Niccolò Martelli' 
> 
pp. 254 -5, 267. 
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offered `seas and mountains' to poison the Cardinal, which he accepted, being eager, 
`as are most mortals', to enter the service of a `great prince'.166 
If Martelli had possibly not always desired the overthrow of the Medici, the 
Soderini family clearly had. All but one, Giovanvettorio, of the seven members of the 
immediate family of the deposed Gonfalonier, led by Cardinal Francesco, were found 
to have been involved in the plot. Although the banishment imposed in October 1512 
had been lifted in return for Francesco's support of Cardinal Giovanni in the 
conclave of April 1513,167 the Soderini were on lists of nemici drawn up by 1517, 
and excluded from the regime.168 When the regime banished a number of opponents 
in August 1517 measures were also taken against both Tommaso di Paolantonio and 
Giovanvettorio.169 As Francesco's recent biographer has shown, the Soderini 
bargained with the Medici only to ensure their survival, and ever since 1512 they had 
sought the restoration of Piero as Gonfalonier, and of their family to its former 
leading position in the city.170 Bernardo da Verrazzano, an obscure individual in 
political terms but on a list of nemici drawn up by 1518,171 had also desired the 
Soderini's return since 1512, for he was a long -standing `supporter' (adherente) of 
Cardinal Soderini,i72 and as a Florentine banker in Rome had been closely involved 
in the financial affairs of the Cardinal since before 1512.173 
Thus while Buondelmonti and his associates were former supporters of the 
Medici who desired to establish an aristocratic regime, the involvement of the 
Soderini and Bernardo da Verrazzano, their loyal supporter, meant that the plot was 
to a large extent the work of those thrown out of power, and indeed who were to 
return to power following the overthrow of the Medici in 1527. Tommaso, 
Giovanvettorio and Giovanbattista Soderini, as well as the father of Niccolò Martelli, 
166 Ibid., pp. 240 -1. 
167 A.S.F., Balìe, 43, ff. 136'; Lowe, Francesco Soderini, p. 72. 
168 Appendix A, vi; B.N.F., N.A., 988, f. 94r: `Inimici'; Ibid., f. 158r: 'Ultimi'. Both name the Soderini 
family. On the dates of these lists see Appendix A, Sources n. 9. 
169 A.S.F., O.G., 168, f. 92` (24 August 1517). Order for Tommaso, then living outside the city, to 
represent himself in Florence the next day, and for Giovanvettorio not to leave the city without the 
permission of the Otto. 
170 Lowe, Francesco Soderini, pp. 90 -101. 
171 
Appendix A, vi. ' A.S.Mo., Canc. Duc., Firenze, 13 (unfoliated): Benedetto Fantini to the Duke, 29 April 1523. 
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Lowe, Francesco Soderini, p. 69; 'Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 248. 
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were all to be in the inner circles of the popular government after 1527, members of 
the Dieci or the Uomini di pratica, those elected to the advisory body established in 
August 1528.14 
The Giachinotti -Pitti plot of 1527 was entirely the work of those thrown out 
of power. Giovanbattista Soderini was at the head of the three exiles involved, 
proving wrong Martelli's prediction in 1524 that following the death of Cardinal 
Francesco the Soderini would `live in peace', because they were left `without favour 
and support'.175 All those involved had been opposed to the Medici since 1512, and 
desired the restoration of popular government since its overthrow. Carducci had been 
in voluntary exile in Padua and Venice since 1512 because, according to Varchi, he 
was discontented with the regime and suspect to the Medici.176 Nobili was one of 
those on the list of potential supporters made by Boscoli and Capponi.177 Both he and 
Pescioni were on lists of nemici since before the plot of 1513,178 and Pescioni was 
one of those sent to their villas in 1517.179 Carducci, Giachinotti and Pitti were all on 
lists of opponents drawn up by 1517,180 and both Giachinotti and Pitti were amongst 
those detained in 1521.181 None had held office under the Medici regime, although 
both Giachinotti and Pescioni had sat in the Signoria before 1512 and Carducci had 
been a leading member of the ruling circles of popular government.182 
While Nobili had held no office before 1512, he did have long -standing 
bonds of loyalty to the Soderini family. He had married a niece of Piero Soderini in 
1506,183 was heavily involved in the business affairs of the family by 1512,184 and 
was still when their possessions were confiscated after the plot of 1522.185 Since then 
174 Appendix A, vi. On the measure of 1528 see Roth, Last Republic, p. 116. 
175 Martelli, `Discorso', ed. Guasti, `Documenti', p. 227. 
176 Varchi, Storia, i, p. 174; Sanudo, Diarii, xliv, coll. 91, 1 18. 
177 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 299. 
178 Appendix A, vii. 
179 
The list of those banished is in Appendix B. 
18o Appendix A, vii. 
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The list of those detained is in Appendix C. 
182 Appendix A, vii. 
183 
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A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXIV, n. 376: Tommaso Soderini to Francesco di Jacopo da Empoli, 23 October 
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A.S.F., O.G., 182, f. 31 ". 
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he had been in voluntary exile,186 probably joining Tommaso Soderini for a time, 
before later becoming involved in the plot with Giovanbattista.187 Pieradovardo 
Giachinotti also had long -standing ties with the Soderini, apparently dating from 
after the plot of 1513, when he may have been arrested and examined, as a result of 
mutual discontent with the Medici.188 He had been described by Goro Gheri in 1519 
as the `secretary' of Cardinal Soderini, on account of which Gheri wanted him 
arrested when he came to the city in May of that year.189 The Pope had also wanted 
him arrested, believing that from Giachinotti one could learn of the `intrigues' 
( pratiche) of the Soderini `both past and present' with Florentines, and more 
significantly, of those of the Cardinal with `all the other princes' in Italy.19° 
The Giachinotti -Pitti plot was the work of those who had desired the 
overthrow of the Medici and the restoration of popular government ever since 1512, 
the work of prominent and leading members of the popular government and their 
loyal supporters who had been out of power ever since its overthrow. And they were 
to return to power following the fall of the Medici in May. Nobili was to be one of 
the Nine of the Militia, and like Soderini both Carducci and Giachinotti were to be in 
the inner circles of the popular government of the last republic.191 
By contrast the plot of Filippo Strozzi and others against the Medici in 1527 
was the work of former supporters of the Medici. Indeed, with the exception of 
Lorenzo Strozzi, the plot was the work of the most important leading members of 
inner circles of the regime they were attempting to overthrow, and in that sense was 
unique amongst the conspiracies of the period. Niccolò Capponi had been on a list of 
nemici drawn up by 1517, where all four others involved were on lists of supporters 
drawn up at that time, but he was made a member of the Seventy in 1522 and of the 
Otto di Pratica in 1524.192 Both Francesco Vettori and Matteo Strozzi were amongst 
186 F. Valori, `Ricordi', f. 4`. 
187 
Busini, Lettere, pp. 72, 80. 
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the four individuals said to be governing the regime in 1522 and 1523,193 and the two 
most regular members of the Otto di Pratica and Accoppiatori from 1524 until the 
time of the plot.194 Filippo Strozzi had been the key figure in the financial 
administration of the regime since 1515, Depositor general of the Pope and in charge 
de facto of the office of Depositor of the Signoria.195 
Capponi, Vettori and Matteo Strozzi were to encourage and protect the young 
nobles asking for arms, led by the Salviati, and with the Salviati were perceived to be 
at the head of the Tumulto. The Salviati were also former supporters of the Medici, 
and Averardo Salviati had twice held office in the Signoria, and was thus a 
prominent member of the regime.196 Piero and Giuliano Salviati were too young to 
have held office, but Piero had been a companion of Ippolito de' Medici,197 and 
Giuliano's father had been involved in the parlamento of 1512, and one of those 
citizens Lorenzo de' Medici had hired for his company when Captain- Genera1.198 
These men had all been closely associated with each other after 1524 as the 
leaders of those supporters of the Medici who favoured a broader government, and 
were opposed to any further restrictions in the state. Nerli further noted the ties of 
friendship and marriage between them. Vettori was a brother -in -law of Capponi and 
close friends with Filippo Strozzi. Piero and Averardo Salviati were cousins of 
Capponi and brothers -in -law of Matteo Strozzi.199 Capponi, one can add, was a 
brother -in -law of Filippo Strozzi.200 Nerli describes how, bound together by such 
family ties, this group began to be `very strong and powerful' compared to that of the 
stricter partisans who favoured a narrower regime, because it brought together `so 
many favours, so much wealth, so much credit and so great numbers of relatives' and 
because of the growth in `reputation' and `credit' of Capponi and Filippo Strozzi, 
who `for their many qualities, and for their riches were followed by a large band of 
193 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 413, 417, 430. 
194 Appendix A, viii. 
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20° Lina, Famiglie, disp. 165 (Capponi), tay. xiv. 
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honoured citizens'.201 Thus it was that when this group abandoned the regime in 
1527 to work against it, to provide leadership and protection to the young nobles 
demanding arms, the regime was unable to prevent the clamour towards revolt. 
The importance of marriage ties in binding together the leading opponents of 
the Medici in 1527, as Vettori's biographer has pointed out, was to illustrate the 
prudence of Lorenzo's desire to control marriage alliances between the ottimati.202 
The fact that the marriage ties between the conspirators of 1527 all dated from the 
period of popular government is also significant. For it shows the dangers presented 
to the Medici after 1512 by the bonds established between ottimati during the 
popular regime. It provides a further example of the way in which the events of 1527 
were the result not only of the failures of the Medici in the 1520s, but also of their 
earlier failures in 1494. 
There were other leading members of the regime involved in the Tumulto 
besides Capponi, Vettori and Matteo Strozzi, and who with them directed the revolt 
in its later stages from the room of the Gonfalonier. Four of the twelve citizens 
named in accounts whose careers are known,203 had sat in the Otto di Pratica since 
1524, including Francesco Martelli and Jacopo Gianfigliazzi, who had both 
conspired in favour of the Medici in 1497.204 Giovanni degli Alberti was a member 
of the Seventy, and six others, including Lorenzo Segni, Capponi's brother- in- law,205 
had all held prominent but not leading political office since 1512.206 Three of these 
prominent citizens, including Segni, were to advance to the inner circles of 
government following the overthrow of the Medici in May.207 
Benivieni recorded at the time that those grandi in the Palace such as 
Capponi, Strozzi, and Averardo Salviati were partly there `for themselves' and partly 
`pushed there by the multitude'.208 Foscari noted that those `friends and relatives' of 
201 Nerli, Commentari, p. 143. 
2 °2 Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 294. See also Butters, Governors, pp. 188 -9, 237. 
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the Medici and leading citizens involved were moved not just by the desire for liberty 
but by the desire to save themselves from popular anger with the regime.209 Certainly 
there had been more than an element of self -preservation in the motives of Vettori 
and the others who conspired with Filippo Strozzi. The best illustration of that is 
Vettori's fear that following the overthrow of the regime he and Strozzi would both 
find themselves `wretched' and `exiled' on account of their past associations with the 
Medici. Strozzi assured Vettori in January that he would not have `so much fear' if 
he knew of the `reverence' born for him by the two outlaws also involved,210 and for 
the same reasons he assured his own brother, Lorenzo, of the `confidence' he held in 
Buondelmonti and della Palla, whom he found `to love the city and the universal 
good truly more than their any comfort or benefit'. 
211 Vettori and the others who 
conspired with Strozzi may have desired to pre -empt any revolt that would not look 
so kindly on leading members of the Medicean regime. 
However, also amongst those in the room of the Gonfalonier during the revolt 
were Giovanni Peruzzi and Francesco Tosinghi,212 who had both been known 
opponents of the regime since 1512. Tosinghi had been on the list of possible 
supporters drawn up by the conspirators of 1513, on account of which he had been 
arrested and examined,213 and both he and Peruzzi had been on lists of nemici since 
before the plot,214 and both amongst those banished in 1517, and detained in 1521.215 
Tosinghi had held office in 1523 as a Captain of the Guelf Party, an exceptional 
favour for such a long - standing opponent, and due no doubt to the elevation of his 
father to the Seventy the previous year. Peruzzi however, had been a prominent 
member of the popular government but had held no office since 1512. Both were to 
be members of the inner circles of popular government of the last republic.216 
Committed opponents such as Peruzzi, or their sons, and others out of power since 
209 Foscari, `Relazione', p. 51. 
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1512, were at the forefront of the revolt. This has not been recognized in modern 
accounts, which have completely ignored the political background of those 
involved.21 7 
Of the eight principal members of the young nobles led by the Salviati in the 
months preceding the Tumulto,218 only the father of Antonio Berardi had been named 
on lists of supporters of the regime, and his was the only father to have held office 
since 1512. The fathers of six however, had held office under the popular regime 
before 1512, and in the case of the father of Battista del Bene that had meant being a 
leading member of the regime's inner circle. The fathers of four of those six, 
including of Dante da Castiglione, were to hold office during the last republic, and 
the father of Niccolò Machiavelli was to be a member of the inner circles of the 
popular government. Three of those from families who had lost position after 1512 
were the sons of those who had been known opponents of the regime since the 
overthrow of popular government. Both Battista del Bene and his father, and the 
fathers of both Niccolò Machiavelli and Dante da Castiglione, had been on lists of 
nemici from before 1518.219 
Castiglione and del Bene had been close since at least 1525 when they were 
both summoned to appear before the Otto, probably on account of some act of 
violence.220 A violent background was something they shared with Piero Salviati, 
who had been fined in 1524 with fourteen others for carrying arms.221 Yet their 
political backgrounds were quite different and Pitti provides an interesting insight 
into the relationship between Salviati and his principal followers. Salviati's 
leadership of the young nobles depended on both his great wealth and his marriage 
connections with the leading citizens of the regime, according to Pitti, and he 
explains that Castiglione and the other young nobles followed him partly on account 
of the largesse of his household, and partly because they planned to `use him for 
some political change', presuming that by means of his favour the regime would take 
217 
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no action against them.222 Salviati failed to save Castiglione from punishment in 
January 1527, and may not even have tried to do so according to Pitti, but it does 
seem as though an initially reluctant Salviati was pushed by his followers towards 
revolt. Varchi explains that it was Salviati's reluctance, on account either of fear or 
support for the regime, that was the reason that the activities of the young nobles had 
subsided in February 1527 rather than resulting in revolt, as they did later in Apri1.223 
Thus while Salviati was a former supporter of the Medici, at the forefront of 
the noble youths involved in the Tumulto were those from families opposed to the 
Medici since the overthrow of the popular regime, and others from families who had 
been out of power since 1512. That was also the case with those twenty citizens 
young and old who most distinguished themselves in the revolt.224 Fourteen were 
from families outside the ruling circles of the Medici regime, six of whom, including 
Francesco Bandini, were from families prominent in the popular government before 
1512. Pierfrancesco Portinari was the only one to have held office himself since 
1512, a single appearance in the Colleges in 1518, and he was to advance to the inner 
circles of the regime following the overthrow of the Medici in May.225 
In the cases of seven of those from families outside the ruling circles of 
government since 1512, they or their fathers were on lists of nemici drawn up before 
1517.226 These include Daniello Strozzi, on the list of potential supporters made by 
the conspirators of 1513;227 Giovanni Rinuccini, who in 1516 had declared 1512 to 
be the year he died; and the son of Niccolò Paganelli, condemned for verbal offences 
in 1515. Rinuccini and Paganelli were both amongst those banished in 1517 and 
those detained in 1521.228 Three of these nemici, including Rinuccini, had themselves 
222 Pitti, `Istoria', p 148. 
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held prominent office during the popular government before 1512 and two others, 
including Francesco Corsi, were the sons of nemici who had lost position with the 
return of the Medici.229 Ser Giuliano da Ripa, who had been in trouble with the Otto 
in 1515,230 on account of his possession and veneration of images of Savonarola,231 
had held no office in the popular regime. However, he had been dismissed in 
December 1512 from the post in the Chancery granted to him for life in 1494 as a 
reward for his role, as notary of the Signoria, in drawing up the provision for the 
expulsion of the Medici.2232 
Strozzi and Corsi's father were both to be members of the Council of one 
hundred and twenty established after the overthrow of the Medici in May,233 
Paganelli's father was to sit in the Colleges, and Rinuccini was to be a leading 
member of the inner circles of popular government during the last republic. 
Francesco Bandini and two others involved from families outside ruling circles since 
1512, were to hold prominent positions after 1527.234 
The revolt was above all the expression of the long -held desire of the young 
nobles and others involved for the restoration of popular government, and at their 
head were those who themselves or whose fathers had opposed the Medici ever since 
1512, who had been prominent members of the ruling circles of popular government 
and out of power ever since its overthrow. These men had a fear and hatred of those 
who had supported the Medici not shared by those such as Capponi who were 
themselves leading members of the regime. Contemporaries recalled how Paolo de' 
Medici, Bartolomeo Valori, Palla Rucellai and others seen as too close to the Medici 
and `enemies of liberty' were refused entry to the Palace by the young nobles at the 
229 See Appendix A, xi. 
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beginning of the revolt and driven away by their threats.235 However, other citizens 
had called Paolo to the Palace, and Valori in particular had been encouraged by both 
Capponi and Cavalcanti, according to Nardi, who `better knew his mind'. Following 
his rejection, and fearful of some attack on account of the `suspicion' towards him, 
according to Nardi, Valori promptly decided to rally to the defence of the regime, as 
did Rucellai and Paolo de' Medici.236 Indeed Valori's rejection was of some 
significance to the outcome of the revolt, according to contemporaries, for it was he 
who secured the gate through which the Medici returned to the city, accompanied by 
Urbino and the other commanders of the League.237 
Those implacable opponents of the Medici involved in the conspiracy of 
1522, the Giachinotti -Pitti plot of 1527 and the Tumulto sought not only the 
restoration of popular government but revenge, just as the partisans of the Medici had 
done in 1497 and 1512. Excluded from power since 1512, banished in 1517, 
imprisoned in 1521, they had endured the full personal costs of the fear and hatred of 
the regime towards them, and following the overthrow of the Medici regime in May 
1527 they were to seek to avenge all that they and the city had suffered since 1512. 
They were to be amongst the foremost members of the arrabbiati who sought the 
exclusion and persecution of former supporters of the Medici, and were utterly 
opposed to Capponi's attempts to accommodate them within the government. 
Pierfilippo Pandolfini was amongst their number, although his father, 
Alessandro, had been a soldier in Medici employ before 1512,238 excluded from 
popular government, and was to return after 1512 to the prominence he had enjoyed 
before 1494.239 In his attack on Capponi in 1528 Pandolfini expressed outrage at the 
`malice' and `madness' by which those responsible for all the `wickedness' suffered 
by the popolo since 1512, who deserved to be `deprived not only of life but of 
burial', were being given a share of the honours. It was madness because `revolution 
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would soon result of it'.240 As that remark shows, it was fear as much as hatred that 
lay behind the desire of the arrabbiati for the exclusion and persecution of former 
supporters of the Medici regime. Yet there was hatred and a desire for revenge, and 
those long- standing opponents of the Medici involved in the plots of 1522 and 1527 
and in the Tumulto, such as Pandolfini and Jacopo Alamanni, were at its forefront. 
Tommaso di Paolantonio Soderini and Baldassare Carducci were two of the 
three leading arrabbiati during the last republic, who would have wanted, according 
to Segni and Nerli, to `avenge' themselves against supporters of the Medici.24I 
Carducci is recorded to have argued publicly that the commune needed to `bloody 
itself with the death of those who had been favourites of the Medici',242 and Daniello 
Strozzi was one of his supporters.243 Both Pitti and Giachinotti were to support the 
arrabbiato Gonfalonier Francesco Carducci,244 and both had been amongst the five 
Syndics appointed in June 1527, as were Carducci and Alessandro Segni.245 
Bernardo da Verrazzario and Rinaldo Corsini were amongst those appointed Syndics 
a year later.246 Bartolomeo Pescioni, Antonio Alamanni, and the father of the 
executed Jacopo da Diacceto were amongst the five officials of the balzello in June 
1527;247 Baldassare Carducci and Francesco Tosinghi, amongst those appointed in 
October;248 and Giovanni Rinuccini amongst those appointed in May 1528.249 These 
taxes were levied particularly heavily on supporters of the Medici regime.250 Those 
young nobles at the forefront of the demands for arms preceding the Tumulto, such as 
Castiglione, Machiavelli, del Bene and Berardi, were all to be leading members, with 
Jacopo Alamanni, of the young arrabbiati in the last republic, responsible for the 
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most violent threats against former supporters of the Medici before and during the 
siege, even of attempting to murder Ottaviano de' Medici.251 
Capponi and his attempts at moderation were to have their supporters from 
amongst those involved in the Tumulto and plots against the Medici, including Piero 
Salviati, Alamanno de' Pazzi, Rinaldo Corsini, Piero Vettori, Salvestro Aldobrandini 
and Zanobi Buondelmonti.252 Most were from families that had not been prominent 
since 1512, but some, perhaps all, were former supporters of the Medici.253 What 
most distinguished Carducci, Soderini and other conspirators who sought the re- 
establishment of popular government and the exclusion and persecution of supporters 
of the Medici regime was their long- standing opposition to the Medici. 
Like most of those involved in plots against the Medici, so most of the forty 
individuals condemned for verbal offences against the Medici regime were from 
outside the ruling circles of the Medicean government, and many had been thrown 
out of power in 1512. Ire the cases of twenty -four of the twenty -seven condemned 
from families in the guilds, neither they nor their fathers had held office after 1512. 
Six of those twenty -four, including Giovanni Bartolomei, had been prominent 
members of the popular government before 1512, and both Bartolomeo Redditi and 
Bartolomeo Pandolfini had been on the fringes of the inner circles of the popular 
regime, having spoken in pratiche on their own behalf, though on a few occasions 
only. Most were long- standing opponents of the Medici and ten were on lists of 
nemici drawn up before they were condemed.254 
Some of those listed nemici and other implacable opponents of the Medici 
involved in the Tumulto and other attacks against the regime were from families that 
had been enemies of the Medici since the early fifteenth century. The ancestors of 
Peruzzi had been banished in 1434, and those of Corsi deprived of office,255 while 
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the ancestors of Francesco Serragli and the grandfather of Ubertino Boncianni, two 
of those condemned in the aftermath of the plot of 1513, had been deprived of office 
in 1444 and 1466 respectively.256 Francesco Bandini's ancestors had also been 
deprived of office in 1444, and a member of his family had murdered Giuliano in the 
Pazzi plot in 1478.257 The Rinuccini and the family of Niccolò Martelli had 
quarrelled with Lorenzo in the 1470s and suffered as a result.258 
However, most of those long- standing nemici involved in plots and other 
attacks against the Medici after 1512, such as the Soderini and Niccolò Valori, were 
those `implacable' opponents described by Guicciardini shortly after 1512, who 
themselves or whose fathers been supporters of the Medici but opposed them in 
1494, and continued to oppose the Medici until 1512 without ever reconciling with 
them.259 Cardinal Soderini had been involved in the plot of April 1494.260 The fathers 
of Martino Scarfi and Alessandro Manetti, who were condemned for verbal offences 
in both 1513 and 1523,- had both been amongst the twenty accoppiatori appointed in 
December 1494 after Piero's overthrow.261 The father of Giovanni Bartolomei had 
been rewarded by the Medici for his role in drawing up the acts of the parlamento of 
1466,262 but he had replaced the Medicean notary of the Riformagioni in November 
1494 and drawn up the provisions of the parlamento for the abolition of the 
Medicean system of government, and later for the establishment of the Great 
Counci1.263 
Thus plots in early sixteenth century Florence, whether aimed to establish a 
regime in which the ottimati were dominant, to re- establish the popular government, 
or to restore the Medici to power, were generally the work of the same group: those 
from noble families of political prominence, often the leading families in the city. 
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The exceptions were the plot of 1497, a small majority of whose leaders, and of their 
accomplices, were from ordinary families in the major guilds, and the plot of 1513, 
whose two leaders were both noble, but obscure men in political terms. 
The most important distinction to be drawn between those conspirators who 
sought to establish a regime in which the ottimati were dominant and those who 
sought the re- establishment of the past regime was that between those who were in or 
out of power. Those plots that sought to establish a regime in which the ottimati were 
dominant were the work of discontented former supporters of the regime. In most 
cases they or their fathers were prominent or leading members of the regime which 
they sought to overthrow. Most plots were the work of those who had always desired 
the re- establishment of the past regime. Those involved were mostly from families 
outside the ruling circles of the regime they were attempting to overthrow. In many 
cases they or their fathers had been prominent or leading citizens of the past regime 
which they sought to re- establish, while others shared long- standing bonds of loyalty 
to those thrown out of power. They sought to return to power and to avenge their 
overthrow and all that they had suffered on account of their opposition to the regime. 
To that extent political conflict in Florence was the conflict between those in power 
and those thrown out of it. 
Outside the ruling circles as they were however, there is no sense that those 
who conspired to re- establish the past regime would not have done so had they been 
able to find a place in government. They, or in some cases their fathers, had loyally 
supported the past regime until its overthrow and desired its re- establishment ever 
since. Moreover, amongst the loyal supporters of the past regime involved in both the 
parlamento of 1512 and the Tumulto del Venerdì there were those whose fathers 
were prominent and leading members of the present regime. This was the 
background of Prinzivalle della Stufa, the protagonist of the plot of 1510. Plots thus 
testified not only to the failure of both popular and Medicean regimes to crush loyal 
supporters of the past regime, but also to the failure and even futility of attempts to 
accommodate them. Plots demonstrated other failures too, as we shall see, in the 
ways in which regimes treated not only their enemies, but also their friends, failures 
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Friends and Enemies 
Almost all plots were the work of well -known opponents of the regime, 
suspected of waiting for the opportunity to work for its overthrow. The only 
exceptions were Buondelmonti and his associates from the Rucellai gardens in 1522,1 
and those who conspired with Filippo Strozzi in 1526/7. Even the leaders of the plot 
of 1513, Boscoli and Capponi, as well as Giovanni Folchi, were all citizens under 
suspicion,2 on a list of nemici drawn up before the discovery of the plot, hatched just 
two months after the Medici returned to the city.3 Most plots might thus be seen as 
the result of the failure-of regimes to crush their opponents. One reason for that was 
the belief that attempting to accommodate opponents was the better way to secure the 
regime. Soderini's failure to deal ruthlessly with the earlier hostile activities of those 
responsible for his overthrow was due at least in part to the belief, as Machiavelli 
argued, that he could overcome their enmity with patience and clemency, and it 
further appears that he had also sought to conciliate some of them with benefits and 
reward. 
Contemporaries also blamed the overthrow of the Medici on mistaken 
attempts to conciliate opponents with benefits and rewards, not least because it 
resulted in the neglect of their supporters, who were thus neither inclined nor forced 
to defend the regime. It has been an argument made more recently too that while 
repression of the piagnoni was more harsh after 1523, the Medici's undiscriminating 
efforts to bind their opponents to the regime with ties of interest and obligation 
succeeded only in furnishing their enemies with the means of protection and survival 
and thus contributed directly to their overthrow.4 Amongst those who conspired 
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Vettori, `Sommario', p. 295. 
' Appendix A, xii. 
4 Polizzotto, `Medici', pp. 136 -40, 145 -50. 
244 
against the Medici there were a few long -standing opponents, most notably Niccolò 
Capponi, whom the Medici had sought to benefit. Yet almost all of those well -known 
and listed opponents condemned for verbal offences, involved in plots and at the 
forefront of the Tumulto had endured exclusion and persecution since 1512. To that 
extent plots and other violent attacks against the Medici regime were the result of the 
failure of the Medici to crush their opponents despite attempts to do so. 
On their return in 1512 the Medici had been urged by their partisans to banish 
opponents as their ancestors had done in 1434, and on their return in 1530 Clement 
was to ensure that over a hundred of the most vociferous supporters of the last 
republic were ruthlessly banished, imprisoned and executed.5 Yet in 1512, as had the 
popular government in 1494, the Medici had sought to conciliate those closely 
associated with the past regime with a policy of clemency towards them, protecting 
them from the desire of some to banish them and confiscate their possessions. Plots 
vindicated those who criticized that clemency, to the extent that they were largely the 
work of those thrown out of power and their loyal supporters, who had supported and 
defended the past regime until its overthrow and sought its restoration ever since. 
However, plots also demonstrated the wisdom of the policy of clemency pursued in 
both 1494 and 1512, for on both occasions it succeeded in conciliating most 
supporters of the past regime, at least to the point that they felt no need to risk their 
lives in actively pursuing the overthrow of the government, and thus left 
conspirators, as they were well aware, somewhat isolated. 
Plots, as well as other acts against the regime, also demonstrated the serious 
consequences that could arise from the persecution of opponents or its threat. The 
parlamento in 1512 was in large part the result of the desire of partisans of the 
Medici to secure themselves from the persecution by the frateschi that they feared 
would ensue if the settlement of 7 September was allowed to remain in place. 
Nevertheless, as the Medici were more ruthless in 1530 than they had been in 1512, 
so the popular government was more ruthless in 1527 than it had been in 1494. That 
was to have as equally serious consequences as the errors of Soderini it was intended 
5 Roth, Last Republic, pp. 335 -6; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 238 -9. 
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to avoid. For it drove leading citizens such as Francesco Guicciardini and Francesco 
Vettori to join the Pope against the city at the beginning of the siege in 1529, and 
then to be instrumental in persuading him against abandoning the siege altogether. 
Guicciardini once observed that where the maintenance of popular 
government, being a broad regime, depended on its ability to preserve the security of 
all citizens, the maintenance of the Medici regime, being narrow, depended on its 
ability to preserve the loyalty of its supporters.6 The failure of Medici to satisfy the 
honour and expectations of their supporters not only ensured that their supporters 
sought to join the revolt in 1527 rather than defend the regime, but in 1522 and 1526 
resulted directly in plots against them. It was the desire to avenge injuries and insults 
from the Medici that precipitated the conspiracy of 1522 and drove Filippo Strozzi to 
plot in 1526. Conspirators against Lorenzo in the fifteenth century, in 1478 and 1481, 
had also been moved by the desire to avenge injuries from the Medici.' The main 
difference after 1512 was that where the injuries to the Pazzi, for example, were the 
result of a deliberate attempt by Lorenzo to humble a rival family with the open 
desire to compete with the Medici,8 those to Strozzi and the conspirators of 1522 
were injuries to supporters of the regime. They were mostly the result of the Medici's 
failure to satisfy the competing demands of their supporters, and particularly to meet 
the expectations aroused by their elevation to the Papacy. Plots thus demonstrate the 
extent to which the Medici's possession of the Papacy, and the expectations aroused 
by it, threatened the security of the regime in Florence. 
Thus there were a number of ways in which plots demonstrated the various 
successes and failures with which popular governments and the Medici treated their 
supporters and opponents. This has not been recognized before now. Indeed there has 
been no attempt to examine the relationship even between particular plots and the 
treatment by regimes of their supporters and opponents, although the reasons for the 
flight of Guicciardini and Vettori to the Pope during the siege are now well- known.9 
6 F. Guicciardini, Scritti politici, pp. 287 -8: `Ricordi', C. 21. 
Brown, `Public Opinion', pp. 63 -4. 
8 F. Guicciardini, Dialogo, pp. 30 -1, 75; Idem, Storie fiorentine, pp. 31 -2. 
9 Rossi, Guicciardini, i, pp. 138 -64; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 209 -220; Roth, Last 
Republic, pp. 204 -5, 241 -2. 
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Yet an examination of conspiracies and other acts against the regime provides the 
clearest illustration of the success and failure with which regimes treated friends and 
enemies. 
During the last republic, according to Guicciardini, those who demanded the 
ruthless persecution of former supporters of the Medici regime recalled the clemency 
with which the Medici's supporters had been treated in 1494, and that their loyalties 
had remained unchanged, despite the honours accorded them in the popular 
government.10 The plot of 1497 was certainly to provide the clearest evidence of the 
failure of the amnesty of 1495 to conciliate supporters of the Medici to the popular 
government. For as a result of their support for Piero before 1494, the plotters were 
foremost amongst the targets of popular anger in the aftermath of Piero's departure. 
Ridolfi and del Nero are reported to have been two `partisans' who in the hours after 
Piero's exit entered the Piazza on horseback with an armed company crying 'popolo 
e libertà' in order to lessen the `burden of blame' (carico) upon them, but they were 
thrown back and chased as `suspetti', in danger of their lives.11 That night, as efforts 
were made to seize `adherents' of Piero's regime, Pucci left the city in secret, and 
Tornabuoni went into hiding.12 Francesco Cegia recorded how his house had been 
threatened with the sack, from which it was only saved through the efforts of 
Francesco Valori, and how, as a `servant' of Piero, he too had hidden. Having 
answered a summons to appear before the Signoria he was detained for ten days 
during which he had `the greatest fears', before being freed `through the love of God 
and of the King of France'.13 
Ridolfi, Alamanni, and del Nero are also recorded to have been protected by 
some of those in the magistracies from the popular anger against them as close 
supporters of Piero, and the desire of some to have them exiled or deprived of the 
ability to hold office.14 Suspicion of them was such that on 14 November the arms of 
1° 
F. Guicciardini, Scritti autobiografici, p. 238. 
11 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 98; Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, p. 125. 
12 
Landucci, Diario, p. 77; Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, p. 126. 
13 
Cegia, `Ricordi', p. 197. 
14 
A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 96, f. 87' (10 November 1494); Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, pp. 
128 -9; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 98. 
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del Nero, Ridolfi, Tornabuoni and others were confiscated,15 but the desire of many 
citizens following the parlamento in December to `beat upon' particularly those three 
as well as other `citizens of the old regime' was opposed by Piero Capponi and 
Francesco Valori, the two main leaders of the overthrow of the regime.16 
Valori and Capponi had both been supporters of the Medici and they sought 
to protect the bigi, according to Guicciardini, partly because they feared that once 
those of the `old regime' had been expelled, they themselves would be at the mercy 
of those excluded by the Medici since 1434, who were naturally their enemies.17 
Niccolò Valori, Francesco's nephew, recorded that affairs were managed `with the 
utmost clemency' in order not to `divide or harm the city' which would have 
happened `if we had proceeded too vigorously', because in sixty years at the head of 
the regime the Medici `had made so many friends' that `one would have had to 
punish too great a number of men'.18 It was this thinking, supported by Savonarola, 
that led in March 1495 to a provision granting amnesty to those who had been 
`supporters' of the Medicean regime on account of anything they may have done 
concerning that regime, except the theft of public money.19 While the plot 
demonstrated the failure of such attempts to conciliate supporters of the Medici 
regime, it also demonstrated its success, at least in isolating the conspirators from 
those supporters of the Medici who saw no need to work for Piero's return. Thus 
Giovanni Cambi, one of the leaders of the plot, had remarked that twenty -five or 
thirty of Piero's supporters would need to be banished before the Medici could return 
to Florence.20 
Machiavelli and others argued that Soderini had been overthrown on account 
of his mistaken belief that he could extinguish the enmity and `envy' of his 
opponents with `time', `goodness', `patience', `fortune' and, in some cases, with 
`benefiting' them with 'rewards'.21 Soderini had not known, according to 
15 Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, p. 130. 
16 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 107. 
17 Ibid. 
18 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 12`. 
19 Provvisioni, i, pp. 1 1 1 -8. 
.O `Processo di Lamberto dell'Antella', p. xvi. 
21 Machiavelli, `Discorsi', III iii, and III xxx, Opere (1954), pp. 316, 388. 
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Machiavelli, that `goodness is not enough, fortune varies' and `malice is a not a 
woman placated by time or gifts', and thus he had failed to `kill the sons of Brutus' 
and been thrown out of power.22 Partisans of the Medici urged them to treat their 
enemies as Cosimo had done on his return in 1434, arguing that Soderini's failure to 
crush his opponents had led to his overthrow in 1512.23 Those who called during the 
last republic for the ruthless persecution of former members of the Medici regime 
argued, according to Guicciardini, that Soderini had been overthrown because he had 
`tolerated' his most dangerous opponents, particularly Bernardo Rucellai, when there 
was no clear evidence of wrong doing, rather than seeking, as he should have done, 
to treat them ruthlessly on the grounds of suspicion alone. That would have averted 
future troubles by dealing with them at their origins, `as was necessary in matters of 
state', and thus the ruthless treatment of one or two individuals would have assured 
the security of the regime.24 
We have already seen how Soderini's failure to deal ruthlessly with his 
opponents had led to his overthrow not least because it had meant that the earlier 
activities of those responsible, in the Rucellai gardens, in public visits to the Medici 
in Rome, and in the Strozzi- Medici marriage alliance, had gone unpunished. 
Soderini had been unable as much as unwilling to take action against them but it does 
seem as if he had sought to overcome the enmity of at least some of those responsible 
for his overthrow not only with patience, but also with rewards, a fact little 
emphasized in modern accounts.25 
Soderini certainly seems to have believed, as Guicciardini recorded, that 
proceeding ruthlessly against Rucellai and other opponents purely on the grounds of 
their discontent would serve only to turn their discontent into despair, and force those 
opponents who would not otherwise actively seek the overthrow of the regime into 
doing so, out of `fear' and `necessity'.26 Cerretani noted how the first to attack the 
Gonfalonier were those who had been helped by him.27 Nardi mentions that the 
22 
Ibid., pp. 317, 388. 
23 Butters, Governors, p. 271. 
24 F. Guicciardini, `Oratoria accusatoria', Scritti autobiografici, p. 230. 
25 
Some brief remarks are made in Butters, Governors, p. 164. 
26 F. Guicciardini, `Oratoria accusatoria', Scritti autobiografici, p. 230. 
2' 
Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 48. 
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leaders of Soderini's overthrow were relatives of the Gonfalonier whom he had 
privately benefited, particularly Bartolomeo Valori, husband of his niece,28 and 
Strozzi and Nerli reported that Albizzi and Vettori had both drawn close to Soderini, 
the better to deceive him.29 Yet as early as 1506 Albizzi and Valori were both well - 
known opponents of the Gonfalonier, had openly consorted with the Medici in Rome, 
and were suspected of wishing to overthrow the regime, and Valori had been one of 
Soderini's `principal enemies', according to Guicciardini, when a Prior in 1508.30 By 
1512 however, Soderini certainly seems to have believed that he could trust them, a 
fatal error as it turned out, and thus it was that Albizzi, Valori and Vettori were not, 
as the Rucellai were, amongst those detained in the Palace as the Viceroy approached 
Prato. 
Soderini was overthrown because he had failed to deal ruthlessly with his 
opponents and kill the sons of Brutus, and one reason for that was his belief, 
mistaken as it turned out, that he could overcome their enmity and conciliate them to 
the regime. The parlamento that followed however, was to illustrate the serious 
consequences of persecuting opponents, and the dangers posed to the regime by those 
threatened with persecution. For fear of persecution seems to have been the main 
reason why partisans of the Medici urged the forcing of a parlamento in September 
1512, and why Cardinal Giovanni agreed to it. This deserves to be examined in some 
detail, for it has been almost completely ignored in modern accounts, yet was 
considered to be of central importance by contemporaries in all their accounts of the 
event.31 Buonaccorsi for example wrote that having returned as private citizens the 
Medici and their supporters had not judged themselves to be `secure' with the way of 
government as it was and thus decided to make a parlamento.32 
According to contemporary accounts, it was the need to secure themselves 
from the persecution they feared from their enemies that was the very basis of the 
argument with which partisans urged and finally persuaded the Medici to overthrow 
28 
Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 496; Ibid., ii, p. 15. 
29 
Strozzi, `Vita', p. 107; Nerli, Commentari, p. 98. 
30 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 306. 
31 The issue is mentioned only briefly by Butters, Governors, pp. 180, 181; Stephens, Fall, p. 60; 
Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 68 -9, 73. 
'? Buonaccorsi, Diario, p. 184. 
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the regime based on the Great Council, and establish one in which they were 
dominant. Francesco Vettori later recalled that Medici partisans had persuaded 
Cardinal Giovanni to force the parlamento and seize control of the government 
arguing that `otherwise they and their friends were in danger', and their persuasions 
were such, Vettori wrote, that they `pushed the Cardinal to do that which perhaps he 
would not have done'.33 Francesco Baldovinetti, a supporter of the Medici, gives a 
more detailed account of the argument of the partisans in his unpublished 
Memoriale:34 
The Medici worried that some harm would befall them in the city, which was also said to 
them by their friends, who showed them the danger they were in if the Spanish left, for 
having in part acted against the popolo and shown themselves to be against the regime, and 
that from that Council the Medici and their followers would never have office, and that this 
was said throughout the city, and that it was of necessity to secure both themselves and their 
friends by seizing the Palace to their devotion, abolishing that Council, and making the 
Signoria, Colleges, Otto and Dieci as they saw fit, a mano ... 
The Medici duly obliged their friends, according to Baldovinetti `moved by 
true reasons and to secure themselves in the city'. As did Baldovinetti, both Cerretani 
and Nerli emphasized the partisans' fears that it was only the presence of the Spanish 
army near the city which protected them from their enemies, and that thus they would 
be `banished from Florence with their total ruin' once the Spanish left.35 As did 
Baldovinetti, Nerli described how those who had shown themselves opposed to the 
popular regime wanted a parlamento for their `security' believing that the popolo 
would not forgive them, and that they would thus have no share of the government in 
a `free and large regime'.36 
33 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 293. 
34 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 156 ": `i detti Medici dubitassino loro non chapitare male nella cipta 
che fussi anche loro detto da loro amici e mostrarono loro il pericholo se gli Spagnuoli se andavano 
che portavano per avere in parte fatto chontro al popolo ed essersi scoperto chontro al detto vivere e 
che da quello chonsiglio detti Medici e loro seguici non avrebbono mai uficii e che chosi si dicieva 
per tutta la cipta e che gli era di necessità da sichurarsi loro e loro amici chol pigliare il Palazzo alloro 
divotione e chassare detto chonsiglio e fare la Signoria, Cholleghi, Otto e Dieci a mano alloro 
proposito e governarsi a modo e nel modo di Lorenzo loro padre di che i detti Medici mossi dalle vere 
ragioni ...' 
'S Cerretani, Dialogo, p. 48; Nerli, Commentari, p. 114. 
36 
Ibid., p. 112. 
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It was as a result of these fears that Nerli explained the desire of partisans of 
the Medici for a parlamento expressed during the pratiche on the reform of the 
constitution in the days following the overthrow of Soderini.37 According also to 
Cerretani, the fear amongst some of those involved in the overthrow of Soderini that 
`some harm would befall' them, given the quality of the `pane fratesca', was 
apparent as soon as Soderini departed the city, and was the reason why they 
immediately sought to persuade the Medici to head a new regime.38 This is 
confirmed by a letter' of Filippo Strozzi written on 4 September during the 
discussions on reform. `Those who have greatly revealed themselves in this affair', 
he reported, `do not believe they will remain secure if the government does not 
change and press much for a parlamento.'39 
The reform of 7 September seems only to have heightened the fears of 
partisans, although the Medici agreed to it, and according to Cerretani it was intended 
to provide for the `security' of the Medici, while maintaining the Great Council.4° 
Following the election that day of opponents of the Medici as the first twenty -one 
members of the new Senate, the young partisans who had taken up arms to guard the 
Palace following Soderini's departure immediately concluded that the reforms as 
they stood did not offer enough `security' for themselves or the Medici, and thus, 
according to Cerretani, for their `security' they persuaded Giuliano to request the 
addition of a further one hundred men drawn from the Medici's supporters.41 
The next day saw the election as Gonfalonier of Giovanbattista Ridolfi, a 
leading member of the frateschi, which Nerli and Cerretani recalled brought `terror' 
to the Medici's partisans.42 Giovanni Rucellai and other young palleschi saw in 
Ridolfi's election and his dismissal of their guard on the Palace `the ambassadors of 
their ruin', according to Cerretani, and believed they were in `danger' because once 
the Spanish left, they and the Medici would be left at the `discretion' of their 
`enemies', whose leader was now Gonfalonier. Thus they renewed pressure for a 
37 Ibid., pp. 111 -2. 
38 Cerretani, Dialogo, pp. 48 -9. 
39 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 178, f. 69r: Filippo to Lorenzo Strozzi, 4 September 1512. 
4° 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 281; Idem, Storia, p. 444; Idem, Dialogo, p. 49. 
41 Idem, Storia, p. 444; Idem, Dialogo, p. 50. 
42 
Idem, Storia, p. 444; Nerli, Commentari, pp. 114-5. 
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parlamento, telling the Cardinal that they were in `greater danger than before', that 
`the past regime was stronger than before', and that `the piagnoni would chase them 
out again' .43 
It was with this `singular' argument above all, according to Cerretani, that 
palleschi continued to press for a parlamento over the next week until they persuaded 
the Medici of the `danger' they were in, of the `harm that would befall them and their 
friends', and that they could not enjoy `security' unless they forced the establishment 
of a Balla and a new regime.44 If the partisans had found another way to secure 
themselves according to Cerretani, they would have agreed to it, but `one never 
found a way'.45 On the day before the parlamento, according to Parenti, Giuliano 
spoke at length with the Gonfalonier about the government and the `security' of the 
Medici.46 When Giuliano and the young partisans took over the Palace by force they 
were asked what they desired, according to Nardi, and replied `with one voice' that 
they desired `proper security'.47 
A letter of Niccolò Pandolfini written to the Cardinal from Romethree days 
before the parlamento confirms the representation of the argument of the partisans 
given by Baldovinetti, Cerretani and others. Bemoaning the creation of the 
Gonfalonier and the `hotchpotch' (guazzabuglio) of the Senate `packed with 
piagnoni and the other friends of Soderini', and supporters of the Great Council, 
Pandolfini warned that if matters were not `remedied and firmly taken in hand', 
neither the League nor the Cardinal nor his supporters would be able to `remain 
secure in that regime', which `every day would become more settled and more nasty' 
and when the Spanish left, would come to have `so much license' that shortly the 
Medici and their friends would encounter some `great difficulties'.48 
as 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 282; Idem, Storia, p. 445; Idem, Dialogo, p. 51. 
aa Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 282, 283, 285; Idem, Storia, pp. 445 -7; Idem, Dialogo, pp. 53, 54, 57. 
45 Ibid., p. 54. 
46 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 80 ". 
47 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 7. 
48 A.S.F., M.A.P., LXVII, n. 32: Niccolò Pandolfini to Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, 13 September 
1512, `si sono ristretti di piagnoni e li altri amici di Soderini e così e popolari perchè si abbia 
amorevolmente loro el Grande Consiglio e se non si remedia et vivamente fermandosi le cose ... nè la 
Lega, nè la Vostra Reverendissima, nè li amici di quella hanno a potere restare securi in cotesto stato, 
quale ogni dì diventerebbe più resto e più traverso e partendosi le gente d' arme si verrebbe aver tanta 
licentia che in breve sarebbe .. qualche grande inconveniente'. 
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The fears of the partisans were not only real, they were also well founded. 
Guicciardini wrote that the Medici, as their partisans knew, would not have found it 
tolerable as private citizens since they were hated by everyone for the sack of Prato 
and for bringing the Spanish army to the city gates and would have been continually 
suspected by other citizens of making some attempt against liberty.49 Lorenzo Strozzi 
recalled that the fearful response of the partisans to the election of Ridolfi was caused 
by the `many vain and hateful words' spoken against them by the `multitude'.5° 
Cerretani described how the partisans' fear that the reforms of 7 September and 
Ridolfi's election would lead to their destruction was a response to the threats made 
by many frateschi and `enemies of the Medici' concerning what they would do once 
the Spanish left.51 Thus evenfrateschi, according to Cerretani, could agree that the 
forcing of the parlamento was not to be `marvelled at', because the Medici and their 
partisans were driven to it by `necessity'.52 
A good illustration of the fate which partisans of the Medici feared would 
befall them unless the Medici seized control of the regime, and the reasons for it, is 
provided by the experience which even in the months after the parlamento, Paolo 
Vettori nevertheless had to suffer. In April 1513 his brother, Francesco, reported that 
Paolo had received a heavy imposition of taxes which Francesco believed was on 
account of his brother's role in the overthrow of Soderini, which harmed him greatly 
because `all those who were friends of that regime wish Paolo harm'.53 In August 
1513 Francesco wrote to Paolo informing him that he had told Giulio de' Medici of 
the persecution he had suffered on account of his role in the overthrow of Soderini 
and then the parlamento:54 
49 F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 234. 
50 
Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxxi. 
5' Cerretani, Storia, p. 447; Idem, Dialogo, pp. 50, 51. 
52 
Ibid., p. 60. 
53 Machiavelli, Lettere, p. 373: Francesco Vettori to Niccolò Machiavelli, 21 April 1513. 
54 
A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I., 136, f. 219 ": Francesco to Paolo Vettori, 5 August 1513, `chi te haveva di 
quel tempo in qua potuto offendere colla graveza l' havea facto perchè nel gonfalone nostro non è il 
più dishonesto arbitrio che quello habbiamo noi, e li altri loro amici erono suti riguardati. Nelle cause 
civili havevi mosse o alla Mercantia o all' Arte havevi havuto la sententia contro, havendo mille 
ragione, chi haveva il tuo nelle mani a Lione, a Brugia e a Londra non te lo voleva restituire et in 
effecto ciascuno ti faceva il peggio poteva'. A transcription of this letter can be found in R. J. F. 
Hughes, `Francesco Vettori: his place in Florentine Diplomacy and Politics' (London University 
Ph.D. thesis, 1958), pp. 571 -3. 
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from that time until now those who had been able to hurt you with taxes had done it, 
because in our gonfalone there is no more dishonest imposition than the one that we have 
had, and the other friends of the Medici had been regarded. In the civil actions you had 
brought either at the Mercantia or at the Guild, you had had the sentence against you, when 
you had had a thousand reasons in your favour; those who had your goods in their hands in 
Lyons, in Bruges and in London were unwilling to restore them to you, and in effect 
everyone was doing the worst to you that they could ... 
Francesco wrote that he had explained to Giulio that Paolo was suffering in 
this way not just because he was hated by the Soderini and their friends for his part in 
Piero Soderini's overthrow, but also because his relatives, unlike those of the two 
others most involved, Bartolomeo Valori and Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, were 
unable and unwilling to protect him, and thus he was in the greater danger:55 
of you three ... none was more hated by them [the Soderini] and their friends than you and 
none was in more danger, because Bartolomeo was their relative and hurting him they were 
hurting their sister and progeny. Antonfrancesco had great and powerful relatives, that is 
there are a hundred men in his family, Giovanbattista [Ridolfi] is his father -in -law, and in 
fact everyone would be wary of bringing an action against him, but you were left with few 
relatives and those were ill- disposed and discontented with you, some with respect to Piero 
Soderini and some to the parlamento ... 
Thus, as Francesco informed Paolo, he had asked Giulio to protect him, 
explaining to Giulio that it was `necessary he helped you extraordinarily, and beyond 
deeds, were needed demonstrations'.56 Only the extraordinary help of the Medici 
could protect Paolo from the hostility of the Soderini and their friends, but Valori's 
marriage to a daughter of Paolantonio Soderini,57 and Albizzi's to the daughter of the 
head of the frateschi, whose election as Gonfalonier so frightened partisans of the 
Medici,58 ensured their security. Where Vettori was dependant on the Medici for 
protection, Valori and Albizzi were not, and this difference must have been one of 
ss 
Ibid.: `di voi tre .. nessuno era più odiato dalloro e dalli amici di te e nessuno portava più pericholo, 
perchè Bartolomeo era loro parente et offendendolo offendevano la sorella e nipoti. Antonfrancesco 
era d' un parentado grande chè in casa sono huomini cento, ha per suocero Giovambatista et ne ffacto 
ognuno andrebbe andagio a tocharlo, ma tu restavi cho non molti parenti et quelli mali disposti et 
male contenti di te, che rispecto a Piero Soderini, e chi al parlamento'. 
56 Ibid. 
5' 
Litta, Famiglie, disp. 17 (Valori), tav. ii. 
58 
Ibid., disp. 180 (Albizzi), tav. xix. 
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the main reasons why Paolo supported the parlamento, where Albizzi and Valori, as 
we have seen, opposed it. 
While the Medici heeded the calls of their supporters for security in 1512, 
they prevented their partisans from pursuing the vengeful persecution of their 
opponents. As did the plot of 1497 so the plot of 1.513 provides the clearest evidence 
of the failure of the regime's attempts to conciliate its opponents, not least through 
the involvement of Cosimo de' Pazzi. Cardinal Giovanni had agreed to Pazzi's 
request for the appointment of his father, Guglielmo, as Gonfalonier, despite the 
fierce opposition from Medici supporters on account of the Pazzi family's public 
hostility to the parlamento.59 The Cardinal had asked Giuliano to get assurances from 
the Archbishop that he would point his father in the `right direction' (bona via), if 
Guglielmo's `nature' should cause him to stray from it.6o 
Yet like the plot of 1497, the plot of 1513 testified to the wisdom and success 
of attempts to conciliate supporters of popular government at least in isolating 
implacable opponents of the regime. Giovanni Folchi, who had had a petition 
concerning his inheritance granted by the Balia in October 1512,61 and refused to 
join the plot, told Boscoli that the foremost reason he believed that Giuliano and the 
regime were very secure, was because of the `kindness' (benignità) of the Medici, 
since following their return to power they `never did harm to anyone'.62 
Yet the Medici were under pressure from their partisans to treat opponents 
with more ruthlessness, which Niccolò Valori, condemned for his involvement in the 
plot, felt acutely. Shortly after being released from his sentence on the occasion of 
the elevation of Cardinal Giovanni to the Papacy in March 1513 Valori described in 
his Ricordanze the desire for plunder and revenge that he had perceived in the Medici 
and some of their supporters since their return:63 
59 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 296. 
60 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. II, 86, f. 225r: Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici to Giulio and Giuliano de' 
Medici, 15 December 1512. 
61 A.S.F., Balle, 43, f. 61". 
62 
A.S.F., M.A.P., LXXXIX, n. 38: Examination of Giovanni Folchi. 
63 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 17 ": `in vero da natura erano benigni, ma i disordini che contrarono con 
uno debito incredibile e con havere promisso il forte dello stato nostro e molto più per havere intorno 
huomini rovinati, gli sforzava e covava di natura e sempre cercavano occasioni di potere vendicarsi e 
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[The Medici] in truth were benign by nature, but the disorders that they had incurred with an 
incredible debt and with having promised the strength of our state, and much more for 
having around them ruined men, were forcing and pulling them from their nature and they 
were always seeking occasions to be able to avenge themselves and banish all those who 
loved liberty, or who had some possessions that could feed both them and a very great 
multitude of bankrupts and the poverty- stricken they had around them. 
Valori believed that he was a particular target of the Medici supporters' desire 
for vengeance on account of his family's role in the execution of the conspirators in 
1497. The Valori, he'recorded, had been supporters of the Medici but opposed them 
as soon as they saw that the Medici `aspired to tyranny and domination',64 yet his 
paternal uncle, Francesco, having `freed the city' in 1494, had afterwards `wished 
that no friend or relative of the Medici suffer in anything, thinking that liberty had to 
please them so much that they would never more look to tyrants'. Nevertheless a 
`few friends' of the Medici had `conspired against liberty and the popular regime', 
for which five were decapitated.65 
Francesco Valori, leader of the frateschi, was the man most responsible for 
the execution of the five leaders of the plot of 1497,66 and thus it was, as Niccolò 
explained, that Francesco, `true liberator of his country' was killed soon after by that 
`same faction', friends of the Medici, with part of the popolo, `always desirous of 
new things' and `persons of little judgement'. Niccolò himself later rose to a position 
of authority and thus, as he explained, because the city's foreign enemies were using 
the Medici for their `instrument', he had `many times to add new enmities to the past 
matters.' 67 
As Guicciardini recorded, Valori was certainly amongst a group of citizens in 
1508 who had been `enemies' of the Medici for some time and never reconciled with 
them, and who supported Soderini's attempts to take action against those involved in 
mandarne tutti quelli che amavano la libertà, o, havevano qualche substantia da potere pascere e loro 
e una moltitudine grndissima di falliti et malistanti haveano intorno. 
64 
Ibid., f. 12`. 
65 Ibid., f. 17`. 
66 Parenti, `Storia' ed. Schnitzer, p. 211; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 140, 142, 144; 
Cerretani, Storia, pp. 238 -9. 
67 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 17`. 
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the Strozzi- Medici marriage alliance for conspiring against the regime.68 The group 
was known as `la setta valoriana' because its members, who also included 
Alessandro Acciaiuoli and Pierfrancesco Tosinghi, had all been `adherents' of 
Francesco Valori,69 and it was fear of persecution by the Medici that was one reason 
why Niccolò Valori and the others in this group were amongst Soderini's closest 
supporters,70 and did all they could in August 1512 to keep the Medici out of 
Florence.71 Valori recalled telling Soderini as an orator to the Viceroy that since the 
Medici could not remain private citizens their return would put the regime and `for 
us, our lives' in their hands, and records that following the agreement by which the 
Medici returned to Florence he would have fled the city, but for his wife and 
children.72 
It may be that fear of persecution was one reason why Valori got involved in 
the plot, although Valori himself sought only to explain that it was the desire of the 
Medici's supporters for revenge which lay behind the `most cruel and unjust 
judgement' by which he was sentenced to two years imprisonment in the fortress of 
Volterra and exiled for life to Città di Castello. It was unjust, he argued, because 
while he had not revealed the plot, he had sought to dissuade Boscoli from his plans, 
and believed that he had thus `saved two lives at one stroke', those of both Boscoli 
and his intended victim, Giuliano de' Medici.73 
The plot of 1513 testified to the failure of the Medici's attempts, despite their 
wider success, to conciliate all implacable opponents with clemency and even 
rewards, not least perhaps because of the continual threat to opponents posed by their 
partisans. The plot of 1522 however, was the result of the failure of the Medici to 
satisfy the demands and expectations of their supporters. This has been ignored in 
modern accounts, and Ammirato's later descriptions of the injuries that the 
conspirators sought to avenge were rejected by Alamanni's biographer, without the 
68 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 326. 
69 Ibid., p. 328. 
70 Ibid., p. 272. 
71 Tosinghi was a commissioner of Florentine forces in the field, Acciaiuoli the commander of troops 
guarding the the city's gates, Guasti, ed., Sacco di Prato, ii, p. 10; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 278. 
7 N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 17v. 
73 Ibid., ff. l 8` `. 
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benefit of much new evidence, and unaware that they were based on contemporary 
accounts.74 
Brucioli lamented in 1526 that the Cardinal had never rewarded Jacopo da 
Diacceto with the position merited by his learning and literary talents,75 and Nardi 
recalled that da Diacceto was said at the time to have felt `slighted' (sdegnato) at not 
having been made Chancellor after the death of Marcello Adriani.76 Both Cerretani 
and Cambi record the injuries which contemporaries, including Cambi himself, 
believed had moved the two leaders of the plot, Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi 
Alamanni, the poet. Alamanni had been arrested at the beginning of 1522 for 
carrying arms which had filled him with so much `resentment' (sdegnio), according 
to Cambi, that he had plotted to kill the Cardinal.77 A disagreement over the 
ownership of a benefice between Zanobi and his kinsman, Benedetto, had resulted in 
Benedetto giving Zanobi a `slap' (ceffata). Cardinal Giulio, unable to make a peace 
between them, had made a truce by which Benedetto was banished from Florence for 
a period. Within a short time however, the Cardinal had wanted Benedetto to return 
to the city and had him given leave to do so, and thus for this `slight' (sdegnio), 
according to Cambi, Zanobi was moved to plot.78 
Cambi and other contemporaries who believed that the reasons for the plot 
were the causes of `resentment' (sdegnio) the two leaders had for the Cardinal, 
emphasized that the aim of the plot was to kill the Cardinal with the `design of 
appearing to desire to free their country'.79 Cerretani believed that despite the truth of 
the personal `resentments' (sdegni) these had not been all that had precipitated the 
plot, and indeed he judged that the aim of the conspirators had been to `free the city 
from the servitude of the Cardinal de' Medici and his followers' and that they had 
been moved more by the vanity of glory than `by hatred'.80 Nardi also wrote that the 
conspirators had been moved not by any hatred for the Cardinal but only by the 
74 Hauvette, Luigi Alamanni, pp. 29 -30. 
75 Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 269. 
76 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 89. 
77 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 203; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 407. 
78 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 202 -3; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 407. 
79 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 201, 202 -3. 
80 Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 407 -8. 
259 
desire to `free their country', but he is quite wrong to argue that they did so knowing 
that the Cardinal's plans for reform were a fiction.$' Buondelmonti, as we have seen, 
believed the contrary, and there can be no doubt that it was his desire to avenge the 
injury from Benedetto and the Cardinal that precipitated and drove the plot. Luigi 
Alamanni, the soldier, is recorded to have confessed that when Buondelmonti 
recruited him he had told him that `I want to kill Benedetto Buondelmonti, my 
enemy, and I want you to kill the Cardinal'.82 
Correspondence recently brought to light from both Benedetto and his father 
to in March 1521,83 by which they hoped to present to the Pope their version of the 
disagreement with Zanobi and excuse Benedetto's resort to physical violence, 
confirm the fact and extent of the enmity between the two kinsmen.84 The records of 
the Otto di Guardia reveal that they supervised the truce between Zanobi and 
Benedetto in April 1521, and that Benedetto was banished from the dominion for one 
year.85 They also confirm that Benedetto was allowed to return to the city long before 
the end of the term of his exile by means of successive commandments by the Otto to 
present himself in the city.S6 The first such commandment, in September 1521, was 
no doubt partly the work of Benedetto's father, Filippo, who was a member of the 
Otto which began its term in that month.87 
The Cardinal's favour to Benedetto was to prove a drastic error of judgement, 
made in the mistaken belief that having failed to persuade Zanobi to consent that 
Benedetto could return to the city, Zanobi would be no danger if he had Benedetto 
return anyway.88 Yet Zanobi was to prove a dangerous man, and his violent 
disagreement with his kinsman was a dangerous one in which to intervene.89 
81 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 89. 
82 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 406. 
83 
R. Bizzocchi, `La dissoluzione di un clan familiare: 1 Buondelmonti di Firenze nei secoli xv e xvi', 
A.S.1., cxl (1982), pp. 37 -39. 
84 
A.S.F., Mss. Torrigiani, III, ins. 21, F: Benedetto Buondelmonti to Piero Ardinghelli, 27 March 
1521; Filippo Buondelmonti to Pope Leo X, 30 March 1521. 
85 A.S.F., O.G., 179, f. 80`. 
86 
Ibid., 181, ff. 4" (September 1521), 48" (January 1522). 
S7 A.S.F., Tratte, 906, f. 87v. 
88 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 407. 
ß9 A.S.F., Mss. Torrigiani, III, ins. 21, F, ff. 4`' Benedetto Buondelmonti to Piero Ardinghelli, 27 
March 1521, reveals that the threat of violence between the two kinsman had been apparent from the 
very beginning of the dispute. 
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Francesco Guicciardini had noted in March 1521 the `ugly' affair of the assault, 
remarking that unless some action was taken against Benedetto, if Zanobi was a man 
of any substance, some `disorder' (disordine) would result.90 
The Cardinal had brought Benedetto back to the city because he was a trusted 
supporter and important agent of the Medici,91 and his father was a leading member 
of the inner circles of the regime.92 Following his involvement in the coup against 
Soderini, Benedetto had been particularly close to Lorenzo, being one of those 
citizens Lorenzo hired for his company when Captain- genera1,93 then in 1517 an 
agent for Lorenzo during the wars over Urbino,94 in March 1518 one of five citizens 
who accompanied Lorenzo to France on the occasion of his wedding,95 and from then 
until Lorenzo's death in May 1519 his agent in Rome and one of his closest 
advisors.96 Close as Zanobi was to the Cardinal, he was too young to be a member of 
the ruling circles of the regime. Benedetto's importance however, was such that in 
May 1522 the Cardinal sent him to France to repair the very rift with Francis I which 
made the conspiracy of Zanobi possible.97 The plot thus reveals the extent to which 
the security of the Medici was threatened by their willingness to favour their most 
trusted supporters, even to the point of protecting them from the consequences of 
their transgressions of the law. 
This was not the first occasion when such protection had provoked an attack 
on the Medici regime from within the ranks of its own supporters. Camillo Antinori, 
for example, was no long- standing opponent of the Medici, and his outburst against 
the regime in April 1517, when he was a prominent member of the government, 
seems to have been the result of his belief that the regime had allowed a grievous 
9° 
F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, xvii, p. 157: Francesco to Luigi Guicciardini, 2 March 1521. 
91 Appendix A, xiii. B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. 49` -50`: `Seconda nota di cittadini confidenti più giovani 
per experimentarle et dare poi loro reputatione secondo rieschono', names Benedetto Buondelmonti. 
92 Appendix A, xiii. B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. 57` -58 ": "Nota di cittadini confidenti allo stato ", names 
Filippo Buondelmonti. Lanfedino Lanfredini (d. 1518) is also named on this list. 
9' 
A.S.F., M.A.P., CXXXII, f. 91 ". 
94 
Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, ff. 133 ", 134`. 
95 
Ibid., f. 138`. 
96 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXLIII and CXLV: Collections of letters from Buondelmonti to Lorenzo de' 
Medici and Goro Gheri from May 1518 to May 1519; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 132 -4. 
97 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 408; `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', pp. 246 -7; Devonshire Jones, Francesco 
Vettori, pp. 154 -6. 
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injury committed him against by partisans of the Medici to go unpunished. Antinori's 
father, Niccolò, was named on a list of supporters of the Medici drawn up in 1513 
and had been an official of the Monte in 1515.98 On account of his loans to the 
regime, Goro Gheri had supported Niccolò's request in March 1517 that Camillo be a 
member of the next Twelve Good Men,99 and Camillo was duly appointed, only to be 
dismissed from office by the Signoria on 11 April as a result of his outburst.1°° 
Antinori's attack was made in the midst of a threatening and abusive tirade 
against two members of the Otto di Guardia, including Cristofano Sernigi,101 a 
partisan supporter of the Medici who had taken part in the forcing of the parlamento 
in 1512.102 According to both Gheri and Luigi Guicciardini, Antinori was angry that 
a complaint lodged with the Otto on his behalf against three `supporters (amici) of 
the Medici family', accusing them of breaking into his house at night and raping one 
of the girls in his household, had been found to be false.103 The three had denied the 
charge and worked with the Otto, according to Guicciardini, to find the `truth' behind 
its `falseness' .104 
When Antinori was condemned for his outburst he was also condemned for 
having made an `insulting' and `infamous libel' against `noble persons' that was 
`wholly against the truth', for which he was sentenced to pay over a thousand florins 
to various pious and charitable groups.105 Yet Antinori evidently believed that 
partisans of the Medici in the Otto had protected three of their friends who had 
98 
See Appendix A, xii. 
99 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 9, n. 44: Goro Gheri to Lorenzo de' Medici, 4 March 1517. 
loo A.S.F., Tratte, 61, f. 102 "; A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, ff. 140 ", 152r: Goro Gheri to Ser 
Bernardo Fiamminghi da San Miniato, 8 and 12 April 1517; F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, ii, p. 86. 
101 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, f. 152r: Gheri to Ser Bernardo Fiamminghi da San Miniato, 
12 April 1517. 
102 B.N.F., N.A., 988, f. 146`: `Amici'; Ibid., f. 104r: `Confidenti', both name Sernigi. Lanfredino 
Lanfredini (d. 1518) is on both lists. Sernigi is also named on lists in Ibid., f. 25`: `Nota de' cittadini 
da dare loro utile, homini da bene et amici' and Ibid., f. 49`.-50`: `Seconda nota di cittadini confidenti 
più giovani per experimentarle et dare poi loro reputatione secondo rieschono'. 
103 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, ff. 137 ", 150 ", 155`, 160 ": Letters of Gheri to Alfonsina de' 
Medici and Ser Bernardo Fiamminghi of 7, 8, 12 and 16 April 1517. Antinori was married in 1515, so 
it is unlikely that the girl was his daughter, B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 156 (Antinori), tay. vii; Ibid., 8, f. 
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committed a grievous injury against him, and that is why his attack on the members 
the Otto had included the charge that `justice was not being done',106 and why he had 
attacked the regime in the midst of his tirade. 
While the cases of Antinori and Buondelmonti demonstrated the dangers to 
the regime of protecting partisans from the consequences of their transgressions of 
the law, the plot of 1522 also demonstrated the dangers to the regime of failing to 
satisfy the expectations of their supporters, particularly those aroused by elevation of 
Cardinal Giovanni to the Papacy in 1513. Like the other conspirators, Battista della 
Palla was said by contemporaries to have been moved by some personal resentment 
with the Cardinal.107 Nardi relates how Battista della Palla had been a `familiar and 
affectionate servant' of Giuliano, from whom he had firm hope of being made a 
Cardinal. Deprived of that hope following Giuliano's premature death in 1516, della 
Palla had persevered in a `most devoted service' of Pope Leo X.108 At great personal 
expense della Palla had donated some sable linings to the Pope, who had promised to 
give him the first ` scrittoria' that fell vacant. He had still found no post when the 
Pope died, and the sables, which were being claimed by Leo's heirs, were only 
returned to him through the help of Cardinal Soderini.'09 
Della Palla had certainly been unsuccessfully courting the Medici for 
ecclesiastical position ever since 1512. Busini later recalled how della Palla had held 
the most sumptuous banquets for Giuliano on his return to Florence in 1512, that he 
was then living like a gentleman with many pages and servants, and that he had bet 
Giuliano Gondi that he would have earnings of one thousand scudi within three 
years. 110 Correspondence of the Medici family,111 and hitherto ignored letters from 
della Palla to a secretary of Cardinal Giulio,112 show that from 1514 to March 1521 
della Palla was regularly making requests for some profitable benefice or 
106 A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, ii, f. 137 ": Gheri to Alfonsina de' Medici, 7 April 1517. 
107 Nerli, Commentari, p. 138. 
108 Nardi, Istorie, ii, p. 79. 
109 
Ibid., p. 80. 
I l° Busini, Lettere, p. 94. See also Varchi, Storia, ii, p. 396. 
111 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXLI, f. 10': Lorenzo to Alfonsina de' Medici, 13 March 1514. 
112 There is no mention of this correspondence in the best study on della Palla to date, C. Elam, `Art in 




ecclesiastical office.113 In this pursuit he could find himself writing to inform 
Giulio's secretary, as he did in 1518, of the ill health of the present holder of two 
benefices, one of which he estimated to be worth forty ducats.114 By September 1520 
his dissatisfaction with the little if any success which his requests had enjoyed led to 
a direct complaint to Giulio's secretary of ̀ having spent so much money, and exerted 
so much effort without having any ize' .115 
Della Palla was not the only the supporter of the Medici discontented that the 
Medici's possession of the Papacy had not borne the `fruits' he had hoped for. Indeed 
such dissatisfaction was widely felt, and discontent with the Medici was thus greater 
than it had been than before Cardinal Giovanni's elevation, as Alessandro de' Pazzi 
remarked only weeks before the plot was uncovered.116 The plot of 1522, as we have 
seen, revealed the extent to which the security of the Medici in Florence relied on the 
powerful resources of the Papacy to protect it from plots and all but the most 
powerful armed assault. Yet della Palla's involvement in the plot also reveals just 
how serious a threat was posed to the security of the Medici by their possession of 
the Papacy, and their failure to satisfy the expectations it aroused in their supporters. 
Other Florentines who shared della Palla's resentment were also moved to 
work and conspire against the regime. Lorenzo Salviati was in France in the autumn 
of 1521,117 hatching plans over the next few months to kill the Cardinal and to 
command an assault on Florence with French backing. He told Niccolò Martelli that 
Pope Leo X had `benefited all my relatives but had never wished to benefit me', and 
that he thus desired to show the Pope whether he was `a man to be esteemed or 
not'.118 Filippo Strozzi was also partly moved to plot against the Medici in 1526/7, 
according to contemporaries, by resentment that Clement had not fulfilled a promise 
113 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVIII, nn. 5, 11, 75, 91: Battista della Palla to Borso Bertolotti 
May 1516, 19 January 1518, 26 August 1519, 2 March 1521; Ibid., XCVIII, n. 128: 
21 November 1520. 
114 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVIII, n. 25: Battista della Palla to Borso Bertolotti, 22 August 
115 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXVIII, nn. 117, 118: Battista della Palla to Borso Bertolotti, 20 
and postscript. 
116 
Pazzi, `Discorso', p. 425. 
117 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 389. 
118 `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', pp. 255 -6. 
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da Coreggio, 28 
Same to Same, 
1518. 
September 1520, 
to make his son a Cardina1,119 and that the Pope and other members of the Medici 
family had defrauded his wife, Clarice de' Medici, of part of her inheritance.120 
With regards to Buondelmonti and della Palla the plot of 1522 was the result 
of the Medici's failure to satisfy the honour and expectations of their supporters, but 
the involvement of the Soderini in the conspiracy was rather the result of the 
Medici's failure to crush their opponents. The lifting of the banishment of the 
Soderini in exchange for Cardinal Soderini's support for Cardinal Giovanni in the 
conclave of 1513 was opposed by Giuliano and met with vociferous protest from 
Medici supporters.121 The Rucellai sent Corsi and da Diacceto to Rome to persuade 
the Pope of the `scandal' that would follow.122 Also part of the deal struck between 
the two Cardinals was a marriage alliance between the two families, and while 
Alfonsina vetoed a match with Lorenzo, one with the Pope's nephew, Luigi Ridolfi, 
proceeded in January 1517.123 This too was met with protests from Medici supporters 
in Florence, including Goro Gheri,124 who complained of this and recent concessions 
to the Soderini concerning some benefices, with the remark that he praised 
'humanity, clemency and goodness, but not when it harms oneself, because then it is 
against charity , . 125 
Gheri believed that the Medici were mistakenly attempting to conciliate or 
quieten the Soderini with favour, but it may be that they were simply biding their 
time until the conditions of the deal of 1513 had been observed, for the treatment of 
the Soderini was certainly ruthless thereafter. In June 1517 Cardinal Soderini was 
arrested, examined and banished to Naples following what his biographer has argued 
was a false accusation of involvement in a fictitious plot against the life of the 
Pope.126 In December the Soderini were forced to sell back at purchase price, without 
compensation for any improvements, Medici property bought after 1494, when the 
119 Foscari, `Relazione', p. 55; Carnesecchi, `Assedio', p. 451; Segni, Storie, i, pp. 11 -12. 
120 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxxvii; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 128. 
121 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 305. 
122 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 91y. 
12., Lowe, Francesco Soderini, pp. 97 -8. 
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A.S.F., Copialettere di Goro Gheri, i, ff. 222"": Gheri to Alfonsina de' Medici, 4 January 1517. 
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Medici's possessions had been confiscated.127 Thus that the Medici failed to crush 
the Soderini was not the result of any mistaken attempt to conciliate them, and the 
involvement of the Soderini in the plot of 1522 was rather the result of the inability 
of the Medici, despite their best efforts and with all the resources of the Papacy at 
their disposal, to break a family with a Cardinal. 
In the end however, it was to the Medici's mistaken attempts to reconcile 
opponents to the regime that contemporaries were to attribute their overthrow in 
1527, a fact largely ignored by modern historians.128 In contrast to those who had 
explained Soderini's overthrow in terms of that same mistake however, the emphasis 
was placed on the disastrous affect the mistaken attempt to reconcile opponents had 
had on the loyalty of the Medici's supporters. Foscari for example, described a few 
months after the overthrow of the Medici how their supporters, those who had 
suffered for their cause, had become increasingly discontented, both because of the 
growing share of offices distributed to opponents of the Medici, and because an equal 
share of taxes was being imposed on friends and enemies alike. The Medici, their 
supporters had lamented, should be giving offices to their friends and taxes to their 
enemies, as Lorenzo had done. If the Medici had shown more favour to their 
supporters, Foscari argued, the majority of them would not have sided the city 
against the Medici in 1527, and consequently the regime would have stayed firm.129 
Guicciardini also argued that in distributing office and honours widely, not 
showing any `extraordinary favour' to their friends and treating everyone with 
`equality', the Medici had pleased the popolo but been quite unable to eradicate the 
desire for the return of the Great Council.l3° Yet in attempting to do so, the Medici 
had failed to make a `foundation of partisan supporters', who obtained much benefit 
from the regime and knew themselves `lost' and unable to remain in Florence if the 
Medici were expelled, and thus their supporters had not been so satisfied with the 
127 Tommasini, Machiavelli, ii, p. 1053; Lowe, Francesco Soderini, pp. 71, 101. 
128 The matter is referred to briefly in Anzilotti, Crisi, p. 103. 
129 Foscari, `Relazione', p. 74. 
13° F. Guicciardini, Scritti politici, p. 288: `Ricordi', C. 21. 
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regime that they had risked their lives to defend it, hoping rather to be able to survive 
the overthrow of the Medici as in 1494. Thus the Medici had been overthrown.131 
The serious consequences for the Medici of the neglect of their supporters in 
the mistaken attempt to conciliate their enemies had indeed already been foreseen by 
the Mantuan ambassador, Giovanni Borromeo, in February 1525:132 
in this city everyone is discontented, and the friends of the Medici family more so than their 
enemies, because they see the affairs of the regime in bad condition and that our lord Pope 
always seeks to favour and benefit his enemies thinking to make them friends, while they 
are left with kind words, and with these perhaps he believes that they can both feed and 
clothe themselves, and they are so desperate that if the need arises he will see how many of 
them will seize arms in the service of his family. 
With the Tumulto del Venerdì the need did arise, and supporters of the Medici 
rushed to the Palace to show support for the revolt. Only when their overtures were 
rejected did they seek to support the Medici, for only then did they fear that they 
would not survive if the revolt succeeded. 
Equally there were long -standing opponents involved in the Tumulto whom 
the Medici appear to have sought to conciliate with the rewards of office. At the head 
of the Tumulto, and amongst those who had conspired with Filippo Strozzi, was 
Niccolò Capponi, a member of the Otto di Pratica in 1524 despite having been on a 
list of nemici before 1517. Franceso Tosinghi was another listed nemico involved to 
have held office, in 1523, and Agostino Dini had been on a list of ̀ dubii' drawn up 
before 1518, which denoted those who were neither 'amici' nor 'ultimi', neither 
supporters of the regime, nor its most committed opponents.133 Together with Dini, 
both Capponi and Tosinghi's father, Pierfrancesco, were also on this list, yet all three 
were to be made members of the Seventy in July 1522,134 when Cardinal Giulio 
13' Ibid., p. 287 -8. 
132 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 559r: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 16 February 1525, `in 
questa cipta ognuno e mal contento e più gli amici che li inimici della casa de' Medici perché vedono 
le cose di questo stato in mal termine e che nostro Signore sempre cercha favorire et benefichare li sua 
inimici pensando farseli amici et loro restono con buone parole et crede forse di queste si possino et 
pascere et vestire e sono tanto desperato che se li venisse el bisogno vedrà quanti ne piglierano le 
arme per servitio della casa sua.' 
133 Appendix A, viii and x. 
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sought to broaden the regime in the aftermath of the plot,135 and Dini was to sit in the 
Otto di Pratica.136 This was despite the fact that Pierfrancesco Tosinghi had been a 
supporter of Francesco Valori and his efforts to execute the five leaders of the plot in 
1497,137 and that Dini had been a member of the Otto di Guardia that had executed 
them.138 Pierfrancesco Portinari and Lorenzo Segni were two others involved in the 
revolt who had been on the list of dubii, and both had nevertheless gone on to hold 
office, albeit only in the Colleges.139 
These men were not considered to be the most committed opponents of the 
Medici, but their involvement in the Tumulto, and particularly that of Capponi, does 
reveal the extent to which the revolt was the result of the failure of attempts by the 
Medici to conciliate their opponents to the regime. Yet Capponi and Tosinghi were 
the only two of the thirteen listed nemici or sons of nemici involved in the revolt who 
had held office since 1512. Those well -known opponents of the Medici who were at 
the forefront of the young nobles and others who distinguished themselves in the 
revolt had endured exclusion and the costs of exclusion ever since 1512. So too had 
those involved in the Giachinotti -Pitti plot of February 1527, who were all listed 
nemici. These men had suffered the full consequences of the fear and hatred of the 
regime towards them, including fiscal discrimination and persecution in the civil and 
criminal courts, such as a judgement against Battista Pitti by the consuls of the 
merchants' guild in 1525 which was overturned by the Signoria two weeks after the 
overthrow of the Medici.140 Giovanni Rinuccini was also absolved in those days from 
an earlier condemnation of 1524,i41 when for false testimony he had been deprived 
for life of the right to hold office and exiled for one year to Bologna.142 Both 
135 
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136 Appendix A, x. 
137 F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 141, 145. 
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Lodovico de' Nobili and Francesco Bandini had been forced in 1518 to sell back at 
purchase price confiscated Medici estates bought before 1512.143 
Some of the persecution they suffered was driven by the desire to avenge 
attacks committed during the popular regime by them or their families against the 
Medici and their supporters. Daniello Strozzi, for example, had been ordered by the 
Otto in 1514 to pay compensation for damage done to the property of the then 
Cardinal Giovanni during the overthrow of regime in November 1494.144 Some 
persecution was the result of deliberate attempts to deprive them of any ability to 
pose a threat to the regime. Some had the support of the Medici, and some did not. 
The Medici themselves appear to have been divided on the best way to treat 
opponents. When Giuliano died in 1516 it was said that he had been displeased with 
the way that affairs were governed in Florence under Lorenzo, because Giuliano 
preferred to `make himself loved rather than feared by men' and desired sooner to 
`propitiate his opponents by benefiting them, than to oppress them with vendetta',145 
According to Francesco Vettori, Lorenzo desired to be more severe to opponents, 
since he was the son of Piero, than did the Pope, Giuliano or Giulio.146 
Divisions between the Medici and their supporters, and between the Medici 
themselves, prevented the development of any coherent, consistent and thorough 
policy of oppression.147 It was Lorenzo who ordered the banishment of twenty -three 
of the most `suspected' opponents to Bologna, Modena, or to their villas when the 
threat of a Spanish attack in August 1517 brought fears of a revolt,148 but all were 
readmitted to the city by papal bull of Leo X two months later.149 The imprisonment 
of seventeen opponents by the Signoria on the occasion of Leo's death in December 
1521 was made in Giulio's absence, and he immediately released those detained on 
143 Tommasini, Machiavelli, ii, p. 1053. 
144 A.S.F., O.G., 158, f. 73` (April 1514). 
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his return six days later,150 criticizing, according to Cambi, the `private passions' of 
those responsible.151 Thus the Medici did seek to protect opponents from the 
excesses of their partisans, and a striking instance of that was Giuliano's concern in 
December 1513 that Tommaso Marchi was in trouble on account of the fact that his 
brother had been condemned for speaking ill of the Medici some months before. 
When Giuliano resigned his position in Florence to Lorenzo in August 1513, he had 
advised him to ensure that civil justice was not impeded by favours or money and 
that the Otto were not moved by malevolence to punish individuals more than they 
deserved.152 He now instructed Ser Niccolo Michelozzi to have the proceedings 
against Marchi brought to an end:153 
It seems that he is suffering unjustly for the error of others, which displeases me strongly, 
and especially that this condemnation has proceeded for our cause. Whoever has sinned 
suffers the penance, whoever is not at fault neither justice nor we ourselves desire should 
suffer punishment... You will understand what it is necessary to do in Tommaso's benefit, 
and in my name, where it is expedient, recommend his innocence, requesting the Signoria or 
the Otto not to allow themselves to do wrong ... because it does not seem to me just to 
persecute those who have not offended ... 
Thus the Medici did protect opponents from some acts of what they 
considered to be of partisan excess, and Giovanni Rinuccini was one individual 
involved in the Tumulto whose public hostility to the Medici ten years earlier had 
been tolerated, as we have seen, much to Gheri's disapproval. Nevertheless Rinuccini 
held no office after 1512 and was amongst those banished in 1517 and detained in 
1521, and it is clear that those well -known opponents involved in the Giachinotti- 
Pitti plot, and at the forefront of the young nobles and others who distinguished 
themselves in the Tumulto had endured the costs of exclusion and persecution rather 
150 Tosinghi, Vita', f. 129`; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 176`. 
15' Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 190; Pitti, `Istoria', p. 121. 
152 `Instructione al Magnifico Lorenzo', p. 302; Butters, Governors, p. 223. 
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essendo tal condenatione proceduta per la cause res, chi ha peccato patisce la penitenza, chi non è in 
colpa nè la iustitia nè noi vogliamo patisca punitione per tanto poichè non si trova costi el Magnifico 
Lorenzo. Intenderete voi quello bisogni fare in benefitio del predetto Tommaso et in mio nome dove 
fussi expediente rachommandate la innocentia sua pregando la Signoria o li Octo che non li lassino far 
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than the rewards of conciliation. To that extent both the plot of February 1527 and 
the revolt in April were testament not to mistaken attempts by the Medici to 
conciliate their opponents, but rather to the ability of their opponents to survive 
ruthless persecution by supporters of the regime. 
A good example of what they had endured since 1512 is provided by the 
experience of Tommaso Tosinghi, a well -known and listed opponent of the 
Medici,154 whose full story has not been told before.155 He was not one of those at the 
forefront of events in 1527, but like many who were, he was amongst those banished 
in 1517 and those detained in 1521.156 Tosinghi's fate reveals not only the 
persecution suffered by opponents of the Medici, but also the mixture of both fear 
and hatred behind it, the extent to which it took place with and without Medici 
blessing, and to which the Medici did protect opponents from attacks they considered 
to be of needless excess. 
In 1525, having recorded `all the most notable things' that he had suffered 
since 1512, Tosinghi concluded that `in effect, in every case I have been treated as an 
enemy of the regime'. He recorded that neither he nor his sons had ever been drawn 
for any office, and that amongst the `very least things' he had suffered were `most 
dishonest impositions, forced loans beyond any duty, dishonest taxes', which had 
forced him to rent out his house in Florence, and live `very wretchedly' in his 
villa.157 
In December 1515 Tosinghi and Francesco del Pugliese, another nemico of 
the regime, were amongst those citizens forced by the Signoria to give free lodging 
to Cardinals attending the Pope during his visit to the city.158 In December 1516, in 
what Tosinghi considered to be `the most wicked sentence that was ever given in our 
city',159 he had been deprived of some property and fined three hundred ducats by the 
Otto di Guardia having been accused and found guilty with his son, Luigi, of 
154 
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unlawfully and forcefully taking possession of property rightfully belonging to a 
ward of the commune.160 In 1514 however, the Ufficiali dei Pupilli had heard the 
disputed claims over the property and despite a legal report in Tosinghi's favour had 
given a judgement, as Tosinghi recalled, `to make a compromise of it', the terms of 
which were established by July 1516.161 According to Tosinghi it then seemed to 
Jacopo Salviati, who `had had this care from the regime' that he had not been able to 
ensure that Tosinghi's cause was `ruined', and so when he was a member of the Otto 
di Guardia he had originated the accusation against Tosinghi. Tosinghi records that 
when he afterwards complained to Salviati about the case, Salviati said that he had 
not agreed to it and told Tosinghi to `have patience', that `a little venting of anger' 
(sfochamento) was necessary, that he believed that there had now been enough, and 
that Tosinghi's affairs would not be so treated in the future.162 
Goro Gheri emerges from his own correspondence as the main force within 
the regime behind the case, of which the Medici were kept fully informed, although 
Gheri was always afraid that they or Jacopo Salviati would intervene to protect 
Tosinghi, and indeed they may have prevented Gheri from pursuing another 
attack.163 Shortly before the notification was accepted by the Otto,164 Gheri informed 
Baldassare Turini, whose advice he had already sought on the matter, that Tosinghi's 
hold on the property `does not please me, but I would truly like to find honest causes, 
or at least ones coloured that way, to want to lift it from him', and that having 
searched for a way to do so `justifiably, not for his count, but for that of the 
universale', he had had an action against Tosinghi put before the Otto.165 
The reason for which Gheri was so concerned with despoiling Tosinghi of the 
property was no doubt his belief, expressed throughout his correspondence at this 
time, that it was necessary `to weaken enemies by that way that is more honest and 
160 A.S.F., O.G., 166, ff. 80`, 82` (31 December 1516). 
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more reasonable',166 to `touch treacherous enemies with justice, as every day could 
happen', for then `those who are malcontent only for the ambition that they would 
like the popular government' need not be feared, since `if you remove their leaders 
and batter these traitors', the others in time would accommodate themselves to the 
regime. ]67 
In April 1525 the Signoria banished Tosinghi and three others from the city 
for two years and deprived them for life of the ability to hold office in their guild,168 
for having established a new scrutiny for the provveditore of the Arte de' Mercatanti 
without the consent of the Signoria.169 Tosinghi recorded his sentence with dismay, 
having believed that `my affairs had been persecuted and trampled on and that I had 
been left in peace'.170 Tosinghi believed that the affair was not in any way considered 
a threat to the regime, since the individual elected as provveditore, his nephew, 
Lorenzo, was not removed from office. Tosinghi thus accounted for his punishment 
as the result of a desire `to batter me', without which `none of the others would have 
been so dealt with'.171 Certainly the sentence of Tosinghi and the others was 
overturned by the Signoria shortly after the overthrow of the Medici in 1527.172 
Little wonder that if following the condemnation Tosinghi could give thanks that 
`having come into so much disgrace of the regime worse has not been done to me', 
he had also to lament that `outside of taking my life, they could do little worse to 
me'.173 
Tosinghi blamed Piero di Niccolò Ridolfi and Piero di Lionardo Tornabuoni 
for the harshness with which he was treated in the case of 1525.174 They were both 
relatives of the conspirators executed in 1497, and Tosinghi had been one of the Otto 
di Guardia at the time.175 Parenti and others inform us that he was rightly held to 
166 
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have worked hard for the execution `at the instance of the Valori' and was a close 
supporter of Francesco Valori thereafter.176 Indeed Tosinghi believed his role in 1497 
to have been `the cause of my ruin' and all that he had suffered since 1512. Tosinghi 
did note however, that his companions in office had not been treated in the same 
way, some even finding a place in the regime, and he explained that this was because 
he, unlike them, had not `wanted to seek forgiveness and accommodate myself to 
today's government', because `this regime seeming to me to be totally against my 
taste, I have never been able to reconcile myself with it if it harmed me as much as 
the power of the world'.177 
Tosinghi's fate had been shared by those well -known opponents involved in 
the events of 1527, who had not been crushed by the regime despite the exclusion 
and persecution they had endured. They sought vengeance for all that they had 
suffered, but that was not the reason for their opposition to the Medici, nor the reason 
for which they attacked the regime. They had suffered because they were opponents, 
and neither the Giachinotti -Pitti plot nor the Tumulto were in any way directly 
provoked by the exclusion and persecution endured by those involved. 
Some verbal offences against the regime however, were a direct response to 
injuries which those involved believed they had suffered on account of their well - 
known opposition to the regime. Andrea Rinuccini was a listed nemico of the 
Medici,178 and his and Francesco Carcherelli's attack in 1518 was made in the midst 
of an angry and abusive tirade towards the Commissioner in Prato, Domenico 
Canigiani, a supporter of the Medici.179 The pair were aggrieved, according to 
Gheri's account, that Canigiani had confiscated arms from one of them, and 
Rinuccini clearly believed that he had been grievously treated by a partisan of the 
Medici because he was one of their opponents, and thus it was that his attack was 
directed not only against Canigiani, but his `friends' and the regime.180 The same 
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grievance may have provoked Niccolò Paganelli's outburst in 1515. For this was 
directed towards a tax official who was a close supporter of the Medici,18 1 and 
Paganelli was a listed opponent of the ime. ' 82 
However, amongst those condemned for verbal offences were also well - 
known opponents of the regime whom the Medici had sought to conciliate with 
rewards. Thirteen of the forty individuals condemned by the Medici were listed 
nemici before they were condemned, one of whom, Alessandro Manetti, had been 
amongst those banished in 1517. While most had held no office after 1512, two had, 
both before they were condemned.' 83 Jacopo Altoviti had requested Lorenzo in 1514 
for a position in the Colleges, reminding him of the affection that the Altoviti had 
shown the Medici in the past,184 and his request was granted in 1517, despite being 
on a list of opponents drawn up at that time.185 Piero Orlandini had been on lists of 
nemici since before the plot of 1513, concerning which he had been arrested and 
examined, but had nevertheless been granted positions in the Colleges in January 
1518 and the Otto di Guardia in 1520.186 Goro Gheri had recommended Orlandini to 
Lorenzo for the position in 1518.187 Cardinal Giulio believed that Orlandini could be 
won over, Gheri reported, and he reminded Lorenzo that when men `are not 
supporters ordinarily, it is necessary to make them so artificially', and `if they cannot 
be won over completely, they can at least be made the objects of the jealousy of the 
other discontented' .188 
Thus the Medici did seek to conciliate opponents with honour and rewards, 
and that may have resulted, as contemporaries argued, in the overthrow of the regime 
in 1527 because it meant that the Medici failed to bind their supporters closely 
enough to them that they made any effort to defend the regime. Yet with only a very 
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few exceptions, all those well -known and listed opponents condemned for verbal 
offences, involved in plots and at the forefront of the Tumulto had endured exclusion 
and persecution since 1512. To that extent plots and other violent attacks against the 
Medici regime were the result of the failure of the Medici to crush their opponents 
despite attempts to do so. 
The exclusion and persecution suffered by those involved in plots and the 
Tumulto helps to explain the hatred and desire for vengeance that they and other 
opponents of the Medici were to display during the last republic. This was to have as 
serious consequences for the popular regime, Guicciardini predicted in 1528 and 
again in 1530, as the Medici's neglect of their supporters had done. While the Medici 
had been overthrown for having governed according to the customs of `liberty', the 
popular government would be overthrown, Guicciardini warned, for governing 
according to the customs of a `narrow regime' (stato stretto), `especially in excluding 
one part of the city', because `liberty cannot be maintained without the universal 
satisfaction'. 189 The popular regime could conserve itself, Guicciardini wrote, only 
`with infinite friends', achieved by assuring the `security of all' through proceeding 
`in every effect with justice and equality', and not as it was attempting to do, `with 
few partisans whom it is incapable of ruling', because to maintain itself it needed to 
`escape the discords of the citizens' which `open the way to the overthrow of 
governments' .190 
Guicciardini himself was to prove his warnings right, for with Francesco 
Vettori he was one of those leading citizens driven into the arms of the Pope at the 
beginning of the siege by their fear of persecution at the hands of the popular 
government. In the early summer of 1530 Guicciardini explained why in a passage in 
his Considerations on the `Discourses' of Machiavelli which has been ignored by his 
biographers:191 
following the overthrow of the regime of 1527, some good and well -qualified 
citizens have been persecuted and trampled on, and finally with the arrival of the Prince of 
1S9 F. Guiccardini, Scritti politici , pp. 279, 287: `Ricordi', B. 180, C. 21. 
19° 
Ibid., p. 288. 
191 F. Guicciardini, `Considerazioni', I, x, Scritti politici, pp. 19 -20. 
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Orange it has been necessary for them either to disobey the commandments made by the 
Otto to stay in Florence under pain of being declared an outlaw, or to remain, with the 
danger of being killed, and at least with the certainty of being detained as men under 
suspicion. Necessity has driven them either to desire the overthrow of a regime that under 
the name of liberty is tyrannical and destructive of the country, or silently to allow 
themselves with the greatest injustice to be deprived of their country and their possessions. 
As that passage makes plain, Guicciardini and others who fled for fear of 
persecution at the beginning of the siege would still not have joined the Pope if they 
had been allowed to leave the city without being declared outlaws and having their 
goods confiscated. Thus the ruthlessness with which those who disobeyed the ban to 
remain in the city were punished was a fatal error, as contemporaries recognized, 
forcing them not only to join the Pope, but to ensure that he did not come to terms.192 
Both Guicciardini and Vettori were to be amongst the Pope's closest advisors,193 and 
with other Florentine exiles persuaded the Pope in the summer of 1530 against 
abandoning the campaign, telling him that `otherwise they are destroyed for having 
done him service . 194 
In 1527, unlike in 1494 and 1512, those who sought the ruthless persecution 
of leading members and supporters of the past regime were able to have their way, 
and since 1527 leading members of the Medici regime, particularly former servants 
of the Pope, as Guicciardini was, had suffered the full force of that persecution. That 
story is now well- known.195 What has been little emphasized however, is the extent 
to which that persecution was driven not only by hatred and a desire for revenge, but 
also by fear and suspicion. Indeed it is a vast simplification to view the persecution 
of leading members of the Medici regime during the last republic, as is often done, as 
driven solely or even mainly by the desire for revenge.196 For they were persecuted 
not only on account of what they had done in the past, but out of fear and suspicion 
of what they would do in the future. They were assumed, as Guicciardini was, to be 
192 
Ughi, `Cronica', p. 156; Busini, Lettere, p. 146. 
193 
Rossi, Guicciardini, i, p. 164, n. 2; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 221 -4. 
194 
Roth, Last Republic, p. 242; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 224 -5. 
195 
Stephens, Fall, pp. 221 -229, 230 -240, 249 -251; Roth, Last Republic, pp. 64 -5, 98 -100; Rossi, 
Guicciardini, i, pp. 90 -138; R. Ridolfi, The Life of Francesco Guicciardini, trans. C. Grayson 
(London, 1967), pp. 179 -200; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 203 -9; 
196 Stephens, Fall, pp. 220 -1. 
277 
of `tyrannical soul' and opposed to the popular regime, and much of what they 
suffered, as Guicciardini knew, was on account of `suspicion' as well as `hatred'.197 
And once the imperial armies approached in the autumn of 1529, the last republic 
was to end as an exercise in fear. 
There were attacks motivated mainly by the desire for vengeance, such as the 
appointment of Syndics in June 1527 to investigate errors and frauds in the 
administration of public funds committed during the Medici regime.198 Benedetto 
Buondelmonti was one of those found to be in debt to the Commune, and it was in 
the midst of a confrontation with servants of the Syndics when they attempted to 
collect the debt in October 1527 that Buondelmonti had threatened to rouse the 
popolo, the outburst for which he was condemned.199 During his outburst 
Buondelmonti had blamed his treatment on the `traitor' Pieradovardo Giachinotti, 
one of the Syndics, whom he said had tried to have him executed several times 
without success.200 This was a reference perhaps to a variety of capital charges for 
which Buondelmonti was also to be tried following his outburst, and which were 
orchestrated, according to Buondelmonti's son, by Battista Pitti, another of the 
Syndics.201 Buondelmonti then, one of the leading members of the Medici regime, 
was being pursued by two of the Medici regime's most implacable opponents, who 
had been imprisoned for conspiring against it, and who following its overthrow 
sought revenge for all that they had endured. 
Yet even Buondelmonti's case illustrates the fear and suspicion in which 
leading members of the Medici regime were held and which lay behind the 
ruthlessness with which they were treated. One of the charges on which 
Buondelmonti was examined was that he had written to the Pope `in prejudice of the 
popular regime'.202 Buondelmonti claimed that he had written to the Pope in 
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criticism of His Holiness and augmentation of the city', but the Quarantia wanted 
him re- examined believing that there must have been more to the correspondence, 
`because one does not expect Benedetto to criticize the Pope, and I do not know how 
this popular regime is acceptable to him'.2 
°3 
As the imperial forces approached in 1529, it was above all fear and 
`suspicion', as Guicciardini recorded, that lay behind the threats against him and 
other members of the Medici regime.204 A notification of March 1528 warning the 
Otto to be vigilant since the uomini da bene were all `friends of the Pope and 
discontented with the way of government', bluntly expresses the fears of supporters 
of the popular regime:205 
it would not be surprising to find some proof of that in this city from some malicious 
citizen, given their avarice and ambition, and since, having had in the past the means to be 
able to satisfy their wild appetites, they now submit themselves reluctantly to the laws, 
which they are accustomed to command. The Pope is able to give and promise much, and 
undoubtedly has the firm intention of again oppressing the city, if not with force then with 
deceit, according to the custom of perfidious tyrants, and thus it is necessary to be 
suspicious and to have the eyes open. 
Another warned that with regards to the 'grandi' the Otto should `consider 
every little moment as a great matter', since `they cannot be under the yoke of the 
laws that are usually held in contempt and trampled on by them'.206 Such blanket fear 
and suspicion of all those who had served the Medici regime however, was in many 
20' A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 129, ff. 285° -6` (2 December 1527). 
204 
F. Guicciardini, Carteggi, xvii, p. 268: Francesco to Luigi and Jacopo Guicciardini, 20 September 
1529; Rossi, Guicciardini, i, pp. 288 -9: Francesco Guicciardini and Alessandro de' Pazzi to 
Giovanbattista Sanga, 30 September 1529; F. Guicciardini, Opere inedite, x, pp. 136 -7: Francesco 
Guicciardini to Otto di Guardia, 12 December 1529. 
205 A.S.F., O.G., 201 (Libro di Notificazioni), ff. 108 " -9`: `li huomini da bene si sono tucti absentati 
dallo stato per essere amici al Papa et mal contenti del modo del ghoverno ... se trovassi qualche 
riscontro in questa cipta di qualche doloroso cittadino non sarebbe da maravigliarsi atteso la loro 
avaritia et ambitione che per havere hauto il modo di poter satiare e disordinati appetiti loro mal 
volentieri si sottomectano alle leggi alle quale sono advezzi comandare. Potendo il Papa adunque dare 
et promectere molto et havendo fermo proposito di opprimere di nuova la cipta indebitamente se non 
con le forze con li inganni secondo il costume di perfidi tyranni bisogna temere et havere gli occhi 
aperti'. 
206 Ibid., f. 91`: `de grandi stimate ogni piccol momento un gran cosa perché non possono stare sotto el 
gioglio delle leggi consueto dalloro essere villiprese e calpreste'. 
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cases unwarranted. Buondelmonti was a good example. He was the object of popular 
`suspicion' despite the fact, as Busini recalled, that he had been involved in the 
intrigues of his cousin, Zanobi, and Filippo Strozzi against the Medici in the winter 
of 1526,207 and was one of those who loved liberty, according to Busini, on account 
of ̀ offences received'.208 Guicciardini wrote in the Considerations that the harsh 
persecution `without distinction' of those who had in the past supported the Medici, 
`has made many desire their return, who otherwise would have abhorred it no less 
than anyone else'.209 
Thus the persecution of former leading members and supporters of the Medici 
regime proved a fatal error on two counts. For it not only drove them into the arms of 
the Pope out of necessity, it did so when in many cases they would not otherwise 
have even desired the Medici's return. Oppression had created the very beast it had 
been intended to slay. Persecuted because they were believed to be of `tyrannical 
soul', Guicciardini and other leading citizens had become so. For they were driven to 
conclude, as Vettori did in 1528, that those such as the plotters of 1522 who had 
thought to remove control of the regime from the Medici and `restore a civil and 
good regime in Florence', were `more desirous of liberty than prudent'. For `the 
contrary would have happened to them' and they would have succeeded only in 
restoring a regime that was `licentious and tyrannical to all'.210 Liberty, a civil 
republican regime, was no longer possible. Thus, as has long been recognized, the 
ruthless treatment of leading citizens during the last republic finally paved the way 
for the end of republican government in Florence and the establishment of a Medici 
duchy.211 
The ruthlessness with which the popular government of the last republic 
treated those believed to be opponents of the regime was driven in large measure by 
the desire to avoid the mistakes that led to Soderini's overthrow in 1512. Soderini 
had failed to crush his opponents, even when they were suspected or found to have 
707 Busini, Lettere, p. 12; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 98. 
208 Busini, Lettere, pp. 150 -1. 
209 
F. Guicciardini, `Considerazioni', I, xvi, Scritti politici, p. 27. 
210 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 342. 
211 Anzilotti, Crisi, pp. 77 -81; Stephens, Fall, pp. 253 -5. See also Devonshire Jones, Francesco 
Vettori, pp. 242 -5. 
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committed acts against him, and that is why he was overthrown. He had been unable 
as much as unwilling to kill the sons of Brutus, but that he failed to do so was at least 
in part due to the belief that he would be able to overcome their enmity with patience 
and rewards. 
However, the parlamento that followed Soderini's overthrow, just as events 
during the siege, was the result of the fear of persecution felt by those involved, and 
demonstrated the serious threat posed to the regime by those threatened with 
persecution. In both 1512 and during the siege popular government had proved 
incapable of assuring the security of one part of its citizens, who were forced by 
necessity to seek its overthrow. Thus if Soderini's overthrow demonstrated the need 
for popular government to crush its opponents and kill the sons of Brutus, as 
Machiavelli argued, there were quite different lessons to be drawn from the events 
the last republic. Guicciardini pointed this out when he came in 1530 to consider 
Machiavelli's argument concerning the sons of Brutus. He noted how the 
indiscriminate persecution of members of the Medici regime had driven many to 
desire their return who otherwise would not have done so, and concluded that newly 
acquired liberty could only be maintained if it assured the security of those who had 
supported the past tyranny and crushed them only if they proved hostile to the new 
regime. ziz 
Plots against the Medici in 1522 and 1526/7 were the direct result of their 
failure to satisfy the honour and expectations of their supporters, particularly those 
arising from the Medici's possession of the Papacy. Thus plots reveal the extent to 
which the elevation of the Medici to the Papacy, far from bolstering their position in 
Florence, actually threatened the security of the regime. Yet to the extent that most 
plots whether against the Medici or the popular government were the work of well - 
known opponents of the regime, suspected of waiting for the opportunity to work for 
its overthrow, most plots were the result of the failure of the regime to crush its 
opponents. 
The Medici did seek to conciliate opponents with benefits and rewards, a fatal 
error according to contemporaries, which led to their overthrow particularly because 
2t2 F. Guicciardini, `Considerazioni', I, xvi, Scritti politici, p. 27. 
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it resulted in the neglect of their supporters, who were thus neither inclined nor 
forced to defend the regime. Buondelmonti's leadership of the plot of 1522 however, 
demonstrates the extent to which the security of the Medici was also threatened by 
their willingness to favour their most trusted supporters, even to the point of 
protecting them from the consequences of their transgressions of the law. Moreover, 
with only a very few exceptions, most notably Niccolò Capponi, those well -known 
opponents involved in plots against the Medici, and at the forefront of the Tumulto 
del Venerdì, had endured exclusion and persecution and the full force of the fear and 
hatred of the regime towards them. To that extent most plots against the Medici were 
the result of the failure of the regime to crush its opponents despite attempts to do so. 
'g1 
8 
Nobility and Youth 
Plots in early sixteenth -century Florence have been viewed as part of a 
development amongst young men (giovani) of a political and social mentality of their 
own, a process which was to culminate in the central role of giovani in the events of 
1527 and the last republic.' Alternatively, the conspiracies of 1513 and 1522, for 
example, have been seen as part of a tradition by which plots were generally the work 
of `playboys', of young and wealthy men, who neither needed nor desired work.2 The 
noble youths who were at the forefront of the Tumulto del Venerdì, it has recently 
been pointed out, had been at the centre of each violent overthrow of the regime in 
Florence, and various social and political factors have been advanced to explain this. 
In a society where most men married after the age of thirty, and eligibility to office 
began at the age of thirty, the central role in plots and political violence of noble 
youths, those between the ages of eighteen and thirty, is thus explained as the work 
of those with wealth, but without family responsibility, occupation, or political 
privileges.3 
David Herlihy put forward a similar argument some time ago, to explain the 
proclivity to political violence he found characteristic of the Tuscan cities. Rich 
young men, he argued, were at the forefront of plots and factional conflicts, such as 
those in Florence and Pistoia in the early fourteenth century, because the late age of 
marriage amongst the wealthiest households in Tuscan cities meant that rich men 
under thirty were free from family responsibility, lacked any legitimate sexual 
outlets, and were often without any strong paternal presence, since fathers were often 
dead before their sons reached adulthood. Political violence was thus characteristic of 
Trexler, Public Life, pp. 512 -547. 
2 Stephens, Fall, p. 121. 
3 Ibid., p. 197. 
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Tuscan cities because of the preponderance of rich young unmarried men within 
them.4 
This argument serves to remind us that the role of giovani in the plot of 1522 
or the Tumulto, for example, was no new phenomenon in Florentine political 
conflict. Yet plots, according to this view, are presented as acts of youthful 
recklessness, to be explained by the absence in those involved of the moderating and 
restraining influences of work, family responsibility and political participation. It 
detracts from and even ignores the significance of the reasons for which conspirators 
risked their lives and property in attempting to overthrow the government, and it can 
and should be challenged. For it was the reasons for which men conspired against the 
regime, not their youth, that made the risks involved seem worth taking. If there ever 
was a moment in Florentine history when violent political conflict was the work of 
rich, young, unmarried men under thirty, that was simply not the case in the early 
sixteenth century. That there were plots against the regime in Florence in the early 
sixteenth century cannot in any way be explained by the political and social factors 
of the late age of marriage and fatherhood amongst the wealthiest sections of society 
and the exclusion of those under thirty from participation in political affairs, nor can 
the Florentine proclivity to violent political conflict be in any way attached to them. 
There is no warrant for the notion that plots were mainly the work of the 
young. Many plots were mainly, even wholly the work of those in their forties and 
fifties, and such plots were just as common as those by younger men. Many plots, but 
certainly not most of them, were the work of those who were young by contemporary 
standards, but it was simply not the case that young men were a particular danger to 
the regime because they lacked family responsibility, occupation or political rights. 
Most of those conspirators who were young men were not in their twenties, but in 
their thirties. They were eligible to political office, and indeed many had held it. 
They were usually married, often had children, and were at the beginning of their 
commercial or other careers, and that indeed was also the case with many of those 
° D. Herlihy, `Some Psychological and Social Roots of Violence in the Tuscan Cities', Violence and 
Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200 -1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley and London, 1972), pp. 141- 
152; D. Herlihy and C. Klapisch Zuber, Tuscans and their Families (Newhaven and London, 1985), 
pp. 196, 215, 220, 222 -3. 
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few young conspirators who were only in their twenties. Their family 
responsibilities, occupations and commercial interests not only contradict the idea 
that young conspirators were `playboys', but even on occasion help to explain why 
they were involved in conspiracy at all. 
Some plots were the work of young and wealthy men, but the key fact about 
their wealth was not that it made them `playboys', but that wealth was an essential 
resource for conspirators to possess, enabling them to gather the other disaffected 
around them, and to fund the military expeditions deemed essential for success. The 
most important fact about those conspirators who were young nobles, was not their 
youth but their nobility. For it was nobility, not youth, that all conspirators had in 
common, and it was their nobility, not their age, that most distinguished conspirators 
from others discontented with the regime. 
Most conspirators, as we have seen, were from noble families and in almost 
all cases they or their - fathers had held important political office. In many cases they 
or their fathers had been members of the inner circles of the regime, having held 
positions in the Dieci di Balìa, the Otto di Pratica, the Accoppiatori and the Council 
of Seventy, or had been called to speak in pratiche on their own behalf. Plots were all 
generally the work of the same group: those from noble families of some political 
prominence, often the leading families in the city. The reason is simple. It was these 
families who possessed the qualities and resources necessary to lead plots, and these 
families who were able to provide those financial and military resources which the 
leaders of conspiracies considered essential for success. One key to understanding the 
sociology of plots lies in explaining why those involved were able and asked to take 
part, and thus in understanding the resources in their possession that qualified them 
to lead and to participate in conspiracies. The participation of individuals in plots was 
largely dictated by the strategy of the plots themselves, by the need not only for 
trustworthy accomplices, but for those with the resources deemed necessary for 
success. Those resources might range from an individual's military skill to his 
financial wealth to his social and political clout and ability to command respect and 
support within the political community as well as outside it. Whatever those 
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resources may have been however, it is clear that part of the key to understanding an 
individual's participation in conspiracy lay in his possession of them. 
It is in this way that the central role of young nobles in the violent assaults on 
the Palace in August and September 1512 and in 1527 is best explained, and not by 
reference to the lack of family responsibility, occupation or political privileges of 
those involved. Even if the young nobles involved in the Tumulto were mostly men in 
their twenties, that was not the case on either occasion in 1512, and while the leaders 
of the revolt of 1527 may have been unmarried and unoccupied youths, most of their 
young followers were men with family responsibility. The most important fact about 
their nobility and their youth was that it afforded them arms and the ability to use 
them. Young nobles, in their twenties or thirties, whether married, with children, and 
at the beginning of their political and commercial careers or not, were possessed of a 
military capacity. Young nobles were a military resource and that is why they had a 
central role in the violent overthrow of regimes. 
Some contemporaries certainly believed that the young were far more 
dangerous to the regime than their elders. Luigi Guicciardini warned the Medici after 
1530 that of the 'sospetti' in the city he feared those `more young, and more 
courageous and more pertinacious than the others' because he held `much less 
account of the old, being more cold towards undertakings, nor so venomous'.5 In the 
same vein Lodovico Alamanni had written in 1516 that the `old' were `wise', and `the 
wise are not to be feared because they never make political change (novità)' .6 
However, Niccolò Martelli advised Cardinal Giulio in 1524 that the old (vecchi), by 
which he referred to those with children, were as equally dangerous to the Medici as 
the young (giovani), although for different reasons.' In the light of the plots that took 
place, Martelli's was sound advice. 
For plots were almost never, as they have been assumed to be, the work of 
rich young unmarried men in their twenties. Thanks to the archives of the Tratte, 
which record the date of birth of those citizens eligible for political office, it is 
s L. Guicciarclini, `Discorso al Duca Alessandro', ed. G. Capponi, A.S.I., Ser. 1, i (1842), p. 460. 
6 L. Alamanni, `Discorso', ed. Albertini, Staatsbewusstein, p. 370. 
Martelli, `Discorso', ed. Guasti, `Documenti', pp. 217 -222. 
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possible to present, for the first time, an almost complete account of the ages of those 
involved in conspiracies against the regime. With only one exception, as Table One 
below shows, most members of all plots were over the age of thirty. The plot of 
1510, whose sole protagonist, the `young noble' Prinzivalle della Stufa, was aged 
twenty -six,8 was the only conspiracy in the early sixteenth century whose members 
could be said to have been even mainly under the age of thirty. 
Table One 
Ages of Conspirators 
17 - 29 yrs 30 - 39 yrs 40 - 49 yrs Over 50 yrs Age 
Unknown 
Total 
1497 2 8 9 3 8 30 
1510 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Aug. 1512 5 10 1 0 0 16 
Sept. 1512 7 16 3 3 4 33 
1513 0 2 3 0 0 5 
1522 6 5 1 3 1 16 
1526/7 0 1 1 3 0 5 
Feb.1527 0 0 4 2 0 6 
Total 22 42 22 14 12 112 
Sources: See Appendix A, i -viii. 
Far from being the work of young men, four of the eight plots in the period 
were the work of men mainly aged over forty, often over fifty. All those involved in 
the Giachinotti -Pitti plot were aged over forty, Pescioni was fifty -seven, and 
Carducci, one of the three exiles involved, was seventy -one.9 All four of those who 
conspired with the thirty -eight year old Filippo Strozzi in 1526/7 were over forty, and 
Capponi, Vettori and Matteo Strozzi were each in their fifties.10 Three out of the five 
men involved in the plot of 1513 were in their forties, including one of its leaders, 
8 Appendix A, ii; Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxvi. 
9 Appendix A, vii. 
1° Appendix A, viii. 
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Agostino Capponi, aged forty- two.11 The majority of the conspirators of 1497 were 
aged over forty, including three of its five leaders: Giovanni Cambi, aged forty -three; 
Niccolò Ridolfi, aged fifty -two; and the `very old' Bernardo del Nero, aged seventy - 
one.12 Thus the security of the regime in Florence was threatened as much and as 
often by men in their forties and fifties, as it was by their younger counter parts. 
Half of the plots of the period were mainly the work of those aged under 
forty, most of whom were in their thirties. These were, by contemporary standards, 
young men (giovani) and it is to those under the age of forty that Florentines referred 
when they wrote of giovani involved in plots and other attacks against the regime. 
Youth, by contemporary standards, was as relative as other terms of social 
description, but it was also a precise term for a distinct political group. The young, 
giovani or iuvenes, referred to in laws and provisions were those between the ages of 
twenty -four and forty, between the age at which one became eligible to attend some 
councils, and the age -at which one was eligible to hold positions within the inner 
circles of the regime.13 The late teens and early twenties was in political terms the 
age of adolescence, and contemporaries often referred to young men in this age group 
as garzoni. 14 
Those plots that were described as the work of giovani, were mainly the work 
of those in their thirties. The overthrow of Piero Soderini was the work of `young 
men of the nobility' according to contemporaries.15 Its leaders were `young nobles',16 
they were accompanied by other `young men' from noble families," and it was with 
other `young men' that Albizzi and the Rucellai took control of the Palace after 
Soderini had been forced to leave it.18 All but one of those involved was under forty, 
11 Appendix A, v. 
12 Appendix A, i; F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 143. 
13 Marzi, Cancelleria, pp. 618 -9: A provision of April 1498 by which ambassadors were 
henceforward to be accompanied by a `giovane cittadino' between the ages of twenty -four and forty. 
14 
F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 326: A description of Filippo Strozzi, aged twenty -one, as 
`garzone'; Trexler, Public Life, p. 388. 
1 Cerretani, Storia, p. 442. 
16 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 292; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iii, p. 231. 
17 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 29`: Jacopo to Francesco Guicciardini, 3 September 1512; 
Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 156`; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 279; Idem, Storia, p. 442; Nardi, Istorie, i, p. 
496. 
18 Cambi, Istorie, xxi, pp. 308 -9; Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, p. clxxiv; Cerretani, Storia, p. 443. 
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and apart from the twenty -five year old Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, the six leaders 
were all in their thirties, as were most of their accomplices.19 
Most of these young men were to be at the forefront of those who urged the 
Medici to force the parlamento, and were amongst those `young men', according to 
contemporaries, who accompanied Giuliano when he took over the Palace on 16 
September.20 Those involved were `other young men, his friends' according to 
Prinzivalle della Stufa, who was one of their number.21 The vast majority of those 
twenty -nine recorded to have taken part whose ages are known were under forty. Far 
from being very young however, as has been suggested,22 only seven, a small 
minority, were under thirty, as many indeed as were over forty. Half of all those 
involved were in their thirties. 
The plot of 1522 was described as the work of `young men', and its two 
leaders, Buondelmonti and Alamanni, the poet, were both `young'.23 Alamanni was 
twenty -six and Buondelmonti thirty -one, and their accomplices in Florence were 
evenly split between those in their twenties, such as Martelli and the two executed 
conspirators, da Diacceto and Alamanni the soldier, and those in their thirties, such 
as della Palla and Brucioli. It is worth noting however, that some of their allies in 
Rome and elsewhere were older. Bernardo da Verrazzano was forty -five, Cardinal 
Soderini was sixty -nine, and his brother Tommaso, fifty- two.24 
`Young nobles' (giovani nobili), according to contemporaries, were at the 
forefront of the Tumulto del Venerdì, just as they had been responsible for the violent 
assaults on the Palace in August and September 1512.25 As on both occasions in 
1512, it is probable that most of those young nobles in 1527 were in their thirties 
19 See Appendix A, iii. The sons of Piero and Jacopo Pitti, ten individuals in all, who have not been 
listed, were also mostly in their thirties. A.S.F., Tratte, 88, ff. 11`, 21r, 38`, 53`, 75`, 89`; Ibid., 86, ff. 
3 ", 45 ", 70', 74`; Ibid., 419, ff. 4`, 14`, 32r, 42r, 56`. 
20 Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 81 "; Cerretani, Storia, p. 448. 
21 
Sanudo, Diarii, xv, col. 141: Prinzivalle della Stufa to Piero da Bibbiena, 23 September 1512. 
22 Stephens, Fall, p. 63. 
2' Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 201, 203; Vettori, `Sommario', p. 342. 
24 Appendix A, vi. 
25 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Missive, 18, f. 168r: Letter to Domenico Canigiani, 21 May 1527; B.N.F., 
Magl. VIII, 1487, ins. 142: Paolo Benivieni to Bernardo Segni, 29 April 1527; F. Guicciardini, 
Carteggi, xiv, p. 5: Francesco Guicciardini to Gianmatteo Ghiberti, 26 April 1527; A.S.M., A.G., 
Estera, 1109, f. 3122: Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 April 1527. 
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rather than their twenties, but most of their leaders in 1527, unlike in 1512, were 
under the age of thirty. Piero and Giuliano Salviati, the two cousins who had led the 
young nobles since the demands for arms had first surfaced in the winter of 1526, 
were aged twenty -three and twenty respectively, and of their seven principal 
followers whose ages are known, all but one were in their twenties.26 
The revolt was by no means solely the work of young men, and Niccolò 
Capponi, whom the Medici blamed equally with the Salviati for leading it, was in his 
fifties.27 All of those fourteen leading citizens who are recorded with Capponi to 
have directed the revolt in its later stages from the room of the Gonfalonier were over 
forty, most were over fifty, and Francesco Martelli was seventy- one.28 Only the 
thirty -eight year old Averardo Salviati, who was also held responsible with Capponi 
for leading the revolt, was giovane. Of the sixteen other citizens who distinguished 
themselves in the revolt whose ages are known, seven were in their twenties, and 
seven aged over forty:29 
Clearly then, plots and the violent overthrow of regimes were almost always 
the work not of those in their twenties, but of young men in their thirties or just as 
commonly, men in their forties and fifties. It was young men in their thirties too, and 
their elders, who had headed plots in the past. Of the three leaders of the Pazzi plot in 
1478, Jacopo de' Pazzi was aged fifty -six, while Francesco Salviati and Francesco 
de' Pazzi were both in their thirties, as indeed were the two other Pazzi most closely 
involved, Renato and Giovanni.30 Amorotto Baldovinetti, one of the two leaders of 
the plot of 1481, was aged twenty- five,31 but the other, Battista Frescobaldi, was 
probably in his thirties, and possibly as old as forty- five.32 The two leaders of the plot 
of April 1494, Lorenzo and Giovanni di Pierfrancesco de' Medici, were aged thirty - 
one and twenty -seven respectively, and of their three accomplices,33 Cosimo Rucellai 
26 Appendix A, ix. 
27 
Segni, `Vita', p. 301. 
28 Appendix A, viii and x. 
29 Appendix A, xi. 
30 A. Poliziano, Della congiura dei Pazzi (coniurationis commentarium), ed. A. Perosa (Padua, 1958), 
pp. 5, 14, 21, 51; P. Hurtubise, Une famille- témoin. Les Salviati (Città del Vaticano, 1985), p. 54. 
31 Baldovinetti, 'Memoriale', f. 23v. 
32 B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 156 (Frescobaldi), tay. v. 
' For those involved see Parenti, Storia, ed. Matucci, i, pp. 68 -72. 
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was twenty six, but Francesco Soderini was aged forty -four, and Zanobi Acciaiuoli 
was thirty- three.34 
Since plots were mainly the work of men in their thirties or older, they cannot 
be explained as the work of those with wealth but without family responsibility, 
occupation or political privileges. Even those at the forefront of plots who were 
young men were mostly in their thirties and were eligible to office, indeed some had 
attained a measure of political prominence. Giannozzo Pucci in 1497, Vettori, Valori 
and Capponi in 1512, and Averardo Salviati in 1527, were all young men at the head 
of attempts to overthrow the regime who had held office in the Signoria, the 
Colleges, or the Otto.35 Despite his youth, Filippo Strozzi had enjoyed a pre- eminent 
position as one of Lorenzo's most trusted counsellors and Depositor of the Pope,36 
but most young conspirators, although eligible to office, were excluded from the 
inner circles of the regime on account of their age. For membership of the Dieci, the 
Otto di Pratica, the Council of Seventy and other leading positions in the regime was 
restricted to those of forty years of age and over. Thus if young conspirators were at 
all impatient for political position denied to them by their youth, they were impatient 
for positions in the inner circles of the regime. 
Young conspirators could award themselves, as Buondelmonti planned to in 
1522, positions in the inner circles of the new regime they planned to establish, and 
such positions certainly formed part of the rewards of success. Three of the leaders of 
Soderini's overthrow, Albizzi, Vettori and Valori, and three of their accomplices, 
Giovanni Vespucci, Benedetto Buondelmonti and Maso degli Albizzi, were amongst 
eight men of `minor age', below the qualifying age of forty, appointed by the 
Signoria to the Senate created by the reform of 7 September.37 During the 
parlamento of 16 September, all these plotters, with the exception of Vettori, were to 
be amongst seven `young men' made eligible by the Signoria to all the offices of the 
34 For Rucellai see L. Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Rucellai (Florence, 1861), pp. 132, 
175; for Acciaiuoli, see Lina, Famiglie, disp. 104 (Acciaiuoli), tay. ii; for Soderini see Appendix A, 
vi. 
35 Appendix A: i, iii, and X. 
36 Nerli, Commentari, p. 128. 
37 
Cambi, Istorie, xxi, pp. 313, 322. 
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city `despite their minor age'.38 By this privilege, the twenty -five year old 
Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi was to sit in the Otto di Guardia in 1513, but all the 
others were in their thirties, and the privileges they gained were those of eligibility to 
the honours of the Gonfalonier and positions in the inner circles of the regime. 
However, none were to be granted such positions before they had reached the normal 
qualifying age,39 although Valori was appointed orator to the imperial representative 
in Italy, the Bishop of Gurk, in October 1512,4° and again a year later.41 
Contemporaries certainly believed that one factor which discouraged men 
from engaging in plots against the regime was marriage and fatherhood. Niccolò 
Valori reflected this when, concerning his inclusion on Boscoli and Capponi's list of 
`discontented men', he described himself as `more averse to political change (novità) 
than was any man in this city' on the grounds that he was `burdened with a family, 
and especially with children', as well as being wealthy and having had `so many 
offices and honours' that he was `sated' of them and `wholly turned to the quiet 
life' .42 Valori, aged forty -nine, had two sons and two daughters, all aged under 
twenty,43 and that may have been one reason why he refused to get involved. 
Yet just as those conspirators who were young were mostly in their thirties 
and eligible to political office, so they were usually married and often had children. 
Indeed, those few conspirators who were in their twenties were often married and had 
children. Again the archives of the Tratte are a useful source, at least concerning 
fatherhood. Without a similar record of marriages however, it is not possible to give 
a complete account of the family responsibilities of young plotters, but it can be 
shown however, that contrary to what has been supposed, almost all of those young 
conspirators at the head of plots, whether in their twenties or their thirties, were men 
with family responsibilities. 
38 
A.S.F., Balie 43, f. 31`: `Habilitatio juvenum ad officio'. 
39 Appendix A, iii. 
40 
A.S.F., Signori, Carteggi, Legazioni e Commissarie, Elezioni e Istruzioni a Oratori, 23, f. l00`; 
Masi, Ricordanze, p. 112. 
41 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Missive, 10, f. 9`. Ibid., f. 6' records that Paolo Vettori was appointed a 
Commissioner in October 1513. 
42N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18`. 
43 Ibid., f. 11 `. 
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Two of the executed leaders of the plot of 1497, for example, were young 
men: Lorenzo Tornabuoni, aged twenty -nine; and Giannozzo Pucci, aged thirty- 
seven.44 Pucci had been married three times,45 Tornabuoni twice, and both had 
children.46 Apart from Tornabuoni, Jacopo Gianfigliazzi was the only other 
individual involved in the plot to be in his twenties, and he too had young children at 
the time.47 The only two participants in their thirties whose family responsibilities are 
known, Galeazzo Sassetti and Francesco Cegia, both had children at the time of the 
plot.48 One of the executed leaders of the plot of 1513, Pietropaolo Boscoli, was a 
`young noble' aged thirty- two,49 and he had a son,50 although the other leader of the 
plot, Agostino Capponi, was still unmarried at forty -two. " Filippo Strozzi had 
children when he conspired against the Medici in 1526/7,52 as did Averardo Salviati, 
one of the young leaders of the Tumulto.53 
The overthrow of Soderini was the work of young men, but only two of its six 
leaders, Palla and Giovanni Rucellai, were unmarried at the time. The twenty -five 
year old Albizzi was married, and Capponi, Valori and Vettori all had children. 
Seven of their ten accomplices were married, and six had children.54 Those eleven 
young men involved in the parlamento whose family responsibilities are known are 
fairly evenly split between those six who were unmarried at the time, and those five 
who were married, four with children, including two of those in their twenties.55 Both 
Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi Alamanni, the young leaders of the conspiracy of 
44 Appendix A, i. 
45 
Litta, Famiglie, disp. 158 (Pucci), tay. v. 
46 A.S.F., Tratte, 88, f. 230" records that Giovanni and Lionardo di Lorenzo Tornabuoni were born in 
1487, and 1491 respectively. For his marriages and the birth of two daughters see Litta, Famiglie, 
disp. 54 (Tornabuoni), tay. ii. 
47 
A.S.F., Tratte, 88, ff. 206`, 221` records that Pierfilippo and Filippo di Jacopo Gianfigliazzi were 
born in 1493 and February 1497 respectively. 
48 A.S.F., Tratte, 88, f. 220" records that Francesco di Galeazzo Sassetti was born in 1491. On Cegia 
see R. Ristori, `Francesco Cegia', D.B.I., xxiii, p. 324. 
49 Della Robbia, `Recitazione', p. 284, and see Appendix A, v. 
50 
C. Pincin, `Pietropaolo Boscoli', D.B.I., xiii, pp. 219 -20. 
s' Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 5. 
52 
A.S.F., Tratte, 88, ff. 273 ", 284` (Roberto born in 1513, Vincenzo born in 1511). See also Litta, 
Famiglie, disp. 71 (Strozzi), tay. xx. 
s' Hurtubise, Salviati, p. 498, records that Salviati had children born in 1513 and 1515. 
sa 
Appendix D, i. 
ss Appendix D, ii. 
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1522, had children at the time of the plot,56 although it is probable that all of their 
young accomplices were unmarried, as della Palla,57 Brucioli,58 Tommaso, Giuliano 
and Piero di Paolantonio Soderini are known to have been.59 
The protagonist of the plot of 1510, Prinzivalle della Stufa, was still 
unmarried in 1515,60 and neither of the leaders of the young nobles in 1527, Piero 
and Giuliano Salviati, were married at the time of the Tumulto.61 These were men in 
their twenties, and the plot of 1510 and the revolt of 1527 were the only occasions 
when attempts to overthrow the regime were led by young unmarried men. Yet there 
is no reason to suppose that the Salviati were typical of the young nobles in 1527, 
even if most were in their twenties. Indeed it would appear that many, perhaps most, 
were husbands and fathers. Of the seven other young men at the forefront of the 
revolt whose family responsibilities are known, all but one were in their twenties, yet 
all but one was married, and four had children..62 
Thus there is no warrant for the notion that young men were a particular 
danger to the regime because they lacked family responsibility. Indeed the fact that 
young conspirators were married occasionally helps to explain their involvement in 
plots, to the extent that the marriage ties they shared with others involved helps to 
explain why they conspired together. Lorenzo Tornabuoni, for example, had been 
married since 1492 to the sister of Jacopo Gianfigliazzi, with whom he conspired in 
1497,63 and Pucci had been married to the sister of another of the plotters, Luigi Bini, 
until her death in 1494.64 Paolo Vettori was married to a niece of the Rucellai with 
whom he conspired in 1512.65 
Most young conspirators were probably wealthy, but not all were, and the 
assumption that young conspirators also lacked occupation is contradicted by what 
56 Machiavelli, Lettere, p. 509: Letter of I August 1520, which records the birth of a son to 
Buondelmonti. Alamanni had a son born in 1519. See Hauvette, Luigi Alamanni, p. 24. 
57 Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 59. 
58 Ibid., p. 556. 
59 
Litta, Famiglie, disp. 141 (Soderini), tavv. vi, vii. 
60 A.S.F., M.A.P., CXV1, n. 105: Luigi della Stufa to Lorenzo de' Medici, 6 February 1515. 




Litta, Famiglie, disp. 54 (Tornabuoni), tay. ii. 
64 Ibid., disp. 158 (Pucci), tay. v. 
65 Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. xi. 
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we know about the leaders of plots. Indeed their occupations and commercial 
activities often provided one reason for their involvement in conspiracies at all. We 
are already familiar with two of the most striking examples: Battista della Palla's 
discontent as a result of his fruitless quest for ecclesiastical position; and Lorenzo 
Tornabuoni's desperate need to avoid bankruptcy as a result of his take -over of the 
Medici bank. 
Both young leaders of the plot of 1522 were partners in businesses at the time 
of the conspiracy: Buondelmonti in a goldsmith company and a wool and pelt 
merchants with branches in Lyons;66 Alamanni in a wool business.67 One of their 
young allies, Giovanbattista Soderini, was a partner in a firm with interests from 
Lucca to Antwerp.68 Averardo Salviati had been a banker for some time before 
1527.69 Gino Capponi had a company in Pisa by 1509 and was a partner in others by 
1512.7° Paolo Vettori, another of the leaders of Soderini's overthrow, had owned and 
run, with his brother,- an iron foundry producing arms and ammunition for some time 
before 1512, and his own goldsmith company also probably dates from before 
1512.71 As was the case with Tornabuoni, Vettori too, as we have seen, seems to 
have been moved to plot partly by the desire to escape the threat of insolvency 
resulting from the failure of his commercial activities, for which he may even have 
held Soderini responsible.72 
Vettori was certainly debt -ridden, and was to abuse the position of treasurer 
of the clerical decima, granted him by the Pope in November 1513, to salvage the 
state of his finances.73 He does not seem to have been the only individual involved in 
the events of 1512 moved by the desire to relieve his insolvency. Filippo Strozzi 
wrote to his brother on 4 September 1512 that amongst those pushing for a 
parlamento were `some bankrupts, to whom ordinary ways are not useful', whereas 
66 
A.S.F, O.G., 182, ff. 34`, 38`-", 431--v, 511; Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 174. 
67 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 22 ", 42`. 
68 A.S.F., Sig., Minutari, 21, f. 461 . 
69 Hurtubise, Salviati, pp. 145, 147. 
70 E. Luttazzi, `Gino Capponi', D.B.1., xix, pp. 31 -3. 
71 Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 4 -5. 
72 Segni, `Vita', p. 282; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 58. 
73 
Bullard, Filippo Strozzi, p. 87. 
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`whoever is content with ordinary ways, and lives on his own means does not 
consent to it'.74 When Guicciardini sought to explain in 1516 why those who were 
`naturally enemies' of the Medici had been those `few' who had favoured their return 
in 1512, he argued that `desperation' and `extreme necessity' had driven them to it.75 
They were `bankrupts' and `desperate men', who had worked for the return of the 
Medici only on account of `extreme necessity', and through seeing `no other way to 
secure their well- being'.76 Clearly not all those at the head of plots can be considered 
wealthy men by patrician standards, and the desire of Vettori and others involved in 
the events of 1512 to stave off bankruptcy shows one reason why that was so. 
If some of those young men at the head of plots were not rich, and had 
occupations, that may have been even more the case with some of their young and 
noble accomplices. Jacopo da Diacceto, a young noble in the plot of 1522,77 was a 
professional man of letters, `a learned youth but poor' according to contemporaries, 
on which account Cardinal Giulio had granted him a lectureship in the humanities.78 
This was a post at the Studio in Pisa which he is known to have held in 1521, at least 
for four months.79 Niccolò Martelli, whose involvement in the plot of 1522 began 
with a commission from the French to deliver letters to Buondelmonti, was in 
substantial debt. He claimed in his examination to have assured one of his creditors 
on his departure from France that he would profit `many hundreds of scudi' from 
fulfilling his commission.80 Da Diacceto also claimed in his examination, as we have 
seen, that he had become involved in the plot solely on account of his poverty, and 
while such claims are to be treated with caution, they show a further reason why 
some of those young nobles involved in plots were poor men, by patrician standards, 
with occupations. 
74 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. III, 178, f. 69V: Filippo to Lorenzo Strozzi, 4 September 1512. 
75 F. Guicciardini, `Del modo di assicurare lo stato alla casa de' Medici', Dialogo, p. 274. 
76 Ibid., p. 267. 
77 Nerli, Commentari, p. 139. 
78 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 403; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 204, 205; Vettori, `Sommario', p. 342; Sanudo, 
Diarii, xxxiii, col. 297. 
79 Tommasini, Machiavelli, ii, p. 1072. 
8° 
`Processo di Niccolò Martelli', pp. 266 -7. 
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Another reason was the occupation itself. One of the young nobles executed 
in 1522, Luigi di Tommaso Alamanni, was a professional soldier, as was another of 
the plotters condemned, Alessandro Monaldi.81 Alamanni, according to Vettori, had 
been for some months in the guard of Cardinal Giulio.82 Certainly his `experience of 
the art and skill of soldiery' had led him in January 1522 to be commissioned by the 
Otto di Pratica to command a company of 150 men.83 In April he was one of those 
sent to guard Siena, as Renzo da Ceri approached Sienese territory,84 and he was 
there with his company when he was arrested following the discovery of the plot.8' 
It was precisely because they were professional soldiers that Alamanni and 
Monaldi were recruited to the conspiracy. Monaldi confessed to having been given a 
horse and ten ducats by Buondelmonti and commissioned to tell Renzo da Ceri to 
leave Siena and approach Florence.86 Alamanni confessed to having been approached 
by Buondelmonti specifically to kill Cardinal Giulio, which they decided was to take 
place while the Cardinal was dining with Buondelmonti. Buondelmonti and 
Alamanni the poet had found him the hatchet with which the soldier wished to 
commit the deed.87 At some stage Buondelmonti seems to have intended Alamanni to 
commit the murder in the Duomo, together with his `companions and retainers' 
(compagni et sgherri), a reference perhaps to his company.88 
Alamanni provides a stark illustration of the way in which those involved in 
plots, were involved for a purpose, and even recruited to order. The leaders of 
conspiracies found accomplices because they needed them, and the involvement of 
any individual or group in plots is to be partly explained by the reasons for which 
they were asked to participate. Most young noble conspirators were wealthy, they 
were from the wealthiest section of society, and some may have lacked occupation, 
81 Anon.. `Cronica', f. 147"; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 403. 
82 Vettori, `Sommario', p. 342. 
83 A.S.F., Otto di Pratica, Missive, 10, f. 44 ". 
84 
Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 399. 
85 B.N.F., F.P., II VI 51, f. 118 ": Agnolo Marzi to Bartolomeo Valori, 27 May 1522; A.S.F., Otto di 
Pratica, Responsive, 25, f. 178 ": Letter of Bartolomeo Valori, 27 May 1522; Cambi, Istorie, xxii, pp. 
204 -5; Masi, Ricordanze, p. 258, Nerli, Commentari, p. 139. 
86 A.S.F., O.G., 182, ff. 32`- ". 
87 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 406. 
88 `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 245. 
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but the significance of their wealth was not that it made them `playboys', as has been 
suggested, but that wealth, just as Alamanni's ability to kill in cold blood, was a 
resource essential for the leaders of plots and their accomplices to possess. 
The significant fact about those conspirators who were young nobles, was not 
their youth but their nobility. For it was nobility, not youth, that they possessed in 
common with other conspirators, and which distinguished them from the other 
discontented. The best illustration of that is to compare the conspirators with those 
condemned for verbal offences against the regime. The ages of twenty -nine of those 
condemned are known, all of them from families in the major or minor guilds (Table 
Two). The clear majority, two thirds, were forty years of age or over. Thus a higher 
proportion of those condemned for verbal offences were forty years or over than of 
those involved in plots, but conspiracies were as much and as often the work of men 
in their forties and fifties as they were of younger men. 
Table Two 
Ages of those from families in the guilds condemned for verbal offences against the regime 
18 - 29 yrs 30 - 39 yrs 40 - 49 yrs Over 50 yrs Age 
Unknown 
Total 
1502 -12 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1512 -27 4 4 7 8 3 26 
1527 -30 2 0 3 1 0 6 
Total 6 4 10 9 3 33 
Sources: See Appendix A, xii and xiii. 
Whether young or old however, most conspirators were from the same social 
and political group. They were mostly from noble families of some political 
prominence, often the leading families in the city. The contrast with the social and 
political background of those condemned for verbal offences is very marked indeed. 
298 
As Table Three shows, under a third of those condemned for verbal offences 
were from noble families, and nobles were fewer than those from other families in 
the guilds, major or minor. Only half of those condemned were from noble families 
or ordinary families in the major guilds. However, of the one hundred and twelve 
conspirators, two -thirds were from noble families, and all but eight were either from 
noble families or from ordinary families in the major guilds.89 
Table Three 
Social background of those condemned for verbal offences against the regime 
Nobles Other Minor Identified Identified Friars Total 
Major Guilds by Trade by Place 
Guilds of Origin 
1502 -12 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1512 -27 12 10 5 3 4 7 40 
1527 -30 2 3 0 0 1 2 9 
Total 15 13 5 3 5 9 50 
Sources: See Appendix A, xii and xiii. 
One third of those condemned for verbal offences were from groups outside 
of the guild structure and political society. Half of these were friars, and half, 
identified in their condemnations either by trade (two weavers and a footman), or by 
their parish or other place of origin, can be said to have been members of the popolo 
minuto.90 Since most were not condemned in the company of members of the guilds 
or the nobility, most would seem to have been expressing their own discontent, rather 
than that of their social superiors. A footman (staffiero) and one Tonione di Lionardo 
from Bologna were condemned with a member of a noble family, Giovanni 
89 Seventy-four were from noble families, and thirty from ordinary families in the major guilds. See 
Chapter Six, Table One. The figures for the Tumulto del Venerdì have been discounted. 
9° Cohn, Labouring Classes, pp. 37 -8, 67 -9. 
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Guicciardini,91 and three of the friars were those condemned with Bartolomeo 
Redditi in 1513. These are the only two cases of their kind however, and Parenti's 
account of the latter does not suggest that the friars had been any more than 
encouraged to prophesy by the two members of the major guilds condemned with 
them. 92 
Only half of those condemned for verbal offences were nobles or from 
families in the major guilds. Equally, in the cases of only one half of those 
condemned, had either they or their fathers held important political office (Table 
Four). However, ninety -one of the one hundred and twelve conspirators, eighty 
percent, were prominent citizens or from prominent families. In the cases of fifty - 
three, one half of those involved in plots, either they or their fathers had held 
positions in the inner circles of the regime.93 
Table Four 
Political background of those from families in the guilds condemned for verbal offences 
Inner Circles Prominent Office No Office Total 
1502 -12 1 0 0 1 
1512 -27 9 11 5 26 
1527 -30 1 3 2 6 
Total 12 13 7 33 
Sources: See Appendix A, xii and xiii. 
As Table four shows, only a small minority of those condemned for verbal 
offences had either themselves or their fathers held positions within the inner circles 
of the regime. And in six of these twelve cases, those were positions on the very 
91 A.S.F., O.G., 158, f. 7` (10 January 1514): Condemnation `pro conservatione presentis pacificis 
optimi status et regiminis populi Florentini' to be banished from Florentine jurisdiction for three 
years. 
92 Parenti, 'Storia', Il IV 171, ff. 93`, 94`. 
93 See Chapter Six, Table Two. Again, the figures for the Tumulto del Venerdì have been discounted. 
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margins of the inner circles of government, limited to only a few occasions on which 
those concerned had spoken in pratiche on their own behalf.94 Luigi Manelli was one 
of these, and he had held no office, so Cerretani described him as a man of `noble 
family but of little authority'.95 
Thus amongst those condemned for verbal offences there were `principal 
citizens' such as Piero Orlandini and Carlo Cocchi,96 men who were both `very 
noble' and `of authority', as Orlandini was described at the time of his offence.97 But 
just as commonly those condemned were from outside the guild structure and 
political society, and that was the case both during the Medici regime and the last 
republic. The political and social background of those condemned for verbal offences 
reveals that discontent with both Medicean and popular government was felt and 
openly expressed by members of every section of Florentine society, both within the 
ruling orders and outside them, by those of every level of political prominence or 
obscurity. Conspiracy however, was the almost exclusive preserve of nobles and 
those from the major guilds, and most members of most plots were from noble 
families of political prominence, commonly the leading noble families of the city. 
The leaders of plots were almost always from the city's leading noble families. 
All plots against a prince were made by `great men' or his most intimate 
associates, Machiavelli explained in the Discourses, because no one else, unless they 
were `completely mad' (matto), could conspire against a prince. `Weak men' (uomini 
deboli) and those not close to a prince, Machiavelli explained, lacked all the qualities 
and resources the execution of a plot required. `Weak men' had little to ensure that 
men kept their faith with them, and would eventually be betrayed. Without access to 
the prince they were bound to fail in the execution of their plan, and being `weak' all 
the difficulties involved during and after the deed itself ̀ increase without end'.98 
When those who saw themselves to be weak were discontented with a prince, they 
94 Appendix A, xii and xiii. 
9s Cerretani, Storia, p. 317. 
96 
B.N.F., N.A., 988, f. 21: `Cittadini principali'. This list names Orlandini and Donato di Messer 
Antonio Cocchi and his `fratelli'. 
97 A.S.M., A.G., Estera, 1108, f. 207': Giovanni Borromeo to the Marquis, 26 November 1523, 
`nobilissimo ... e d' auctorità'. 
99 Machiavelli, `Discorsi', III vi, Opere (1954), p. 323. 
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cursed him and waited for those of `greater quality' to act against him. If weak men 
ever did conspire against a prince, Machiavelli argued, they should be praised for 
their intention, and not for their prudence.99 
There was a plot in Florence in our period by the weak, that of 1513 against 
the Medici, and Machiavelli was almost certainly thinking of it when he wrote the 
passage above only three or four years later. For he had been one of those arrested, 
examined and imprisoned in connection with the conspiracy, after his name was 
found to have been included on the list of potential supporters drawn up by the 
leaders of the plot.100 Both Giuliano and the Dieci sought to impress upon their 
representatives abroad that the plot was no more than a `messy muddle without any 
order', a `bad intention with little order, without foundation or following', and that its 
leaders, Boscoli and Capponi, were `young men', although noble, `without 
reputation, or following or power'.101 To emphasize the rashness and weakness of the 
plot, the regime described it as the work of `imprudent youths', moved by `youthful 
passions and desires' and with no other foundation than the `desires and passions of 
young men' .102 
At forty -two however, Capponi was an elderly youth, and it was usual for the 
regime to emphasize to its ambassadors abroad the lack of quality of those found to 
have conspired against it. Contemporaries rightly described the leaders of the plot of 
1497 as 'primarii' and `extremely wealthy',103 remarked upon the `authority and 
grandness' of Ridolfi and del Nero,104 and noted that they were two of the `leaders' 
of the city.105 Yet both the Signoria and the Dieci wrote relentlessly that the plot was 
of `little' and `weak foundation', `few men of quality were involved', the 
99 
Ibid., pp. 323 -4. 
loo Machiavelli was found to have been uninvolved in the plot, and was not officially condemned by 
the Otto to any punishment. However, Cerretani records that Machiavelli was sentenced to life 
imprisonment in the Stinche, and he was only released on 12 March 1513 as a result of the elevation 
of Cardinal Giovanni to the Papacy. Cerretani, Ricordi, pp. 299 -300; Parenti, `Storia', II IV 171, f. 
85" 
101 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 39, ff. 161 " -2`: Dieci to Piero Martelli, 19 February 1513; Sanudo, 
Diarii, xv, col. 573; Ibid., xvi, col. 25: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da Bibbiena, 19 February and 7 
March 1513. 
102 A.S.F., Dieci di Balia, Missive, 39, ff. 162" -3`: Dieci to Roberto Acciaiuoli, 22 February 1513. 
los 
Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 723: Letter of Antonio Vincivera, 24 August 1497. 
101 Cerretani, Storia, p. 239. 
i°s F Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 142. 
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conspirators were `of not much quality', and there was `no person of condition' 
amongst them.106 However, whilst the regime's descriptions of the weakness of the 
plotters of 1513 should not be taken at face value, as they have been,1 °7 Boscoli and 
Capponi were the least prominent and thus the most weak of those who led 
conspiracies against the regime, for uniquely amongst the leaders of plots, as we have 
seen, neither they nor their fathers had held office. 
Both obscure men in political terms, Boscoli and Capponi were certainly 
perceived by Niccolò Valori to lack those qualities necessary to conspire successfully 
against the regime. Valori recorded that he had sought to discourage Boscoli from 
proceeding with the plot partly on the grounds that `they were not men for such 
affairs'.108 The weakest of those who conspired against the regime, they met their 
demise in the way that Machiavelli later warned was often the fate of conspiracies by 
the weak: they were betrayed. It is usually assumed,1 °9 following the accounts of 
Vettori, Nardi and Nerli, that the plot was uncovered when the conspirators' list of 
possible supporters fell by chance into the hands of a Sienese secretary, although 
Nerli wondered whether Capponi had not confided in him.110 However, Niccolò 
Valori explained at the time, as did Masi and later Baldovinetti, that the plot was 
uncovered when a man to whom the conspirators had confided their plans, Lamberto 
Cambi, informed the authorities." 
Valori even accused Cambi, although he was on the list of opponents drawn 
up before the conspiracy,112 of provoking Boscoli to plot so that he could inform on 
him, either at the instigation of Medici partisans eager for an occasion to banish their 
enemies, or solely for his own purposes. `A true traitor' wrote Valori, `he thought by 
this means to enter into their grace'.13 Cambi was rewarded with remunerative 
106 A.S.F., Dieci di Balìa, Missive, 20, ff. 60`, 61`, 62r, 64`, 68r, 71 ", 73 ": Letters of 8, 10 12, 14, 15, 19 
and 21 August 1497; Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. xlviii: Letter of Signoria, 10 August 1497. 
107 Villari, Machiavelli, ii, p. 198. 
1°8N. Valori, `Ricordanze', f. 18`. 
109 Villari, Machiavelli, ii, p. 198. 
11° Vettori, `Sommario', p. 295; Nardi, Istorie, ii, pp. 25 -6; Nerli, Commentari, p. 123. 
111 Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 159 "; Masi, Ricordanze, pp. 117-8. 
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minor office in May 1513 at Giuliano's behest,' 14 and a position in the Colleges in 
1514,11' but he remained a well -known and listed opponent of the regime, and was 
amongst those detained in 1521.116 
Unlike the conspirators of 1513, Prinzivalle della Stufa, the protagonist of the 
plot of 1510, was from a leading noble family, the son of a leading member of the 
inner circles of the popular government. Yet he too was perceived to lack the 
qualities necessary to conspire against the regime, and it becomes clear that one 
reason for that was because of his youth. Cerretani did not believe that della Stufa 
had or would have found accomplices, because no `men of account' would have 
trusted him, since he was only in his twenties. He also lacked wealth, intelligence, 
judgement, and `credit' amongst other young men, `did not know how to speak' and 
was not 'esteemed' in any way.' 17 Rather, according to Cerretani, della Stufa was 
considered to be an `ordinary youth' of ̀ not much wisdom' and `little substance' (da 
pocho), and thus his - involvement in the plot was said to astonish his contemporaries, 
who could not believe the `madness' of those in Bologna who had entrusted him with 
such an enterprise.]'$ Lorenzo Strozzi was one who believed that Colonna and the 
Pope had quite undeservedly attributed to della Stufa the reputation and credit of a 
person `bold and capable of conducting such undertakings' and indeed that della 
Stufa had agreed to their plans in order not to lose such a reputation.19 Strozzi's 
brother, Filippo, may have been of the same opinion, and that may have been one 
reason for his refusal to get involved, which led to the plot's early demise. 
Cerretani's remark concerning the improbability that men of account would 
have trusted a young man of twenty -six enough to agree to conspire with him helps 
to explain why, contrary to what has been assumed, so few of those at the head of 
conspiracies were in their twenties. Men of such a young age, even if from prominent 
noble families as della Stufa was, generally lacked that reputation, following and 
14 B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 41 (unfoliated): Giuliano de' Medici to Ser Niccolò Michelozzi, 30 May 
1513 
15 A.S.F., Tratte, 61, f. 125`. 
16 B.N.F., N.A., 988, ff. 93`, 94 ", 98`, 103`, 162r; Appendix C. 
'" Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 237. 
1 8 Ibid., pp. 230, 231; Cerretani, Storia, pp. 398, 399, 405. 
19 Strozzi, `Vita', p. xxvi. 
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power, necessary to attract support. Lorenzo Tornabuoni and Piero Salviati however, 
were two young nobles in their twenties who possessed those qualities in abundance, 
and a prime reason for that was that unlike della Stufa they were both extremely 
wealthy men. Tornabuoni, one of the leaders of the plot of 1497, was renowned as 
one of the richest men in the city, and one of the most popular, on account of his 
nobility, virtues and wealth.120 He was described by one contemporary, who 
estimated his worth at over a hundred thousand ducats, as one of the `most powerful' 
of men, both for his `following' (seguito) and for his wealth.121 Salviati was also 
extremely rich,122 and it was his great wealth and marriage connections with leading 
citizens, as Varchi recognized, that made him the leader of the young nobles in 
1527.123 
Like Salviati and Tornabuoni, most of those young conspirators at the head of 
plots were also wealthy men from leading noble families, and clearly the most 
significant fact about their wealth was not that it made them `playboys', but that 
together with their nobility it was the basis of their ability to attract supporters and 
gather the other disaffected around them, just as it was for their elder counterparts. 
Plots were almost always led by those both young and old from leading families 
because conspiracy was a strategy beyond anyone else's reach. Those from leading 
families could hope to conspire most successfully against the regime, and those who 
were leading members of the inner circles of the regime they were attempting to 
overthrow, such as Filippo Strozzi and the other conspirators of 1526/7, could hope 
to conspire most successfully of all. Strozzi's position had already been such by 1523 
that Machiavelli told Cardinal Giulio, according to Busini, that no one could `better 
and more securely conspire against the regime' than Strozzi.124 
The leaders of plots were almost all from leading families because they 
needed to be, and that their accomplices were almost all from prominent or leading 
noble families was also because they needed to be. For these families could most 
120 Cerretani, Storia, pp. 217, 237. 
121 
Villari, Savonarola, ii, p. xxxiii: Paolo Somenzi to the Duke of Milan, 6 August 1497. 
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easily provide those financial and military resources considered essential for success. 
There was a need, as Machiavelli described, for trustworthy accomplices whose 
loyalty could be depended upon,12' and who could provide a means of 
communication between the others involved, and that probably accounts for most of 
the very few conspirators who were obscure men in social and political terms. Luca 
Speranzini, for example, was described at the time of the plot of 1497 as the 
`steward' of Giovanni Cambi,126 and his condemnation refers to him carrying letters 
and replies.127 Francesco Naldini was commissioned by Tornabuoni and Pucci, 
according to Tornabuoni's examination, to convey a message to Piero.128 Antonio 
Brucioli is a unique example of a Florentine from outside the guilds condemned as a 
conspirator, rather than an accomplice, whose condemnation with Buondelmonti and 
Alamanni in 1522 denies him the status of civis given to them, and identifies him 
only by his parish.129 He was an associate of theirs from the Rucellai gardens, and a 
client, even a dependant, of Alamanni, according to contemporaries.'3° 
Yet if some accomplices were needed solely on account of their loyalty to the 
leaders of the plot, the vast majority were to provide those resources for which 
accomplices were needed most: money and arms. These were resources most often 
sought and found in those from prominent and leading noble families, and that is 
why it was from these families that most conspirators came. Money was needed 
particularly to raise those forces that were to approach the city's gates. Piero de' 
Medici requested seven or eight thousand ducats from Pucci, Ridolfi, Tornabuoni 
and the other conspirators in March 1497 to finance his expedition, and Pucci, known 
for his wealth,131 confessed to have agreed to supply Piero with funds.'32 Pucci had 
125 Machiavelli, `Discorsi', III, vi, Opere (1954), pp. 325 -6. 
126 Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 723. 
127 A.S.F., O.G., 108, f. 131`. 
128 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 12 ". 
129 A.S.F., O. G., 182, ff. 34r, 39`, 59`; Ibid., 223 (Libro di Bandi), ff. 188`-". All give Antonio di 
Francesco del Bruciolo da San Niccolò. The del Bruciolo family are recorded as holding the Priorate 
in the fifteenth century as members of the minor guilds. See G. Mecatti, Storia genealogica della 
nobiltà e cittidinanza di Firenze (Naples, 1756), p. 308. It is possible that he or his father were 
enrolled in the minor guilds although due to the casual nature of their work recognised by notaries as 
effectively outside the guild system. See Cohn, Labouring Classes, pp. 42 -3. 
130 Nardi. Istorie, ii, p. 86; Varchi, Storia, i, p. 52. 
131 F Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 142. 
132 
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told Piero that he believed Ridolfi and Tornabuoni would have difficulty raising the 
money, but it seems that Lorenzo Tornabuoni did serve Piero with funds for his 
expedition, perhaps two thousand scudi.133 Money came apparently too from Nofri 
Tornabuoni in Rome although Lorenzo confessed to have known nothing of this.134 
Lucrezia Salviati, Piero's sister, and the only woman in the period found to have 
been involved in conspiracy, confessed to have spent three thousand ducats without 
the knowledge of her husband to have her brother return to Florence.135 
The money for Renzo da Ceri's expedition in 1 522 was to come from 
Cardinal Soderini, although it was to be paid back by the King of France, as were 
over twenty -five thousand ducats.136 Soderini was believed in Florence to have spent 
thirty -six thousand ducats on the expedition.137 The role of Bernardo da Verrazzano, 
a Florentine banker in Rome, was to administer the finances of the expedition.138 
Niccolò Martelli later stated in his examination that da Verrazzano, and both 
Giovanbattista and Tommaso di Paolantonio Soderini had each provided two and a 
half thousand ducats for the Cardinal for Renzo's expedition. He also named 
Giovanni Rinuccini, Giovanvettorio Soderini and Giovanni Girolami, the Cardinal' s 
secretary, as amongst those who provided funds, as well as perhaps Piero del Bene 
and Pandolfo della Casa,139 who were both, as da Verrazzano, Florentine bankers in 
Rome.140 However, none of these men was amongst those condemned. The finance 
for these expeditions came from conspirators both young and old, often professional 
bankers, and the need for financial resources was one reason why conspiracy was as 
much the work of the old as the young. 
Accomplices were also needed to take control of the Palace of the Signoria, 
and establish command of the city, and those from prominent and leading noble 
families were best able to provide the human and military resources necessary. 
133 
Cei, `Storia', ff. 49 51`; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, i, p. 287. 
134 A.S.F., C. Strozz., Ser. I, 360, f. 12 Examination of Lorenzo Tornabuoni. 
135 Sanudo, Diarii, i, col. 723: Letter of Antonio Vincivera, 24 August 1497. 
136 `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', pp. 250, 260; F. Guicciardini, Storia d' Italia, iv, p. 165. 
137 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 402. 
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Tommaso Soderini had promised to provide for Buondelmonti in 1522 both money 
and two thousand men from Lucca, according to Niccolò Martelli,141 and 
Buondelmonti's plan, according to Martelli, was that as Renzo and the other foreign 
forces approached the city, Buondelmonti, Alamanni the poet, and other citizens 
involved would assemble armed men in their houses under cover of saving both their 
property and the regime. At the appointed moment the plotters on one side of the 
Arno would take control of the Palace, and those in the Oltrarno would take control 
of one of the city's gates to admit Renzo's forces.142 According to Martelli, 
Buondelmonti had a list of those whom he intended to ask to take part in this, with 
whom he had not conferred his plans by the time of the discovery of the plot. 
Martelli names eight individuals, including Niccolò Capponi and Antonfrancesco 
degli Albizzi, whom Buondelmonti particularly wanted to recruit to the plot. Those 
who had been examined about the plot of 1513 were also to be sought out, 
particularly Niccolò Valori, Piero Orlandini and Daniello Strozzi, as were all those 
opponents banished in August 1517.143 
These were discontented men but Buondelmonti needed more than just their 
discontent. It was for this reason that Martelli, under the impression that 
Buondelmonti wanted to recruit Niccolò Machiavelli, the author of the Discourses, 
warned that on account of his poverty and known opposition to the Medici family 
Machiavelli would be unable to assemble armed men in his house unsuspected. 
Buondelmonti assured him however, that his interest was in another Niccolò 
Machiavelli, who was rich and capable of doing as Buondelmonti planned.144 Wealth 
was the most important quality that Buondelmonti needed in those he hoped to 
involve in the plot. 
Machiavelli, the political thinker, had been one of those whom the 
conspirators of 1513 had hoped to include in their planned attempt to overthrow the 
regime. Fifteen individuals including Machiavelli, are known to have been examined 
in connection with the plot, all of whom had probably been on the list of potential 
141 `Processo di Niccolò Martelli', p. 247. 
142 
Ibid., p. 245. 
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supporters drawn up by the conspirators.145 There were probably others amongst 
them, besides Machiavelli, who lacked wealth, such as the two priests from the 
Tosinghi and Martini families, but most were noble, and most had either themselves 
or their fathers held prominent if not leading political office,146 and that is why both 
the plotters of 1513 and later Buondelmonti hoped to recruit them. 
Wealth was important to the strategy of Buondelmonti, where youth was not, 
nor had it been in 1513. To his agent in Venice Giuliano described those on Boscoli's 
list of potential supporters as `young men',147 yet six of the thirteen whose ages are 
known were over forty years of age, and none was under the age of thirty.148 Nine 
years on, when Buondelmonti wanted to recruit them, those named in 1513 were all 
over forty years of age, and six were in their fifties, including Valori, Orlandini and 
Strozzi, whose involvement Buondelmonti particularly desired. All of those twenty - 
three opponents banished in 1517 were over 50 in 1522, apart from four who were 
nevertheless in their forties. Seven were aged over sixty.149 Of the eight individuals 
whom Buondelmonti particularly wanted to involve, Filippo degli Albizzi and 
Antonio Strozzi were both in their sixties,15o Alfonso Strozzi was fifty- five,151 
Niccolò Capponi forty -nine, and the Niccolò Machiavelli probably referred to was 
'45 Niccolò Valori, Giovanni Folchi, Lodovico de' Nobili, Francesco Serragli, Niccolò Machiavelli, 
Andrea Marsuppini, Piero Orlandini, Daniello Strozzi, Francesco Tosinghi, a priest of the Martini 
family, Pandolfo Biliotti, Duccio Adimari, Giovanni di Ser Antonio Bartolomei, Ubertino Boncianni 
and Tosingho Tosinghi, a priest. See Sanudo, Diarii, xv, col. 574: Giuliano de' Medici to Piero da 
Bibbiena, 19 Febuary 1513; Baldovinetti, `Memoriale', f. 159v; Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 299; Cambi, 
Istorie, xxii, p. 5; Vaglienti, Storia, p. 237. 
146 
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aged seventy- three.152 Only two, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi and Filippo Nerli, are 
known to have been under forty.'53 
The plot of 1522 was one of those led by young men, who found their first 
accomplices mostly amongst young men. Yet those whom Buondelmonti was further 
wanting to involve were almost all older men, many aged over fifty, and indeed if the 
plot had proceeded as Buondelmonti planned, most of its members may have been 
older rather than younger men. At the very least, those involved, as in 1497, would 
have been neither predominantly young nor old, for it was wealth not youth that was 
the most important quality Buondelmonti needed in his accomplices. 
Prinzivalle della Stufa however, wanted accomplices mainly for their youth, 
rather than their wealth. He is recorded to have told Filippo Strozzi in 1510 that he 
was planning to seize the Palace with other `young men' and they would overthrow 
the regime.] i4 It was young nobles who provided the arms for each violent assault on 
the Palace in our period, and the central role of young nobles in the overthrow of 
Soderini, the parlamento of September 1512 and the Tumulto del Venerdì of 1527 is 
to be partly explained by the fact that young nobles were a military resource. The 
most important fact about the youth and nobility of those involved was not that these 
qualities meant that they were without family responsibility, occupation or political 
rights. Indeed, those involved in the events of August and September 1512 were 
mostly men in their thirties and thus eligible to political office, and often husbands 
and fathers. Unmarried men in their twenties were at the head of the young nobles in 
1527 but the real significance of the youth and nobility of those involved in the 
Tumulto, as in the events of 1512, was that they afforded them arms and the ability to 
wield them. In their twenties or thirties, with families, occupations, and political 
office or not, young nobles were a military resource, and that is why della Stufa 
sought them in 1510, why first the leaders of Soderini's overthrow and then the 
Medici sought them in 1512, and why those who desired to overthrow the regime 
desired to arm them in 1527. 
152 
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To the extent that those at the head of the young nobles in 1527 were almost 
all under thirty, the Tumulto del Venerdì was almost the only occasion in the period 
when an attempt to overthrow the regime could be said to have been the work of 
young men in their twenties. In leading the revolt in 1527 young men under thirty 
played a quite unprecedented role in public affairs, at least in terms of the city's 
recent past. It was a role too, which those same young men were to continue to play 
during the last republic as the adirati, the young arrabbiati. That there were plots 
against the regime Is not to be explained in any way, as it has been, by the social and 
political factors of the late age of marriage and fatherhood amongst the wealthiest 
sections of Florentine society, and the exclusion from public life of those under 
thirty. 
Many plots were mainly even wholly the work of men in their forties and 
fifties, and such plots were just as common as those by younger men. There were 
plots that the work of giovani, but it was not true that young nobles were a particular 
danger to the regime because they lacked family responsibility, occupation and 
political privileges. The plot of 1510 and the Tumulto of 1527 were the only 
occasions when young unmarried men can be found at the head of attempts to 
overthrow the regime. Those plots that were the work of giovani were mostly the 
work of young men in their thirties, at the beginning of their political and 
commercial careers, normally married, often with children. Indeed that they had 
family responsibilities, occupations, and commercial careers often helps to explain 
their involvement in plots at all. 
That plots were as commonly the work of the old as of the young, and mostly 
led by men with family responsibility, serves to emphasize the significance of the 
reasons for which conspirators risked their lives and the welfare of their families to 
attempt to overthrow the regime. It was the reasons for which men conspired against 
the regime, not their youth, that made the risks involved seem worth taking. The 
significant fact about those involved in conspiracy was not their age but that they 
were mostly from prominent or leading noble families. For it was this, not youth that 
conspirators had in common, and it was this, not youth, that distinguished them from 
the other discontented. Those who led and participated in plots were mostly from 
311 
prominent and leading noble families because it was members of these families who 
could hope to lead plots most successfully against the regime, and who possessed the 
financial and military resources the leaders of plots considered essential for success. 
Young nobles were a military resource and that is why they played a central role in 
the violent assaults on the Palace in August and September 1512 and April 1527. 
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Conclusion 
Discontent with every regime in Florence after 1494, with both the Medici 
and popular government, was felt and openly expressed by members of every section 
of Florentine society, both within the ruling orders and outside them, by those from 
every level of political prominence or obscurity. That much is evident from those 
condemned for verbal offences against the regime throughout the period. However, it 
was only those from noble families and families in the major guilds who possessed 
the financial and military resources that plots required, and thus conspiracy was the 
almost exclusive preserve of nobles and those from the major guilds. Most members 
of most plots were from noble families of political prominence, commonly the 
leading noble families of the city. The leaders of plots were almost always from the 
city's leading noble families. 
There is no warrant for the notion that plots were the work of reckless 
youths. Contrary to what has been assumed, plots in Florence were almost never the 
work of rich young men devoid of family responsibility, occupation and political 
rights. Many plots were mainly even wholly the work of men in their forties and 
fifties, and such plots were just as common as those by younger men. Many plots, but 
certainly not most of them, were the work of those who were young by contemporary 
standards. However, most of those conspirators who were young were in their 
thirties, and thus not only eligible to political office, but many had also actually held 
it. They were usually married, often had children, and at the beginning of their 
commercial or other careers, and that indeed was also the case with many of those 
few young conspirators who were only in their twenties. 
It was the decision of conspirators to attempt to overthrow the regime rather 
than their discontent which distinguished them from other opponents. But they 
emerged from a society in which it was commonly assumed that there were reasons 
for which it was, or at least might be, worth risking one's life to plot against the 
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regime. It was the reasons for which conspirators attempted to overthrow regimes, 
rather than their youth, which made the risks involved seem worth taking. 
Plots emphasize the primacy of a hitherto neglected aspect of political 
conflict in Florence, and thus of the reasons for the instability of Florentine political 
life in the early sixteenth century. That instability is often explained in terms of the 
desire of the ottimati for an ascendant place in government uncontested by either the 
Medici or the popolo. However, only a few plots sought to establish a regime in 
which the ottimati had a dominant role. These few plots were the work of 
discontented former supporters of the regime. In most cases they or their fathers were 
prominent or leading members of the regime which they sought to overthrow. 
Most plots by contrast sought to re- establish the past regime, either the 
restoration of popular government or the return of the Medici. They were the work of 
those who had always desired the re- establishment of the past regime. Those 
involved were mostly from families outside the ruling circles of the regime they were 
attempting to overthrow. In many cases they or their fathers had been prominent or 
leading citizens of the past regime which they sought to re- establish, while others 
shared long -standing bonds of loyalty to the deposed leaders of the past regime. They 
sought to return to power and to avenge their overthrow and all that they had suffered 
on account of their opposition to the regime. Almost all plots were the work, to some 
extent, of those who had always desired the restoration of the past regime, of those 
who had been thrown out of power and their loyal supporters. Most plots were 
mainly so. 
Political conflict in Florence in the early sixteenth century was thus not the 
conflict between ottimati on the one hand and the Medici or popular government on 
the other. Rather, it was the conflict between the ottimati themselves, as it had been 
since the two or three decades following the Ciompi revolt of 1378. Moreover, to the 
extent that most plots sought the re- establishment of the past regime, political 
conflict in Florence was mostly the conflict between those patricians who supported 
popular government as it existed under Soderini in 1512 and those patricians who 
desired a party -based regime with the Medici as party bosses. 
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This was a conflict between those in power and those they had thrown out of 
power. Some of the supporters of popular government or the Medici involved in plots 
after 1494 were descendants of those who had opposed or supported the Medici in 
1434 and the decades to follow, and thus in some respects political conflict after 
1494 dated back to the earliest years of the Medici regime in the fifteenth century. 
For the most part however, the conflict after 1494 between supporters of popular 
government and supporters of the Medici first originated in the last years of the 
Medici regime in the fifteenth century concerning the increasing predominance of the 
Medici and particularly of Piero before 1494. It was in 1494 that it first erupted. In 
the case of those long- standing supporters of the Medici who conspired against the 
popular government they or their fathers had loyally supported the Medici until their 
overthrow in 1494 and desired their return ever since. Most of those supporters of 
popular government involved in plots and other attacks against the Medici after 1512 
were men who themselves or whose fathers had been supporters of the Medici but 
opposed them in 1494, remained implacably opposed to their return until 1512, and 
sought the restoration of the popular government ever since. 
It was the fact that most plots against the Medici after 1512 sought the re- 
establishment of a broad popular government, rather than the oligarchic one of 1433 
sought by opponents of the Medici in 1466 and 1494, that partly distinguished them 
from plots against the Medici in the fifteenth century. Savonarola had played an 
important role in the creation of the Great Council in 1494 which was to ensure this 
difference. However, contrary to recent assertions, it was not the case that followers 
of Savonarola were at the forefront of opposition to the Medici or that they provided 
the ideological justification for it. Every plot against the Medici expressed above all 
the desire for a popular or an aristocratic republic rather than a godly one and very 
few of those involved in conspiracies against the Medici can be found to have had 
any piagnone sympathies at all. The focus and leadership of opposition to the Medici 
was provided by supporters of popular government or an aristocratic republic guided 
by the traditional values of Florentine republicanism and not by followers of 
Savonarola. 
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Those who conspired against the Medici sought their inspiration and 
justification not from Savonarola, but rather from classical sources and the ancient 
doctrine of tyrannicide, from Aristotle, Livy and the praise of Brutus in Roman 
literature. Indeed far from providing the justification for opposition to the Medici, 
most followers of Savonarola believed that tyrannical government was a punishment 
from God to purge the sins of the popolo, and that the Medici should be endured until 
God saw fit to remove them. This belief was probably the main reason why 
Savonarolans were not at the forefront of opposition to the Medici. Plots against the 
Medici were the work of supporters of popular government or an aristocratic republic 
guided by the traditional values of Florentine republicanism rather than by 
Savonarola's vision of a godly republic because it was those values and not 
Savonarola that provided a justification for opposition to the Medici. 
The classically inspired belief that it was legitimate and glorious for an 
individual to attempt to overthrow the government in order to restore liberty to the 
city or to save it from destruction was instrumental to plots, and every conspiracy 
depended upon it. To the extent that conspirators against the Medici were ever 
moved by the desire for glory, as some contemporaries believed they were, the 
doctrine of tyrannicide played a fundamental role in plots, providing not only their 
justification but their inspiration. However, there were supporters of republican 
liberty during the Medici regime, of whom Machiavelli was only one, who 
counselled against attempts to restore liberty to the city on the grounds that they were 
bound to do more harm than good, since the chances of success were so slim, and the 
costs of failure to the city so high. That argument was to hold increasing sway in the 
decades after 1530, and conspiracy was to become less frequent as a result. 
Plots against the Medici after 1512 differed from those against them in the 
fifteenth century in the fact that they were mostly the work of those thrown out of 
power and their loyal supporters who had always desired the overthrow of the 
Medici. Yet there were plots after 1512, in 1522 and 1526/7, by discontented 
supporters and leading members of the regime. These expressed the desire for a 
regime in which the ottimati were dominant, as plots before 1494 had done, but they 
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also expressed discontent, in some individuals at least, with the Medici's failure to 
satisfy the expectations aroused in their supporters by their possession of the Papacy. 
Indeed the discontent of those involved in the plot of 1526/7 and other 
leading supporters and members of the regime who with them were to be at the head 
of the Tumulto could be said to have arisen largely as a result of the elevation of 
Cardinal Giulio to the Papacy as Clement VII in 1523. For it was this that led to the 
appointment of Cortona and the Medici bastards and the increase in Medici power 
after 1523 discontent at which ensured that Capponi, Vettori, the Strozzi, the Salviati 
and the others involved sought the overthrow of the Medici as soon as Clement's 
foreign policy was seen to fail. It was Clement's pursuit of the interests of the Papacy 
at the cost of those of Florence that exposed the city to the danger of the sack, 
threatened it with financial exhaustion, and drove Capponi and other leading 
supporters and members of the regime to plot to free the city from Medici control. 
Plots thus reveal the extent to which in a number of ways the elevation of the Medici 
to the Papacy, far from bolstering their position in Florence, actually threatened the 
security of the regime. 
Plots against the Medici were always encouraged by popular support for the 
past regime, by popular discontent on account of the desire for the reopening of the 
Great Council. All plots against the Medici sought to appeal to that discontent and 
would not have occurred without it. Plots thus testify to the extent to which the 
creation of the Great Council and its abolition left the Medici weaker on their return 
in 1512 than they had been in the fifteenth century. By contrast the most important 
internal weakness of the popular government after 1494 was the discontent of ottimati 
on account of their desire for a dominant role in the regime. The plot to overthrow 
Soderini which brought the Medici to city in 1512 was not only the expression of that 
discontent, it was encouraged by the wider discontent of leading citizens on account 
of their desire for a Senate, and which contributed at least in part to its success. 
For that was the cause of the divisions within the regime which helped to 
render Soderini and the popular government incapable of proceeding against the 
conspirators and ensured that their earlier activities in the Rucellai gardens, their 
public visits to the Medici in Rome, and their involvement in the Strozzi- Medici 
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marriage alliance went unpunished. Soderini failed to deal ruthlessly with his 
opponents and "kill the sons of Brutus ", in Machiavelli's phrase, and that is why he 
was overthrown. He had been unable as much as unwilling to do so, but his failure 
was at least in part due to the belief that he would be able to overcome the enmity of 
those who eventually overthrew him with patience, clemency and rewards. 
There was a vast difference between the clemency with which opponents 
were treated by Soderini and the ruthlessness of the Medici and the popular 
government of the last republic. That is no better demonstrated than by the way in 
which each regime dealt with verbal offences against it. Only one individual was 
condemned for verbal offences in the years from 1502 to 1512, where the Medici 
regime and the popular government of the last republic condemned on average three 
individuals a year. Despite its particular reputation for ruthlessness the last republic 
was no more extreme than the Medici in the regularity with which it condemned 
verbal offences, but the sentence of execution was more common, and performed in 
public. 
The same idea of political crime was shared by all regimes. Where they 
differed was in the extent to which the regime itself could agree on whether particular 
cases of outspokenness, for example, were crimes against it, or indeed crimes at all. 
Popular governments were divided to an extent that the Medici regime never was, 
and each side accused the other of crimes against the popular regime and the public 
welfare, and defended itself from the same accusation. It was never as clear under 
popular government as it was under the Medici who were the guardians of the status 
civitatis, the condition of the city. Popular government did not know in whose 
interests it was to rule, whereas the Medicean regime had no such doubt. 
The last republic was more able than the popular regime under Soderini to 
condemn verbal offences not because it was any less divided, but because the balance 
of power more often, if not always, favoured those who sought to be ruthless. Their 
desire to condemn verbal offences vigorously was backed up by the belief that the 
popular government had been overthrown in 1512 as a result of the negligence, faint- 
heartedness, patience, goodness and respect with which Soderini in particular had 
treated opponents of the regime. That same belief had informed the calls of partisans 
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of the Medici for the crushing of their opponents, as well as Machiavelli's famous 
advice to kill the sons of Brutus. If there was a new emphasis on force in Florentine 
political thought after 1512 then the desire to avoid the failures of Soderini was a 
major reason why. 
That desire was to have serious consequences during the last republic, for the 
blanket persecution of former leading members and supporters of the Medici regime 
that resulted proved a fatal error on two counts. It not only drove them into the arms 
of the Pope out of necessity, and then to be instrumental in persuading him against 
abandoning the siege altogether, it did so when in many cases they would not 
otherwise have even desired the Medici's return. Moreover Guiccardini, Vettori and 
other leading citizens were driven not only to work for the overthrow of popular 
government and the return of the Medici, but ultimately for the overthrow of 
communal government in Florence and the establishment of a Medici duchy. 
The Medici regime was more able than popular government to be ruthless 
towards its opponents and as a result three times as many individuals were 
condemned for verbal offences in the first three years after the return of the Medici in 
1512, than in the three short years of the last republic. But it was able only as long as 
it was united, and when the Medici regime split apart in the winter of 1526 in the 
face of the growing Imperialist threat to the city, the young nobles were able to 
clamour their way towards revolt. 
The Medici did seek to conciliate opponents with benefits and rewards, a 
fatal error according to contemporaries, which led to their overthrow particularly 
because it resulted in the neglect of their supporters, who were thus neither inclined 
nor forced to defend the regime. Buondelmonti's leadership of the plot of 1522 
however, demonstrates the extent to which the security of the Medici was also 
threatened by their willingness to favour their most trusted supporters, even to the 
point of protecting them from the consequences of their transgressions of the law. 
Moreover, with only a very few exceptions, all those well -known and listed 
opponents condemned for verbal offences, involved in plots and at the forefront of 
the Tumulto had endured exclusion, persecution and the full force of the fear and 
hatred of the regime towards them since 1512. To that extent most plots and other 
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violent attacks against the Medici regime were the result of the failure of the Medici 
to crush their opponents despite attempts to do so. 
Plots demonstrate that the greatest failures of all regimes, however, were 
diplomatic ones, and their greatest weakness the military incapacity of the city in the 
face of the new foreign powers in Italy after 1494. For plots depended above all else 
on foreign support, and thus it was above all else the failure of regimes to prevent an 
external military threat that provided the opportunity to attempt to overthrow the 
regime. Plots were less frequent after 1494 than they had been a hundred years earlier 
because regimes were stronger and opponents weaker than they had been, and thus 
plots were more dependant on outside help. The domination of Italy after 1494 by 
only two great powers meant that there were also fewer opportunities to obtain 
essential foreign support than there had been in the early fifteenth century. 
Nevertheless the Italian Wars ensured that there were more opportunities to gain 
outside help than there had been in the Laurentian era, when the Italian political 
scene had been more stable, and plots were more frequent after 1494 as a result. 
The dependence of conspiracy on foreign support reveals the weakness of 
opponents to both the Medici and popular government, and their inability to 
overthrow the regime without outside help. The security of all regimes, whatever 
their popularity, was to depend in the end on their ability to secure the city from 
external military threat. It was above all the overwhelming presence of the Spanish 
army that explains the equal facility with which both Soderini was overthrown and 
the parlamento forced in 1512, and it was above all the lack of outside help that 
explains the failure of the Tumulto in 1527. Plots were testament to the diplomatic 
errors of the regime, and their success the result of its military collapse. Plots thus 
provide dramatic evidence of how much the instability of Florentine politics after 
1494 was the result of the instability of the Italian political scene after 1494, of the 
conflicts between the Pope, France and Spain, and the historical military weakness 





The Political and Social Background 
of Opponents 1494 -1530 
GUIDE TO APPENDIX A. 
1. LAYOUT. 
The information in Appendix A has been arranged as follows: 
NAME OF OPPONENT Political Career 
Date of Birth. Guild Membership /Antiquity of Family 
Name of Opponent's Father Political Career of Opponent's Father 
2. NAMES. The preposition `di' has been omitted to save space. 
3. POLITICAL OFFICE. 
a) Only important political office held within the city has been listed. 
Positions as ambassadors, orators, commissioners and offices in the 
Florentine dominion have been omitted. 
b) Political office held only after 1455 has been listed. 
c) For the Consulte e Pratiche, only the years from 1498 to 1512 have 
been included. 
4. SOURCES. The main sources are listed at the end of the Appendix, others have 
been given in the footnotes. 
5. ABBREVIATIONS. The following abbreviations have been used: 
A Accoppiatori 
Amico( ) On Lists of Supporters of the Medici regime 
(Date of Lists) 
B Balla 
CP( ) Consulte e Pratiche (Years in which 
individuals spoke in pratiche on their own 
behalf) 









Uomini di pratica 
Major guilds (Date of family's first Prior) 
Minor guilds 
Magnate family 
Officials of the Monte di Pietà 
Officials of the Monte 
On Lists of Opponents of the Medici regime 
(Date of Lists) 













Captains of the Guelf Party 
Priors in the Signoria 
Otto di Guardia 
Nine of the Militia 
Dieci di Balla 
Twelve Good Men 
Sixteen Gonfaloniers of the Companies 
Twelve Procurators 
Seventeen Reformers 
Those appointed to advise the Signoria on 
constitutional reform, 1 September 1512 
Those elected to regulate the re- establishment 
of popular government, 27 May 1527 
Council of Seventy 
70(1480 +) Those co -opted to the Council of Seventy from 
1480 to 1494 
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MESSER BERNARDO ACCOLTI 
b. 1458.' M(No Priors) 
Messer Benedetto Messer Michele d. 1464. 
Accolti 
LORENZO MESSER PIERO ALAMANNI 




Francesco Piero Alamanni 
FILIPPO DELL' ANTELLA 
b. 1449. M(1282) 
Giovanni Taddeo dell' Antella 
LIONARDO BARTOLINI 
b. 1464. M(1362) 
Zanobi Zanobi Bartolini 
SFORZA BETTINI 
m3  
Ser Antonio Bettino Bettini 
LUIGI PIERO BINI 
M(1352) 
GIOVANNI CAMBI 
b. 1454. M(1437) 
Bernardo Giovanni Cambi 
GINO CAPPONI 
b. 1453. M(1287) 
Lodovico Agostino Capponi 
Sig(1465, 72, 80, 84) G(1490, 1513) X(1510, 13) 
A(1492, 1512) OP(1490, 93, 1514, 15, 16, 17, 18) 
17(1490,1514) VIII(1483) Mt(1493, 1515) B(1512) 70(1480+, 
1514) 12(1514, 15, 17) 
Sig(1483, 1522, 25) G(Jan. 1494, 1518) XVI(1503, 06) 
XII(1504) VIII(1482, 93) CP(1505-1509) X(1503, Dec. 1512) 
70(1480+, 1514) B(1512) OP(1514) 
Sig(1473, 80) G(1467, 77) VIII(1458, 68, 79) Mt(1476) 
70(1480) A(1470) OP(1481) 
G(1516) B(1512) 70(1514) 
Political background unknown 
Sig(1455, 69) XVI(1461) XII(1459, 63, 75) Mt(1479) 
Sig(1479) 
L. Mantovini, ` Benardo Accolti', D.B.1., i, pp. 103 -4. 
Accolti's father was granted Florentine citizenship in 1459, R. Black, Benedetto Accolti and the 
Florentine Renaissance (Cambridge, 1985), p. 330. 
' The members of the Bettini family in the Great Council in 1496 were all members of the minor 
guilds, Guidi, Lotte, pp. 537 -539. 
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FRANCESCO CEGIA 
b. 1460. m 
Agostino Domenico Cegia 
TOMMASO CORBINELLI 
b. 1457. M( I286) 
PANDOLFO CORBINELLI 
b. 1449. 
Bernardo Tommaso Corbinelli 
FANTONE FANTONI 
b. 1464. m 
Bernardo Antonio Fantoni 
AGNOLO FORTINI 
M(1386) 
Guaspare Ser Agnolo Fortini 
JACOPO GIANFIGLIAZZI 




b. 1458. M(1352) 
Orlando Bartolomeo Gherardi 
FRANCESCO MARTELLI 
b. 1456. M(1343)5 
Roberto Niccolò Martelli 
ANDREA DE' MEDICI 
b. 1448. M(1291) 




Sig(1474) X11(1481) d. 1482.4 
Sig(1486, 94) G(1513) VIII(1482, 14, 22) X(1513) B(1512) 
OP(1515, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23) 
12(1514, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22) 70(1514) 17(1514) 
A(1512) 
Sig(I475) G(1460, 81) XVI(1460) VIII(1460, 66, 72, 77) 
X(1467, 79) Mt(1476) 70(1480) OP(1481) A(1468) 
Sig(1519) VIII(1521) 
Sig(1475) 
Sig(Mar. 94) XVI(1487) 
Sig(15I0, 17) G(1514, 21) XVI(1513, 15) XII(1507) 
VIII(1511) B(19 Sept. 1512) X(1513) 70(1514) 17(1514) 
Mt(1519) A(1512) PG(1513, 14,15) 
OP(1515, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24) 
Sig(1472, 80) G(1467, 70) XII(1475, 83) Mt(1470, 78) 
X(1467, 78) 70(1480) OP(1480) A(1469) 17(1481) 
VIII(1463, 67, 69, 73, 77) 
Sig(1490) XVI(1516) 
Sig(1457, 68) G(1464) XII(1474) VIII(1460, 66, 70) 70(1480) 
Sig(1492, 1520, Mar. 1527) G(1516) VII1(1491, 16) 
B(19 Sept. 1512) 70(1516) OP(1524) 
VIII(1483) 
Political background unknown 
a 
R. Ristori, `Francesco Cegia', D.B.I., xxiii, p. 324. 
5 The first Priors for the Martelli were for the minor guilds, but the family had Priors for the major 
guilds before 1434, Pesman Cooper, `Florentine Ruling Group', p. 139. 
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BERNARDO DEL NERO 
b. 1426. M(1382)6 
Nero Filippo del Nero 
PIERO PITTI 
b. 1448. M(1283) 
Messer Luca Buonaccorso Pitti 
GIANNOZZO PUCCI 
b. 1460. M(1396)7 
Antonio Puccio Pucci 
NICCOLÒ RIDOLFI 
b. 1445. M(1321) 
Luigi Messer Lorenzo Ridolfi 
LUCREZIA SALVIATI 
GALEAZZO SASSETTI 
b. 1461. M(1453) 
Francesco Tommaso Sassetti 
LUCA SPERANZINI 
LORENZO TORNABUONI 
b. 1468. Mg 
Giovanni Francesco Tornabuoni 
NOFRI TORNABUONI 
b. 1451. Mg 
Niccolò Francesco Tornabuoni 
MESSER LUIGI TORNABUONI 
Mg 
PIERO TORNABUONI 
Sig(1478, 84) G(1475, 87, Mar. 1497) XII(1483) 
VIII(1472, 78, 81, 88) Mt(1462) 17(1490) X(1468, 96) 
70(1480) OP(1480, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94) 
A(1465, 76, 91, 94) 
G(1458) A(1455, 58, 66) 
V I I I (1492) 
Sig(1458, 76) G(1463, 81) XVI(1470) XII(1478) X(1456) 
VIII(1466, 72, 76, 82) 70(1480) OP(1480, 81) A(1471, 74) 
17(1481) d. 1484.8 
G(1489) XII(1477) VIII(1479, 93) 70(1480+) Mt(1491) 
17(1490) A(1490, 93) OP(1486, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94) 
A(1455, 58) XII(1459) 
Daughter of Lorenzo the Magnificent. 
Sig(1513) d. 1513.9 
Sig(1469) XVI(1484) 
From Camiamo.10 
G(1482) 70(1480+) d. 1497.11 
XVI(1485) 
Sig(1460) G(1468) VIII(1462, 70) A(1472) 
G(1514) 20(Sept. 1512) B(1512) 70(1514) 
Filippo Filippo Tornabuoni Sig(1464) G(1476) XVI(1461) 
6 Del Nero had been a member of the minor guilds. 
7 Pucci's grandfather was in the minor guilds, and the family's first prior for the major guilds was 
after 1434. See Rubinstein, Government, p. 256; Pesman Cooper, `Florentine Ruling Group', p. 141. 
8 Litta, Famiglie, disp. 158 (Pucci), tay. v. 
9 B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 191 (Sassetti), f. 5`. 
1° 
Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 109. His condemnation describes him simply as `de Florentia'. 
11 Roover, Rise, p. 261. 
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PRINZIVALLE DELLA STUFA 
b. 1484. M(1328) 
Messer Luigi Messer Agnolo 
della Stufa 
APPENDIX A, ii. 
The Conspiracy of 1510 
Sig(1526) VIII(1523) PG(1523) 
Sig(1484) G(1515) XVI(1485, 97) XII(1486, 93) 
VIII(1502, Sept. 1512) X(1498, 05, 06, 13) CP(1498-1509) 
B(1512) 70(1514) OP(1515, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25) 
12(1513) 17(1514) A(1512, 13, 22, 24, 25, 26) 
Amico(1513, 1518b) 
APPENDIX A, iii. 
The Overthrow of Soderini, August 1512 
ANTONFRANCESCO 
DEGLI ALBIZZI 
b. 1487. M(1282) 
Luca Antonio degli Albizzi 
GIROLAMO DEGLI ALBIZZI 
b. 1485. M(1282) 
GIOVANNI DEGLI ALBIZZI 
b. 1479. 
MASO DEGLI ALBIZZI 
b. 1478. 
Luca Maso degli Albizzi 
MATTEO BARTOLI 
b. 1474. M(1345) 
COSIMO BARTOLL 
b. 1484. 
Cosimo Matteo Bartoli 
BENEDETTO BUONDELMONTI 
b. 1481. Mg 
Filippo Lorenzo Buondelmonti 
VIII(1513) X(1528) B(1527) 
Sig(1490, 98) XVI(1497) VIII(1488, 97, 01) X(1499) 
CP(1498-1500) d. 1502.12 
Sig(1525) VIII(1516) 
Sig(1514, 21) VIII(1514) 
Sig(1484, 92) G(1501, 15) XVI(1483, 05) VIII(1485, 00, 14) 
IX(1509) Mt(Mar. 1494, 1519) X(1500, 02, 04, 13) 
CP(1498-1512) 20(Sept. 1512) B(1512) 70(1480+,1514) 
OP(1515, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25) 12(1512) 17(1514) 
A(1512) Amico(1513, 1518b'`) 
Sig(1515, 19) VIII(1515) B(1522) 70(1524) 
Sig(1517, 26) XVI(1522, 25) VIII(Jan. 1527) 
Sig(1467, 78) G(1481) VIII(1472) 17(1481) Mt(1483) 
Sig(1523) XII(1511) VIII(1513) 70(1524) 12(1525) 
Sig(1500) G(Nov. 1512) XVI(1484) XII(Dec. 1494) IX(1508) 
X(1495) 20(Sept. 1512) B(1512) 70(1514) VIII(1521) 17(1514) 
12(1512) A(1512) OP(1514, 15, 16, 18) Amico(1513, 18b) 
12 Litta, Famiglie, dispp. 178-80 (Albizzi), tav. xix. 
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GINO CAPPONI 
b. 1478. M(1287) 




b. 1485. M(1302) 
Girolamo Filippo Rucellai 
GIOVANNI RUCELLAI 
b. 1475. M(1302) 
PALLA RUCELLAI, 
b. 1473. 
Bernardo Giovanni Rucellai 
SIMONE TORNABUONI 
b. 1472. Mg 
Filippo Francesco Tornabuoni 
BARTOLOMEO VALORI 
b. 1476. M(1322) 
Filippo Bartolomeo Valori 
GIOVANNI VESPUCCI 
b. 1476. M(1350)17 
Messer Guidantonio Giovanni 
Vespucci 
PAOLO VETTORI 
b. 1477. M(1320) 
Piero Francesco Vettori 
XII(1511) d. 1516.13 
Sig(1490, 1509) XVI(1488) XII(1491) VIII(1509) X(1509) 
B(1512) 70(1514) 
X11(1519) 
Sig(1523) XVI(1515) VIII(1524) 
Sig(1488, 95) XVI(1490, 98) VIII(1499) PG(1504) CP(1499) 
d. 1525.14 
Sig(1516, 25) G(1520) VIII(1517) B(1524) 70(1515) 
OP(1520, 23, 26) A(1525) 
G(1480) OP(1487, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93) X(1497, 99, 13) 
CP(1498-1502) 17(1490) A(1478, 90, Dec. 94, 1512) 
20(Sept. 1512) B(1512) 12(1513) 70(1480+, 1514) 
Amico(1513) 
Sig(1523) 
Sig(1465) G(1476) 70(1481) 
Sig(1508, 21) G(1524) XVI(1513) Mt(1508) VIII(1509, 22) 
70(1519) OP(1522, 25) 12(1520, 22, 23, 26) 
Sig(1485) XVI(1483, 89) XII(1486, 90) VIII(1487) 17(1490) 
Mt(1491, 92) d. 1494.15 
d. 1517.16 
Sig(1468, 73, 91) G(1487, 98) VIII(1471) 70(1481+) 
OP(1487, 88, 90, 91) X(1496, 99) A(Dec. 1494) Mt(1497) 
CP(1498-1500) d. 1501.18 
Sig(1507, Nov. 12, 23) X11(1508) VIII(1513) 70(1524) 
Sig(1476, 80) VIII(1486) X(1478, Dec. 94) 70(1481 +) 
d. 1496.19 
13 Ibid., disp. 165 (Capponi), tay. xx. 
14 Passerini, Rucellai, p. 139. 
15 Litta, Famiglie, disp. 17 (Valori), tay. ii. 
16 B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 192 (Vespucci). 
17 The first Priors of the Vespucci were for the minor guilds, but the family had Priors for the major 
guilds before 1434, Pesman Cooper, `Florentine Ruling Group', p. 145. 
18 Guidi, 1494, p. 191. 
19 Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 5. 
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GIROLAMO DEGLI ALBIZZI 
b. 1485. M(1282) 
Luca Maso degli Albizzi 
FRANCESCO ALTOVITI 
b. 1479. M(1282) 
Guglielmo Bardo Altoviti 
MATTEO BARTOLI 
b. 1474. M(1345) 
COSIMO BARTOLI 
b. 1484. 
Cosimo Matteo Bartoli 
PANDOLFO BARTOLINI 
b. 1476. M(1362) 
Bernardo Lionardo Bartolini 
PIERO BARTOLINI 
b. 1480. M(1362) 
Marco Lionardo Bartolini 
ROBERTO DEL BECCUTO 
b. 1476. M(1283) 
Messer Felice Deo del Beccuto 
ALESSANDRO BONI 
b. 1473. M(1 442) 
Antonio Bono Boni 
GIOVANBATTISTA BONI 
Sig(1484, 92) G(1501, 15) XVI(1483, 05) VIII(1485, 00, 14) 
IX(1509) Mt(Mar. 1494, 1519) X(1500, 02, 04, 13) B(1512) 
CP(1498-1512) 20(Sept. 1512) 70(1480+, 1514) 12(1512) 
17(1514) A(1512) OP(1515, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25) 
Amico(1513, 15186'`) 
Sig(1525) XVI(1522) XII(1524) B(1524) Otr(1522, 
Sig(1481) XVI(1497) VIII(1486) PG(1504) CP(1498-1504) 
d. 1511.2° 
Sig(1515, 19) VIII(1515) B(1522) 70(1524) 
Sig(1517, 26) XVI(1522, 25) VIII(Jan. 1527) 
Sig(1467, 78) G(1481) VIII(1472) 17(1481) Mt(1483) 
G(1521) XVI(1516) VIII(1522) 
Sig.(1472) G(1490) XII(1473, 81) VIII(1483) B(1480) 
17(1490) 
Sig(1525) XVI(1514, Jan. 1527) 
Sig(1517, 25) XVI(1519) XII(1521, 26) VIII(1518) B(1524) 
Sig(1463) XVI(1457, 67) XII(1456, 60, 72, 92) VIII(1457, 81) 
Sig(1469) 
Could be one of three individuals.21 
JACOPO BOTTEGARI 
b. 1476. (m) 
Francesco Ser Jacopo Bottegari XVI(1490) 
20 L. Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Altoviti (Florence, 1871), p. 164. 
21 Antonio, Lionardo and Francesco Boni all had sons called Giovanbattista alive in 1512, born in 
1472, 1467 and 1483 respectively. A.S.F., Tratte, 419, f. 49°; Ibid., 88, f. 325`; Ibid, 86, f. 265`. 
329 
BACCIO CINI 
b. 1456. m 
Simone Matteo Cini 
Sig(1491) XVI(1492) XVI(1513) 
GIOVANNI DAVANZATI Sig(May 1494) XVI(1505) 
b. 1460. M(1320) 
Niccolò Giovanni Davanzati Sig(1465) XII(1477) 





Piero Salvestro Lapi 
GIOVANNI MARUCELLI 
n1.25 
BERNARDO DE' MEDICI 
b. 1476. M(1291) 
MALATESTA DE' MEDICI 
b. 1487. 
Antonio Giuliano de' Medici 
PAOLO DE' MEDICI 
b. 1467. M(1291) 
Piero Messer Orlando de Medici 
Sig(1479) XVI(1496) VIII(1480) Amico(1513) 
Could be one of two individuals.24 
d. c.151726 
Sig(1517, 26) G(1519) XVI(1514) XII(1521) VIII(1513) 
B(1516) 70(1519) OP(1520, 25) 
G(1473) VIII(1481) 
DOMENICO MARTELLI 
b. 1486. M(1343) 
Braccio Messer Domenico Martelli Sig(1474) G(1489) XII(1492) A(Dec. 1494) CP(1498 -1500) d. 
c.1500.27 
FILIPPO RICASOLI 
b. 1480. Mg 
Piergiovanni Andrea Ricasoli 
COSIMO RUCELLAI 
b. 1495. M(1302) 
Cosimo Bernardo Rucellai 
Sig(1493, 1501) VIII(1495) X(1495) CP(1498 -1500) d. 1510.28 
d. 1520 
d. 149529 
22 There is no evidence that a Giovanfrancesco di Luigi Fortini existed, although a Giovanfrancesco di 
Guaspare di Ser Agnolo Fortini, alive in 1512, is recorded to have been born in 1460. A.S.F., Tratte, 
86, f. 274`; Ibid., 88, f. 321`. 
23 Lapi's grandfather moved from the minor to the major guilds between 1434 and 1452, Rubinstein, 
Government, pp. 253, 274. 
24 
Both Gherardo and Giuliano Marucelli had sons called Giovanni alive in 1512, born in 1471 and 
1482 respectively. A.S.F., Tratte, 419, f. 49`. 
25 The Marucelli in the Great Council in 1496 and 1508 were all members of the minor guilds, Guidi, 
Lotte, pp. 537 -539. 
26 Litta, Famiglie, disp. 23 (Medici), tay. xvii. 
27 Cerretani, Ricordi, p. 137. 
28 L. Passerini, Genealogia e storia della famiglia Ricasoli (Florence, 1861), p. 158. 
29 Idem, Rucellai, p. 145. 
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GIOVANNI RUCELLAI 
b. 1475. M(1302) 
PALLA RUCELLAI 
b. 1473. 
Bernardo Giovanni Rucellai 
GIOVANNI RUCELLAI 
b. 1489. M(1302) 
Antonio Giovanni Rucellai 
PIERO RUCELLAI 
b. 1467. M(1302) 
Niccolò Piero Rucellai 
PIERO RUCELLAI 
b. 1475. M(1302) 
Francesco Bernardo Rucellai 
GIOVANFILIPPO SALVETTI 
b. 1464. M(1436) 
Piero Messer Tommaso Salvetti 
FRANCESCO SALVIATI 
b. 1481. M(1297) 
Giuliano Francesco Salviati 
CRISTOFANO SERNIGI 
b. 1479. M(1390) 
Chimenti Cipriano Sernigi 
PRINZIVALLE DELLA STUFA 
b. 1484. M(1328) 
Messer Luigi Messer Agnolo 
della Stufa 
AGNOLO TORNABUONI 
b. 1475. Mg 
Giovansimone Filippo Tornabuoni 
313 Ibid., p. 185. 
31 Ibid., p. 96. 
32 Ibid., p. 99. 
33 Hurtubise, Salviati, p. 59. 
d. 1525 
Sig(1516, 25) G(1520) VIII(1517) B(1514) 70(1515) 
OP(1520, 23, 26) 
G(1480) OP(1487, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93) X(1497, 99, 13) 
17(1490)CP(1498-1502) A(1478, 90, Dec.94, 1512) 
70(1480+,1514) 20(1 Sept. 1512) B(1512) 12(1513) 
Amico(1513) 
Sig(1506) XVI(1505) d. 1521.30 
VIII(1524) 
d. c.1508.31 
Sig(1518) G(1526) VIII(Sept.1512) B(1522) 70(1524) 
Sig(1482) VIII(1486) d. 1490.32 
XII(1506, 17) PG(1511) XVI(1526) 
Sig(1475) XVI(1476) XII(1470, 79, 85) 
Sig(1478) G(1493, 98) VIII(1482) 70(1480+) OP(1493) 
17(1490) A(1492, Dec. 1494) PG(1495, 04) CP(1498-1504) 
X(1496, 98, 00, 02) B(1512) d. 1512.33 
Sig(1514) XVI(1510, 15, 22) XII(1513) VIII(1517) B(1522) 
Sig(1481, 90, 94, 1502) G(1515) XVI(1478, 93) 
XII(1496, 1516)VIII(1485, 1507, 14) IX(1507) CP(1498 -1512) 
X(1497, 99, 1500, 03, 05, Oct. 1512) B(1512) 70(1514) 
Amico(1513) 
Sig(1526) VIII(1523) PG(1523) 
Sig(1484) G(1515) XVI(1485, 97) XII(1486, 93) 
VIII(1502, Sept. 1512) X(1498, 05, 06, 13) CP(1498-1509) 
B(1512) 70(1514) OP(1515, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25) 
12(1513) 17(1514) A(1512, 13, 22, 24, 25, 26) 
Amico(1513, 1518b) 




b. 1479. Mg 
Piero Filippo Tornabuoni 
GIROLAMO TORNABUONI 
b. 1449. Mg 
Marabotto Francesco Tornabuoni 
PIETROPAOLO BOSCOLI 
b. 1481. Mg34 
Giachinotto Francesco Boscoli 
AGOSTINO CAPPONI 
b. 1471. M(1287) 
Bernardo Agostino Capponi 
GIOVANNI FOLCHI 
b. 1475. M(1463)36 
Simone Giovanni Folchi 
G(1514) 20(Sept. 1512) B(1512) 70(1514) 
Sig(1489, 18) VIII(1494, 1513) XII(1514) CP(1502-1503) 
APPENDIX A, v. 
The Conspiracy of 1513 
Nemico(1513) 
Nemico(1513) 
Nemico(1513, 1517b'°) d. 1518.35 
Sig(1484) XII(1478) XVI(1492) 
ARCHBISHOP COSIMO DE' PAZZI 
b. 1464. Mg 
Guglielmo Antonio de' Pazzi Sig(1467) G(1513) A(Dec. 1494, 1513) X(1513) VIII(1469) 
Mt(1472) B(1512) 70(1514) CP(1498 -1512) 20(Sept. 1512) 
Amico(1513) 
NICCOLÒ VALORI 
b. 1464. M(1322) 
Bartolomeo Filippo Valori 
Sig(1502, 06, 11) XII(1497, 1500) XVI(1501) VIII(1494, 99) 
X(1506, 08) IX(1510) CP(1500-1509) Nemico(1517b' 1 8a.b) 
Sig(1470) XVI(1467) VIII(1470) Mt(1474) 
34 
E. Grasselini and A. Fracassini, Firenze. Famiglie minori (Florence, 1984), p 22. 
35 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 5. 
36 Mecatti, Storia, p. 323. 
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LUIGI ALAMANNI 
b. 1495. M(1354) 
Messer Piero Francesco Alamanni 
LUIGI ALAMANNI 
b. 1494. M(1454) 
Tommaso Andrea Alamanni 
APPENDIX A, vi. 
The Conspiracy of 1522 
Sig(1465, 72, 80, 84) G(1490, 1513) X(1510, 13) A(1492, 
1512) OP(1490, 93, 1514, 15, 16, 17, 18) 17(1490, 1514) 
VIII(1483) Mt(1493, 1515) B(1512) 70(1480+, 1514) 
12(1514, 15, 17) Amico(1513) d. 1519.37 
ANTONIO FRANCESCO BRUCIOLI From the parish of San Niccolò 
b. 1487.38 
ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI 
b. 1491. Mg 
Bartolomeo Rosso Buondelmonti Sig(1495) XVI(1485) d. 1515.39 
JACOPO DA DIACCETO 
b. 1494. Mg 
Giovanbattista Lapo da Diacceto XII(1501) d. 1527.40 
NICCOLÒ MARTELLI 
b. 1498. M(1343) 




BATTISTA DELLA PALLA 
b. 1489. M(1478) 
Marco Mariotto della Palla 
TOMMASO SODERINI 
b. 1493. M(1283) 
Messer Giovanvettorio Messer 
Tommaso Soderini 
XVI(1514) PG(1506) X(1529) Nemico(1517`) Dubio(1518) 
Political background unknown 
Sig(1521) XII(1519) XVI(1529) 
Sig(1490) 
Sig(1490, 96) XVI(1508) X(1504, 06, 08, Nov. 1527) 
CP(1498 -1509) Nemico(1517a) 
37 Hauvette, Luigi Alamanni, p. 6. 
38 Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 553. 
39 Litta, Famiglie, disp. 124 (Buondelmonti), tav. xi. 
40 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 337. 
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TOMMASO SODERINI 
b. 1470. M(1283) 








BISHOP GIULIANO SODERINI 
b. 1491. 
Paolantonio Messer Tommaso Sig(1486) G(1 497) XVI(1492) 70(1480 +) OP(1491, 92, 93, 
Soderini X(Dec.1494, 95, 98) A(1491) 17(1490) CP(1498 -1500) 
Mt(1487, 88, 89, 90, 99) 
PIERO SODERINI Gonfalonier for life 1502 -1512. 
b. 1452. M(1283) 
CARDINAL FRANCESCO SODERINI 
b. 1453. 
Messer Tommaso G(1460) A(1455, 58, 73) 70(1480) OP(1480, 82) 
Messer Lorenzo Soderini 
BERNARDO DA VERRAZZANO Nemico(1518a) 
b. 1477. M(1319) 
Pierandrea Bernardo da Verrazzano 
APPENDIX A, vii. 
The Conspiracy of February 1527 
MESSER BALDASSARE Sig(1502) CP(1502 -09) 20(May 1527) X(1528) 
CARDUCCI Nemico(1517a'b'`, 1518b) 
b. 1456. M(1380) 
Baldassare Niccolò Carducci Sig(1455) 
PIERADOVARDO GIACHINOTTI Sig(151 1, 29) HP(1529) Nemico(1517b'`, 1518b) 
b. 1482. Mg 
Girolamo Adovardo Giachinotti Sig(1474, 95) 
LODOVICO DE' NOBILI IX(Jun. 1527) Nemico(1513, 1517a'b'`, 1518a,ó) 
b. 1480. M(1355) 
Giovanni Roberto de' Nobili Mt(1497) 
BARTOLOMEO PESCIONI Sig(Jan. 1512) Nemico(1513, 1517a'ó'' 1518b) 
b. 1470. M(1368) 
Antonio Michele Pescioni XVI(1470, 78) XII(1472) 
GIOVANBATTISTA PITTI Nemico(1517`) 
b. 1482. M(1283) 




b. 1484. M(1283) 
Paolantonio Messer Tommaso 
Soderini 
Mt(1512) HP(1528) 
Sig(1486) G(1497) XVI(1492) 70(1480+) OP(1491, 92, 
X(Dec.1494, 95, 98) A(1491) 17(1490) CP(1498-1500) 
Mt(1487, 88, 89, 90, 99) 
93, 94) 
APPENDIX A, viii. 
The Conspiracy of 1526/7 
NICCOLÒ CAPPONI 
b. 1473. M(1287) 
Sig(1502) G(1526, 27- 29) 70(1522) OP(1524) B(1524) 
12(1523, 25, 26) 20(May 1527) X(21 May 1527) 
Nemico(1517a) Dubio(1518) 
Piero Gino Capponi Sig(1483, 93) 70(1481 +) 20(Dec. 1494) 
LORENZO STROZZI Sig(1521) VIII(1515) Mt(1514, 22) B(1522) HP(1529, 30) 
b. 1482. M(1283) Amico(1518a,b) 
FILIPPO STROZZI 
b. 1488. 
Mt(1515, 16, 18, 19) Amico(1513, 1517, 1518a.b) 
Filippo Matteo Strozzi Sig(1485) 
MATTEO STROZZI Sig(1513, 26) G(1519) XVI(1511) VIII(1514) Mt(1505, 15, 20) 
b. 1471. M(1283) B(1514) 70(1514) OP(1515, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25) X(1528) 
A(1522) 12(1515, 17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26) HP(1528) 
Amico(1513, 1518a,b) 
Lorenzo Matteo Strozzi 
FRANCESCO VETTORI Sig(1509, 20, 24) G(1521) VIII(1504, Sept. 1512, 18, 23) 
b. 1474. M(1320) PG(1509) XI1(1504) CP(1512) B(1512) 70(1514) 
12(1518, 23, 25, 27) OP(1515, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26) A(1523) 
Amico (1513, 1518a,ó) 
Piero Francesco Vettori Sig(1476, 80) VIII(1486) X(1478, Dec. 94) 70(1481 +) 
APPENDIX A, ix. 
The Young Nobles 1526/7 
GIOVANFRANCESCO ANTINORI 
M(1351) 
Raffaello Tommaso Antinori 
GIOVANBATTISTA DEL BENE 
b. 1492. M(1283) 
Tommaso Antonio del Bene 
Sig(1508) 
Nemico(1517a) 
Sig(1495) XVI(1497, 1501, 05) XII(1505) VIII(1496) 




b. 1500.41 M(1363) 
Giovanni Corrado Berardi 
DANTE DA CASTIGLIONE 
b. 1503. Mg 
Guido Dante da Castiglione 
GIOVANBATTISTA GIACOMINI 
b. 1507. Mg 
Lorenzo Jacopo Giacomini 
GIULIANO GONDI 
b. 1504. M(1438) 
Giovanbattista Giuliano Gondi 
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI 
b. 1499. M(1283) 
Giovanni Gherardo Machiavelli 
ALAMANNO DE' PAZZI 
b. 1501. Mg 
Antonio Geri de' Pazzi 
PIERO SALVIATI 
b. 1504. M(1297) 
Alamanno Averardo Salviati 
GIULIANO SALVIATI 
b. 1507. M(1297) 
Francesco Giuliano Salviati 
Sig(1489, 99) G (1502, 13) XII(1513) XVI(1503) VIII(1499) 
IX(1507, 09, 1 1) X(1501, 03, 04) MP(1512) CP(1500-1509) 
70(1514) Amico(1513) d. 1515.42 
Sig(1498, Aug. 1527) Nemico(15 18a) 
XII(1503) Sig(1528) XVI(1527) 
XVI(1509) Sig(1504, 28) X(1529) Nemico(1518b) 
XVI(1508, 30) 
Sig(1494, 1502) X(1503, 05, 06, 08) Mt(1495, 1505) IX(1507) 
CP(1498-1509) d. 1510.43 
Amico(1513) 
APPENDIX A, x. 
Those in the room of the Gonfalonier directing the Tumulto del Venerdì 
GIOVANNI DEGLI ALBERTI 
b. 1477. M(1289) 
Albertaccio Daniello degli Alberti 
MAINARDO CAVALCANTI 
b. 1471. Mg 
Bartolomeo Mainardo Cavalcanti 
Sig(1511, 23) XVI(1513) XII(1508) PG(1509, 27) VIII(1515) 
70(1522) Amico(1517, I 518a,b) 
Sig(1509) PG(Sept. 1512) Amico(1513) Dubio(1518) 
Political career unknown 
41 
B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 186, (Berardi) f. 1 ". 
42 
Butters, Governors, p. 230. 
43 Hurtubise. Salviati, p. 61. 
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AGOSTINO DINI 
b. 1463. M(1370) 
Francesco Piero Dini 
JACOPO GIANFIGLIAZZI 




b. 1456. M(1343) 
Roberto Niccolò Martelli 
GIOVANNI PERUZZI 
b. 1463. M(1283) 
Antonio Giovanni Peruzzi 
AVERARDO SALVIATI 
b. 1489. M(1297) 
Alamanno Averardo Salviati 
ALESSANDRO SEGNI 
b. 1469. M(1347) 
Piero Mariotto Segni 
LORENZO SEGNI 
b. 1481. M(1347) 
Bernardo Stefano Segni 
FRANCESCO SERRISTORI 
b. 1470. M(1392) 
Averardo Antonio Serristori 
FRANCESCO TOSINGHI 
b. 1471. Mg 
Pierfrancesco Francesco Tosinghi 
Sig(1497, 1529) G(1523) XVI(1495) VIII(1497, 1521) 
70(1522) OP(1526) 12(1523) X(1528) Dubio(1518) 
Sig(1485) G(1468, 90) XII(1487, 93) VIII(1463, 71, 79) 
Mt(1464) X(1468, 79) 70(1480) 17(1480, 90) A(1478, 89, 93) 
OP(1481, 86, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93) 
Sig(1510, 17) G(1514, 21) XVI(1513, 15) XII(1507) 
VIII(1511) B(19 Sept. 1512) X(1513) 70(1514) 
17(1514) Mt(1519) A(1512) PG(1513, 14, 15) 
OP(1515, 16, 17, 20, 21, 24) Amico(1513, 1518b) 
Sig(1472, 80) G(1467, 70) XII(1475, 83) 
VIII(1463, 67, 69, 73, 77)X(1467, 78) 70(1480) OP(1480) 
Mt( I470, 78) A(1469) 17(1481) 
Sig(1492, 1520, Mar. 1527) VIII(1491, 1516) G(1516) 
B(19 Sept. 1512) 70(1516) OP(1524) 
Amico(1513, 1517, 1518a'b) 
Sig(1499, Sept. 1527) XVI(1504) XII(1498) 20(May 1527) 
VIII(1511, 18 May 1527) Nemico(1513, 15171'`, 1518a.b) 
Sig(1520,'25) B(1522) 
Sig(1494, 1502) X(1503, 05, 06, 08) Mt(1495, 1505) IX(1507) 
CP(1498 -1509) 
Sig(1504) XII(1518) X(1529) HP(May 1529) 
Sig(1469, 84) XII(1472, 81, 88) VIII(1484) 
Sig(1514) XVI(1520, 28) XII(1515) IX(Jun. 1527) X(1528) 
Dubio(1518) 
Sig(1476, 95) XVI(1494) XII(1486) 
Sig(1507, 15, 21) G(1526) XVI(1505, 15, 18) 
VIII(1506, 16, 24) 70(1522) B(1524) OP(1523, 25) A(1525) 
12(1523, 26) Amico(1513) 
Sig(1468, 87) XVI(1469) XII(1485) VIII(1472) 
PG(1523) OP(18 May 1527) IX(1528) Nemico(1513, 1517a'ó'`) 
Sig(1480) G(1500) XVI(1475, 04) XII(1481) VII1(1496) 
X(1498, 02, 04, 05, 09) CP(1498-1512) 70(1522) Dubio(1518) 
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APPENDIX A, xi. 
Those who distinguished themselves in the Tumulto del Venerdì 
JACOPO ANTONIO ALAMANNI 
b. 1506. M(1354) 
ANTONIO JACOPO ALAMANNI XII(1508) Nemico(1517b, 1518b) d. 1527.44 
b. 1464. 
Jacopo Francesco Alamanni Sig(1475) XII(1476) VIII(1494) 
MESSER SALVESTRO ALDOBRANDINI 
b. 1499. M(1320) 
Messer Piero Salvestro Sig(1511) XVI(1509) XII(1513) VIII(1511) Amico(1513) 
Aldobrandini d. 1519.45 
BARDO ALTOVITI 
b. 1469. M(I282) 
Piero Giovanni Altoviti Sig(1470) G(1491) XVI(1479) XII(1472) VIII(1475, 81) 
FRANCESCO BANDINI VIII(1529) PG(1528) 
b. 1495. M(No Priors) 
Pierantonio Guaspare Barïdini CP(1498) d. 1499.46 
MAESTRO GIROLAMO Sig(1507) XVI(1502) IX(1527) Nemico(1517b, 1518b) 
BUONAGRAZIA 
b. 1469. M47 
Bartolomeo Giovanni Buonagrazia Sig(1491, 1500) XII(1495, 98, 1505) VIII(1508) 
BARTOLOMEO CAVALCANTI 
b. 1503. Mg 
Mainardo Bartolomeo Cavalcanti Sig(1509) PG(Sept. 1512) Amico(1513) Dubio(1518) 
FRANCESCO CORSI 
M(1354) 
Jacopo Simone Corsi XII(1509) Nemico(1517b, 1518b) d. 1530.48 
RINALDO CORSINI Sig(1528) 
b. 1487. M(1290) 
Filippo Bertoldo Corsini Sig(1479, 83) 
44 Cambi, Istorie, xxiii, p. 13. 
45 Martines, Lawyers, p. 509. 
46 `Della famiglia de' Baroncelli', Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xvii (Florence, 1783) p. 214. 
47 Buonagrazia, as his father, had been in the Minor Guilds before 1512. 
48 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 133, f. 36`. 
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GIOVANNI LANFREDINI 
b. 1503. M(1334) 
Lanfredino Jacopo Lanfredini 




b. 1494. M(1282) 
Niccolò Jacopo Paganelli 
Sig(1492, 98, 1512) G(1501, 17) XVI(1486,1504) X11(1512) 
Mt(1503) X(1505, 09, Dec. 1512) VII1(1491, 1518) 
CP(1498 -1512) B(1512) PG(1513, 14, 15) 70(1514) 
17(1514) A(1512) 12(1512, 15, 17, 19) 
OP(1514, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19)Amico(1513, 18a.b) d. 1518.49 
Canon 
Political career unknown 
XI1(1528)Nemico(1513, 15176, 1518b) 
PIERFILIPPO PANDOLFINI 
b. 1498. M(1381) 
Alessandro Messer Carlo Pandolfini Sig(1516) VIII(1492) 
PIERFILIPPO PANDOLFINI 
b. 1502. M(1381) 
Francesco Pierfilippo Pandolfini 
PIERFRANCESCO PORTINARI 
b. 1484. M(1282) 
Folcho Adovardo Portinari 
GIOVANNI RINUCCINI 
b. 1466. M(1347) 
Simone Giovanni Rinuccini 
SER GIULIANO DA RIPA 
b. 1459. M 
Ser Domenico Giuliano da Ripa 
DANIELLO STROZZI 
b. 1475. M(1283) 
Niccola Niccola Strozzi 
FRANCESCO DE' TANAGLI 
M(1452) 
Michelangelo Messer Guglielmo 
de' Tanagli 
Sig(1499,1503) G(1519) XII(1499) CP(1505-09) VIII(1513) 
70(1514) OP(1515, 19) 12(1516, 19) Amico(1513) d. 1520.5° 
XVI(1518, Jul. 1527) Sig(1529) XII(1530) X(1528) HP(1530) 
Dubio(1518) 
XVI(1485) B(1524) Dubio(1518) 
Sig(1501, Jul. 1512, 28) XII(1500, 04, 09) CP(1500) 
20(May 1527) X (1529) VIII(18 May 1527) HP(1529) X(1530) 
Nemico(1517b'`, 1518a') 
Nemico(1513, 1517a,b,c 1518a'ó) d. 1527.51 
XII(1482) 
49 
M. Mansfield, A Family of Decent Folk ( Lanfredini) 1200 -1741 (Florence, 1922) p. 240. 
5° A.S.F., Tratte, 906, f. 66°. 
51 Cambi, Istorie, xxii, p. 336. 
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PIERO VETTORI XVI(1529) 
b. 1499. M(1320) 
Jacopo Luigi Vettori d. 1506.52 
APPENDIX A, xii. 
Those condemned for verbal offences against the Medici regime 1512 -1527 
Date of 
Condemnation. 53 
13 Oct. 1512 MAGISTER JACOPO DA MONTEFALCHO Augustine friars from Santo 
FRA SIMONE DA FIVIZANO 
FRA PIERO ROBERTO DAL CASTELLARIO 
22 Jan. 1513 ALESSANDRO MANETTI54 
b. 1461. m 
22 Jan. 1513 
22 Jan. 1513 
26 Feb. 1513 
Andrea Manetto Manetti 
PIERO BARTOLO ANTONIO 
MARTINO SCARFI 
b. 1474. M(1363) 
Francesco Martino Scarfi 
UBERTINO BONCIANNI 
b. 1477. M(1286) 
Francesco Guido Boncianni 
FRANCESCO SERRAGLI 
Paolo Francesco Serragli 
Spirito 
XVI(Sept. 1494, 1504) 
Nemico(1513, 1517b'°) 
Sig(1501) XVI(1497) XII(1502) 
A(Dec. 1494) d. 1503.55 
Once a baker, from the parish of San Paolo 
XVI(1510) Mt(1508, 11) 
Nemico(1513, 1517b, 1518b) 
Sig(1477, 81) G(Nov. 1494) XVI(1486) 
VIII(1485) Mt(1491, 95, 01) 17(1490) 
A(Dec. 1494) X(1497) CP(1498-1501) 
d. 1501.56 
Nemico(1513, 1517c, 1518b) 
Sig(1487) VIII(1488) 
XII(1530) XVI(1528) b. 1469. M(1325) 
Nemico(1513, 1517b'`, 1518b) 
52 Litta, Famiglie, disp. 54 (Vettori), tay. iii. 
53 Each date records a separate condemnation. Where more than one individual was condemned on the 
same day, a single date has been given where they were condemned together as a group, and the date 
repeated where they were condemned separately. 
54 Manetti is sometimes referred to without the surname, as Alessandro di Andrea di Manetto, but the 
surname is used in the Tratte when recording his date of birth. 
55 
Guidi, 1494, p. 173. 
56 Ibid., p. 185. 
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1 Mar. 1513 PANDOLFO BILIOTTI 
b. 1477. M(1299) 
Baldassare Gualtieri Biliotti 
DUCCIO ADIMARI 
b. 1473. Mg 
Bernardo Duccio Adimari 
Nemico(1513, 1518b) 
Sig(1476) X1T(1458, 65, 88) 
Nemico(1513, 1518b) 
XVI(1467) 
5 Mar. 1513 GIOVANNI BARTOLOMEI57 Sig(1493, 98) XVI(1501, 08) 20(May 1527) 
b. 1464. m IX(Jun. 1527) XVI(1528) 
Nemico(1517b,°, 1518.) 
Ser Antonio Ser Battista d. c1500.58 
Bartolomei 
18 Apr. 1513 FRANCESCO MARCHI 
b. 1471. M(1389) 
Marco Messer Francesco Marchi 
11 June 1513 MAGISTER MARCO DA MILANO Provost of Ognissanti 
FRA NICCOLÒ MATTHEO AGOSTINO Friar of Ognissanti 
FRA LORENZO EUGENIO DA CIGOLI Friar of Ognissanti 
GIUSTO DELLA BADESSA 
M(1287) 
Piero Zanobi della Badessa 
MESSER BARTOLOMEO 
REDDITI 
b. 1455. M(1463).60 
Andrea Antonio Redditi 
Sig(1466) XVI(1472, 80) XII(1469) 
X11(1503) CP(1500) d. 1523 i9 
Sig(1463) VIII(1474) 
16 Aug. 1513 FRANCESCO GIOVANNI MONALDO Linen weaver 
29 Sept. 1513 FRANCESCO DEL PUGLIESE Sig(1490, 98) XVI(1496) MP(1509) 
b. 1458. M(1463) Nemico(15171`) 
Filippo Francesco del Pugliese Sig(1463) 
14 Oct. 1513 
15 Oct. 1513 
GIOVANBATTISTA PETRUCCI 
b. 1486. M(1425)61 
Alamanno Cesare Petrucci Sig(1484) XVI(Jan. 1494) X11(1482) 
VIII(1502) CP(1500) 
BARTOLO GIOVANNI Weaver of German origin 
10 Jan. 1514 CECCHONE BERNARDO DA GUBBIO Footman 
57 Bartolomei is sometimes referred to without the surname, as Giovanni di Ser Antonio di Ser 
Battista, but the surname is used in the Tratte when recording his date of birth. 
58 Marzi, Cancelleria, p. 272. 
59 Martines, Lawyers, p. 495. 
6o Redditi's father was in the minor guilds. 
61 The Petrucci family's Priors were for the minor guilds before 1434, Pesman Cooper, Florentine 
Ruling Group', p. 141. 
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TONIONE LIONARDO DA BOLOGNA 
GIOVANNI GUICCIARDINI 
b. 1489. M(1302) 
Niccolò Giovanni Guicciardini 
4 Feb. 1514 ANDREA SIMONE 
31 Dec. 1514 
10 Jul. 1515 
16. Dec.1515 
BARTOLOMEO PANDOLF NI 
b. 1450. M(1381) 
Pandolfo Messer Giannozzo 
Pandolfini 
NICCOLÒ PAGANELLI 
b. 1468. M(1282) 
Jacopo Niccolò Paganelli 
Sig(Jan. 1494) XII(1485) 
Tinker 
Sig(1489) XVI(1501) VIII(1503) 
CP(1501-03) d. 1517.62 
Sig(1459) XVI(1456) Mt(1463) 
XII(1528) Nemico(1513, 1517b, 1518b) 
Sig(1473) XVI(1478) CP(1498-1500) 
LARIONE BUONGUGLIELMI 
b. 1445.63 M(No Priors)64 
Guglielmo Messer Salvestro Buonguglielmi 
11 Apr. 1517 CAMILLO ANTINORI 
b. 1484. M(1351) 
Niccolò Tommaso Antinori 
28 Apr. 1517 GIOVANNI BARTOLOMEO 
BUONCAMPAGNIO 
30 Jul. 1518 
3 Aug. 1518 
ANDREA RINUCCINI 
b. 1489. M(1347) 
Neri Filippo Rinuccini 
FRANCESCO CARCHERELLI 
b. 1491.66 M(1346) 
Giovanbattista Francesco Carcherelli 
29 Jul. 1519 JACOPO ALTOVITI 
b. 1479. M(1282) 
Ottaviano Oddo Altoviti 
21 Dec. 1521 FRA SPIRITO 
2 Dec. 1522 FRANCESCO TOSINGHI 
Mg 
Rinieri Francesco Tosinghi 
XII(Mar. 1517) 
Sig(1484, 98, 01) XVI(1502) XII(1487, 97) 
VIII(1506) PG(1515) Mt(1504, 06, 09, 15) 
X(1507) Amico(1513) 
From the parish of San Pier Maggiore 
Nemico(1517b) 





62 B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 156 (Pandolfini), tay. iii. 
63 Parenti, "Storia ", II IV 171, f. 124'. 
64 Buonguglielmi's grandfather was born in Perugia and became a Florentine citizen in 1432, P. 
Mari, ` Salvestro Buonguglielmi', D.B.I., xv, pp. 237 -41. 
65 Rinuccini, Ricordi storici, p. 261. 
66 B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 8, f. 69`. 
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1 Oct. 1523 
19 Oct. 1523 
20 Oct. 1523 
24 Nov. 1523 
27 Apr. 1526 
MARTINO SCARFI 
b. 1474. M(1363) 
Francesco Martino Scarf' 
FRANCESCO TORRIGIANI 
b. 1470. m 
Torrigiano Antonio Torrigiani 
ALESSANDRO MANETTI 
b. 1461. m 
Andrea Manetto Manetti 
PIERO ORLANDINI 
b. 1466. M(1286) 
Giovanni Simone Orlandini 
SIMONE GABRIELLO SIMONE 
XVI(1510) Mt(1508, 11) 
Nemico(1513, 1517b, 1518b) 
Sig(1477, 81) G(Nov. 1494) XVI(1486) 
VIII(1485) Mt(1491, 95, 01) 17(1490). 
A(Dec 1494) X(1497) CP(1498-1501) 
d. 1501. 
Sig(1462, 97) VIII(1472, 96) 
XVI(Sept. 1494, 1504) Nemico(1513, 17b'`) 
Sig(1501) XVI(1497) XII(1502) 
A(Dec. 1494) d. 1503 
Sig(1507) XVI(1518) VIII(1506, 20) 
PG(1505) Nemico(1513, 1517a'b'c, 1518e) 
Dubio(1518) 
Sig(1467) G(1472) XII(1461) VIII(1479) 
M(1472) 70(1481) 
From the jurisdiction of Pisa, living in Santa 
Maria al Monte 
APPENDIX A, xiii. 
Those condemned for verbal offences against popular regimes 
1502 -1512, 1527 -1530 
Date of 
Condemnation. 
22 Apr. 1503 
10 Dec. 1527 
LUIGI MANELLI 
b. 1450. Mg 
Giovanni Niccolò Manelli 
BENEDETTO BUONDELMONTI 
b. 1481. Mg 
Filippo Lorenzo Buondelmonti 
343 
CP(1500-1502) 
Sig(1523) XII(1511) VIII(1513) 70(1524) 
12(1525) Amico(1517, 1518a.b) 
Sig(1500) G(Nov. 1512) XVI(1484) X(1495) 
XII(Dec. 1494) IX(1508) 20(Sept. 1512) 
B(1512) 70(1514) OP(1514, 15, 16,18) 
VIII(1521) 17(1514) 12(1512) A(1512) 
Amico(1513, 18b) 
3 Feb. 1528 
3 May 1528 
MICHELE MODESTI DA PRATO 
b :1510. M(No Priors)67 
Messer Jacopo Ser Michele 
Modesti da Prato 
GIROLAMO DEGLI ALBIZZI 
b. 1483. M(1282) 
Zanobi Lucantonio degli Albizzi 
d. 1530.68 
Sig(1516) X11(1500) VIII(1503) d. 1529.69 
2 Aug. 1528 FRA LODOVICO Guardian in Santa Croce 
FRANCESCO DE' GUGLIELMI 
6 Nov. 1528 JACOPO ALAMANNI 
b. 1506. M(1354) 
Antonio Jacopo Alamanni X11(1508) Nemico(1517b, 1518b) d. 1527. 
7 May 1529 FRA BONAVENTURA Formerly of San Marco 
GIOVANNI DA CASTELFRANCO 
5 Jun. 1529 ANTONIO FRANCESCO BRUCIOLI 
b. 1487. No Guild 
15 Oct. 1529 CARLO COCCHI Sig(1521) XVI(1518) XII(1521) VIII(1526) 
b. 1486. M(1376) Amico(1518b) 
Messer Antonio Messer Donato Cocchi 
17 Jun. 1530 FICINO FICINI 
b. c1470.70 M (No Priors) 
Cherubino Messer Ficino Ficini 
SOURCES TO APPENDIX A. 
1. Unless otherwise stated, information presented on those outside the Guilds comes from 
their condemnations. 
2. A.S.F., Tratte, 61: `Priorista dal 1455 al 1532', records those who held postions in the 
Signoria, the Sixteen Gonfaloniers of the Companies and the Twelve Good Men. 
3. A.S.F., Tratte, 903, 904, 905 and 906 record those who held `ufficii intrinseci', political 
office within the city, from 1455 to 1530. Tratte 906 also records the members of the Council of 
Seventy from 1514 to 1527, and of the Balla from 1512 to 1527, as well as the Uomini di pratica 
elected from 1528 to 1530. 
4. A.S.F., Tratte, 85, 86, 88 and 419 record dates of birth. 
5. The records of the Consulte e Pratiche from 1498 to 1512 have been published in 
Consulte e Pratiche della repubblica fiorentina, 1498 -1505, ed. D. Fachard, 2 vols. (Florence, 
1993); Consulte e Pratiche della repubblica fiorentina, 1505 -1512, ed. D. Fachard, (Geneva, 1988). 
67 Modesti's father matriculated in the Major guilds in 1515, and was made a Florentine citizen in 
1519, Martines, Lawyers, p. 505. 
G8 Marzi, Cancelleria, pp. 319, 514. 
69 Litta, Famiglie, dispp. 178 -80 (Albizzi), tay. xiii. 
70 L. Felini, ` Ficino Ficini', D.B.I., 47 (Rome, 1997), pp. 376 -7. 
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6. Cambi, Istorie, xxi, p. 310, lists the twenty citizens appointed to advise the Signoria on 
constitutional reform 1 September 1512. Ibid, xxii, p. 325, lists the twenty citizens elected 27 May 
1527 to regulate the re- establishment of popular government. 
7. Lists of the Accoppiatori from 1455 to 1480, and of the members of the Council of 
Seventy appointed in 1480, can be found in Rubinstein, Government, pp. 238 -44, 309 -10, 316 -22. 
8. A list of those citizens co -opted to the Council of Seventy from 1480 until 1494 can be 
found in Pesman Cooper, `Florentine Ruling Group', p. 179. A list of the Seventeen Reformers in 
1480 can be found in A. Brown, `Lorenzo, the Monte and the Seventeen Reformers', Lorenzo de' 
Medici. Studi, ed. G. Carfagnini (Florence, 1992), pp. 103 -167. 
9. B.N.F., N.A., 988 contains lists of supporters and opponents of the Medici regime. 
Nemico 1513 refers to the list on f. 92` and includes Pietropaolo Boscoli and Agostino Capponi, 
executed in 1513. Nemico 1517a refers to the list on f. 93`. Nemico 1517b refers to that on ff. 94": 
` Inimici', which is divided by Quarter. Nemico 1517 refers to that on ff. 1031.-104 ": `Nota di non 
amici'. All three include Alessandro Acciaiuoli (d. 1517). See Butters, Governors, pp. 210, 244. 
Amico 1517 refers to the list on f. 104`: `Confidenti', which is the counterpart to Nemico 1517e. 
Amico 1518a refers to the list on ff. 99` -100`: `Confidanti e amici', which includes Lanfredino 
Lanfredini (d. 1518). Nemico 1518a refers to the counterpart of Amico 1518a on ff. 98": Nota di 
non amici'. Amico 1518b, Dubio, and Nemico 1518b refer to the three parts of the list on ff. 140`- 
164": `De omni qualità cittadina di tucta la città di Firenze, quartiere per quartiere, sapientis et 
ordinare'. This list includes Lanfredino Lanfredini (d. 1518) and is divided into three parts, `Amici', 
`Dubi', and `Ultimi'. It may be to this list that Parenti referred in the autumn of 1516, when he 
described how Lorenzo kept a book for the purposes of selecting the holders of office in which `tutte 
le famiglie e gli huomini di Firenze' were divided into three parts, `amici, inimici e neutrali', 
Parenti, `Storia', B.N.F., F.P., ]I IV 171, f. 130r. 
10. Amico 1513 refers to the list of supporters of the Medici in A.S.F., M.A.P., XCIX, n. 
45, which includes Galeazzo Sassetti (d. April 1513). See Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 
71 -2. 
11. Unless otherwise stated, details of Magnate families, and of the first Prior of families 
in the Major guilds, are from Pesman Cooper, `Florentine Ruling Group' pp. 130 -148. 
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Appendix B 
Opponents banished or sent to their villas in August 1517." 
TO BOLOGNA 
Giovanni Simone Folchi 
Bartolomeo Simone Corsi 
Giovanni Antonio Peruzzi 
Tommaso Francesco Tosinghi and sons 
Francesco Paolo Serragli74 
Ubertino Francesco Guidi Boncianni 
Andrea Antonio Cambini and sons 
Carlo Apardo Lottini 
Francesco Apardo Lottini 
Bartolomeo Antonio Pescioni 
Bernardo Angiolini 
Sandro Niccolò Buongirolami 
Niccolò Jacopo Paganelli 
TO MODENA 
Giovanni Simone Rinuccini 
Buonaccorso Simone Rinuccini 
Carlo Niccolò Federighi 
Alessandro Andrea Manetto Manetti72 
Francesco Pierfrancesco Tosinghi73 
IN VILLA 
Giovanni Ser Antonio Ser Battista 
B artolomei75 
Piero Bancho da Verrazzano 
Alessandro Filippo Girolami 
Bernardo Dante da Castiglione 
Roberto Dante da Castiglione 
At least four miles from the city 
At least four miles from the city 
To Serezana 
71 A.S.F., O.G., 168, ff. 91r -921 (22, 23 and 24 August 1517). B.N.F., N.A., 988, f. 96r: `Non amici', 
is an incomplete list of those confined which includes Tommaso Giacomini, to be sent to his villa. 
72 The surname is omitted. 
73 Given as Francesco `detto "Cechotto "' Tosinghi. 
74 Given in error as Francesco di Piero Serragli. 
75 The surname is omitted. 
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Appendix C 
Opponents detained in the Palace 
by the Signoria, 3 December 1521.76 
FROM THE QUARTER OF SAN GIOVANNI SANTA CROCE 
Tommaso Tosinghi Buonaccorso Rinuccini 
Francesco Tosinghi77 Giovanni Rinuccini 
Filippo degli Albizzi Giovanni Antonio Peruzzi 
Niccolò Valori and his sons 
SANTA MARIA NOVELLA SANTO SPIRITO 
Piero Bartolomeo Popoleschi Niccolò Braccio Guicciardini 
Carlo Niccolò Federighi Francesco Serragli 
Lamberto Cambi Giovanni Ser Antonio Ser Battista Bartolomei78 
Pieradovardo Giachinotti Niccolò Paganelli 
Bernardo Giachinotti Battista Bastiano Pitti 
76 A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 123, f. 162`. The list is arranged according to Quarter. 
77 Given as Cecchotto Tosinghi. A.S.F., Sig. e Coll., Delib., o.a., 123, f. 162`. The list is arranged 
according to Quarter. 
78 The surname is omitted. 
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Appendix D 
The Family Responsibilities of Young Conspirators 
i. 
The Overthrow of Soderini, August 1512.79 
Antonfrancesco degli Married 1508 Giovanni Rucellai Never married 
Albizzi 
Maso degli Albizzi Two children by 1512 Palla Rucellai Married after 1512 
Giovanni degli Albizzi A son born 1511 Simone Tornabuoni A son born 1505 
Benedetto A son born 1511 Bartolomeo Valori A son born 1509 
Buondelmonti 
Gino Capponi A son born 1503 Giovanni Vespucci Married 1500 
Francesco Rucellai Married 1519 Paolo Vettori A son born 1500 
APPENDIX D, ii. 
The Parlamento of September 1512.80 
Francesco Altoviti Married 1525 Giovanni Antonio Married 1507 
Rucellai 
Roberto del Beccuto Married 1519 Palla Rucellai Married after 1512 
Cosimo Bartoli A daughter born 1509 Piero Rucellai Four sons by 1512 
Matteo Bartoli Three sons by 1512 Francesco Salviati A son born 1507 
Filippo Ricasoli Married 1513 Prinzivalle della Stufa Unmarried in 1512 
Giovanni Bernardo Never married 
Rucellai 
79 A.S.F., Tratte, 88, ff. 208", 221`, 231`, 264°; B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 8, f. 5 "; Litta, Famiglie, disp. 54 
(Tornabuoni), tay. ii; Ibid., dispp. 178 -80 (Albizzi), tavv. xix, xx ; Devonshire Jones, Francesco 
Vettori, p. xi; Passerini, Rucellai, pp. 57 -9, 132 -3, 139 and tavv. vii, xvi. 
80 A.S.F., Tratte, 88, ff. 135', 218`, 245`; B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 8, f. 42 "; Ibid., 186 (del Beccuto); 
Passerini, Altoviti, tay. xii; Idem, Ricasoli, tay. xiv; Idem, Rucellai, tay. xi. 
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APPENDIX D, iii. 
The Tumulto del Venerdì.8' 
Jacopo Alamanni Married by 1527 Pierfilippo di Francesco Married 1529 
Pandolfini 
Salvestro Aldobrandini Married 1520 Giuliano Salviati Married 1530 
Francesco Bandini A son born 1524 Piero Salviati Married 1542 
Bartolomeo Cavalcanti A son born 1526 Piero Vettori A son born 1519 
Alamanno de' Pazzi Married 1520 
81 Brucioli, Dialogi, p. 59 (Alamanni); Litta, Famiglie, disp. 66 (Aldobrandini), tav. ii; `Della famiglia 
de' Baroncelli', Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xvii, p. 217; B. Cavalcanti, Lettere, ed. C. Roaf 
(Bologna, 1967), p. xvii; Litta, Famiglie, disp. 128 (Pazzi), tav. v; B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 156 
(Pandolfini), tav. vi; Hurtubise, Salviati, pp. 225, 497; B.N.F., Mss. Passerini, 8, f. 37`; Litta, 
Famiglie, disp. 54 (Vettori), tav. iii. 
349 
Bibliography 
A. Manuscript Sources 
1. FLORENCE 
(a) Archivio di Stato 
Archival collections 




Consulte e Pratiche. 
Copialettere di Goro Gheri. 
Dieci di Balìa, Legazioni e Commissarie, Lettere Missive. 
Dieci di Balìa, Legazioni e Commissarie, Lettere Responsive. 





Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia, Notificazioni e Querele. 
Otto di Guardia, Epoca Repubblicana. 
Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, Lettere Missive. 
Otto di Pratica, Legazioni e Commissarie, Lettere Reponsive. 
350 
Provvisioni, Registri. 
Signori, Carteggi, Legazioni e Commissarie, Elezioni e Istruzioni a Oratori. 
Signori, Carteggi, Minutari. 
Signori, Carteggi, Responsive. 
Signori, Carteggio Missive, Prima Cancelleria. 
Signori e Collegi, Deliberazioni fatti in forza di ordinaria autorità. 
Soprastanti delle Stinche, Carcerati. 
Tratte. 
Chronicle 
Anonymous, `Diario istorico di quello che è seguito nella città di Firenze, cominciato l' anno 1435, finito 
nell' anno 1522', Manoscritti 117. 
(b) Biblioteca Nazionale 
Manuscript Collections 
Fondo Baldovinetti. 








Diaries, Chronicles etc. 
Anonymous, `Cronica da anonimo di Firenze dal 1521 al 1536', Magliabecchi, XXV, 366. 
Anonymous, `Diario dall' anno 1521 al 1532', Magliabecchi, XXV, 555, ff. 2" -40 ". 
Anonymous, `Diario d' incerto del 1529 e 1530 dell' assedio di Firenze', Magliabecchi, XXV, 555, ff. 
134` -173 ". 
Anonymous, `Ricordi di storia fiorentina, 1493- 1512', Fondo Principale, II, II, 339, ff. 1` -13`. 
Baldovinetti, F., `Memoriale', Fondo Baldovinetti, Ms. 244. 
Cei, G., `Storia di Fiorerítia, 1494- 1509', Fondo Principale, II -140. 
Pandolfini, P., `Sermone sopra 1' elezione del Gonfaloniere di Giustizia', Magliabecchi, VIII, 18, ff. 59`- 
82". 
Parenti, P., `Storia florentina', Fondo Principale, II, II, 133; II, II, 134; II, IV, 171. 
Tosinghi, T., `Vita di Tommaso Tosinghi', Fondo Principale, II, II, 325, ff. 127` -130`. 
Valori, F., `Ricordi', Manoscritti Panciatichiani, 134, ins. 6. 
Valori, N., `Ricordanze', Manoscritti Panciatichiani, 134, ff. 11` -20`. 
2. MANTUA 
Archivio di Stato 
Archivio Gonzaga, Corrispondenza Estera. 
3. MODENA 
Archivio di Stato 
Cancelleria Ducale, Estero, Carteggio Ambasciatori, Firenze. 
352 
B. Printed Primary Sources 
Alamanni, L., Versi e prose, ed. P. Raffaelli, 2 vols. (Florence, 1859). 
Albèri, E., ed., Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, Ser. 2, i (Florence, 1839). 
Bardi, A., ed., `Filippo Strozzi (da nuovi documenti)', Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 5, xiv (1894), pp. 3- 
78. 
Buonaccorsi, B., Diario di successi più importanti seguiti in Italia 1498 -1512 (Florence, 1568). 
Brucioli, A., Dialogi, ed. A. Landi (Naples, 1982). 
Busini, G., Lettere di Giovambattista Busini a Benedetto Varchi sopra l ' assedio di Firenze, ed. G. 
Milanesi (Florence, 1860). 
Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and 
Spain, II, III and IV, ed. P. de Gayangos (London, 1866 -77). 
Cambi, G., Istorie fiorentine, ed. I. di San Luigi, Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xxi, xxii, and xxiii 
Florence, 1785 -6). 
Capelli, A., ed., `Lettere e notizie del Magnifico Lorenzo de' Medici', Atti e memorie delle R. R. 
Deputazione di storia patria per le provincie modenese e parmenese, i (1863). 
Carnesecchi, B., `L' Assedio di Firenze', ed. L. Gentile, Studi Storici, xiv (Pisa, 1905), pp. 445 -466. 
Cavalcanti, B., Lettere, ed. C. Roaf (Bologna, 1967). 
Cegia, F., `I ricordi segreti del mediceo Francesco di Agostino Cegia (1495 -1497) ', ed. G. Pampaloni, 
Archivio Storico Italiano, cxv (1957), pp. 188 -234. 
Cerretani, B., Dialogo della mutatione di Firenze, ed. R. Mordenti (Florence, 1990). 
Ricordi, ed. G. Berti (Florence, 1993). 
Storia fiorentina, ed. G. Berti (Florence, 1994). 
Consulte e Pratiche della repubblica fiorentina, 1498 -1505, ed. D. Fachard, 2 vols. (Florence, 1993). 
Consulte e Pratiche della repubblica fiorentina, 1505 -1512, ed. D. Fachard (Geneva, 1988). 
Le 'Consulte' e 'Pratiche' della repubblica fiorentina, ed. E. Conti, i (1401) (Florence, 1981). 
Della Robbia, L., `Recitazione del caso di Pietro Paolo Boscoli e di Agostino Capponi, l' anno MDXIII', 
ed. F. Polidori, Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 1, i (1842), pp. 283 -309. 
Dovizi, B., Epistolario di Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena, ed. G. Moncallero, i (Florence, 1955). 
Foscari, M, `Relazione di Firenze', ed. E. Albèri, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, Ser. 2, i 
(Florence, 1839), pp. 7 -97. 
Gelli, G., Opere, ed. A. Alesina (Naples, 1970). 
353 
Gherardi, A., ed., Nuovi documenti e studi intorno a Girolamo Savonarola (Florence, 1887). 
Giannotti, D., Dialogi di Donato Giannotti de' giorni che Dante consumò nel cercare l' Inferno e' l 
Purgatorio, ed. D. Redig de Campos (Florence, 1939). 
Republica fiorentina, ed. G. Silvano (Geneva, 1990). 
Ginori, T., `Libro di debitori e creditori e ricordanze', ed. J. Schnitzer, Quellen und Forshungen zur 
Geschichte Savonarolas, i (Munich, 1902). 
Giovio, P., Historiarum sui temporis, 2 vols., ed. D. Visconti (Rome, 1964). 
Guasti, C., ed., `Documenti della congiura fatto contro il cardinale Giulio de' Medici nel 1522', 
Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani, iii (1859), pp. 121 -50, 185 -232, 239 -67. 
Il sacco di Prato, 2 vols. (Bologna, 1880). 
Guicciardini, F., Carteggi, i, ii and iii, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bologna and Florence, 1938- 1943). 
Carteggi, xiv and xvii, ed. P. Ricci (Rome, 1969 and 1972). 
Dialogo e discorsi del reggimento di Firenze, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1932). 
Opere inedite, ed. G. Canestrini, x (Florence, 1867). 
Scritti autobiografici e rari, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1933). 
Scritti politici e ricordi, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1933). 
Storie fiorentine, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1931). 
Storia d' Italia, ed. C. Panigada, 5 vols. (Bari, 1929). 
Guicciardini, L., `Il sacco di Roma', in Il sacco di Roma del MDXXVII, ed. C. Milanesi ( Florence, 
1867). 
`Discorso al Duca Alessandro', ed. G. Capponi, Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 1, i (1842), 
pp. 460-467. 
Guicciardini, N., `Discorso di Niccolò Guicciardini del modo del procedere della famiglia de' Medici 
in Firenze et del fine che poteva havere lo stato di quella famiglia', ed. R. von Albertini, 
Das Florentinische Staatsbewusstsein im Übergang von der Republik zum Prinzipat (Berne, 
1955), pp. 353 -362. 
Instructione al Magnifico Lorenzo', ed. T. Gar, Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 1, appendix i 
(1842 -4), pp. 299 -306. 
Landucci, L., Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, ed. I del Badia (Florence, 1883). 
Machiavelli, N., `Discursus florentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medices', Tutte le 
opere (Italy, 1813), iv, pp. 105 -123. 
Lettere, ed. F. Gaeta (Turin, 1984). 
Opere, ed. M. Bonfantini (Milan, 1954). 
Opere minori, ed. F. Polidori (Florence 1852). 
Masi, B., Ricordanze di Bartolomeo Masi calderaio fiorentino dal 1478 al 1526, ed. G. Corazzini 
(Florence 1906). 
Medici, L., Scritti e documenti, ed. C. Teoli (Milan, 1862). 
Molini, G., ed., Documenti di storia italia, i (Florence, 1836). 
Morelli, G., Ricordi, ed. V. Branca (Florence, 1956). 
Morelli, L., Cronaca, ed. I. di San Luigi, Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xix ( Florence, 1785). 
354 
Nardi, J., Istorie della città di Firenze, ed. L. Arbib, 2 vols. (Florence, 1842). 
`Lettera sopra la mutatione dello stato nel 1527', ed. I. del Badia, Miscellanea fiorentina di 
erudizione e storia, i (Florence, 1902), pp. 132 -42. 
Nerli, F., Commentari de' fatti civili occorsi dentro la città di Firenze dall' anno MCCXV al 
MDXXXVII (Augusta, 1728). 
Pandolfini, P., 'Oratione di Pier Filippo di Alessandro Pandolfini al Popolo di Firenze nel tempio di 
San Lorenzo, a dì xxviii di gennaio MDXXVIII', ed. G. Canestrini, Archivio Storico 
Italiano, Ser. 1, xv (1851), pp. 350 -377. 
Parenti, P., Storia fiorentina, ed. A. Matucci (in progress), i (Florence, 1994). 
`Storia fiorentina', partly ed. J. Schnitzer, Quellen und Forshungen zur Geschichte 
Savonarolas, iy (Leipzig, 1910). 
Pazzi, A., `Discorso di Alessandro de' Pazzi al Cardinale Giulio de' Medici anno 1522', ed. G. 
Capponi, Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 1, i (1842), pp. 420 -32. 
Pitti, J., `Istoria fiorentina', ed. F. Polidori, Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 1, i (1842), pp. 1 -208. 
Poliziano, A., Della congiura dei Pazzi (coniurationis commentarium), ed. A. Perosa (Padua, 1958). 
`Processo di Lamberto dall' Antella', ed. P. Villari, La storia di Girolamo Savonarola e de' suoi 
tempi ( Florence, 1888), ii, pp. iii -xxiv. 
`Processo di Niccolò Martelli', ed. C. Guasti, `Documenti della congiura fatto contro il cardinale 
Giulio de' Medici nel 1522', Giornale Storico degli Archivi Toscani, iii (1859), pp. 239 -67. 
Provvisioni concernenti i' ordinamento della repubblica fiorentina, 1494 -1512, ed. G. Cadoni (in 
progress), i (Rome 1994). 
`Raccolto delle azioni di Francesco e Pagolo Vettori', ed. A von Reumont, Archivio Storico Italiano, 
Ser. 1, appendix vi (1848), pp. 267 -80. 
Redditi, B., `Breve compendio e sommario della verita predicata e profetata dal R. P. fra Girolamo 
Savonarola', ed. J. Schnitzer, Quellen und Forshungen zur Geschichte Savonarolas, i 
(Munich, 1902). 
Rinuccini, A., Dialogus de libertate', ed. F. Adorno, Atti e memorie dell' accademia toscana di 
scienze e lettere `La colombaria', xxii (1957), pp. 270 -303. 
Rinuccini, F., Ricordi storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dal 1282 al 1460 colla continuazione di 
Alamanno e Neri suoi figli fino al 1506,'ed. G. Aiazzi (Florence, 1840). 
Ruscelli, G., ed., Lettere di principi, 2 vols. (Venice, 1570). 
Sanudo, M., Diarii, 58 vols. (Venice, 1879 -1902). 
Savonarola, G., Prediche sopra Amos e Zaccaria, ed. P. Ghighieri, 3 vols. (Rome, 1971 -2). 
Prediche sopra i Salmi, ed. V. Romano, 2 vols. (Rome, 1969 -74). 
Trattato del reggimento e governo della città di Firenze, ed. G. Pella and G. Lapira (Turin, 
1954). 
Segni, B., Storie fiorentine, 3 vols. (Milan, 1805). 
`Vita di Niccolò Capponi' in Ibid., vol. iii. 
355 
Statuta Populi et Communis Florentiae, 2 vols. (Fribergi [Florence], 1778 -83). 
Strozzi, L., `Vita di Filippo Strozzi' in G. -B. Niccolini, Filippo Strozzi, tragedia (Florence, 1847), 
pp. iii -cxxiii. 
Suriano, A., `Relazione di Firenze', ed. E. Albèri, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, 
Ser. 2, v (Florence, 1858). 
Trionfi e canti carnascialeschi toscani del rinascimento, ed. R. Bruscagli, 2 vols. (Rome 1986). 
Ughi, G., `Cronica di Firenze', ed. F. Frediani, Archivio Storico Italiano, Ser. 1, appendix vii 
(1849), pp. 113 -241. 
Vaglienti, P., Storia dei, suoi tempi, 1492 -1514, ed. G. Berti, M. Luzzati and E. Tongiorgi 
(Pisa, 1982). 
Varchi, B., Storia fiorentina, ed. G. Milanesi, 3 vols. (Florence, 1857 -8). 
Vettori, F., Scritti storici e politici, ed. E. Niccolini (Bari, 1972). 
`Sommario della storia d' Italia dal 1511 al 1527', ed. A von Reumont, Archivio Storico 
Italiano, Ser. 1, appendix vi (1848), pp. 287 -382. 
Zeffi, F., `Vita di Lorenzo Strozzi', in L. Strozzi, Vite degli uomini illustri della casa Strozzi 
(Florence, 1892), pp. v -xxvi. 
C. Secondary Sources 
Acton, H., The Pazzi Conspiracy (London, 1979). 
Albertini, R. von, Das Florentinische Staatsbewusstsein im Übergang von der Republik zum 
Prinzipat (Berne, 1955). 
Antonelli, A., `La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze', Archivio Storico Italiano, cxii 
(1954) pp 3 -39. 
Anzilotti, A., La crisi costituzionale della repubblica fiorentina (Florence, 1912). 
Baron, H., The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance (Princeton, 1955). 
356 
Bauman, R., The ' Crimen Maiestatis' in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principats (Johannesburg, 
1967). 
Becker, M., `Changing Patterns of Violence and Justice in Fourteenth- and Fifteenth -century Florence', 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, xviii (1976), pp. 281 -96. 
Bertelli, S., 'Petrus Soderinus Patriae Parens', Bibliothèque d' humanisme et renaissance, xxxi (1969), pp. 
93 -114. 
`Pier Soderini "Vexillifer Perpetuus Reipublicae Florentinae ", 1502 -1512', Renaissance Studies 
in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. A. Molho and J. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971), pp. 335 -59. 
`Constitutional Reforms in Renaissance Florence', Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 
iii (1973), pp. 139 -64. 
`Uno magistrato per a tempo lungho o uno dogie', Studi di storia medievale e moderna per 
Ernesto Sestan, ii (Florence, 1980), pp. 451 -94. 
`Di due profili mancati e di un balancio con pesi truccati. A proposito di un nuovo studio su 
Firenze repubblicana', Archivio Storico Italiano, clxv (1987), pp. 579 -610. 
Bizzocchi, R., `La dissoluzione di un clan familiare: i Buondelmonti di Firenze nei secoli xv e xvi', 
Archivio Storico Italiano, cxl (1982), pp. 3 -43. 
Black, R., Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance (Cambridge, 1985). 
`Machiavelli, Servant of the Florentine Republic', Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. G. Block, 
Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 71 -101. 
Bowsky, W., `The Anatomy of Rebellion in Fourteenth -Century Siena: from Commune to Signory ?', 
Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200 -1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley and London, 
1972), pp. 229 -73. 
Brackett, J., Criminal Justice and Crime in Late Renaissance Florence, 1537 -1609 (Cambridge, 1992). 
Brown, A., `Lorenzo, the Monte and the Seventeen Reformers', Lorenzo de' Medici. Studi, ed. G. 
Carfagnini (Florence, 1992), pp. 103 -167. 
`Lorenzo and Public Opinion in Florence: the Problem of Opposition', Lorenzo il Magnifico e 
il suo mondo, ed. G. Garfagnini (Florence, 1994), pp. 61 -85. 
Brucker, G., Florentine Politics and Society 1343 -1378 (Princeton, 1962). 
`The Ciompi Revolution', Florentine Studies. Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, 
ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 314 -56. 
The Civic World of Early Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1978). 
Bullard, M. M., Filippo Strozzi and the Medici. Favor and Finance in Sixteenth- Century Florence and 
Rome (Cambridge, 1980). 
"`Mercatores Fiorentini Romanum Curiam sequentes" in the early sixteenth century', Journal of 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vi (1976). 
Burckhardt, J., The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. S. G. C. Middlemore (New York, 1960). 
Butters, H. C., Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth- Century Florence 1502 -1519 (Oxford, 
1985). 
357 
Cadoni, G., `La crisi istituzionale della repubblica fiorentina, 1499 -1502', Bulletino dell' Istituto Storico 
Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio Muratoriano, xcix (1994), pp. 341 -405. 
Cantimori, D., `Il caso del Boscoli e la vita del rinascimento', Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana, 
viii (1927), pp. 244 -255. 
Clarke, P. C., `A Sienese Note on 1466', Florence and Italy: Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai 
Rubinstein, ed. P. Denly and C. Elam (London, 1988), pp. 43 -52. 
The Soderini and the Medici: Power and Patronage in Renaissance Florence (Oxford, 1990). 
`Lorenzo de' Medici and Tommaso Soderini', Lorenzo de' Medici. Studi, ed. G. Garfagnini 
(Florence, 1992), pp. 67 -102. 
Cohn Jr., S. K., The Labouring Classes in Renaissance Florence (New York, 1980). 
`Criminality and the State in Renaissance Florence, 1344 -1466', Journal of Social History, xiv 
(1980), pp. 211 -34. 
`Florentine Insurrection, 1342 -85, in Comparative Perspective', The English Rising of 1381, ed. 
T. Ashton and R. Hilton (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 143 -65. 
`Della famiglia de' Baroncelli', Delizie degli eruditi toscani, xvii (Florence, 1783) pp. 215 -7. 
Devonshire Jones, R., Francesco Vettori: Florentine Citizen and Medici Servant (London, 1972). 
Dionisotti, C., Machiavellerie (Turin, 1980). 
Dizionario biografico degli italiani, 45 vols. (in progress), (Rome, 1960- ). 
Dorini, U., II diritto penale e la delinquenza in Firenze nel secolo XIV (Lucca, 1923). 
Edgerton Jr., S., Pictures and Punishment. Art and Criminal Prosecution during the Florentine 
Renaissance (Ithaca, 1985). 
Elam, C., `Art in the Service of Liberty: Battista della Palla, Art Agent for Francis I', I Tatti Studies, v 
(1993), pp. 33 -111. 
Ford, F., Political Murder from Tyrannicide to Terrorism (London, 1985). 
Ghauthiez, P., Lorenzaccio (Lorenzin de Médicis), 1514 -1548 (Paris, 1904). 
Gilbert, F., `Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari: a Study on the Origin of Modern Political 
Thought', Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, xii (1949), pp. 101 -32. 
Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth -Century Florence (Princeton, 
1965). 
`The Venetian Constitution in Florentine Political Thought', Florentine Studies: Politics and 
Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 463 -500. 
Giusberti, E., `Un mito del Cinquecento: Lorenzo il Magnifico', Bulletino dell' Istituto Storico Italiano 
per il Medioevo e Archivio Muratoriano, xci (1984), pp. 183 -281. 
Goldthwaite, R., Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968). 
358 
Grasselini, E., and Fracassini, A., Firenze. Famiglie minori (Florence, 1984). 
Guidi, G., Ciò che accadde al tempo della Signoria di Novembre -Dicembre in Firenze I ' anno 1494 
(Florence, 1988). 
Lotte, pensiero e istituzioni politiche nella repubblica fiorentina dal 1494 al 1512 (Florence, 
1992). 
Hauvette, H., Un exilé florentin à la cour de France au XVIe siècle: Luigi Alamanni (1495 -1556). Sa vie 
et son oeuvre (Paris, 1903). 
`Les poesies de Cosimo Rucellai et de Francesco Guidetti', Annales de la Faculté des Lettres de 
Bordeaux, Ser. 4, Bulletin Italien, iv (1904), pp. 85 -101. 
Herlihy, D., `Some Psychological and Social Roots of Violence in the Tuscan Cities', Violence and Civil 
Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200 -1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley and London, 1972), pp. 141- 
152. 
and Klapisch -Zuber, C., Tuscans and their Families (Newhaven and London, 1985). 
Heers, J., Parties and Political Life in the Medieval West, trans. D. Nicholas (Oxford -New York - 
Amsterdam, 1977). 
Hook, J., The Sack of Rome, 1527 (London, 1972). 
Hurtubise, P., Une famille -témoin. Les Salviati (Città del Vaticano, 1985). 
Jászi, O., and Lewis, J., Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide (Glencoe, Illinois, 
1957. 
Kent, D., The Rise of the Medici. Faction in Florence 1426 -1434 (Oxford, 1978). 
Kovesi, C., 'Niccolò Valori and the Medici Restoration of 1512: Politics, Eulogies and the Preservation of 
a Family Myth', Rinascimento, Ser. 2, xxvii (1987), pp. 301 -325. 
Kristeller, P. 0., Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Rome, 1956). 
Lifta, P., Famiglie celebri italiane, 14 vols. (Milan and Turin, 1819 -1894). 
Lowe, K. J. P., Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: The Life and Career of Cardinal Francesco 
Soderini (Cambridge, 1993). 
`The Political Crime of Conspiracy in Fifteenth and Sixteenth -Century Rome', Crime, Society 
and the Law in Renaissance Italy, ed. T. Dean and K. J. P. Lowe (Cambridge, 1994). 
Mallet, M., `Preparations for War in Florence and Venice in the late Fifiteenth Century', Florence and 
Venice: Comparisons and Relations, ed. S. Bertelli, N. Rubinstein and C. Smyth, i (Florence, 
1979), pp. 149 -64. 
Mansfield, M., A Family of Decent Folk (Lanfredini) 1200 -1741 (Florence, 1922). 
McCuaig, W., `Bernardo Rucellai and Sallust', Rinascimento, Ser. 2, xxii (1982), pp. 75 -99. 
Martines, L., Lawyers and Statecraft in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968). 
359 
`Political Conflict in the Italian City States', Government and Opposition, iii (1968), pp. 69 -91. 
`Political Violence in the Thirteenth Century', Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 
1200 -1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 331 -53. 
Martini, F., Lorenzino de' Medici e il tirannicidio nel rinascimento (Florence, 1882). 
Marzi, D., La cancelleria della repubblica fiorentina (Rocca S. Casciano, 1910). 
Mazzi, M. S., `Cronache di periferia dello stato fiorentino: reati contro la morale nel primo Quattrocento', 
Studi Storici, New Ser., xxvii (1986), pp. 609 -637. 
Mecatti, G., Storia genealogica della nobiltà e cittidinanza di Firenze (Naples, 1756). 
Moncallero, G., Il Cardinale Bernardo Dovizi da Bibbiena: umanista e diplomatico 1470 -1520 (Florence, 
1953). 
Municchi, A., La fazione antimedicea detta 'del Poggio' (Florence, 1911). 
Pampaloni, G., `Fermenti di riforme democratiche nella Firenze medicea del Quattrocento', Archivio 
Storico Italiano cxix (1961), pp. 11 -62. 
II giuramento pubblico in Palazzo Vecchio a Firenze e un patto giurato degli anti- medicei, 
maggio 1466', Bulletino Senese di storia patria, lxxi (1964), pp. 212 -38. 
Passerini, L., Genealogia e storia della famiglia Rucellai (Florence, 1861). 
Genealogia e storia della famiglia Ricasoli (Florence, 1861). 
Gli Alberti di Firenze. Genealogia, storia e documenti, 2 vols. (Florence, 1869). 
Genealogia e storia della famiglia Altoviti (Florence, 1871). 
Perrot, M., `Delinquance et système pénitentiare en France au XIXe siècle', Annales. Economie, Societes, 
Civilisations, xxx (1975), pp. 67 -91. 
Pesman Cooper, R., `L' elezione di Pier Soderini a gonfaloniere a vita', Archivio Storico Italiano, cxxv 
(1967), pp. 145 -85. 
`Pier Soderini: Aspiring Prince or Civic Leader ?', Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 
New Ser., i (1978), pp. 69 -126. 
`La caduta di Piero Soderini e il "governo popolare ". Pressione esterne e dissenso interno', 
Archivio Storico Italiano, cxliii (1985), pp. 225 -258. 
`The Florentine Ruling Group under the "governo popolare ", 1494 -1512', Studies in Medieval 
and Renaissance History, New Ser., vii (1985), pp. 71 -181. 
`Political Survival in Early Sixteenth -Century Florence: the Case of Niccolò Valori', Florence 
and Italy. Renaissance Studies in Honour of Nicolai Rubinstein, ed. P. Denly and C. Elam 
(London, 1988), pp. 73 -90. 
Phillips, M., The Memoir of Marco Parenti. A Life in Medici Florence (Princeton, 1987). 
Piccolomini, M, The Brutus Revival: Parricide and Tyrannicide during the Renaissance (Carbondale, 
Illinois, 1991). 
Pinto, G., `Controllo politico e ordine pubblico nei primi vicariati fiorentini: gli 'atti'criminali degli 
ufficiali forensi', Quaderni Storici, xlix (1982), pp. 226 -41. 
360 
Polizzotto, L., `The Medici and the Savonarolans 1512 -1527: the Limitations of Personal Government and 
the Medicean Patronage System'. Patronage, Art and Society in Renaissance Italy, ed. F. Kent, 
P. Simons and J. Eade (Oxford, 1987), pp. 135 -153. 
"`Dell' Arte del Ben Morire": the "Piagnone" Way of Death 1494 -1545', 1 Tatti Studies, iii 
(1989), pp. 27 -89. 
The Elect Nation: the Savonarolan Movement in Florence 1494 -1545 (Oxford, 1994). 
and Elam, C., -La unione de' gigli con gigli ": Two documents on Florence, France and the 
Savonarolan Millenarian Tradition', Rinascimento, Ser. 2, xxxi (1991), pp. 239 -59. 
Post, G., Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State 1100 -1322 (Princeton, 1964). 
Prosperi, A., `Il monaco Teodoro: note su un processo fiorentino del 1515', Critica Storia, i (1975), pp. 
71 -101. 
Ridolfi, R., The Life of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C. Grayson (London, 1963). 
The Life of Francesco Guicciardini, trans. C. Grayson (London, 1967). 
Rocke, M., `Il controllo dell' omosessualità a Firenze nel XV secolo: gli "Ufficiali di Notte "', Quaderni 
Storici, lxvi (1987), pp. 701 -23. 
Rodolico, N., I Ciompi: una pagina di storia del proletario operaio (Florence, 1945). 
Il popolo minuto: note di storia fiorentina 1343 -1378 (Florence, 1968). 
Roover, R. de, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank 1397 -1494 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). 
Rossi, A., Francesco Guicciardini e il governo fiorentino dal 1527 al 1540, 2 vols. (Bologna, 1896 -9). 
Roth, C., The Last Florentine Republic (London, 1925). 
Rubinstein, N., `Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth century', Italian 
Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, 1960), pp. 148 -83. 
The Government of Florence under the Medici (1434 -1494) (Oxford, 1966). 
`La confessione di Francesco Neroni e la congiura antimedicea del 1466', Archivio Storico 
Italiano, cxxvi (1968), pp. 373 -88. 
`Florentine Constitutionalism and Medici Ascendancy in the Fifteenth Century', Florentine 
Studies, ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 442 -63. 
`Notes on the word "stato" in Florence before Machiavelli', Florilegium Historiale. Essays 
presented to Wallace K. Ferguson, ed. J. Rowe and W. Stockdale (Toronto, 1971), pp. 314 -26. 
`Oligarchy and Democracy in Fifteenth -Century Florence', Florence and Venice: Comparisons 
and Relations, ed. S. Bertelli, N. Rubinstein, and C. Smythe, i (Florence, 1979), pp. 99 -115. 
`Machiavelli and Florentine Republican Experience', Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. G. 
Block, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 3 -16. 
The Palazzo Vecchio 1298 -1532: Government, Architecture and Imagery in the Civic Palace of 
the Florentine Republic (Oxford, 1995). 
Sasso, G., Per Francesco Guicciardini. Quattro Studi (Rome, 1984). 
Schellhase, K. C., Tacitus in Renaissance Political Thought (London, 1976). 
Silvano, G., 'Vivere civile' e 'governo misto' a Firenze nel primo Cinquecento (Bologna, 1985). 
361 
Spini, G., Tra rinascimento e riforma. Antonio Brucioli (Florence, 1940). 
Starn, R., Donato Giannotti and his Epistolae (Geneva, 1968). 
Contrary Commonwealth. Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Berkely, 1982). 
Stella, A., La révolte des Ciompi: les hommes, les lieux, le travail (Paris, 1993). 
Stephens, J. N., The Fall of the Florentine Republic 1512 -1530 (Oxford, 1983). 
and Butters, H. C., `New Light on Machiavelli', English Historical Review, xcvii (1982), pp. 54- 
69. 
Stern, L., The Criminal Law System of Medieval and Renaissance Florence (London, 1994). 
Tommasini, O., La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli, 2 vols. (Rome, 1883- 1911). 
Trexler, R., Public Life in Renaissance Florence (London and New York, 1980). 
Power and Dependence in Renaissance Florence, iii. The Workers of Renaissance Florence 
(New York, 1993). 
Il Tumulto dei Ciompi: un momento di storia fiorentina ed europea (Convegno Internazionale di Studi, 
1979) (Florence, 1981). 
Vannucci, M., Lorenzaccio. Lorenzo de' Medici: un ribelle in famiglia (Rome, 1984). 
Verde, A., `Questioni savonaroliani aperti. A proposito della pubblicazione di "Le Giornate" di Lorenzo 
Violi', Memorie Domenicane, New Ser., xviii (1987), pp. 368 -81. 
Villari, P., La storia di Girolamo Savonarola e de' suoi tempi, 2 vols. (Florence, 1888). 
Niccolò Machiavelli e suoi tempi, 3 vols. (Milan 1895). 
Weinstein, D., Savonarola and Florence: Prophesy and Patriotism in the Renaissance (Princeton, 1970). 
Wolfgang, M., `Political Crimes and Punishments in Renaissance Florence', Journal of Criminal Law, 
Criminology and Police Science, xliv (1953 -4), pp. 555 -81. 
Zandonati, A., La congiura contro il cardinale Giulio dei Medici (Rovereto, 1891). 
Zorzi, A., `Aspetti e problemi dell' amministrazione della giustizia penale nella repubblica fiorentina', 
Archivio Storico Italiano, cxlv (1987), pp. 391 -453, 527 -578. 
`I fiorentini e gli uffici pubblici nel primo Quattrocento: concurrenza, abusi, illegalità', Quaderni 
Storici, lxvi (1987) pp. 725 -52. 
ed., `Istituzioni giudiziarie e aspetti della criminalità nella Firenze tardomedievale', Ricerche 
Storiche, xviii (1988), pp. 447 -637. 
`Le esecuzioni delle condanne a morte a Firenze nel tardo medioevo: tra repressione penale e 
cerimoniale pubblico', Simbolo e realtà della vita urbana nel tardo medioevo, ed. M. Miglio and 
G. Lombardi (Rome, 1993), pp. 153 -255. 
'The Judicial System in Florence in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', Crime, Society and 
the Law in Renaissance Italy, ed. T. Dean and K. J. P. Lowe (Cambridge 1994), pp. 40 -58. 
362 
D. Theses 
Hughes, R. J. F., `Francesco Vettori: his place in Florentine Diplomacy and Politics' (London University 
Ph.D. thesis, 1958). 
363 
